In view of the aforesaid amendment vide Registration Act,1908 (Act No.XXV of 2004) there is hardly any scope left for anyone to raise a question of forgery of a registered document since the photographs of both the executants are pasted on every instrument and the parties shall sign and put their left impression across their photographs in the instrument. More so, it is no bodies case that the photographs available in the impugned instrument or Heba deed is not the photographs of Kazi Shahidul Islam the father of the plaintiff Nos.1-3 and 5. Under such circumstances the allegation of forgery of the document in question can safely be brushed aside.

When the law specifically used the words `প্রত্যেক স্কুলের বিভিন্ন ডিসিপ্লিনের মধ্যে জ্যেষ্ঠতার ভিত্তিতে এবং ভাইস চ্যান্সলর কর্তৃক নির্দিষ্ট ভাবে অধ্যাপকদের মধ্যে উহার ডীন পদ আবর্তীত হইবে` we hold that the post of Dean will rotate firstly among the Disciplines, according to its seniority of being set up/established, and then also among the senior Professors of each Discipline of the school. Thus so far the two interpretations given by the two Ministries are concerned we are of the view that the subsequent interpretation dated 06.03.2013 given by the Ministry of Education is more rational, reasonable and acceptable for the purpose interpretation of section 28 (5) of the Act.

A return filed under the normal procedure of section 75 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 has to be assessed within the period of limitation of six month, so also the ropening procedure against deemed assessment under the Self Assessment Scheme has to be confined to the period of limitation of two years. No proceeding for assessment of any return can be taken after the period for limitation and any such proceeding initiated shall be a nullity.

The writ petition is not maintainable on two counts,- firstly, due to the reason that the dispute arose out of simple commercial contract and not out of statutory contract and secondly, there is no scope to avail writ jurisdiction as there is an equal efficacious alternative forum to settle the dispute through amicable settlement under clause 54.1, adjudication under clause 54.2 and arbitration under clause 54.3 of section 3 of the GCC between the parties.

In the case in hand cancellation of license was indeed an unbridled arbitrary outcome of executive feat which certainly had indulged in excesses. The act has a curtailing effect upon Article 40 of the Constitution in particular. It has flouted Article 40 of the Constitution directly. The Constitution being the Supreme law of the land the framers of the same in their wisdom have made some provisions protecting the right of the citizen. To do lawful business or trade subject to restriction of law is one of those provisions which cannot be curtailed or throttled in any manner by any authority.

In our view, the petitioner had rightly approached the Court of Settlement, Dhaka for releasing the property in question from the Kha list of Abandoned Buildings. However, as his case was found to be barred by limitation and since he had no other equally efficacious remedy to enforce his rights, the petitioner was entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction.

There is nothing on record to show that Promoth Nath was a man of unsound mind or that plaintiff had any relationship with Promoth Nath whatsoever so as to take him to the Sub-Registry office and to fraudulently get the kabala executed by Promoth Nath. Defendants never raised any question on this aspect in any manner. The above statement of the executant considered with the rent receipts showing payment of rent for the suit land by the plaintiff for the years 1981 to 1994 and the fact of silence of the two sons of Promoth Nath (defendant No.1 and 2) in not challenging plaintiff`s kabala and the fact of physical possession of the plaintiffs lead me to conclude that plaintiffs` purchase is genuine and that their kabala dated 07.06.1980 was acted upon and that the earlier deed of gift dated 10.01.1979 purportedly made by Promoth Nath in favour of his son was a mere paper transaction so far the suit land is concerned.

The appellate court being last and final court of fact will have to discuss and reassess the evidence on record independently while reversing or affirming the findings of the trial court. In case of reversal it is more incumbent upon the appellate court to reassess the evidence to arrive at his own independent finding. The findings of the trial court should not be easily disturbed as a matter of course and before reversing the findings and decisions of the trial court the appellate court should think twice or more than twice.

Sentencing discretion on the part of a Judge is the most difficult task to perform. There is no system or procedure in the Criminal Justice administration method or Rule to exercise such discretion. In sentencing process, two important factors come out- which shall shape appropriate sentence (i) Aggravating factor and (ii) Mitigating factor. These two factors control the sentencing process to a great extent. But it is always to be remembered that the object of sentence should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the society has the satisfaction that Justice has been done and court responded to the society`s cry for Justice. Under section 302 of the Code, though a discretion has been conferred upon the Court to award two types of sentences, death or imprisonment for life, the discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental principle of criminal Justice.

When rectification proceeding is pending before this court, Suit for infringement of Trademark pending in the Court below should be stayed in view of Section 102 of the Trade Marks Act, 2009.

Since the admitted allegation against the petitioners is that in spite of the increase of price of the raw materials as reflected from the concerned bills of entries and assessment orders thereon, the petitioners did not make any corresponding increase in the declared price of the finished products and since such circumstance was not evidently mentioned under any clauses from Clauses-`Ka` to `Ta` under sub-section (1) of Section 9, we do not find as to how the directions of the concerned officers for readjusting the current account register of the petitioner, or for depositing certain amount through treasury challan, was amenable to the alterative remedy of written objection in view of the provisions under sub-section (2ka) of Section 9.

