It appears that the leasing company being the owner of the leased out asset, used the asset for the purpose of business, i.e. leased out the property using the same as business assets and as such attracted by the provision of Article 5A of the 3rd Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984. It appears that the first appellate authority did not consider as to the ownership of the vehicle remaining with lessor and not with the lessee and further that the lessor deals in the business of leasing out the vehicle to the lessee who operates the vehicle for his business. But the business of the lessor remains in the status of using the vehicle for the purpose of business of lease. Therefore these two pre-condition having been fulfilled in the instant case, the Assessee-applicant is entitled to the normal depreciation allowance and the initial depreciation allowance on the vehicle it has leased out to different lessee, being their customer.

On consideration of the materials on record, it appears to us that the impugned order dated o8. 12. 2011 can not be said to be unlawful merely because it is without elaborate reasoning and non-speaking one. The impugned order appears to be otherwise sustainable.

The authority cancelled the lease of the petitioners and in the same breath called upon them to appear before the authority on 12.04.2011 with necessary valid papers, if any. What we are driving at boils down to this: the authority ought to have afforded the petitioners an opportunity of being heard first and thereafter on perusal of the inquiry report and other materials, the authority could have cancelled the lease of the petitioners with reference to the case land; but the authority chose to cancel the lease of the petitioners by keeping them in the dark and thereafter asked them to appear before the authority on a certain future date with their valid papers, if any. To be precise, there is no point in affording the petitioners an opportunity of being heard after cancellation of the lease. Generally speaking, the hearing of the petitioners by the authority should have been a pre-decisional phenomenon; it should not be a post-decisional phenomenon.

Whenever it is noticed that, all the legal mandatory formalities in recording the confessional statement are duly observed and the Magistrate; who recorded the confessional statement is satisfied that the confession is voluntary and free from all taint-in that case, such confession can be the sole basis of conviction of the confessing accused.

The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the convict-appellant took me to the postal receipt and strenuously argued that the postal seal reveal that the same has been received by the postal clerk on 23.03.2008 where as the postal clerk put his signature on the same showing receiving date as 12.03.2008. He further adds that those anomalies are sufficient to show that the postal receipt has been created for the purpose of this case. I have gone through the postal receipt and seen that the anomalies of those dates are palpable on the face of such receipt. It is the receiving clerk of the post office who made all those anomalies, is the best person who can say as to why and under what compelling circumstances he put this date under his signature and also as to why he put seal showing another date and without examining him, it is not possible to arrive at a concrete decision in this respect. In such a state of affairs the court can arrived such a decision which favoured the convict-appellant. Thus, I have no option but to hold that the convict-appellant is entitled to get benefit of the doubt regarding such service of notice.

In the process of selecting the persons for elevation to the High Court Division the Chief Justice may, if feels indispensably necessary consult or share his view with at least two of his senior most brother Judges in the Appellate Division and two of the senior most Judges of the High Court Division as well in forming ‘opinion’ and also to ensure the recommendation appropriate, effective and transparent. After advancing the recommendation expressing opinion by the Chief Justice there should not be any room to disapprove or censure it unless the persons recommended is found by the executive to have an antecedent involving anti-state or anti-social subversive activities. The fate of the recommendation of the Chief Justice expressing opinion should not be sealed and scrapped for no justified reason, in view of observation made in the ‘ten judges case’ by the Appellate Division of our Supreme Court.

Recording of a statement of an accused beyond the period of office hour can not be a plea to hold that the said statement is not true and voluntary. If the said statement is found that same was recorded by the concerned Magistrate having compiled with all the provisions of law then there is no room to say that the said statement is not true and voluntary.

In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, since, apparently and admittedly, no prosecution has been concluded against the petitioner and that the petitioner has neither been convicted or acquitted in any criminal case for the offence in question, namely, the offices punishable under Sections 500 and 501of the Penal Code, we are of the view that, the petitioner does not have any case before this Court under writ jurisdiction to invoke Article 35(2) of the Constitution or other provisions of the Constitution or Code of Criminal Procedure. Besides, since the petitioner does not have any particular case of enforcement of fundamental rights under any of the above mentioned Articles, the writ petition is not maintainable.

