| Serial
No. |
Name
of the Parties,
Citation and Key Words |
Summary
of the case |
Key
Ratio |
| 1. |
Kazi
Md. Kamrul Islam
Vs.
Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors
(Farah Mahbub, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1
Key Words:
Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156 of the 1st
Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908; Section
2(12), 100 of the Trade Mark Act, 2009; Supreme
Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) Rules,
1973; Article 107(1) of the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; Order XLI
Rule 1, Order XLIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; Rule 10, 14, 15 and 50(1) of Trade
Mark Rules, 2015;
|
The questions
arose in this case are (1) what is the time limit
for preferring appeal under Section 100(2) of
the Trade Mark Act, 2009 from the order or decision
of the Registrar of the Department of Patents,
Designs and Trade Marks and (2) whether section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is applicable for
condonation of delay in preferring appeal under
the said section of the Act. Analyzing different
sections of Trade Mark Act 2009 and relevant Rules
of Trade Mark Rules, 2025 the High Court Division
came to the conclusion that time period for preferring
appeal under section 100(2) is 2(two) months and
time starts from the date of receipt of the certified
copy of the order or decision of the Registrar.
The Court also held that Trade Mark Act, 2009
being a special law section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1908 cannot be applied for condoning delay
in preferring appeal under section 100(2) of the
Mark Act, 2009.
|
Section
100 (2) of the Trade Mark Act, 2009 read with
Rule 50(1) of the Trade Mark Rules, 2015:
In view of Section 100 (2) of the Act, 2009
read with Rule 50(1) of the Rules, 2015 the
limitation period for preferring appeal before
the High Court Division is 2 (two) months to
be computed from the date of receipt of the
certified copy of the order or decision of the
Registrar and that vide Rule 15(8) the date
on which the decision of the Registrar, so passed
under Rule 15(6), is sent to the applicant in
Form TMR-19 shall be deemed to be the date of
decision of the Registrar. (Para 25)
|
| 2. |
State
and others
Vs.
Golam Mostafa Mithu and others
(Md. Rezaul Hasan, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 8
Key Words:
Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860; Section
164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898;
Delay to produce the accused within 24 hours
|
In the instant
case two elderly persons were murdered in a cold-blooded
brutal manner by repeated chapati- blows and the
accused was caught red handed. Later he made confessional
statement. The trial court found the accused guilty
and sentenced him to death accordingly. The defense
case was that there was no legal evidence and
the conviction was solely on the basis of confessional
statement. They claimed that since the accused
was produced before the magistrate beyond the
statutory period, the confessional statement was
not made voluntarily and it could not be relied
upon. The High Court Division found that the confessional
statement was true and voluntary and the accused
was sentenced not only on the basis of confessional
statement but also depending on other materials
i.e testimony of the witnesses, material exhibits,
inquest reports, post mortem reports and circumstantial
evidences. The High Court Division also held that
mere delay alone should not be a ground to brush
aside a confessional statement which has been
found to be true and voluntary in nature and corroborated
by other evidence. Considering the brutal nature
of the murder, the Court also refused to commute
the sentence of the convict.
|
Section
164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898:
In the case before us, we however, have found
that the order of conviction and sentence is not
based solely on the confessional statement of
the convict, rather it is based on the testimony
of the witnesses. Moreover, the material exhibits,
inquest reports, post mortem reports all these
evidence clearly establish the complicity of the
convict in the commission of the offence, he has
been charged with. In this case, the confessional
statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, is supported by other evidences and
corroborated by the oral evidences. (Para 33)
Effect of delay in producing the accused:
We are of the opinion that, even if, there were
some unintentional delay or failure of the police
to produce the accused within 24 hours, this
mere delay alone should not be a ground to brush
aside a confessional statement which has been
found to be truth and voluntary in nature, since
established by other evidence. (Para 35)
|
| 3. |
রাষ্ট্র
বনাম আব্দুল্লাহ ওরফে তিতুমীর ওরফে তিতু
(Sheikh Hassan Arif, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 20
Key Words:
স্ত্রী হত্যাকান্ড মামলা; প্রভাব সৃষ্টিকারী নজির;
সুরতহাল প্রতিবেদনের সাক্ষ্যমূল্য; সাক্ষ্য আইনের
১০৬ ধারা; ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ৩৪২ ধারা; ঋণাত্মক
দায়
|
এই মামলায় ভিকটিমের
লাশ তাঁর স্বামীর বাড়ির কক্ষ থেকে পোড়া ঝলসানো অবস্থায়
উদ্ধার করা হয়। বিচার আদালত ভিকটিমের স্বামীকে মৃত্যুদ-
প্রদান করে তা কনফার্মেশনের জন্য হাইকোর্ট বিভাগে
প্রেরণ করে। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগে মৃত্যুদ- রেফারেন্স,
ফৌজদারী আপীল ও জেল আপীল শুনানীকালে আসামীপক্ষে
যুক্তি তুলে ধরা হয় যে, সাক্ষ্য অনুসারে দরজা ভেঙ্গে
ভিকটিমের লাশ উদ্ধার করা হয়েছে এবং তাতে প্রমাণিত
হয়, ভিকটিম আত্মহত্যা করেছে। আসামীপক্ষে আরও বলা
হয় যে, ঘটনার সময় আসামী ঘটনাস্থল শয়নকক্ষে উপস্থিত
ছিল তা রাষ্ট্রপক্ষ প্রমাণ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়েছে এবং
আসামী ঘটনার সময়ে অন্যত্র অবস্থান করছিল মর্মে যে
সকল সাক্ষী সাক্ষ্য প্রদান করেছেন রাষ্ট্রপক্ষ তাদের
বৈরী ঘোষণা করেনি। ফলে সাক্ষ্য আইনের ১০৬ ধারার
অধীনে কোনোকিছু প্রমাণের দায় আসামির নেই। অপরদিকে,
রাষ্ট্রপক্ষে যুক্তি তুলে ধরা হয় যে, সুরতহাল প্রতিবেদনের
বক্তব্য সাক্ষ্য হিসেবে গ্রহণীয় এবং এই প্রতিবেদনে
বলা আছে যে ঘটনার সময়ে আসামী ঘটনাস্থলে উপস্থিত
ছিলেন এবং এতে সাক্ষ্য আইনের ১০৬ ধারা অনুসারে আসামীকেই
প্রমাণ করতে হবে ভিকটিম কিভাবে মৃত্যুবরণ করেছে,
যা আসামী করতে ব্যর্থ হয়েছে এবং এর ফলে আসামীকে
প্রদত্ত সাজা বৈধ এবং তা আইনত বহাল থাকবে। হাইকোর্ট
বিভাগ এই মামলায় ঋণাত্মক দায় নীতি এবং সুরতহাল প্রতিবেদনের
সাক্ষ্যমূল্য বিষয়ে পর্যবেক্ষণ প্রদান করেন এবং
এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হন যে, ঘটনাস্থলে আসামী উপস্থিত
ছিল তা প্রমাণ করতে রাষ্ট্রপক্ষ ব্যর্থ হয়েছে। অন্যদিকে
রাষ্ট্রপক্ষে উপস্থাপিত সাক্ষ্য, সুরতহাল প্রতিবেদন
এবং ময়নাতদন্ত প্রতিবেদন পরীক্ষা করলে যে কোনো সুস্থ্য
বোধজ্ঞানসম্পন্ন ব্যক্তির পক্ষে ভিকটিমের মৃত্যুর
কারণ হিসাবে দুই বা তিন ধরনের মতামত দেয়া সম্ভব।
যেমন- ভিকটিম গায়ে কেরোসিন দিয়ে নিজে আত্মহত্যা
করেছে বা দুর্ঘটনাবশতঃ কেরোসিন বা অন্য কোথাও থেকে
আগুন লেগে ভিকটিম নিহত হয়েছে অথবা ভিকটিমকে কেউ
একজন হত্যা করে কেরোসিন দিয়ে পুড়িয়ে এটিকে আত্মহত্যা
হিসাবে দেখানোর চেষ্টা করেছেন। এরকম তিন ধরনের সম্ভাবনা
যেখানে উন্মুক্ত সেখানে আদালতের পক্ষে কোনোভাবেই
বলা সম্ভব না যে, এটি একটি নরহত্যাজনিত ঘটনা। অতপর
হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ অত্র মৃত্যুদন্ড রেফারেন্সটি নাকচ
করেন এবং ফৌজদারী আপীল মঞ্জুর করে আসামীকে খালাস
প্রদান করেন।
|
যেখানে
ময়নাতদন্ত প্রতিবেদনে নরহত্যাজনিত (Homicidal in
nature) লেখা থাকেনা সেখানে পারিপার্শ্বিক অবস্থা
দেখে আদালতকেই নির্ধারণ করতে হবে এটি নরহত্যাজনিত
মৃত্যু কিনাঃ
স্বীকৃত যে, ময়নাতদন্ত প্রতিবেদনে (প্রদর্শনী-৭)
নরহত্যাজনিত Homicidal in nature) কথাটি উল্লেখ
করা নেই। এ প্রসঙ্গে বিজ্ঞ ডেপুটি অ্যাটর্নি জেনারেল
বলেন, যেখানে ময়নাতদন্ত প্রতিবেদনে নরহত্যাজনিত
(Homicidal in nature) লেখা থাকেনা সেখানে পারিপার্শ্বিক
অবস্থা দেখে আদালতকেই নির্ধারণ করতে হবে এটি নরহত্যাজনিত
মৃত্যু কিনা। আমরা তার সাথে সম্পূর্ণভাবে একমত এবং
আমরাও পারিপর্শ্বিক বিভিন্ন অবস্থা এবং সাক্ষ্য
বিবেচনায় নেয়ার জন্য এই মামলার সাক্ষীসমূহের সাক্ষ্য
এবং দালিলিক সাক্ষ্যসমূহ পুঙ্খানুপুঙ্খভাবে পরীক্ষা
করেছি, যেখানে কোথাও আমরা পাইনি যে, এই মৃত্যুকে
কোনোভাবেই নরহত্যা বলা যাবে। বরঞ্চ সুরতহাল প্রতিবেদন
(প্রদর্শনী-২) এবং ময়নাতদন্ত প্রতিবেদন (প্রদর্শনী-৭)
পরীক্ষা করলে যে কোনো সুস্থ্য বোধজ্ঞানসম্পন্ন ব্যক্তির
পক্ষে দুই বা তিন ধরনের মতামত দেয়া সম্ভব। যেমন-
ভিকটিম গায়ে কেরোসিন দিয়ে নিজে আত্মহত্যা করেছে
বা দুর্ঘটনাবশতঃ কেরোসিন বা অন্য কোথাও থেকে আগুন
লেগে ভিকটিম নিহত হয়েছে অথবা ভিকটিমকে কেউ একজন
হত্যা করে কেরোসিন দিয়ে পুড়িয়ে এটিকে আত্মহত্যা
হিসাবে দেখানোর চেষ্টা করেছেন। এরকম তিন ধরনের সম্ভাবনা
যেখানে উন্মুক্ত সেখানে আদালতের পক্ষে কোনোভাবেই
বলা সম্ভব না যে, এটি একটি নরহত্যাজনিত ঘটনা। সুতরাং,
আমাদের বলতে দ্বিধা নেই যে, রাষ্ট্রপক্ষ ভিকটিম
সালমার এই মৃত্যুকে একটি নরহত্যা হিসাবে প্রমাণ
করতে সম্পূর্ণ ব্যর্থ হয়েছে। (প্যারা ৫.১৩)
|
| 4. |
A.S.M.
