From the Contract, it transpires that it has not been entered into by BPDB in exercise of statutory power and so, it cannot be said that the contract with the statutory body i. e. BPDB is a statutory contract so, as to invoke writ jurisdiction. Further we have already seen that the contract is not entered into by the Government in the capacity of sovereign. Moreover, the Contract is purely a commercial contract for purchasing electricity on rental basis. Further, the requirements as settled by the Appellate Division in the above referred case are not fulfilled. For the reasons discussed hereinbefore, we are constrained to hold that the instant writ petition is not maintainable.

Section 28(4) of the Ain clearly stipulates that if a new Execution case is filed after the expiry of the 6 years from the date of filing of the 1st Execution case, the 2nd case shall also be barred by limitation. In our view, section 28(4) of the Ain contemplates and takes into account the situation were the 1st Execution case, is neither concluded nor disposed of within the period of 6 years.

It has now been settled by our apex Court that, at the time of framing charge the Court concern is required to consider only the materials of the prosecution but not the materials submitted by the defence. In the instant case, it appears that, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not committed any illegality in framing charge against all the accused persons.

In any view of the matter, the members of the petitioner-samity are not at fault. Their legitimate expectation, in all fairness, should be fulfilled by the Sylhet City Corporation Authority by way of constructing the proposed market by removing the sheds from the Bus Terminal. Undeniably, the Sylhet City Corporation Authority has made a commitment to the petitioner-samity to make the proposed construction of the market at the site after removal of the sheds therefrom.

Record of right is evidence of present possession and registered kabala is an evidence of title. The registered document will prevail over the records of rights and would remain in enforce until and unless, such kabala is cancelled by an appropriate civil court. The registered deed dated 13.05.1965 is an old document more than 30 years produced from proper custody presumed under Section 90 of the Evidence Act that it was duly executed and genuine documents.

There is no further burden of proof when the assertions of the witnesses remain unchallenged. In the instant case the convict-appellant failed make out his defence on cross-examining the witnesses. On perusal of the aforesaid position of the facts, circumstances and other materials on record nothing cogent could be elicited to disbelieve the witnesses. Thus I find that there is no scope to interfere into the findings and decision as has been arrived by the learned Judge of the Trial Court.

The Constitution has not given any immunity to the prime Minister or Cabinet in respect of any criminal offence. There is neither any constitutional nor any statutory or legal bar on A.C.C to conduct any enquiry in respect of allegation of Commission of offences mentioned to the schedule of the A.C.C Act, 2004 and schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act-1958. Therefore, we are of the view that not only on the basis of any complaint but A.C.C itself is legally empowered under section 17 of the A.C.C. Act-2004 to conduct any inquiry or investigation.

The crux of the issue is as to whether after receiving the consideration value in the form of earnest money as has been stipulated by the respondents through their own valuation and tender can be changed. Although, this is a matter of law of contract, however, since Government is a party, so this can be looked into in a writ jurisdiction. The basic principle of offer and acceptance is – the offer is binding upon the offeror (proposer) the moment the offeree (acceptor), puts the acceptance into motion. In the instant case, the offer and acceptance both were complete since the tender was invited (offer) the petitioner participated and it was accepted by the respondent No. 2 and part consideration was also paid in the form of earnest money and in such circumstance the respondents, i.e. the offeror Government has no other option left except transferring the land in favour of the petitioner. The property in the goods in fact passes over to the buyer when the sale is complete and in the instant case the sale became binding from the moment the payments were made in compliance with the tender.

Though the term ‘surcharge’ is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution or not defined in the said Ordinance, the basic concept of ‘surcharge’ was always there in our Constitution and the said Ordinance. The only difference being that while the Indian Constitution, under Article 271, specifically has mentioned the word ‘surcharge’, our Constitution has not mentioned the same in such specific way. Not only that, upon examining the dictionary meaning of the word “impost” as used under the definition of ‘taxation’ as provided by our Constitution under Article 152, there is no semblance of doubt that the Parliament has always had the plenary power to legislate provisions for imposition of ‘additional tax’, ‘extra charge’ or ‘impost’, through whatever terms it may be called, by which some additional charges may be levied on the tax payers in addition to their ordinary tax payments. In consideration of the above wide definition of ‘taxation’ as given by our Constitution and the definition of term ‘Tax’ as provided by the relevant provision of the said Ordinance, we are, therefore, of the view that the power of imposition of surcharge, as has been done by the impugned provisions, was very much within the plenary power of legislation of the Parliament.