It is crystal clear from the reading of the plaint that as per sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Section 17B of the Registration Act, the plaintiff –opposite parties nor present the contract for sale itself for registration within six months from the date of coming into force of that section i.e. 1st July, 2005 neither instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract within six months next after the expiry of the period mentioned in clause (a). So, after the expiry of the period mentioned in clause (b) of section 17B, the contract for sale (affidavit dated 03.04.1995) in question stand void.

The Settlement Officer appointed with the additional designation of Assistant Settlement Officer may at any time before final publication of the record-of-rights exercise his jurisdiction under rule, 42 of the Rules, 1955.

It is the clear intention of the Legislature that a party to an Artharin Suit if aggrieved by a decree, must prefer an appeal. Since the Ain, 2003 is a special law with an overriding provision over other laws and has prescribed a special procedure, there is no scope to bypass the appellate forum, if the forum under Section 19(2) of the Ain, 2003 against an exparte decree is already not availed of by the party.

The word ‘Bc¡ma’ as appears in the context of Section 7(1) bears reference to a scenario emerging when the Court which in its considered opinion thinking it just and expedient for a notice to be published in a national daily and in a local newspaper, if there be any, for ends of justice, and making an order to publish a notice at the cost of the plaintiff. But in the present case the plaintiff –Respondent No.2 itself took step under section 7(1) of the Act on its own motion on the date fixed for return of summons and acknowledgement receipt after service upon the defendants without waiting for the report of the Process Server and Order of the Court to that effect. It is noted that the summons in a suit shall be served by the Process Server simultaneously through postal department, and in evidence of the sending of the summons through post the postal receipt thereof must be tagged with the record. But in the present case no summons was served through Process Server or by post nor any attempt was made to serve the notice/ summons upon the defendants. Moreover, no Order has been passed by the Court necessitating publication of summons in the daily newspaper. Rather publication in the newspaper ensued at the behest of and as desired by the plaintiff which, in this Court’s view is contrary to the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act.

Application for execution of a final decree or order is to be made within 3 (three) years from the date mentioned in 2nd Column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act subject to some exceptions as detailed in the 3rd Column read with provisions of section 15 of the Act inasmuch as Article 182 makes no provision for fresh limitation from a final order passed on an application under Order IX rule 13 of the Code. In other words if no stay order or injunction is passed staying the operation of the decree or order under section 15 or no situation arises as per the 3rd Column of Article 182 the decree or order would keep open for execution and time would run from the date of final decree or order. A bare reading of Article 182 of the limitation Act also suggests that an application under order IX rule 13 of the code does not come within the meaning of applications mentioned in clause 5 of column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act to save limitation. Accordingly, pendency of a case under Order IX rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside an ex-parte decree cannot extend the period of limitation for filing execution case.

As we have mentioned before there is a prima-facie apprehension of danger to the property, which is apparent under the circumstances. Moreover, since the suit land is in possession and control of the defendant-appellants it is quite probable that pending final determination of the rights of the parties, the party in possession and control might abuse such possession and control and the sisters may be deprived of their rights. Alienation of mesne-profits which in this case are primarily the rents received by the defendants from the tenants in the disputed property may also result in wastage of the property and therefore entails a source of danger of alienation of the property before final determination of the rights of the parties to the Partition Suit. Upon such considerations we feel that the Court below judiciously and by exercising its discretion very correctly granted the prayer of the plaintiffs under Order 40 Rule 1 for appointment of receiver to the suit property.

It also appears from the FIR that the alleged occurrence took place in between January 2004 to November 2006. The lodging of the FIR and framing of charge covering the whole period is permissible under the provisions of law of sections 6 (IB) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. A single case can be filed and trial may be proceeded by framing charge for more offences, which has been done in the present case. The provisions of section 222 (2) of the Code is no manner of application in this case.