Mahadi Hassan & ors
Vs.
BUET & ors
(J.B.M. Hassan, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 33
Key Words:
Ragging, Section 4, 5, 17, 21 and 24 of the
Ordinance relating to the Board of Residence
and Discipline;
|
The petitioners
of these writ petitions were awarded punishment
by the University authority for the allegations
of Ragging against which the petitioners filed
this writ petitions. Here, question arose as
to whether the petitioners were given enough
opportunity of being heard and whether they
were punished several times for the same offences.
Moreover, the petitioners argued that the university
authority punished them unlawfully. The High
Court Division found that the petitioners were
given adequate opportunity of being heard and
the authority concerned imposed punishment lawfully
and under relevant provisions of its Disciplinary
Ordinance. The Court also found that as there
were several incidents in the name of ragging
on different dates and times their claim of
repeated punishment for the same offence was
not true. But considering the tender age of
the petitioners the Court reduced their punishment. |
Universities
and colleges (under universities) should strictly
prohibit any sort of activities in the name of
Ragging: Ragging, now-a-days, appears
to be a socio-legal problem. It demoralizes the
victim who joins higher education life with many
hopes and expectations. Besides the physical and
mental torture including grievous injuries, it
simultaneously causes grave psychological stress
and trauma to the victim. Even the victim may
drop out and thereby hampering his/her career
prospects. In extreme cases, incidents of suicides
and culpable homicide may also be happened. In
the circumstances, in order to resist this socio-academic
disease, all the universities and colleges (under
universities) should strictly prohibit any sort
of activities in the name of Ragging. All the
universities and colleges (under universities)
should be stringent in taking anti-ragging measures.
Therefore, all educational institutions (including
universities and colleges) shall observe the following
measures to protect and prevent the activities
in the name of Ragging:
i) Educational institutions shall not allow the
students to participate in any untoward incident
and all sorts of activities/gathering/performance
in the name of Ragging.
ii) Every educational institution including all
university authorities should have Vigilance Committee
to ensure vigil on incidents that may happen under
the garb of Ragging. Managements of educational
institutions should be responsible for non-reporting
or inaction against the incidents of Ragging in
their respective premises including residential
halls.
iii) Authorities of all educational institutions
shall publish the consequences for committing
Ragging. In particular, at the main and prominent
spot/point(s) of the institution. iv) Posters
containing measures against the Ragging have to
be posted in the website of respective institutions
which will warn the students about the consequences
for committing Ragging.
v) An affidavit in the form of undertaking may
be obtained from the students and their parents
before start of new session to the effect that
if any student found involving in Ragging he/she
will be punished.
vi) Whatever the term “Ragging” or any other word
is used, whenever, an incident happens with the
elements of criminal offences, the authority should
take action against the perpetrators under the
prevailing law and also stern action under the
Disciplinary Ordinance of the University like
expelling the perpetrators from the university
for good. (Para 27, 28 & 29)
|
| 5. |
Tapan
Chowdhury & ors
Vs.
Bangladesh & ors
(Md. Ruhul Quddus, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 49
Key Words:
Rejection of plaint; Order VII, rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure ; The Forest Act, 1927;
Sections 3, Sub-Section (2) and Section 20,
Sub-Sections (2a) (iii) and (6) of the State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act;
|
In the instant
civil revision the petitioner challenged the order
of the trial court rejecting the application for
rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground
of res judicata. The High Court Division after
scrutinizing the record upheld the trial court’s
decision finding that question of fact arose in
the suit cannot be decided on an application under
Order VII, rule 11 of the Code and the suit land
of the previous suit was different. The High Court
Division also found that the suit property was
declared as forest by a Gazette notification in
1952 and held that when a forest or land under
Jaminder was acquired as forest by government
and notified in the official Gazette, it would
be sufficient to determine the character of the
land on that basis. Finally, the Court expressed
its dissatisfaction over how the suit was conducted
by the concerned public servants in the trial
Court and directed the concerned authority to
take steps for protecting public property and
environment. Consequently, the rule was discharged.
|
Declaration
of a particular land as forest under the Forest
Act when not necessary: If a forest belonged
to any Jaminder is acquired by the Government
under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, declaration
of the said land as forest under the Forest Act
is not necessary. The procedures to be followed
under the two Acts are quite different and they
are independent of each other, so far it relates
to acquisition and declaration of forest. (Para-15)
Section 3 (2) of the State Acquisition
and Tenancy Act:
Gazette Notification mentioning a particular
land as forest would be sufficient to determine
the character of the land: It thus
appears that the Department of Forest under
wrong notion proceeded for further declaration
of the same land as forest, which was already
a forest under the Jaminder and subsequently
acquired as forest by the Government and notified
in the Gazette as forest under the State Acquisition
and Tenancy Act. The subsequent proceedings
of the Forest Department under whatever notion,
or for whatever reasons will not invalidate
the earlier Gazette, nor will it create any
right in favour of any new claimant who did
not challenge the earlier Gazette of 1952. If
any Gazette Notification mentioning a particular
land as forest is published under Section 3
(2) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act,
that would be sufficient to determine the character
of the land, unless the Gazette notification
is challenged and its correctness is rebutted.
( Para-15)
|
| 6. |
Sultana
Fahmida
Vs.
The State & anr
(Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 54
Key Words:
Money Laundering; Sections 409/420/109 of the
Penal Code; Sections 4(2) and 4 (3) of the Money
Laundering Protirodh Ain, 2012; Section 5(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
|
An FIR was lodged
against the accused-persons for withdrawing an
amount of Tk. 26,58,98,126/ from Dhaka Bank Limited,
Dhanmondi Branch against 17 export bills misusing
and abusing power and authority. Charge sheet
was submitted against the accused-petitioner and
others. Thereafter, the case record was transmitted
to the learned Special Judge, Court No. 8, Dhaka
for holding trial and the learned trial Judge
framed charge against the accused-petitioners
and others rejecting the application for discharge
filed by the accused-petitioner. Being aggrieved,
the accused-petitioner filed this Criminal Revision.
