It is to be borne in mind that in adjudicating a disciplinary proceeding against a Judge of the highest court and holding trial of an offender in a criminal case, one cannot claim similar principle to be followed. For proving an offence against an offender, the prosecution must prove the offence against him beyond reasonable doubt but this doctrine cannot be applicable in respect of a Judge while hearing a disciplinary proceeding for removal of a Judge on the ground of gross misconduct. In the alternative, it may be said that an ordinary offender and a Judge cannot be equated at par while finding them guilty of the charges.

It is a well settled legal proposition that the Appellate Court is the last Court of fact and if the Appellate Court comes to a finding of fact on consideration of the evidence on record that cannot be disturbed or reversed by the High Court Division in exercising jurisdiction under section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it can be shown that the finding of the Appellate Court is perverse or contrary to the evidence on record or based on misreading of the evidence on record or on misconception of law. It is also a settled legal principle that in a suit for permanent injunction title can be looked into incidentally and the prime consideration is whether the plaintiff has got exclusive possession in the suit land.

On scrutiny of the deposition of this preemptor-petitioner we find that the preemptor-petitioner while deposing before court, though denied this alleged fact that he obtained the certified copy of the case kabala in the year 1982 for the opposite party No.2, but he did not deny the fact that he was the engaged lawyer of the opposite party No.2. The opposite party No.2 filed Other Suit No.70 of 1982 challenging the genuineness of the impugned kabala. In the circumstances it is not believable at all that the preemptor-petitioner could not know about the case kabala before his alleged date of knowledge. From the facts and circumstances stated above it is rather proved beyond any doubt that the preemptor-petitioner knew about the case transfer in the year 1982. In the circumstances the trial court rightly dismissed the case for preemption.

The petitioner has no significant history of prior criminal activity and that he was aged 14 years at the time of commission of the offence and 16 years at the time of framing of charge. The petitioner has been in the condemned cell since 12.07.2001, that is, more than 14 years. Considering all aspects of the case, we are of the view that the death sentence of the petitioner be commuted to imprisonment for life.

It is an admitted fact that the suit land was acquired in L.A. Case No. 06 of 1948-49 and although steps have been taken for release of the land from acquisition, the applicants have not succeeded in getting the land released. According to section 5 (7) of the (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 the land having been duly acquired and compensation paid, it vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Hence, the title in the property is no longer with the petitioner. We note from the plaint that the petitioner has not included any prayer for declaration of title and hence, in any event, the prayer for temporary injunction is not sustainable.

Since the order passed under section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one of acquittal the second complaint on the same allegation is not maintainable. At whatever stage of the proceeding the acquittal order section 247 is ordered, such order will operate as a bar the fresh trial, in the same way as are acquittal after trial on merits.