In the present case, clause 19.2 of the contracts dated 16.01.2008 entered into between the petitioner and the BPDB contains an arbitration clause stating that the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Act (Act No. 1 of 2001) of Bangladesh as at present in force and the place of arbitration shall be in Dhaka, Bangladesh, therefore, section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 2001 restricts judicial intervention in matters covered by arbitration agreement. Petitioner is trying to interpret the contract in the writ petitions which is impermissible, particularly when the petitioner is having a remedy to go for arbitration under the contract signed by the petitioner. Petitioner having signed contract with open eyes after reading the terms and conditions, it is unconscionable to raise these kinds of contention in the writ petitions.

In the present case the Petitioners or their vendor admittedly was not in possession of the property in question at the relevant time, they entered into the possession of the property in the year 1984. Since the property was declared abandoned under the provision of P.O. 16 of 1972, question of service of notice under Article 7 upon the Petitioner or their vendor who were not in possession, active control, supervision and management of the property at the relevant time does not arise. Moreover, decree in a Suit for Specific performance of contract does not reflect a substantive determination of any issue regarding the abandoned character of the property

In the case in hand, a sentence of fine under section 138 of the Act, 1881 may result in a proceeding of execution of decree (section 386(3) of the Cr.P.C.). Again, the same person may face an execution of decree proceeding under the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003 for the same loan transactions which may together exceed the actual claimed amount. If the accused decides to file appeal against the sentence of fine as well as the decree passed in Artha Rin Suit, he has to deposit 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque and 50% of the decretal amount which in aggregate would almost cover the claimed amount. This may lead to unjust enrichment and thus, the inconvenience through legal process may lead to absurdity. The ends of justice and fairness demand that the process of law must not be allowed to cause or result in ‘absurd inconvenience’. ... For the reasons discussed above, the case in hand, in our view, falls within the category of rarest of rare cases where an order of stay of the criminal proceedings under the Act, 1881 during pendency of the Artha Rin Suit which are between the same parties and over the same loan transactions, should be passed to give effect to section 344 of the Cr.P.C. in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.

Registration Rules, 2008 framed under Article 94 of the Representation of the People Order, 1972;

Right to Information Act, 2009, Section 9

The mandatory provision of Section 135(1) of ITO was not followed by the respondents prior to exercise of power under section 143(2) in freezing the bank account of the assessee-petitioners. In the instant matter the provisions of Section 143 of ITO can be resorted to only after the preceding of provisions of Section 135(1) have been complied with, but the Respondents in this case, circumvented the provisions of the law by outrightly ignoring the mandatory provisions to issue notice under the provisions of Section 135 of the Ordinance, which they cannot lawfully do. The Respondents actions in the instant case are without any lawful authority and therefore has no legal effect.

It is gathered from the evidence of P.W.2 that out of enmity the accused Alfazuddin and Tasli @ Taslim being armed with deadly weapon like dagger “Dao” etc. came at the P.O. house and dealt indiscriminate dagger and dao blows on the person of the victim. Such facts clearly speak about their very motive and intention to kill the victim Aziron. Immediately after the occurrence, the Convict-Appellant Alfaz Uddin and Tasli @ Taslim disappeared from the locality, which indicates their guilt and that is relevant under section 8 of the Evidence Act.

In our view the petitioners will not be prejudiced for not impleading them parties because as legal heirs, they are entitled to get the shares of their predecessors. Even a non contesting party, who has got share in the partible property, can pray for allotment of saham on payment of proper court fees before drawing up the final decree