The High Court Division issued Rule as to why
the order passed by the trial Court should not
be set aside. Further, it issued a Suo Muto Rule
calling upon the opposite-parties to show cause
as to why the order dated 25.11.2021 passed by
the trial Court discharging one accused shall
not be set aside. In course of hearing the High
Court Division found that though names of some
other persons other than the accused have been
disclosed in prosecution materials, they have
not been made accused in the instant case which
resulted in making the investigation perfunctory
in nature. Therefore, the High Court Division
considering facts and circumstances of the case
disposed of both the Rule and Suo Motu Rule with
a direction upon the Anti-Corruption Commission
to hold further investigation setting aside the
orders accepting charge sheet and framing charge
against the accused. |
Exercise
of revisional jurisdiction of High Court Division
to ensure justice under Section 439 of CrPC:
On an application by a party or which otherwise
comes to its knowledge, High Court Division is
legally competent to exercise its revisional jurisdiction
under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to examine the facts and circumstances of the
case and the judgment and the order if there is
any error which may not ensure justice to the
litigant public in not following the correct principles
of law and fact in assessing the material and
evidence in proper perspective and in that case,
High Court Division may, in its discretion, exercise
any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal
by Sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a court
by Section 338. (Para- 52)
Failure of Prosecution to implicate
responsible Persons within the Chain of Occurrence:
Under the circumstances, it is worthwhile to
mention that the prosecution case cannot continue
on a defective foundation of a case since the
necessary and responsible persons who are involved
in the alleged offences within the chain of
occurrence are not implicated in this case making
them accused. (Para-54)
|
| 7. |
মোঃ
হুমায়ুন কবির বনাম অন্যান্য বনাম বাংলাদেশ সরকার
ও অন্যান্য (বিচারপতি মোঃ আশরাফুল কামাল)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 68
Key Words:
মূল সংযোজন কর; আয়কর রিটার্ন; আয়কর; মূসক নিবন্ধন;
ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম;
মূল্য সংযোজন কর ও সম্পূরক শুল্ক আইন, ২০১২,
ধারা ৪, ১৫; The Income-Tax Ordinance, 1994;
ধারা ৭৫
|
আবেদনকারী এই
মর্মে রিট আবেদন করেন যে, গুগল ও ফেসবুক সহ সামাজিক
যোগযোগ মাধ্যম কোম্পানীগুলো ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক বিজ্ঞাপন
প্রদর্শন করে বাংলাদেশ থেকে বিপুল অংকের অর্থ আয়
করলেও এই আয়ের উপর কোন মূল্য সংযোজন কর বা আয়কর
প্রদান করে না এবং বাংলাদেশের আইন অনুসারে উক্ত
কোম্পানীগুলো আয়কর ও মূসক দিতে বাধ্য হলেও সরকার
এ বিষয়ে কোন পদক্ষেপ নেয়নি এবং এতে বাংলাদেশ বড়
অংকের রাজস্ব হারাচ্ছে। আবেদনকারী সরকারের সংশ্লিষ্ট
সংস্থাসমূহের প্রতি এ সংক্রান্ত নির্দেশনা জারি
করার জন্য আদালতের নিকট প্রার্থনা করেন। আদালত সরকারের
সংশ্লিষ্ট সংস্থাসমূহের প্রতি উক্ত কোম্পানীগুলোর
নিকট থেকে রাজস্ব আদায়ের নির্দেশনা জারির সাথে সাথে
উক্ত কোম্পানীগুলো বাংলাদেশ থেকে কত টাকা আয় করেছে
সে বিষয়ে প্রতিবেদন তলব করেন। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ সংশ্লিষ্ট
আইনসমূহ, সরকারী বিভিন্ন সংস্থার প্রদত্ত প্রতিবেদন,
নৈতিকতা সম্পর্কিত বিভিন্ন নিবন্ধ, সংবাদ মাধ্যমে
প্রকাশিত এ বিষয়ক সংবাদ বিবেচনায় এনে সিদ্ধান্ত
প্রদান করে যে, গুগল, ফেসবুক, ইউটিউব, ইয়াহু, আমাজন
সহ অন্যান্য ইন্টারনেটভিত্তিক সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম
কোম্পানীগুলোর মূসক, টার্নওভার কর ও সম্পূরক শুল্ক,
ধারা ১৫ এর অধীনে আরোপিত মূল্য সংযোজন কর এবং আয়কর
প্রদান না করা বেআইনী। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এ সকল রাজস্ব
আদায়ের জন্য সরকারের সংশ্লিষ্ট সংস্থাকে ব্যবস্থা
গ্রহনের জন্য নির্দেশ প্রদান করেন। |
গুগল, ফেইসবুক,
ইউটিউব, ইয়াহু, আমাজনসহ অন্যান্য ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক
সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম বিজ্ঞাপন, ডোমেইন বিক্রি,
লাইসেন্স ফি সহ সকল প্রকার লেনদেন থেকে উৎসে কর,
শুল্কসহ সকল ধরনের রাজস্ব বাংলাদেশের জনগণের ন্যায্য
পাওনা হেতু তা আদায় করা প্রতিবাদীপক্ষগণের করণীয়
কার্য এবং উক্ত কার্য তথা গুগল, ফেইসবুক, ইউটিউব,
ইয়াহু, আমাজনসহ অন্যান্য ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক
যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম বিজ্ঞাপন, ডোমেইন বিক্রি, লাইসেন্স
ফি সহ সকল প্রকার লেনদেন থেকে মূসক, টার্নওভার
কর ও সম্পূরক শুল্ক, ধারা ১৫ এর অধীন আরোপীত
মূল্য সংযোজন কর এবং আয়কর প্রদান সহ সকল ধরনের
রাজস্ব আদায়ের জন্য প্রতিপক্ষগণকে নির্দেশ প্রদান
করা হলো। আমরা, অতঃপর, নিম্নবর্ণিত আদেশ এবং
নির্দেশনাসমূহ প্রদান করলাম :
১। গুগল, ফেইসবুক, ইউটিউব, ইয়াহু আমাজনসহ অন্যান্য
ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম বিজ্ঞাপন,
ডোমেইন বিক্রি, লাইসেন্স ফি সহ সকল প্রকার লেনদেন
থেকে মূসক, টার্নওভার কর ও সম্পূরক শুল্ক, ধারা
১৫ এর অধীন আরোপীত মূল্য সংজোজন কর এবং আয়কর
প্রদান সহ সকল ধরনের রাজস্ব আদায় করা ১-৭নং প্রতিপক্ষেণের
আইনগত দায়িত্ব ও কর্তব্য।
২। গুগল, ফেইসবুক, ফেইসবুক, ইউটিউব, ইয়াহু, আমাজনসহ
অন্যান্য ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম
বিজ্ঞাপন, ডোমেইন বিক্রি, লাইসেন্স ফি সহ সকল
প্রকার লেনদেন থেকে মুসক, টার্নওভার কর ও সম্পূরক
শুল্ক, ধারা ১৫ এর অধীন আরোপীত মূল্য সংযোজন কর
এবং আয়কর প্রদান সহ সকল ধরনের রাজস্ব আদায় করার
জন্য ১-৭ নং প্রতিপক্ষকে নির্দেশ প্রদান করা হলো।
৩। গুগল, ফেইসবুক, ইউটিউব, ইয়াহু, আমাজনসহ অন্যান্য
ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম বিজ্ঞাপন,
ডোমেইন বিক্রি, লাইসেন্স ফি সহ সকল প্রকার লেনদেন
থেকে মুসক, টার্নওভার কর ও সম্পূরক শুল্ক, ধারা
১৫ এর অধীন আরোপীত মূল্য সংযোজন কর এবং আয়কর
প্রদান সহ সকল ধরনের বকেয়া-রাজস্ব আদায় করার
জন্য ১-৭ নং প্রতিপক্ষকে নির্দেশ প্রদান করা হলো।
৪। ০৬ (ছয়) মাস অন্তর অন্তর গুগল, ফেইসবুক, ইউটিউব,
ইয়াহু, আমাজনসহ অন্যান্য ইন্টারনেট ভিত্তিক সামাজিক
যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম বিজ্ঞাপন, ডোমেইন বিক্রি, লাইসেন্স
ফি সহ সকল প্রকার লেনদেন থেকে মুসক, টার্নওভার
কর ও সম্পূরক শুরু, ধারা ১৫ এর অধীন আরোপীত মূল্য
সংযোজন কর এবং আয়কর প্রদান সহ সকল ধরনের বকেয়া
রাজস্ব আদায় এর বিবরণী হলফনামা প্রদান করতঃ অত্র
আদালতে দাখিল করার জন্য জাতীয় রাজস্ব বোর্ডকে
নির্দেশ প্রদান করা হলো। |
| 8. |
Agrocorp
Int. Pte Ltd
Vs.
Vietnam Northern Food Corp.
(Muhammad Khurshid Alam Sarkar, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 213
Key Words:
Arbitration agreement; Mutual Consent; consensus
ad idem; Sections 9, 12, 17 of the Arbitration
Act, 2001
|
In this case
the petitioner is a company having the business
of international commodity trading and the respondent
is a state owned corporation of the Government
of Vietnam. The petitioner prayed before the High
Court Division for the appointment of an arbitrator
from the side of the respondent for formation
of an arbitration tribunal to resolve dispute
between them. The respondent denied existence
of any arbitration agreement between the parties.
The parties had no direct communication between
them rather, they communicated through Mr. Vandara
Din whom the petitioner claimed as a broker of
the respondent but the respondent claimed that
he was petitioner’s broker. The Court held that
it is necessary to determine the existence of
an arbitration agreement to invoke the procedure
under section 12 of the Arbitration Act. Thereafter,
examining all the annexure the Court found that
there was no arbitration agreement between the
parties and no contractual obligation arose between
them from email communications. The Court also
held that even in the absence of any arbitration
agreement between the parties, they are at liberty
to arbitrate through mutual consent. Consequently,
the rule was discharged. |
Existence
of an arbitration agreement is a pre-condition
for invoking the power under sec 12 of the Arbitration
Act: If the parties to the arbitration
have already devised a procedure for appointment
of arbitrator/s, then the provisions of sub-Sections
(2) to (13) under Section 12 of the Arbitration
Act would have hardly any application. But in
absence of any device agreed upon by the parties,
the provisions of sub-Sections (2) to (13) under
Section 12 of the Arbitration Act come into play.
In both the above-mentioned paths, the implied
precondition is that there must be the existence
of an agreement between the parties to go for
arbitration. In other words, in order to make
the provisions of sub-Sections (1) to (13) under
Section 12 of the Arbitration Act applicable,
the parties must agree to resolve any dispute
through arbitration; absence of an agreement among
the parties to hold arbitration shall render the
aforesaid provisions of the Arbitration Act nugatory.
(Para-16)
|
| 9. |
The
State
Vs.
