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Serial No.	Name of the Parties, Citation and Key Words	Summary of the case	Key Ratio
1.	Ataur Mridha alias Ataur Vs. The State 15 SCOB [2021] AD 1 (Syed Mahmud Hossain, CJ, Muhammad Imman Ali, J & Hasan Foez Siddique, J) Key words : Meaning of Imprisonment for life; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Section 35A; Penal Code 1860 Section 45, 53, 55, 57	The question arose in this case was whether imprisonment for life means imprisonment for rest of convict’s natural life. In this case the petitioner sought review of the judgment by the Appellate Division dated 14.02.2017 passed in Criminal Appeal No.15 of 2010 in which his sentence of death was commuted to imprisonment for rest of his natural life. The Appellate Division by a majority decision disposed of the review petition observing that imprisonment for life prima-facie means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of convict’s natural life but it would be deemed equivalent to imprisonment for 30 years if sections 45 and 53 are read along with sections 55 and 57 of the Penal Code and section 35A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, while expressing his dissenting view honorable Justice Muhammad Imman Ali, J held that Supreme Court or any other Court cannot award a sentence which is not sanctioned by law and life imprisonment is not 20 or 25 or 30 years, but for the sake of calculating any benefit to be given to a convict, it can be reckoned to be equivalent to a finite term of years. His lordship was also of the view that section 35A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is a mandatory provision and applicable to life convicts’ as well.	Meaning of Imprisonment for life Majority view: If we read Sections 45, 53, 55 and 57 of the Penal Code with Sections 35A and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure together and consider the interpretations discussions above it may be observed that life imprisonment may be deemed equivalent to imprisonment for 30 years. The Rules framed under the Prisons Act enable a prisoner to earn remissions- ordinary, special or statutory and the said remissions will be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. However, if the Court, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and gravity of the offence, seriousness of the crime and general effect upon public and tranquility, is of the view that the convict should suffer imprisonment for life till his natural death, the convict shall not be entitled to get the benefit of section 35A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the most serious cases, a whole life order can be imposed, meaning life does mean life in those cases. In those cases leniency to the offenders would amount to injustice to the society. In those cases, the prisoner will not be eligible for release at any time. The circumstances which are required to be considered for taking such decision are: (1)surroundings of the crimes itself; (2) background of the accused; (3) conduct of the accused; (4) his future dangerousness; (5) motive; (6) manner and (7) magnitude of crime. This seems to be a common penal strategy to cope with dangerous offenders in criminal justice system. (Per Hasan Foez Siddique, J) Minority View On the question of sentence, I have to say first and foremost that the Supreme Court is neither above nor beyond the law of the land and is bound to award a sentence which is permitted by law. Hence, when awarding sentence for an offence under section 302 of the Penal Code, just as the Supreme Court could not award a sentence of “rigorous imprisonment for 20 years”, it cannot also award a sentence of “imprisonment for rest of the life”. Neither of those two punishments mentioned is permitted by the Penal Code. Section 302 provides that, “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” Without amendment of the Penal Code, when an accused is convicted of an offence under section 302 of the said Code, the Supreme Court or any other Court cannot award any sentence of fixed term of imprisonment for a finite number of years nor “imprisonment for the natural life” or any such term. ...Quantifying the term “imprisonment for life” to any duration measured in years is a legal fiction created in order to give benefit. Hence, it can be categorically stated that life imprisonment is not 20 or 25 or 30 years, but for the sake of calculating any benefit to be given to a convict, it can be reckoned to be equivalent to a finite term of years. (Per Muhammad Imman Ali, J)
2.	Md. Abdul Haque Vs. The State (Syed Mahmud Hossain, CJ) 15SCOB [2021] AD 58 Key Words: Evidence Act 1872 Section 118; Competence of a child witness; Dowry demand; Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain 2000, Section 11(Ka); Plea of alibi in a wife killing case	The Appellant was convicted under section- 11 (KA ) of the Nari-O –Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2000 and sentenced to death for killing his wife for dowry. The High Court Division confirmed the death sentence. The convict preferred Jail appeal before the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the Jail Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court Division. The Appellate Division also determined the competence of a child witness discussing the relevant laws and held that preliminary examination of a child witness is not at all necessary	Competence of a Child Witness: A child as young as 5/6 years can depose evidence if she understands the questions and answers in a relevant and rational manner. The age is of no consequence, it is the mental faculties and understanding that matter in such cases. Their evidence, however, has to be scrutinised and caution has to be exercised in each individual case. The Court has to satisfy itself that the evidence of a child is reliable and untainted. Any sign of tutoring will render the evidence questionable if the Court is satisfied, it may convict a person without looking for corroboration of the child’s evidence. As regards credibility of child witness, it is now established that all witnesses who testify in Court must be competent or able to testify at trial. In general, a witness is presumed to be competent. This presumption applies to child witnesses also. ..... Testing of intelligence of a witness of a tender age is not a condition precedent to the reception of his evidence. Therefore, preliminary examination of a child witness is not at all necessary.
