Despite the absence of any provision empowering the Tribunal to pass any interim order, the Tribunal is not powerless since it has all the powers of a civil court and in proper cases, it may invoke its inherent power and pass interim order with a view to preventing abuse of the process of court or the mischief being caused to the applicant affecting his right to promotion or other benefit. But the Tribunal shall not pass any such interim order without affording the opposite party affected by the order an opportunity of being heard. However, in cases of emergency, which requires an interim order in order to prevent the abuse of the process and in the event of not passing such order preventing such loss, which cannot be compensated by money, the Tribunal can pass interim order as an exceptional measure for a limited period not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the order unless the said requirements have been complied with before the expiry of the period, and the Tribunal shall pass any further order upon hearing the parties.

A combined reading of the provisions of sections 42, 43 and 39 of the Act, 2001 clearly shows that the only remedy open to a person who wants to set aside an arbitral award is to file an application under section 42 of the Act, 2001 within sixty days from the date of receipt of the award and after the expiry of the period of sixty days as envisaged in the section, the award becomes enforceable within the meaning of section 44 thereof and thus, jurisdiction of the civil Court has impliedly been barred if not expressly. In the context, we may also refer to section 9 of the Code which has clearly provided that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred and therefore, in view of the provision of section 42 of the Act, 2001, clause (d) of rule 11, Order VII of the Code is attracted.

Though there is no clear provision mentioning the word ‘transposition’ but order I rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the courts to make such transposition, Order I rule 10(2) has empowered the courts to strike out name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, improperly joined and also to add any persons-either as plaintiff or defendant-who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court may be necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of the matter. Exercising this very power the courts can make transposition also of either of the parties of a suit or other proceeding to the other category of the parties and the courts also are doing so, and it has become a long practice now. Of course, generally, the courts will not allow transposition of defendants as plaintiffs after striking the names of the original plaintiffs or after transposing them as defendants. But in appropriate facts and circumstances-as these are in the present case-the courts should not be reluctant to make such transposition of the parties for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

On consideration of section 3 of the Ordinance vis-a-vis regulation 6 of the Regulations, it is obvious that consultation with Public Service Commission is mandatory before passing the order of dismissal in respect of each of the respondent as section 3 of the Ordinance has not ousted the operation of other laws, rules and regulations.

In the facts of the case before us, where there is some inkling of a doubt as to which of the shots from the firearms of the accused caused the death, or conversely which one of the three accused who fired the shots missed his target, the application of sections 302/34 of the Penal Code was correct, but the question remains as to whether the death sentence would be appropriate. We are inclined towards the view that where the conviction is not under section 302 of the Penal Code simpliciter, and where the complicity of the accused is proved by the aid of section 34 of the Penal Code, then the sentence of death would not be appropriate.

The oath that they took referred to their obligation to “faithfully discharge the duty” upon which they were about to enter. They are public servants since they held office by virtue of which they were authorized or required to perform public duty. The word “office” has been used in Articles 3 and 3D of P.O.28 of 1973 meaningfully.