Thus it is palpably clear that the respondent no. 1 (Alliance) has been acting with the consent of the DIFE and assisting it in inspecting and ensuring the safety of the garment factories in the country. So we hold that the Alliance has been performing de facto functions in connection with the affairs of the Republic.
Since as per Article 102(1) any person aggrieved can enforce any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution, we do not find any difficulty on the part of the petitioner-company, an indigenous Bangladeshi company whose shareholders and directors are all Bangladeshi citizens, to invoke Articles 27 and 40 of the Constitution in this case. Besides, Articles 27 and 40 do not say who can enforce them; it is only Article 102 (1) which says any person aggrieved can enforce them which undeniably fall under Part III of the Constitution. So Articles 27 and 40 which have been invoked by the petitioner-company are to be interpreted in the light of Article 102(1) of the Constitution.
We are of the opinion that for the limited purpose of enforcement of any of the fundamental rights as guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, an indigenous company like the petitioner-company, whose shareholders and directors are all Bangladeshi citizens, is a ‘citizen’ of Bangladesh. This interpretation, as we see it, is in perfect accord with the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the tone and tenor of Article 102(1) of the Constitution.

If we now exercise our common sense it can be perceived when the Review Panel can ‘dismiss’ an Appeal if the same is not well founded either in fact or law then why it can not ‘allow’ the same if a decision appealed against is otherwise wrong ? In other words, when CPTU is competent to dismiss an Appeal it can also allow an Appeal if it is otherwise found to be competent.

That there being no decision of the Government for acquisition of the property in question, there is no valid acquisition of the property and in the meantime the said proceeding having become non-est due to repeal of the said section 47 of the said Ordinance, 1982, there is no further scope to take decision for acquisition of the property.

Where the case is at a stage of framing charges and the prosecution evidence is yet to commence, the trial court has to consider the question of sufficiency of the ground for proceeding against the accused on a general consideration of materials placed before him by the investigating agency. The truth, veracity and effect of the evidence are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of the test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at this stage.

Anti-Corruption Commission, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, demanding bribe, substantive evidence, extra-judicial confession.

Moreso, the word “অভিযোগটি অনুসন্ধানের জন্য” as contemplated in section 27(1ka) is very significant. It means that an inquiry should be done on the allegations brought against an accused. It does not mean that inquiry should be done to ascertain whether the complainant went to the police station and he/she was refused by the police.

This concept of “administrative fairness” requires that an Authority, while taking a decision which affects a person’s right prejudicially, must act fairly and in accordance with law. We note, albeit with utmost regret and disappointment, that in the instant case, there has been a gross violation of the well-settled principles of natural justice, and that too by the Syndicate. In our view, failure to comply with the principles of natural justice leads to arbitrariness, which in turn, vitiates the impugned order.

In the facts and circumstances as it appears from the record, I find that the deceased Most. Hosneara Begum Laizu/Lipa Rani Roy was a Hindu lady, but she was converted to Muslim and she died as a Muslim, presence in her father’s house at the time of committing suicide can be a reason to find that she was reconverted to a Hindu.
As a Muslim or a believer in Islam she is entitled to get burial as per the Islamic rituals.
The prayer of Mr. Subrata Chowdhury as mentioned above cannot be considered by this Court since the deceased herself did not donate her dead body to any institution.
Apparently, the father of the deceased has been suffering from some ego and for his such ego Mr. Subrata Chowdhury, as well as Mr. Md. Mominul Islam made such prayers finding themselves helpless to establish that the deceased was reconverted to a Hindu. Such ego cannot be a reason for the Court to decide any dispute like the instant one.
For such ego a dead body has been rottening in mortuary since last four years. Keeping dead body of a human being for such long time cannot be allowed by any religion, rather it amounts to an inhuman act. Apparently the father just for his ego behaved like an inhuman being, and such sort of ego cannot be allowed in the society or by the court of law.

That the City Corporation holding tax receipt is not the proof of possession if isolated from a lawful prima-facie title claimed on the basis of apparently genuine deed and with reference to a clear chain of title. It has to be noted here that, this case of claiming title in the suit property based on no title in any specific property is apparently a case of the land grabbers. Case of a land grabber is totally isolated from the chain of title and their deeds do not refer to any specific immovable property, so that a land grabber can grab any property or any portion of a property, on the basis of the papers created by or kept in their hands.

