It is our finding further that section 65 in its entirety is the corridor within the statutory scheme through which the sanctity of the section 63 penal sanction must be gauged. Consequentially, any failure to trigger section 65 or any of its components necessarily leads to a statutory infraction resulting in a more fundamental constitutional infraction.

If the section 65 provisions are to be obliterated or to be considered a dead letter of the law one is necessarily at a loss to find other statutory mechanisms that may be called upon for due implementation of section 63. Furthermore, it is our unqualified view that the power to charge an administrative fine to a maximum of Tk. 300 Crore must always have an in-built mechanism of fair play. Otherwise one is visited with a scenario of administrative anarchy resulting from an exercise of unfettered discretion.

It is well settled that in writ certiorari this Division would be loath to interfere with a decision of a Tribunal in specific, if the same is not a perverse one or a gross miscarriage of justice has been done.

A writ of certiorari is maintainable only in a case where erroneous decision within it jurisdiction. Even if there is mere error of law that will not confer any power on the High Court Division to issue a writ of certiorari except where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, that means, the error must be something more than a mere error. The High Court Division can issue writ of certiorari only if it can be shown that the judgment has been obtained by fraud, collusion or corruption or where the tribunal has acted contrary to the principles of natural justice or where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or where the tribunal’s conclusion is based on no evidence whatsoever or where the decision is vitiated by malafide.

If any particular case the selection committee abuse its power in violation of Article 31 of the Constitution, that may be a case for setting aside the result of a particular interview.

If any appointment is given by the Authority in gross violation of the Rules, lapse of any period of time and rendering of service in the said post by the incumbent cannot clothe the said appointment with any legal validity.

In the present case the Plaintiffs grandfather sold the suit property by registered saf-kabala deed dated 11.10.1963 and executed a deed of re-conveyance on that date with a condition of repurchase of the same within eight years period that is till 10.10.1971.The President’s Order No.88 of 1972 came into effect on 03.08.1972 and following certain amendments therein by P.O No. 136 of 1972 and the condition giving right of repurchase having expired. The sale/transaction became past and closed transaction and the plaintiff was not entitled to get relief on the ground that the property was a mortgaged property.

Simply remanding back the suit for proper evaluation of the much-discussed documentary evidences, there shall not be an effective adjudication of the suit.

Since in a partition suit, a person approaches the Civil Court with a grievance of not being able to enjoy his/her property absolutely or independently or peacefully and, in responding to the plaintiff’s case, if the defendant questions the very title of the plaintiff, in that scenario, it is incumbent upon the Court to assess and determine the plaintiff’s title, right and interest in the suit land.

If the plaintiff does not make proper prayer in the plaint, the suit must not be dismissed on the said ground; rather it would be the duty of the Court to frame appropriate issue/s on the basis of the pleadings and submissions put forwarded by all the parties to the suit and proceed with the suits towards its effective disposal.

Prior use of trade mark and prior application for registration in case of identical marks will go in favour of the prior user.

Time consumed in the so called arbitration proceedings or waiting for subsequent refusal are of no assistance to the plaintiff.

Specific performance is a relief which the Court will not grant, unless in cases where the parties seeking it come promptly, and as soon as the nature of the case will admit. The rights of equity are rights which are given to litigants who are vigilant and not to those who sleep.

The issue before the Honorable HCD is whether Rule 2(Ga) and Rule 9(1) of the 2013 Rules should be struck down. Rule 2(Ga) define ̎কার্যকর চাকুরিকাল which means that if a teacher renders, say 10 years of service prior to nationalization, his effective service period under the 2013 Rules shall be 50% thereof, i.e. 5 years. However, if the particular teacher’s term of service is less than 4 years, then his previous service years shall not be counted after the nationalization. The provision is strange but not unreasonable. The nationalized teachers shall be entitled to different Government facilities including pension benefits. If Rule 2(Ga) was drafted differently to take account of the entire period of service prior to nationalization, then it would have had severe financial implications on the Government. Therefore, Rule 2(Ga) of the 2013 Rules is the mechanism used to reduce the financial exposure and at the same time, provide benefits to the teachers. It can be argued that the effect of Rule 2(Ga) is that the petitioners expectation to service benefits is affected; however, expectation is not synonymous to ̏rights and entitlements̏. Loss of expectation of the petitioners cannot be a ground to strike down Rule 2(Ga) of the 2013 Rules.

