Until the contrary is proved, it will be presumed that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated, or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration. Section 118(g), however, provides that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course; provided that where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.

The Court under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is competent to alter or amend the charge at any stage of the proceeding before pronouncement of judgment. Since section 302 of the Penal Code is not applicable even after framing a charge under section 302 of the Penal Code, there is no legal bar to find the accused guilty under lower section of 304 Part II of the Penal Code on proper examination of the facts, circumstances and evidence of the case.

There is no dispute that the F.I.R. has been lodged with a delay of about four years. But, according to the F.I.R. as well as the Criminal Miscellaneous Application, the informant is a Korean woman and she received the copies of forged documents long after from the investigating officer of a previous case. Moreover, delay by itself is no ground for quashing the criminal proceeding.

The process of enlistment of any defaulter name in the CIB list is a continuing process within the meaning of section 5 GaGa read with section 27 KaKa of Banking Companies Act 1991 and also read with Article 42 of Bangladesh Bank Order 1972. If all these provisions are read together one and only inference that could be made is that if any person or a company is indebted to in any manner with any financial institution and the debt remains unpaid, it is the duty of the respondent Bangladesh Bank in its turn to enlist the name of the incumbent in the CIB list nothing more nothing less.

Administrative actions by Government and statutory bodies should be judged on the scale of fairness. In other words, no authority can act arbitrarily and whimsically in discharging its duties, thereby affecting the rights and privilege of the property of an individual.

Section 2(Umo) of the Act contemplates that “c§e£Ñ¢a” means the offences mentioned in the schedule of the Act. It is an indisputable fact that the alleged offences were not scheduled offences of the Act at the relevant point of time. So the question of enquiry into the alleged offences by the respondent no. 3 is out of the question. What we are driving at boils down to this: the respondent no. 3 was not empowered to enquire into the alleged offences, but none the less, he enquired thereinto. Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the enquiry report submitted by the respondent no. 3 was treated as an ejahar by the concerned Police Station which gave rise to the instant case. In this regard, Mr. Md. Khurshid Alam Khan has candidly conceded that the treatment of the enquiry report as an ejahar is not sustainable in law. This being the panorama, we feel constrained to hold that the very initiation of the case is ‘de hors’ the law.

When an application has been made under sub-section (1) any of the remaining co-sharer tenants including the transferee, if one of them, and the tenants holding lands contiguous to the land transferred may within the period referred to in sub-section (1) or within two months of the date of service of notice of the application under clause (b) of sub-section (3) which ever be earlier apply to joint in the said application; any co-sharer tenant or tenant holding land contiguous to the land transferred, who has not applied either sub-section (1) or under this sub-section, shall not have any further right to get pre-emption under this section.

Requirement of law is that the property should be identified by boundaries or numbers. When the plots are identified by numbers, boundaries are not necessary. The identifiable plot numbers having been given with total quantum of land against each plot in the schedule of plaint, there is no difficulty in identifying land of the plots.

The general remedy of the suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be impliedly barred where a right is created by a special law and special forum is provided in it.

A judgment or order becomes effective (subject to correction of error or review by the same Court, as the case may be) the moment it is pronounced in the open Court. A certificate to that effect issued by a learned lawyer is sufficient proof to the parties or persons concerned, according to the law declared in 44 D.L.R. (AD) 219. Besides, as per provisions of article 111 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, the judgment passed by the Appellate Division is binding on the High Court Division too, alongwith the subordinate Courts. Hence, if the Appellate Division pronounces any judgment then it becomes binding on the High Court Division (in similar cases), whether the same is signed or not. If the High Court Division considers it just and proper to wait till the judgment is pronounced by the Appellate Division to be signed, then it (HCD) can at best keep the matter awaiting judgment. But, it should not pronounce any judgment contrary to the judgment pronounced, in the open Court, by the Appellate Division, on the matter having relevance to the case before this Division. However, to cover this interim period, this Division may pass such interim order as the ends of justice may demand.

The parties are entitled to refund of the Court fees if it is found that the apparatus of the Court and its process have not been used for the cause for which the parties have taken recourse to the proceedings of the Court. This underlining principle of the Court Fees Act as well as the provisions under sub-Section (11) of Section 89A of the Code have also been recognized and affirmed in the cases as referred to by Mr. Hannan, in particular the case of Bhola v. Sardar Muhammad, PLD 1976 Lahore 1268.

The above conduct of the petitioner, as to non-disclosure of pendency of the representation before the Board, clearly suggests that he attempted to suppress the said fact before this Court and obtained this Rule by misleading the Court for which he deserves to be penalised. An aggrieved person, who wishes to come to this Court for seeking any remedy, must come with clean hands without attempting to hide any fact inasmuch as this Court in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution carries out its duty as an extra ordinary forum, unlike the other ordinary Courts. This Court, in essence, is an equity Court, for, the State has provided this provision in the Constitution for adjudication upon the bonafide claims of the citizens who will not have any forum, including civil Court, tribunal or a quasi-judicial body, for vindication of their rights. If a citizen seeks to abuse the said provision, this Court not only turns down his petition, but also penalises him.

On the basis of several decisions passed by our Apex Court, now it has been established that generally the legitimate expectation may arise-
I. if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or
II. because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue;
III. Such an expectation must be reasonable.
However, if there is a change in the policy or in the public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise.

Now it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 102 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner in filing a Writ Petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustice.

The question whether a statute operate retrospectively, or prospectively only, in one of legislative intent. In determining such intent, courts observe a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only and not retroactively. However, a contrary determination will be made where the intention of the legislature to make the statute retroactive is stated in express terms, or is clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally, unmistakably, and unambiguously shown by necessary implication or terms which permit no other meaning to be annexed to them, and which preclude all question in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt thereof.

Regarding the claim (No.viii) we find that the accident has taken place during the contract period and thereafter he took treatment and failed to succeed as a result he suffered a lot and finally he lost one of his legs, which was also held within the time frame of contract and MoU and claims was made within stipulated time mentioned in MoU. So there is nothing wrong to get the benefit of the insurance claim.

No provision of the said Act of 1991 empowers the VAT authority to direct the petitioner as a VAT registered person to deliver any documents or records directly to any third party authority, i.e. Local and Revenue Audit Directorate. Neither a notice can be issued either directing and deposit of revenue or under section 55(1) of VAT Act on that Count.

According to Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, where, by any Act of Parliament or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by itself or any other authority in exercise of that power. As the suspension of licence is not there in Section 3 of the Act of 1947, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act can definitely be invoked in order to give a complete and harmonious interpretation of Section 3 of the Act of 1947. What we are driving at boils down to this: the authority making any appointment has the power to suspend the licence of any person appointed.

We have also consulted the rules and, in our considered opinion, a show cause notice, as required under clause (Ka) of Rule- 5.4 giving 7 days time to explain the allegations brought, if any, and further asking, in the same notice, the petitioners as to whether they were willing to appear before the enquiry committee were mandatory on the part of the respondents and such notices ought to have been issued upon the petitioners. We also find that, as per clause (Kha) of Rule 5.4, it is also mandatory that appointing authority should form a 3(three) members enquiry committee and the enquiry committed shall dispose of the disciplinary proceedings, if initiated, within 60 days. But, we find nothing on record to show that any notice was issued upon the petitioners or any enquiry committee was formed required by clause (Kha) or clause (Kha) of Rule 5.4 of the said rules and the impugned memo was not issued following the procedure laid down in clauses (Ka) and (Kha) of Rule 5.4.