Md. Hamidul
(Shahidul Karim, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 224
Key Words:
Confessional Statement; Mitigating Circumstances;
Aggravating Circumstances; Use of examination
under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
|
In the instant
case the dead body of a three year old son of
the informant was recovered from a nearby turmeric
field on the next day after he went missing. The
condemned-prisoner is the 2nd husband of the informant
and step-father of the victim. After recovery
of the dead-body of the victim, the people of
the locality questioned the condemned-prisoner
and he confessed that he killed the victim. Later
on, confessional statement of the condemned-prisoner
was recorded under section 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Upon trial, learned Additional
Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Rangpur sentenced the
accused to death. The High Court Division observed
that, as the confessional statement was found
to be true, voluntary and inculpatory, it is sufficient
evidence to convict the accused. However, the
Court took mitigating circumstances into consideration
and commuted the sentence of the convict to one
of life imprisonment with fine. The Court further
observed that, asking many questions while examining
the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and using the same against the
accused in determining his culpability is illegal,
uncalled for and altogether foreign in criminal
jurisprudence. |
The Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Section 164:
It is by now well settled that an accused can
be found guilty and convicted solely banking on
his confession if, on scrutiny, it is found to
be true, voluntary and inculpatory in nature.
(Para 42)
The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898,
Section 342: We would like to put on
record one legal infirmity that has been committed
by the learned Judge of the court below. On
perusal of the impugned judgment and order,
it reveals that the learned Judge on his own
accord asked as many as 13(thirteen) questions
to the accused while he was being examined under
section 342 of the Code. Not only that the judge
concerned has also used the same against the
accused in finding his culpability in the killing
of the victim boy. The above approach adopted
by the trial Judge is absolutely weird, uncalled
for and illegal as well. (Para 52)
|
| 10. |
Md.
Shakhawat Hossain & ors
Vs.
Election Commission and ors
(Zafar Ahmed, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 236
Key Words:
Union Parishad Election; Power of Election Commission;
Cancellation of election results; Circumstances
for Re-poll; Local Government (Union Parishad)
Ain, 2009; Rule 37(1)(2) and Rule 90 of Local
Government (Union Parishad) Election Rules,
2010
|
Two writ petitions
were filed in the High Court Division – one challenging
inaction of the respondents in holding inquiry
about the alleged irregularities in a Union Parishad
Election and also praying for direction upon the
respondents to hold re-election in two poling
centres and another challenging the direction
issued by the Election Commission cancelling the
election of one polling centre and directing re-poll
there. Two FIRs were lodged in the meantime by
concerned Presiding Officers alleging that election
materials in one centre and 7 lids of ballot boxes
were snatched while they were returning. The Election
Commission cancelled the election of one polling
centre and directed re-poll. The Election Commission
rejected the representation by the petitioners
of first writ petition alleging irregularity in
publishing the election result by stating that
since the election of the Union Parishad was not
completed, the Returning Officer did not send
the election result to the Election Commission.
The High Court Division discussing relevant provisions
of the Union Parishads (Election) Rules, 1983
and the Local Government (Union Parishad) Election
Rules, 2010 and case laws decided thereunder observed
that, as the current law empowers the Election
Commission to stop casting vote only on the Election
Day and as admittedly the election was held without
any interruption and disturbance, the invocation
of the power by the Election Commission to cancel
the election is not justifiable. The Court held
that rest of the matters are disputed question
of facts, which must be decided by the Election
Tribunal exercising judicial authority, not by
the Election Commission in exercise of its plenary
and supervisory authority which is administrative
in nature. Therefore, the High Court Division
set aside the decision of the Election Commission
to re-poll and directed it to publish the names
of the elected candidates in the official Gazette
forthwith. |
The Local
Government (Union Parishad) Election Rules, 2010,
Rule 37, 90(ga), (gha): The power of
the EC to cancel election result and directing
re-poll, which is post election matter, is deemed
to be exercised under Rule 90 (ga) or (gha), but
in so doing the EC has to consider facts in light
of its powers under Rule 37 and Rule 90 and the
circumstances envisaged therein. The power of
the EC under the old Rule 70 was plenary in that
no specific circumstances were envisaged under
the old Rules, but the situation is different
under the new legal regime. From that point of
view, the plenary power to cancel election result
and directing re-poll under the new Rules is more
specific and hence, more defined. However, it
does not mean that the EC cannot exercise this
power at all. It depends on facts and circumstance
of each case. Since the EC, while exercising its
supervisory and plenary powers under Rule 90,
acts as the highest administrative authority,
not as a judicial authority the EC must consider
whether it is stepping out of the parameters set
by the law for that the election disputes are
adjudiciable under the law by the Election Tribunal.
(Para 28)
|
| 11. |
Abu
Khair Md. Nazmul Huq & ors
Vs.
Bangladesh & ors
(Kashefa Hussain, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 247
Key Words:
Section 2, 7 of the Power of Attorney Act 2012;
Rule 8, 9, 10 of the Power of Attorney Rules
2015;
|
In this case
question arose whether the Power of Attorney executed
to file the writ petition was a valid Power of
Attorney. The petitioner argued that although
the power of attorney was executed outside Bangladesh,
since it is a General power of attorney and not
an irrevocable power of attorney, Rule 10(5) of
the Power of Attorney Rules 2015 is not applicable
in the petitioners’ case and they are not under
any obligation to get the endorsement of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs along with payment of stamp
duties. The High Court Division, however, analyzing
different provisions of Power of Attorney Act
2012 and Power of Attorney Rules 2015 came to
the conclusion that all classes of power of attorneys
whether it is special, general or irrevocable,
when it is executed outside Bangladesh, the procedure
prescribed by Rule 10(5) K,L, M must be mandatorily
followed by the power of attorney holder. The
Petitioners did not follow the said Rule. Consequently,
the Rule was discharged as the writ petition was
not maintainable as not being in form. |
Rule
8 and 10 of the Power of Attorney Rules 2015:
Rule 8 essentially sets out the procedure that
is to be followed by the executor while executing
a power of Attorney. While Rule 10(5) clearly
contemplates the procedure that needs to be followed
in cases of all classes of power of attorneys
relating to power of attorneys which are executed
outside of Bangladesh. The provisions of Rule
10(5) (K),(L), (M) has clearly imposed such duty
upon the power of attorney holder following execution
by the executors. It is clear that the intention
of law is cases of those power of attorneys which
are executed outside of Bangladesh following execution
is the same irrespective of the classes of power
of attorney. The power of attorneys whether those
are Special, General, Irrevocable power of attorney
so long they are executed outside Bangladesh certain
conditions inter alia must be followed and fulfilled
by the power of attorney holder which conditions
are clearly prescribed under Rule 10(5) (K),(L),
(M) of the Rules . (Para 25)
|
| 12. |
Mitul
Properties Ltd
Vs.
