For Article 102 (2) to be attracted however the petitioner must be aggrieved by an action of a person performing functions “in connection with the affairs of the Republic”, or local authority or statutory body and he should be without any other alternative remedy or redress . The remedy sought by the petitioner is simply a direction on the Respondent No. 1 for inspecting the petitioner’s factory and publishing the findings in its website. If the petitioner’s factor is unsafe and not fit in any way then the Respondent No. 1 has nothing to loose. The petitioner cannot seek remedy from the Civil Court or any other forum in the form of a direction since there is no contractual relationship with the respondent No. 1. Similarly an action for defamation also will not serve any purpose since the petitioner wants the Respondent No. 1 to publish the accurate condition of its factory. Thus to compel the Respondent No. 1 to inspect its factory and publish the findings in its website the petitioner does not appear to have any other alternative remedy. In such view of the matter therefore this Rule is also maintainable under Article 102 (2).

In Bangladesh Vs. Shafiuddin Ahmed reported in 50 DLR (AD) 27 it has been clearly stated that marks fixed for interview should be kept to a minimum so that the accumulated credits achieved by the candidates over the years in their respective ACRs should not be disregarded by a momentary impression created in the minds of the Interview Board. However as stated earlier, such practice for providing promotion to the employees solely on the basis of an interview is unfair and creates sufficient scope for arbitrariness and unlawful decisions for which aggrieved persons may take the opportunity of getting redress. It is therefore hoped that the respondents Biman authority shall take appropriate measure in this regard to fill up the lacuna. In this respect it is to be pointed out that in several decisions in the Indian jurisdiction including B.V. Sivalah V. K. Addanki Babu reported in 1998 6 SCC 720 as well as Horigovind Yadav Vs.Rewa Sidhi Gramin Bank and others in (2006) 6 SCC 145 promotions with seniority were given to certain officers with retrospective effect for not having been promoted earlier for the ends of justice and in the instant case we feel that the petitioner is in a similar position and has been deprived unlawfully by an unfair method of selection for promotion and deserves to be promoted along with those listed in the impugned order

There is a constitutional bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division under Article 102(2)(a) of the Constitution, if there is any other equally efficacious remedy provided by law.

If any impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction in the sense of not being authorized by the statute or is in violation of a constitutional provision, a Writ Petition will be maintainable without exhaustion of the statutory remedy. Besides, on the ground of mala fides, the petitioner may come up with a Writ Petition bypassing the statutory alternative remedy. It is well-settled that mala fides goes to the root of jurisdiction and if the impugned action is mala fide, the alternative remedy provided by the statute need not be availed of.

Equality before law” is not to be interpreted in its absolute sense to hold that all persons are equal in all respects disregarding different conditions and circumstances in which they are placed or special qualities and characteristics which some of them may possess but which are lacking in others. The term “equal protection of law” is used to mean that all persons or things are not equal in all cases and that persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar way and that people of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same. When a case can be decided without striking down the law but giving the relief to the petitioners, that course is always better than striking down the law.”

It follows that the petitioner can very well seek a remedy under article 102 (2) (b) (ii), of course subject to the condition that no other efficacious remedy is available to him. In seeking a remedy under clause 102(2)(b)(ii). He does not have to be an aggrieved person for filing this case.

The underlying principle of a writ quo warranto, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of India and as quoted above, is clearly the same as enshrined in clause 102(2) (b) (ii) of our Constitution. Under this clause, “any person” can file an application and this court can, upon such an application, exercise the jurisdiction a writ of quo warranto. The applicant is not required to be “an aggrieved person” as opposed to the requirement of clause (1) and (2) (a) of article 102 under which a public interest ligation may be filed. In such a case the duty of this is court to hold an inquiry on the allegation and to arrive at a decision keeping in view of the legal and factual issues.

(a) The issue of maintainability on account of standing of the petitioner to file this case under article 102(2)(b)(ii) (Issue No. 1) is a purely legal issue, and it has been held that the case is maintainable on that count.

(b) The issue of maintainability on account of the bar or restriction imposed by article 125 of the Constitution (Issue No. 2) is purely a legal issue, and it has been held that article 125 article is not a legal bar to entertain this case and that the case is maintainable.

