The customs authority being satisfied about the import documents, released the imported cloths from customs station and the petitioners handed over the imported cloths to the importer as C and F Agent from the Custom Area and place of business of the petitioners is the Customs House or Custom Area as per section 2(i) and 207 of the Customs Act, 1969 and Rule 2(b) of the Rules 1986 and consequently petitioners are in no way responsible for the alleged offence. The petitioners as agent cannot be held liable for the work of the Principal and thus the petitioners committed no offence within the meaning of sections 420/468/469/471/34 of the Penal Code.

The DCT concern, prior to discarding the book versions of the accounts has to raise dissatisfaction as to the method of accounting as to its cumbersomeness that the true and correct income of the Assessee-applicant cannot be deduced therefrom or to pin point the defect in the accounts; else the DCT concern has to accept the book version of the accounts as submitted by the Assessee-applicant and audited and certified by the chartered accountant.

It does not appear that the Election Commission, after admitted declaration of schedule for holding election of Botlagari Union, has taken independent decision of its own considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Rather, it passed the impugned order at the proposal/direction of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order passed by the Election Commission is lawful.

A statutory privilege is a nascent right reserved to an individual person but this privilege is lost once he/she himself infringes it or abandons it voluntarily. The Writ Petitioner in fact has abandoned the statutory privilege by willfully and deliberately refraining from depositing the balance amount of bid money within the prescribed period of limitation. By filing the application seeking permission to deposit the balance 75% bid money instead of depositing the amount directly, the auction purchaser relinquished his known statutory right as auction purchaser and waived all his rights to the property in question as well as the earnest money deposited by him.

Will the petitioner continue to suffer loss of his seniority through no fault of his own? Is the Writ Court powerless in this regard? In this connection, it may be pointed out that the Writ Court is also a Court of equity. The principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience demand that the seniority of the petitioner be restored at least from the date of promotion of his colleague Dr. Md. Jubair Bin Alam to the post of Personal Professor on 06.11.2004 who admittedly made his application therefor on 28.12.2003 which was subsequent to the date of making of the application by the petitioner on 21.12.2003. In this way, the injustice done to the petitioner, according to us, can be remedied.

A dying declaration, whether written or oral, if accepted by the Court unhesitatingly, can itself provide a strong basis for convicting an accused.

It appears from Clause-(d) of Article-2 of P.O. 59 of 1972 that the term “Government” has been specifically defined therein. According to the said provision, “Government” means the Government of the People’s of Bangladesh. Clause-(h) of Article-2 further provides that “Power Board” means Bangladesh Power Development Board as constituted by the said PO 59 of 1972. The very definition of these two terms clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature in that the Legislature wanted to keep these two terms separately with separate definitions.

In the advertisement dated 19.01.2004, the authority has given an express promise to that effect that the appointee shall be on a probation period of 1 (one) year and after satisfactory completion of the said probationary period, the appointee shall be absorbed and therefore, the petitioners’ legitimate expectation arises. The petitioners successfully made out a case of legitimate expectation. The petitioners had a legitimate expectation to be absorbed against the permanent posts on the basis of the advertisement published in the “Daily Observer” on 19.01.2004. In the background of the advertisement dated 19.01.2004, there was reasonable expectation of their being permanently absorbed in the post of Master Pilots.

The ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses supported by post mortem report with regard to the injury no. 1 and 2 cannot be disbelieved. Further, the medical evidence is only corroborative in nature, in that view, the ocular evidence of the eye-witnesses, which substantially corroborates the injuries on the person of the deceased Rokshana, must be accepted.

It appears that, admittedly, defendant no. 3-petitioner was neither a borrower nor guarantor and even nor a mortgagor relating to the loan liability and, therefore, he is not liable for repayment of the loan inasmuch as the petitioner does not come within the purview of sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Ain, 2003, wherein who will be the necessary party in the Artha Rin suit has been provided, and hence the suit ought to have been dismissed as against this defendant no. 3- petitioner.

The learned Sessions Judge, Sunamgonj appears to have fallen in error in law in directing the learned Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance directly inasmuch as from a mere reading of Section 436 of the CrPC, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge is not empowered to directly ask any Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance.

From a close reading of Section 115 of the Evidence Act ..., it is quite clear that the legislature does not allow a person from retracting or denying anything that which he might intentionally have said or done either verbally or by action or by omission and the consequence of which might have led some other person to rely on such as true or act upon such belief. This is as we find is clearly barred under the law. It is also significant to note that the bar is not confined to a particular type or class of suits but it applies to ‘any’ suit or proceeding be it Civil or Criminal whatever may be the nature, class or category of the suit or proceeding. It is evident from perusal of the same that Section 115 in no way distinguishes or otherwise makes any distinction between Civil and Criminal Proceedings. From the language of Section 115 itself it is evident that it applies to all proceedings.

It transpires that for a Steno-Typist of the Board the post of Stenographer is a promotion post and the decision of promotion is to be made on the basis of merit through open competition in which serving Steno-Typists and outsiders may take part. It is true that the Petitioner had earlier drawn the benefits of 3 time-scales as a Steno-Typist. So, on being promoted as Stenographer he has become entitled again to get the benefits of a new-slot of time-scales subject to fulfilling essential conditions like- satisfactory service of 8, 12 or 15 years.