M.N.H. Bulu
(Khizir Ahmed Choudhury, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 257
Key Words:
Persona Designata; Maintainability of Civil
Revision; Arbitral Award; Supervisory Jurisdiction
of the High Court Division; The Arbitration
Act, 2001
|
In this case
petitioner challenged an order passed by the learned
District Judge, Dhaka in an Arbitration Miscellaneous
Case whereby the said court rejected an application
for calling for the record of arbitration proceedings
from the arbitrators. Question arose as to whether
a civil revision is maintainable against any interlocutory
order passed in an application under section 42
of the Arbitration Act, 2001. The honorable Chief
Justice constituted a Special Bench under Rule
1C of Chapter 2 of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
(High Court Division) Rules 1973 to decide the
matter. The Court, after discussing different
provisions of the Arbitration Act 2001, General
Clauses Act 1897 and relevant case laws, observed
that the term “‡RjvRR Av`vjZ” as mentioned in
the Arbitration Act, 2001 means the ‘Court of
District Judge’, not ‘persona designata’ and any
decision passed in a proceeding under this Act
is amenable in a civil revision under the Code
of Civil Procedure and as such, the civil revision
is maintainable. Nevertheless, the Court discharged
the rule rejecting the civil revision contending
that since the petitioner had an arbitrator appointed
by him, he could have easily obtained a copy of
the proceeding from his arbitrator. This application
for calling for records is unnecessary and only
to cause delay. The Court further observed that
the Government should frame necessary rules regarding
how long and under what modes the arbitrators
will maintain the record of any arbitration proceedings
after giving the arbitral award. |
The Arbitration
Act, 2001, Section 42: The term “‡RjvRR
Av`vjZ” as mentioned in Section 2(Kha) of the
Arbitration Act, will be deemed as the ‘Court
of District Judge’, not ‘persona designata’ for
carrying out the object under Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act, and any decision to be passed
in a proceeding under Section 42 of the Act is
amenable to revisional jurisdiction under the
code of Civil Procedure. (Para 12)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section
115: Civil Revision is maintainable
under Section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
against an order passed by learned District
Judge in a proceeding under Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act but such power should be exercised
sparingly only in a case where it appears that
the lower Courts in passing any order committed
any error of law resulting in an error occasioning
failure of justice. It is to be borne in mind
that by repealing Arbitration Act, 1940, Arbitration
Act, 2001 has been promulgated for speedy disposal
of the disputes through privatized system, no
one should be given an opportunity to frustrate
the spirit of law by initiating any proceeding
against each and every order having no merit.
(Para 16)
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| 13. |
Md.
Helal Uddin
Vs.
The State
(Fatema Najib, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 264
Key Words:
Torture in police custody; Delay in lodging
FIR; Medical Report; Section 342 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure 1898;
|
In this case
the informant was detained whimsically and tortured
by some police personnel. When in the police station
the informant refused to give confessional statement,
the officer-in-charge caused severe injury to
the informant and lodged two criminal cases against
him. The informant challenging the proceeding
before the High Court Division obtained direction
on basis of which the instant case was filed.
The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced
him with imprisonment and fine. Appellate Court
confirmed the conviction and sentence of the convict-petitioner.
The convict-petitioner questioned about the delay
in lodging the FIR and about the Medical report
in this Criminal Revision. The High Court Division
analyzing all the evidences found that as the
case was against police personnel the informant
made delay to lodge FIR due to fear of reprisal.
He could file the FIR only after getting direction
from High Court Division which sufficiently explains
delay. Moreover, the High Court Division found
that the medical report had minor discrepancies
but the injury was proved by the witnesses. Consequently,
the Criminal Revision was dismissed. |
When
injured in police custody, burden is upon them:
Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
From the evidence of P.W.4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 5,
6 it appears the informant Kader had been taken
as unhurt into the room of the accused Helaluddin
in khilgaon thana whereon the accused had been
injured. Since the alleged occurrence took place
in police custody, it is duty of officer in charge
to explain how an unhurt man was injured in his
room. The accused was examined under section 342
of the Code of Criminal Procedure giving him an
opportunity to explain the evidence and circumstances
appearing against him. During the examination
under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
the accused said that he will give a written statement.
But on perusal of record no written statement
has been found. Both court below did not utter
that the accused gave a written statement. Since
on declaration by the accused no written documents
has been produced by the accused, no evidence
has been adduced to defense himself which leads
the statement made by prosecution witnesses that
under custody of accused officer in charge of
khilgaon, the informant had been inflected chapati
blow by the accused was remained unchallenged.
(Para 53)
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| 14. |
Prof.
Dr. Muhammad Yunus & ors
Vs.
The State & anr
(SM Kuddus Zaman, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 275
Key Words:
Sections 4 (7) (8), 117, 234, 303(Uma) and 307
of the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006; Labour Welfare
Foundation Law, 2006; Section 200, 241A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
|
In the instant
case the petitioners challenged the charge framing
order passed by the learned Chairman of Third
Labour Court against them under sections 303(Uma)
and 307 of Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006. Their
argument is that the Labour Court possesses the
powers of Civil Court, Criminal Court and Mediator
and provides remedy mainly by monitory compensation.