3.	নুর মোহাম্মদ -বনাম- সরকার এবং অন্যান্য (বিচারপতি মোহাম্মদ ইমান আলী) 15 SCOB[2021]AD 71 গুরুত্বপূর্ণ শব্দাবলীঃ প্রবেশন অব অফেন্ডার্স অর্ডিন্যান্স, ১৯৬০, ধারা:৫; প্রবেশন	মামলার সার সংক্ষেপ এই যে, এজাহার দায়ের করার পর তদন্তকারী কর্মকর্তা আসামীগণের বিরুদ্ধে দন্ডবিধির ১৪৭/১৪৮/১৪৯/৩২৩/৩২৪/৩২৫/৩২৬/৩০৭/৩৫৪/৩৪ ধারায় অভিযোগপত্র দাখিল করে। বিচারকালে আসামীদের বিরুদ্ধে দন্ডবিধির ৩২৩/৩২৪/৩২৫/ ৩২৬/৩০৭ /৩৪/১৪৭ ধারায় অভিযোগ গঠন করা হয়। বিচার শেষে আসামী নুর মোহাম্মদকে দন্ডবিধি ৩২৫ ধারার অপরাধের জন্য এক বছরের সশ্রম কারাদন্ড এবং ৩২৩ ধারার অপরাধের জন্য ২,০০০/- টাকা জরিমানা, অনাদায়ে আরো তিন মাসের সশ্রম কারাদন্ড এবং অন্যান্য আসামীদের বিভিন্ন মেয়াদের সাজা ও জরিমানা প্রদান করা হয়। এই রায়ের বিরুদ্ধে আসামীগণ আপীল করলে তা খারিজ হয়। এরপর আসামীগণ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগে ক্রিমিনাল রিভিশন দায়ের করলে সেটাও শুনানী অন্তে খারিজ হয়। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের উক্ত খারিজ আদেশে সংক্ষুব্ধ হয়ে আসামী-নুর মোহাম্মদ এই ক্রিমিনাল পিটিশন ফর লীভটু আপীল দায়ের করেন। আপীল বিভাগ এই মামলার রায়ে উল্লেখ করেন যে তুচ্ছ ঘটনা হতে উদ্ভূত এই মামলায় আসামীকে ১(এক) বছরের জন্য জেলে না পাঠিয়ে প্রবেশনে রাখা সমীচিন ছিল। অতপর আপীল বিভাগ দরখাস্তকারী নুর মোহাম্মদ-এর দোষী সাব্যস্তের আদেশ এবং জরিমানা বহাল রেখে তিনি যত দিন কারাদন্ড ভোগ করেছেন ততদিনই তার দন্ড হিসেবে গণ্য করার আদেশ প্রদান করেন।	প্রবেশন অব অফেন্ডার্স অর্ডিন্যান্স, ১৯৬০ দায়রা আদালত হিসেবে ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত যেকোন আদালত বা ট্রাইব্যুনাল এবং ১ম শ্রেণীর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত যেকোন আদালত বা ট্রাইব্যুনাল-এই আইনের বিধান প্রয়োগ করতে পারবে। সুতরাং বিশেষ ক্ষমতা আইন, ১৯৭৪(Special Powers Act, 1974))-এর ধারা ২৯, সন্ত্রাস বিরোধী আইন, ১৯৯২(Anti-Terrorism Act, 1992)-এর ধারা ১৫(১), সন্ত্রাস বিরোধী আইন, ২০(Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009)-এর ধারা ২৭(৩), নারী ও শিশু নির্যাতন (বিশেষ বিধান) আইন, ১৯৯৫-এর ধারা ২৩(১), জন নিরাপত্তা (বিশেষ বিধান) আইন, ২০০০-এর ধারা ২১(১), নারী ও শিশু নির্যাতন দমন আইন, ২০০০-এর ধারা ২৫(১), ক্রিমিনাল ল এ্যামেন্ডমেন্ট এ্যাক্ট, ১৯৫৮-এর ধারা ৬(১)(ক) এবং ফরেন এক্সচেঞ্জ রেগুলেশন এ্যাক্ট, ১৯৪৭-এর ধারা ২৩ক(৩)-এ উল্লেখিত বিধান অনুসারে ক্ষেত্রমতে ট্রাইব্যুনাল অথবা আদালতসমূহ দায়রা আদালত বলে গণ্য হবে। দ্রুত বিচার আইন, ২০০২-এর ধারা ১২(২) অনুসারে ১ম শ্রেণীর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালত বলে গণ্য হবে এবং ফরেন এক্সচেঞ্জ রেগুলেশন এ্যাক্ট, ১৯৪৭-এর ধারা ২৩ক(৩) অনুসারে ক্ষেত্রবিশেষ ট্রাইব্যুনাল ১ম শ্রেণীর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালত অথবা দায়রা আদালত বলে গণ্য হবে। উপরোক্ত আলোচনার প্রেক্ষিতে দেখা যাচ্ছে যে, কোন কোন বিশেষ আইনে অপরাধের ক্ষেত্রেও “প্রবেশন অব অফেন্ডার্স অর্ডিন্যান্স, ১৯৬০” প্রয়োগ করা যাবে।
4.	Md. Humayun Kabir Vs. The State (Hasan Foez Siddique, J) 15SCOB[2021] AD 76 Key Words: Confessional Statement; TI Parade; Motive; Section 27 of Evidence Act; last seen together; Extra Judicial Confession;	In this case first information report was lodged against the appellant Humayun Kabir and his father Moulana Latifullah under Section 7/30 of Nari-O- Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2003, but the Investigating Officer, holding investigation, submitted charge sheet against the appellant Humayun Kabir under section 302/201 of the Penal Code and the learned Sessions Judge, Comilla, framed charge accordingly. On transfer Divisional Druto Bichar Tribunal, Chattogram tried the case and convicted the appellant under section 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to death. The High Court Division receiving the Death Reference accepted it upon hearing and dismissed the connected Jail Appeal and confirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the appellant preferred this Jail Appeal in the Appellate Division. There was no eyewitness in the case and the Appellate Division disbelieving the confessional statement of the accused which is inconsistent with the prosecution case allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and orders of the Courts below.	