In the present case being a case of drug/narcotics, it was incumbent on the prosecution to get the seized phensedyl examined by a chemical expert to prove that the seized articles were actually madak drobyo/drug and under what category of madak drobyo/drug it fell. Absence of such chemical examination and contradictions between the two sets of prosecution witnesses, casted a shadow of doubt over the prosecution case.

In this case remarkably the government does not deny the fact of failure of conclusion of trial of the Druta Bichar Tribunal Case No.07 of 2006 within the stipulated time. As per the provision of section 10 of the Druta Bichar Tribunal Act, 2002, the trial of a Druta Bichar Tribunal Case is to be concluded within 135 days from the date of receipt of the case for trial. No option for the court is left therein except sending the case back to the original court in the event of failure on the part of the tribunal to conclude trial of the case within the stipulated period.

There is no reason why the evidence of the business partners should be discarded simply because they belonged to a construction firm. They came before the Court and testified to the occurrence. They were fully cross-examined by the defence. Their evidence is also evidence with the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution witness Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 are material witnesses though they are business partners of the P.W. No. 5, the informant but cannot be considered as interested witness. There is no reason that the testimony of P.W. Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 can be discarded or liable to be flung to the wind simply because they happened to be business partners.

The Court below has power to order attachment of property situated beyond the local limit of the Court. But the Court passing the Order of attachment cannot directly attach property outside its own jurisdiction and it can only ask the Court in whose jurisdiction the property actually situated to carry out the order of attachment and complete the formalities of attachment. In the present case this Court finds that the Impugned Order passed by the Adalat was sent directly by the Court without sending the same to the District Court for compliance where the property situates. Therefore, the Impugned Order from the face of it is found to be palpably illegal and invalid in law as contained in Section 136 of the Code.

Section 56 cannot be construed or interpreted in an isolated manner. Section 55 and 56 must be read together and from a perusal of the same, it is evident that Section 56 is mandatorily preceded by Section 55 of the VAT Act,1991 which prescribes the issuance of a Show- Cause Notice followed by other procedures and which is exhaustively laid out in the whole Section. The prescription said out in Section 55(1) (2)(3) are mandatory and no action or initiative can be taken or resorted to for realization of any unpaid, less paid or otherwise evaded etc amount, whatsoever under the provisions of Section 56 of the VAT Act, 1991, unless and until firstly the procedure laid out in Section 55 of the VAT Act has been exhausted by the authorities concerned. The principle of law is that Section 56 automatically presupposes a notice under section 55(1) of the Act, followed by the procedure laid out in Sub-section 2 & 3 of the said section 55 and which the respondents cannot avoid under any circumstances.

Doctrine of the legitimate expectation ensures the circumstances in which, the expectation may be ensured or denied and among others the following grounds may also be taken in order to get a remedy under article 102 of the Constitution:- firstly there must be a promise or assurance from the employer or the authority that the incumbent would be assimilated at the end or during the tenure of his service; secondly - the past practice of `আত্মীকরণ` for other persons of similar status has been followed consistently.

In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an Appellate Court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior court.

The offence under section 161 of the Penal Code relates to take illegal gratification by any public servant, while offence under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 speaks of criminal misconduct by the same if he by corrupt and illegal means abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself any pecuniary advantage. The offences of the above sections are quite different and a person may be punished in each section separately and independently.

It is a settled proposition of law that an aggrieved party may invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division under Article 102 of the Constitution straightaway provided the action impugned is malafide, even though there may be an alternative remedy available for him. Since we have found that the inclusion of the case property in `Ka` Schedule of the Gazette Notification dated 06.05.2012 as a vested property is malafide, the instant writ petition, as we see it, is maintainable. Besides, it has been clearly, categorically and unequivocally held in the decision in the case of the Government of Bangladesh represented by the Ministry of Works and another Vs Syed Chand Sultana and others reported in 51 DLR (AD) 24 that the writ-petitioners can come directly to the High Court Division for protection of their fundamental right, even though an alternative remedy is available. So our definite finding is that the petitioners can come directly to the High Court Division for protection of their right to property as contemplated by Article 42 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, even though an alternative forum, that is to say, অর্পিত সম্পত্তি প্রত্যর্পন ট্রাইব্যুনাল is available for necessary legal redress.

ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধি ৫৬১এ ধারার বিধান অনুযায়ী দন্ডিত আদেশ বাতিলের ক্ষেত্রে তিনটি বিষয়ই বিবেচনায় প্রাধান্য পাইবে, যথা : "আইগত সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণের অভাব" এবং "আদালত গঠনে ত্রুটি" (Quoram-non-judice) এবং "আইনের অপব্যবহার যাহার ফলে ন্যায় বিচার ব্যাহত"।