Subjecting an owner or director of a company to
criminal prosecution is an exception and is the
last resort. No such criminal prosecution is permissible
without exhausting the civil remedies available
under the above Ain. Since the alleged violations
of Sections 4, 117 and 134 of Bangladesh Labour
Act 2006 have been sufficiently compensated by
alternative civil remedy, the Complainant committed
serious illegality in lodging complaint against
the petitioners without exhausting civil remedies.
On the other hand contention of the opposite party
was that the petitioners are continuously and
intentionally violating the provisions of sections
4, 117 and 234 of Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
and they refused to stop above violations and
take remedial measure despite repeated written
requests by the complainant. As such the complainant
had no option but to lodge this complaint. The
High Court Division, hearing both the parties
came to the conclusion that the charge framing
order was valid and consequently the Rule was
discharged. |
Section
303 (umo) of Act the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006:
In view of specific allegations that the petitioners
intentionally failed to create, maintain and send
to the complainant the registers of leave, register
of daily attendance, the register of overtime
of the labourer and employees and register of
works, we are unable to find any prima facie substance
in the submissions of the learned Advocate for
the petitioners that the framing of the charge
under section 303 (umo) of Act No.42 of 2006 against
the petitioners is without any lawful basis. (Para
39)
|
| 15. |
Most.
Shamima Begum & anr
Vs.
Most. Rezuana Sultana & ors
(Md. Zakir Hossain, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 284
Key Words:
The right of pre-emption; Section 60 of the
Registration Act, 1908; Section 96 of the State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950; Section 24
of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949; waiver,
acquiescence; estoppel
|
In the instant
case it was the contention of the pre-emptors
that behind their back the case land was transferred
to the pre-emptee. Thereafter, being aware as
to the sale of the property, the pre-emptor procured
a certified copy of the deed and filed the pre-emption
case within the stipulated time. On the other
hand, the pre-emptee-opposite party No. 1 contended
that before the execution of the sale deed, the
pre-emptee-opposite party Nos. 2 & 3 approached
the pre-emptors for selling the case land. But
they refused to purchase the same and as per their
advice, the opposite party Nos. 2 & 3 transferred
the case land to the pre-emptee-opposite party
No. 1. The trial Court dismissed the case and
the appellate Court also dismissed the appeal
concurring with the decision of the trial Court.
On revision the High court Division held that
the conduct of the pre-emptors before and after
purchase amply proved that the pre-emptor-petitioners
waived their right of pre-emption and as such,
the pre-emption case was rightly dismissed by
the trial Court. The High Court Division also
observed that it is true that the right of pre-emption
accrues after the deed entered in the volume as
per section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908,
but if the right of pre-emption is waived before
and after registration, the Court may turn down
the prayer of pre-emption otherwise, the equitable
principle of waiver and acquiescence which operate
as estoppels will be meaningless. Finally, the
High Court Division recommended some amendments
in section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy
Act, 1949 to be considered by the legislators
for the greater interest of the people of the
country. |
If the
right of pre-emption is waived by the conduct
of the pre-emptors before and after purchase,
the pre-emption case may be dismissed:
The conduct of the pre-emptors before and after
purchase amply proved that the pre-emptor-petitioners
waived their right of pre-emption and as such,
the pre-emption case was rightly dismissed by
the trial Court. The petitioners intentionally
relinquished of their statutory right and thereby
waived the right of pre-emption. The Appellate
Court assigning cogent reason concurred with the
finding of the trial Court; therefore, it does
not warrant for any interference by this Court.
It is true that the right of pre-emption accrues
after the deed entered in the volume as per section
60 of the Registration Act, 1908, but if the right
of pre-emption is waived before and after registration,
obviously the Court may turn down the prayer of
pre-emption; otherwise, the equitable principle
of waiver, acquiescence which operate as estoppels
will be meaningless. Nothing is absolute in law;
therefore, it cannot be held absolutely that the
pre-emption right shall accrue only after registration
of the deed and if it so, the equitable principles
of waiver and acquiescence shall be futile and
fruitless. (Para 25)
|
| 16. |
Md.
Al Amin
Vs.
The State & ors
(Md. Akhtaruzzaman, J)
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 294
Key Words:
Acquittal; Sections 265(H), 435, 439 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898; Rule No. 638
of the Criminal Rules and Orders, [Volume I]
|
In the instant
Criminal Revision question came up for consideration
as to whether the Sessions Court had power or
authority to acquit an accused under section 265H
of the Code of Criminal Procedure without examining
any witnesses or without exhausting the legal
procedures for compelling the attendance of the
witnesses. The High Court Division examining relevant
laws, particularly, Rule 638 of the Criminal Rules
and Orders (Practice and Procedure of Subordinate
Court), 2009 and case laws held that in exercising
the power under section 265H of the Code, the
Sessions Court must take necessary measures to
secure the attendance of the witness and comply
all the relevant procedures according to law before
acquitting any accused. Consequently, the rule
was made absolute. |
Section
265H of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898:
The Court must exhaust all the procedure for taking
down evidence before passing the order of acquittal:
Under the provisions of section 265H
of the Code the duty of a Sessions Judge is to
look into the prosecution evidence and materials
brought out in the examination of the accused
and thereafter should hear the learned Advocates
of both sides and considering the evidences and
materials on record if he finds that all the procedures
under the law have been exhausted and if he is
of the opinion that he has taken all possible
steps for taking down the evidences of the prosecution
but the prosecution has miserably failed to comply
with the order of the Court, in that case, the
duty casts on the Court to pass an order of acquittal
of the accused. But in the present case, it appears
manifestly that the learned Joint Sessions Judge
without complying with the relevant laws and procedures
has illegally dismissed the petition filed by
the prosecution with the observations that the
prosecution is not willing to adduce evidences.
(Para-23)
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