Trustworthiness of the confessional statement which is incompatible with the prosecution case: To prove the charge brought under Section 302 of the Penal Code primarily on the basis of the confessional statement it is duty of the Court to ascertain as to whether the confession was made voluntarily, and if so as to whether the same was true and trustworthy. Satisfaction of the Court is a sine qua non for the admissibility in evidence. True and complete disclosure of the offence is the soul of true confessional statement. In this case, the testimonies of P.Ws.1,2,3 and 4 and post-mortem report are inconsistent with the contents of the confessional statement of the appellant which has made the confessional statement unreliable. In view of the evidence quoted above and the contents of the confessional statement, it is difficult for us to hold that the statements made in confession by the appellant are true and those were consistent with the prosecution case. It would be extremely unsafe to base conviction of the appellant on the basis of such confessional statement accepting the same as true.
5.	Md. Hafiz Ibrahim, former Member of Parliament. Vs. The State represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka and another (Mirza Hussain Haider, J) 15SCOB[2021] AD 89 Key words: Money Laundering; section 13 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002; section 4(2)/7 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009.	On 16.08.2011, one Deputy Director of Anti-Corruption Commission, Dhaka, lodged First Information Report (FIR) with the Gulshan Police Station implicating the accused petitioner and his wife under section 13 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 read with section 4(2)/7 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009. A prima facie case of commission of such offence under section 13 of the Money Laundering Protirodh Ain, 2002 read with section 4(2)/7 of the Money Laundering Protirodh Ain, 2009 found to have been committed by the accused persons and charge was framed against them accordingly. Accused challenged the criminal proceeding against him in the High Court Division under section 561A of CrPC which was summarily rejected. Thereafter, he preferred this leave to appeal before the Appellate Division. The question raised in this petition is whether the investigation made and proceeding initiated against the accused petitioner under the provisions of Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2002 and Anti-Corruption Commission Ain 2002 which were amended and repealed subsequently on several occasions and the money laundering offence which is claimed to have been a schedule offence of the ACC Act being not ratified by the parliament the ACC can investigate, lodge and initiate the proceeding against the accused petitioner. With various explanation of laws, the Appellate Division held that the ACC has such authority and dismissed the criminal petition.	Effect of Amendment or Repeal of an Act/Ordinance: It appears that whenever any Act was amended or repealed by any Ordinance the Legislature continued giving effect of the previous law as if the previous law has not been repealed. Thus, the offence committed by the accused petitioner between 19.12.2005 to 16.01.2008 being within the period of continuation of the aforesaid law which were amended/repealed subsequently by different Ordinances/Acts, it cannot be said that the ACC did not have any authority to initiate, investigate, lodge FIR and continue to proceed with the case under the amended law it is to be deemed to have been committed under the law which has got a new life by the saving clause.