More over admittedly he was relased before expiry of 10 years. In such a back ground, it is the well settled principle of law that the fact of merely raising a claim different to the claim of jail authority or the finding of this court does not render it as a disputed question of fact. In fact, the date of his release as decided by this court as being on 01.06.2006 goes to his benefit in calculating the period of sentence served out by him and the quantam of remission permissible to him. If the date of his release claimed by him being 01.12.2005 is taken as correct he would be required to serve a longer period. So the issue of date release is not a disputed question of fact. (Ratio of Md. Emdadul Huq, J

Article 66(2) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Article 12(1)(d) of the RPO relates to the election disputes triable before the election Tribunal. These factual aspect of the writ petition which discussed above are not admitted rather, it is disputed in different aspect and without taking evidence about the disputed fact of date of release of the respondent No.7 from Jail custody, the calculation of blood donation to the Sandhani and the special remission provided in the Jail Code which is recorded in the history ticket, it cannot be decided in a summary proceeding in the writ petition.

In this respect Article 125 of the Constitution of Bangladesh is very much applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Particularly, the facts and circumstances arises in the writ petition is a clear bar as this type of dispute cannot be decided without any evidence both oral and documentary.

An election dispute can only be raised by way of an election in the manner provided therein. Where a right or liability is created by a statute providing special remedy for its enforcement such remedy as a matter of course must be availed of first. The High Court Division will not interfere with the electoral process as delineated earlier in this judgment, more so if it is an election pertaining to Parliament because it is desirable that such election should be completed within the time specified under the Constitution. In the instant case, a serious dispute as to the correct age of the appellant was raised before the High Court Division which was not at all a subject matter of decision on mere affidavits and certificates produced by the parties.

As regards the first ground, it may be stated that if the purpose of the writ petition was only to challenge the election of the appellant on the alleged ground of his being a defaulter then we would have felt no hesitation to declare at once that the writ petition was not maintainable. Indeed, we have already held while rejecting CPSLA No.21 of 1988 (quoted in the affidavit-in-opposition) that “such questions as to disqualification, etc. which are questions of fact are better settled upon evidence which can be done more appropriately before a Tribunal. In the summary proceeding under Article 102 it is not desirable and, more often than not, not possible to record a finding as to a disputed question of fact.”

It is now a well settled proposition of law that if there is efficacious and alternative remedy is available, a writ petition under Article 102 of the Constitution is not maintainable. Admittedly it has been raised whether Article 125 of the Constitution puts a bar in the instant case in hand. Admittedly as per the aforesaid provision of law there is a legal bar questioning the result of the election declared by the commission except following the provisions of RPO. In the present case in hand it appears that the petitioner in the disguise of Article 102 of the Constitution trying to enforce the provisions of RPO. In the present case in hand it further appears that the question as raised by the petitioner regarding certain declarations made by the respondent No.7 before the Election Commission which is completely a dispute to be resolved by the competent authority as provided in the Represented People Order (RPO).

In a suit for Specific Performance of Contract the essential ingredients which the plaintiffs are required to prove in order to succeed in a suit for Specific Performance of Contract, are that the Bainapatra is genuine, considerations money passed by the parties and delivery of possession was given in pursuance thereof.

We find that one of the fundamental principles governing the amendment of the pleadings is that all the controversies between the parties as far as possible should be included and multiplicity of the proceedings avoided.

The proviso to Sub-Section (2) of section 158 of the Ordinance vests discretion with the Commissioner of Taxes to reduce statutory requirement of payment under Sub-Section(2) of section 158 of the Ordinance, if the grounds stated in the application filed by the assessee applicant under the proviso appears reasonable to him/her. From the language of the proviso, we do not find any statutory duty of the CT to pass an order assigning reason.
Though there is no requirement to give an opportunity of hearing to the assessee-applicant or recording reason, but still the Commissioner of Taxes should be aware that his /her order must reflect reasonableness from where it can be transpire that the Commissioner of Taxes applied his/her judicial mind in passing the order. But for inadequacy or absence of reasonableness, the order cannot be set aside. It is discretion of the Commissioner of Taxes.

In the case at hand, we find that the Petition under section 540A was filed by the Public Prosecutor, though it has not been expressly mentioned whether the Public Prosecutor can file such an application; the Code does not prevent the Public Prosecutor from filing as such. The case reported in 14 DLR, aides us in concluding that, where there is no such provision preventing the Public Prosecutor from filing such an application, there is no harm if the Public Prosecutor draws the attention of the Court by filing such an application for the sake of expedition and deliverance of Justice