Rules 9(1) অধিগ্রহণকৃত বেসরকারি প্রাথমিক বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ের শিক্ষক (চাকুরি শর্তাবলী নির্ধারণ) বিধিমালা, ২০১৩ provides that the seniority shall be counted by reference to কার্যকর চাকুরীকালের ভিত্তিতে. This provision also states that the direct appointee shall be senior to the teacher who has been nationalized under the 2013 Rules despite the fact that his tenure of service is less than the tenure of service of the nationalized teacher. This is manifestly absurd, particularly when the teacher directly recruited and nationalized teachers are treated at par. The previous tenure of service in the private schools is recognized by the 2013 Rules. On the date when a nationalized teacher is appointed, he carries forward a deemed tenure of service. The deemed tenure of service recognized by first part of Rule 9(1) would cease to be recognized by second part of Rule 9(1). The second part of Rule 9(1) of the 2013 Rules renders the first part of the Rules 9(1) being ̎শিক্ষকের নিয়োগ প্রদানের তারিখ হইতে কার্যকর চাকুরিকালের ভিত্তিতে শিক্ষক পদে তাহার জ্যেষ্ঠতা গণনা করা হইবে redundant.

It appears that the teachers who are nationalized are affected because their seniority would not be properly recognized. This would affect their পদোন্নতি, সিলেকশন গ্রেড এবং প্রযোজ্য টাইম স্কেল because under Rule 9(3) of the 2013 Rules নিয়োগ বিধির শর্ত পূরণ সাপেক্ষে, উপ-বিধি (১) ও (২) এর অধীন জ্যেষ্ঠতার ভিত্তিতে শিক্ষকগণ পদোন্নতি, সিলেকশন গ্রেড এবং প্রযোজ্য টাইম স্কেল প্রাপ্য হবেন। The Court has concluded that Rule 9(1) of the 2013 Rules is manifestly unreasonable and self contradictory and therefore, is liable to be struck down.

Unquestionably the sentence of fine passed by any Criminal Court is not a “public demand” within the meaning of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. As it is not a “public demand” within the meaning of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the question of realization of the fine amounts through initiation of the Certificate Case is out of the question. Such Certificate cases are an abuse of the process of law.

The realization of any fine amount under any sentence of fine of any Criminal Court cannot be effected by resorting to the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913.

It is settled principle that bail is a very valuable right granted to an accused by the Court and once it is granted, it should not and ought not to be interfered with lightly except upon valid grounds and cogent reasons.

When an accused is enjoying the privilege of bail granted by the High Court Division for a limited period in a pending rule under section 498 of the Cr.P.C or in an appeal under special law, as the case may be, and he is regularly appearing before the Court below his bail cannot be cancelled and he cannot be taken into jail custody by the Court below only on the ground of non-extension of the period of bail by the High Court Division. If such situation arises, the Court below must wait for the result of the rule or the appeal, as the case may be, in which the accused was granted ad-interim bail.

আদালত দ্য কোড অব ক্রিমিনাল প্রসিডিউর, ১৮৯৮ এর ধারা ২৬৫সি এর বিধান অনুযায়ী তখনই একজন আসামীকে মামলা হতে অব্যাহতি দিতে পারবেন যদি নথি (রেকর্ড) এবং তৎসঙ্গে দাখিলকৃত কাগজাদি (documents submitted therewith) হতে প্রাথমিক দৃষ্টিতেই যদি দেখা যায় যে, ঐ আসামীর বিরুদ্ধে মামলার কার্যক্রম পরিচালনা করার জন্য পর্যাপ্ত কোন উপাদান (Sufficient ground for proceeding) নেই। আসামী পক্ষ শুধুমাত্র মামলার নথি এবং তৎসঙ্গে দাখিলকৃত কাগজাদির উপর তাঁর বক্তব্য উপস্থাপনের অধিকারী। এ পর্যায়ে আসামীর দাখিলকৃত আত্মপক্ষ সমর্থনে কৈফিয়তের কাগজাদি বা বক্তব্য কিংবা আসামীর পেশা, পদবি বা অবস্থা (status) বিবেচনা করার সুযোগ নেই।