6.	Md. Rabiul Islam and others Vs. Sultan Mahmud died leaving behind his heirs: (1) Md. Abu Hasnat (Bulbul)and others (Md. Nuruzzaman, J) 15SCOB[2021] AD 95 Key Words: Pre-emption; Section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950; Section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949	In this case of pre-emption the core question is whether a pre-emption application under section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 can be converted to section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. On the rejection of the case by the trial court the pre-emptor-appellant-petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge of Kushtia and that was transferred to the learned Additional District judge. In the appellate court the preemptor filed an application to convert his case as mentioned above. The learned Additional District Judge rejected the application. Against the rejection order preemptor preferred Civil Revision before the HCD and the HCD made the rule absolute. After that, the pre-emptee-opposite parties, being aggrieved, preferred Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal before Appellate Division and obtained leave giving rise to the instant appeal. In the result, the Appellate Division allowed the appeal.	Conversion of an application under section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 to an application under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950: The pre-emption application filed under section 96 of the Act, 1950 may be converted to a pre-emption case under section 24 of the Act, 1949 because the deposit of compensation would not be a impediment in case of such conversion allowing the amendment. It further be noted that the application filed under section 24 of the Act, 1949 may be converted to an application under section 96 of the Act, 1950 if such application for conversion is filed within 120 days, i.e. within period of limitation with rest of the deposit and concerned Court allowed such application of conversation. The application for conversation cannot be allowed after the expiry of limitation as stipulated in the section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act.
7.	Md. Syedul Abrar, son of late Ahmed Hossain Vs. Government of Bangladesh and others (Obaidul Hassan, J) 15 SCOB [2021] AD 102 Key Words: Administrative Tribunal; Administrative Appellate Tribunal; Departmental Inquiry Report; Natural Justice; Disciplinary proceedings	The petitioner was a teacher at a government primary school. A departmental proceeding was drawn against him for misconduct. An inquiry against him was conducted ex parte and second show cause notice was served to him without annexing the inquiry report for which he could not take any defense. The authority ultimately dismissed the petitioner from service. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a departmental appeal before the Appellate authority, but the same was not disposed within 2 months as per the provisions of the Administrative Tribunal Act. Therefore, he filed administrative tribunal case before the Administrative Tribunal, Chittagong. Administrative Tribunal set aside the impugned order of dismissal. On appeal the decision was reversed by the Administrative Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner then filed a leave to appeal before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The impugned decision of the Administrative Appellate Tribunal was set aside by the Appellate Division on the ground, among others, that the petitioner was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to produce evidence in his favour according to Rule 10 of the Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985.	Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985, Rule 10: In the instant case, the authority i.e. the respondents-opposite parties failed to follow the procedures provided in the Rules, 1985 accordingly. The petitioner was not given any opportunity to be heard. The inquiry proceeding was held ex-parte, which was not in accordance with law. At the same time the petitioner was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to produce evidence in his favour according to Rule 10 of the Rules, 1985. Besides the respondents claimed that the date of hearing fixed on 10.04.2005 and 04.05.2005 were informed to the petitioner, but from the materials on record, it appears that the respondents had not produced any copy of notice given to the petitioner fixing the date of hearing on 10.04.2005 and 04.05.2005 respectively. ... However, in consideration of the matters discussed above, we are of the view that the Administrative Appellate Tribunal committed a serious error of law in not considering the provisions of the Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1985 in toto and the principles of natural justice properly. So, we are constraint to interfere.