The Court issued a Rule Nishi on 10.02.2016 calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why the failure to ensure the provision by existing hospitals and clinics, whether governmental or private, of emergency medical services to critically injured persons should not be declared to be without lawful authority and violative of the fundamental rights as guaranteed under Articles 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution. The Court further ordered that the underlying Writ Petition has been filed with the primary intent of ensuring the easy accessibility to emergency medical care and intervention as prevents the undue loss of life of road accident victims. Concomitantly, the intent also is of preparing a set of back-up action plans, policy formulations and, in all likelihood, statutory enactments to facilitate the assured availability of such services and interventions in the best feasible manner. The courts aid is sought in this regard to bring about a mechanism ensuring further the personal safety of “Good Samaritans” made possible by the assured and ready availability of assistance of law enforcement agencies and medical service providers both in the public and the private sectors.
As per the directions of the Court, the guidelines that are placed before this Court for its sanction and approval are in the form of the moK `~N©Ubvq AvnZ e¨w³i Riæix ¯^v¯’¨‡mev wbwðZKiY I mnvqZvKvixi myiÿv cÖ`vb bxwZgvjv, 2018| (bxwZgvjv)
This Court, hereby, further directs, and as per the prayer of all parties concerned agreed on the same, that the bxwZgvjv in its entirety be deemed enforceable as binding by judicial sanction and approval pending appropriate legislative enactments incorporating entrenched standards objectives, rights and duties. This Court further directs a wide dissemination of the bxwZgvjv through publication variously in the Official Gazette and through electronic and print media as shall serve both public interest and secure a broader objective of social mobilization of views and perception of the necessity of such guidelines.

The form prescribed in the Criminal Rules and Order (Practice and Procedure of Subordinate Courts), 2009 presupposes no handwritten memorandum under column No.7. However, there is a blank space for making memorandum under column No.8, which the recording Magistrate is required to fill up stating the reason of his belief regarding voluntariness of the confession. If any Magistrate does not make any memorandum in his own handwriting under column No.7 of the prescribed form of confession, or does not put his signature after making memorandum under column No.8 and does not put his signature after making memorandum, if any, under column No.9, it cannot be held to be a gross illegality and fatal to the prosecution case. The purpose of making memorandum in compliance with section 164 (3) of the Code would suffice by signing the printed memorandum, provided that the precautions prescribed by the Code are duly taken by the recording Magistrate. There is confusion among the members of Bar as well as the Magistrates as to whether a Magistrate is required to make handwritten memorandum at the bottom of recorded confession under column No.7. Where there is already a printed memorandum in the language of law, albeit pre-amendment, it would be an unnecessary and meaningless exercise for the Magistrates to make another memorandum thereunder in the same language. Since the use of old printed memorandum with pre-amendment language and not making of memorandum by own hand of the Magistrate do not injure the accused as to their defence on merits, it would not make the confessions inadmissible.

The contention of learned Advocate Mr. S.M Abdul Mobin for the defence is that the sentence of death is too harsh in this case because both the accused persons tried to save the life of the victim removing him to more than one hospital from the place of occurrence as disclosed by the prosecution witnesses. Now the question is commutation of sentence as pointed out by the defence to be considered or not. In true sense, it is most difficult task on the part of a judge to decide what would be quantum of sentence in awarding upon an accused for committing the offence when it is proved by evidence beyond shadow of doubt but the judge should have considered the legal evidence and materials for punishment of the perpetrator not as a social activist [63 DLR 460, 18 BLD 81 and 57 DLR 591]. Sometimes, it depends on gravity of the offence and sometimes, it confers upon an aggravating or mitigating factor.
In such a situation, it is a very hard job for the court to determine the quantum of sentence whether it will be capital punishment or imprisonment for life upon the accused persons since they played a role for saving the victim’s life soon after occurrence as evident by the said prosecution witnesses. At the same time it is very important to note that the victim was completely an innocent teenager who had no fault of such dire consequences at the hands of the accused persons. Since the determination of awarding sentence to the accused persons is at the middle point of views, it may turn to impose capital punishment or imprisonment for life and that is why, the advantage of lesser one shall find the accused persons to acquire in the instant case. More so, both the accused persons have no significant history of prior criminal activities and their PC and PR [previous conviction and previous records] are found nil in the police report. In this regard it finds support from the decision in the case of Nalu –Vs-The State, reported in 1 ALR(AD)(2012) 222 where one of the mitigating factors was previous records of the accused.

Circulars, Nitimala, Paripatra etc.
It is well settled that in exercise of executive functions of the government, the government can issue circulars, notifications, paripatra etc. to keep its work transparent. Such notifications or circular etc. may be issued in order to give benefits of the enlisted freedom fighters, which is no doubt an appreciable job by the government. But in doing so, the government cannot amend the parent law, namely the definition of freedom fighter as provided by Article 2(h) of P.O. 94 of 1972.
Section 2(11) of the Bangladesh
Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust Act, 2018 (Act No.51 of 2018),
When parliament itself cannot fix the age of freedom fighters as the fixing of such age of freedom fighters will be contrary to the Speech of Bangabandhu and the Declaration of Independence by Bangabandhu, which are part of the Constitution, the same Parliament cannot empower the government to fix such age. On this very simple ground, this empowerment “উক্ত সময়ে যাহাদের বয়স সরকার কর্তৃক নির্ধারিত বয়স সীমার মধ্যে” as incorporated in the definition of বীর মুক্তিযোদ্ধা under section 2(11) of the Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust Act, 2018 (Act No.51 of 2018), has become untra-vires the Constitution.
It has long been decided by various judicial pronouncements that which you cannot do directly, you cannot do the same indirectly. As stated above, when the Parliament itself cannot fix the age of the freedom fighters even by enactment of law without amending the Constitution, it cannot empower anybody including the government to fix such age of freedom fighters.