কোন আসামীর বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগের প্রাথমিক/আপাত যথার্থতা থাকলে (prima facie case) অভিযোগ গঠন পর্যায়ে তাঁকে অব্যাবহতি দেয়ার কোন সুযোগ নেই। অভিযোগ গঠন পর্যায়ে আসামীর বিরুদ্ধে আনীত আপাতদৃষ্ট অভিযোগটি সত্য কিংবা মিথ্যা তা নির্ধারণ করার সুযোগ নেই; সেটি নির্ধারণ হবে বিচার প্রক্রিয়ার শেষে উপস্থাপিত সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণের ভিত্তিতে।

The principle of natural justice by way of service of prior show cause notice are to be complied with, where any legal or vested rights of a citizen or entity are going to be taken away by an administrative order. Non service of prior show cause notice can be a very strong ground against such administrative/quasi judicial order that generates different type of writ petitions amongst others. However, natural justice in the sense of prior show cause notice is not available in criminal justice system. The criminal law, however, provides procedural fairness in enquiry/investigation, ensures the right to defence of an accused and fair trial.

For the purpose of freezing/attachment of property under section 14 of the Act V of 2012, no prior show cause notice is necessary. It may alert the offender, prompt him to transfer or take the property beyond his possession immediately after receipt of the notice thus defeat the purpose of law.

The ACC can proceed with an application for freezing even before completion of the investigation, if there are any credible documents/probative materials or information, which are gathered during investigation, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as provided in section 14 (2) of the Act V of 2012. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Even in rare cases, an order of freezing/attachment of one’s property can be passed when such documents/materials or information are available to the prosecuting/enquiring agency at the time of receiving the initial complaint or at the initial stage of pre-FIR enquiry, but this must not be a general practice.

Where despite a prolonged inquiry, no FIR is lodged and the ACC fails to produce any primary evidence regarding one’s involvement in any offence of money laundering or any predicate offence, his right to maintain and operate bank account cannot be infringed at the whim of Anti-Corruption Commission. A person aggrieved by an order passed under section 14 of the Money laundering Protirodh Ain (Act V of 2012), can prefer an appeal directly to the High Court Division under section 16 without approaching the Court below under section 15 of the Act.

Invariably, under no circumstances, this court can interfere with its own judgment which was even affirmed by the Honb’le Appellate Division.

Mandatory issuance of notice upon the statutory authorities before filing of any suit in accordance with the relevant laws and also taking into consideration the existing customary laws of the Chittagong Hill Tracts which contemplate mandatory service of notice to the concerned authorities prior to filing any suit.

Customary laws and usages of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are all within the ambits of law and as such they can not be violated.

Whether the conduct, behavior and activities like shouting, assaulting the Bench Officer and ransacking the case records, fall within the purview of contempt of court. Contempt may be constituted by any conduct that brings authority of the court into disrespect, disregard and/or disrepute or undermines the dignity and prestige of the court. By the aforesaid act of the Advocates, the administration of the justice and the court proceedings had been seriously interfered with and the course of justice had also been obstructed. The behavior and the conduct of the Advocates by beating and assaulting the Bench Officer is insulting, disrespectful and threatening to the administration of justice.

দূরভিক্রম্য চারটি ধাপ তথা প্রয়োজনীয় শিক্ষাগত যোগ্যতা, এমসিকিউ, লিখিত ও মৌখিক পরীক্ষা অতিক্রম করে আসা একজন প্রার্থীকে বাংলাদেশের সর্বজন প্রহণযোগ্য সাংবিধানিক প্রতিষ্ঠান তথা বাংলাদেশ সরকারী কর্ম কমিশন কর্তৃক নিয়োগের সুপারিশ করা সত্ত্বেও যথাযথ সংস্থা (appropriate agency) কর্তৃক কোনরূপ উপযুক্ত কারণ প্রদর্শন না করে নিয়োগের অনুপযুক্ত মর্মে মতামত প্রদান করা বেআইনী, সংবিধান বিরোধী।