Facilitating misappropriation of the fund which was meant to be used for welfare of orphans, particularly when Begum Zia, the Prime Minister, had entrustment and dominion over it indisputably shocks the human conscience and such act reflects a mindset derogatory to humankind. Obviously Begum Zia had liability and obligation to look after whether the Trust so formed was in actual existence. But she did not do it. Thus Begum Zia was a conscious part of a designed plan to the criminal acts constituting the offence of Criminal breach of Trust as defined in section 405 of Penal Code.
Merely for the reason of political identity of a person prosecuted for an offence punishable under the penal law it cannot be said that she has been brought to justice on political victimization.
We do not find any legal justification and cogent ground to award lesser punishment to the principal offender Begum Zia than the other convicts who were the abators, considering her political and social status.
We consider it appropriate that justice would be met if the maximum sentence prescribed in section 409 of the Penal Code is awarded to Begum Zia so that the persons enjoying the highest position in any organ or any public office of the State thinks twice to go ahead with such criminal design in coming days.

It has been settled by this Division that when a proceeding is initiated which affects the rights of a party, the party whose right would be affected is to be given the opportunity to represent its case, whether statutory contemplated or not.
The Review Panel cannot, in exercising powers under Rule 60 of the PPR, proceed to assume more powers than actually conferred. In the instant case, the Review Panel has exceeded jurisdiction and therefore, its findings cannot be sustained.
It serves no purpose if the petitioner is awarded the tender but the NOC is not issued.
We take the view that the failure of the respondents in issuing the NOC is manifestly arbitrary and without lawful authority.

I am also of opinion that, in a suit for permanent injunction, this Court should satisfy itself as regards the lawful nature of the plaintiffs’ possession. In a suit for permanent injunction, the issue regarding title need not be and should not be conclusively decided, because the purpose of granting the relief of permanent injunction is to prevent forceful ouster of an apparently lawful occupant of the suit property, thereby disapproving the act of taking law into the defendants own hands. Nonetheless, the court should incidentally look into the title or other lawful basis of the plaintiffs acquiring and continuing in possession, to satisfy itself that the plaintiff is not an usurper or trespasser or a land grabber and that he has come in clean hands.

The applicant Md. Hossen and others, who had filed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were not entitled to be added as plaintiffs as heirs of deceased plaintiff No. 2 Haji Badsha Miah. Because, the admitted position is that, the suit property has been claimed (in the plaint) as the property of Abdul Nabi Malum Waqf Estate, not personal property of Haji Badsha Miah.
As such, the added plaintiff-petitioners have denied the interest of the Waqf Estate in the suit property by asserting their personal right in the same. Hence, their interest in the suit property is in conflict with that of the (surviving) plaintiff who claims herself as the sole Motwali (Manager) of the Waqf Estate, since another Motwali (plaintiff No. 2) has died.

Therefore, the interest claimed by the petitioner being in clear conflict with that claimed by the plaintiff, these Md. Hossen and 4 other are not entitled to be added as co-plaintiffs.

It is a mandatory provision of law that before cancellation of a license, the authority must give a chance to the licensee of being heard, failing which the cancellation has no basis in the eye of law.
In this case, the order does not show nor there is anything on record to show that the respondent has given any chance of hearing to the petitioner before making such an order of cancellation and forfeiture of securities. Therefore, the order is violative of the section 14(1) of the ordinance and was thus bad in law.
The writ Court will not examine and weigh the aggrieved person’s case on merit as an Appellate Court but to ensure that he was given a fair deal by the authority in accordance with law.

That the period between the declaration of schedule of election till the publication of the result in the official gazette has been held to be comprised in the election process. The case in our hand it appears that the petitioner filed writ petition before this court invoking the Article 102 of the Constitution before publication of the official gazette. As such the writ petition is not maintainable and the rule is liable to be discharged.

It appears that the plaintiff could not prove their case that they have any title in the suit land and also the possession. The main reasoning of this findings stated above that the basis of the title of the plaintiff is the settlement which was cancelled and the order of cancellation is in existence.

This sentence that someone be punished in such a manner is referred to as ‘Death Sentence’, whereas the act of carrying out the death sentence is known as execution. The execution is not only an exemplary punishment alone that can erase the crime from the society forever. Lesser punishments may significantly prevent or reduce the crimes from the society depending on the good governance and awareness of the people. To consider the lesser punishment from death sentence to life imprisonment mitigating evidence or circumstances must be stronger than that of aggravating evidence produced by the prosecution. In this case we find the following circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances,
1. Condemned prisoner committed double murder without any apparent motive and was suffering from mental derailment or some sort of mental disorder and also suffering from ovarian cyst and bronchial asthma;
2. Her paternal grandmother and maternal uncle had a history of psychiatric disorders according to exibit-15;
3. She was around 19[nineteen] year old at the relevant time and the occurrence took place just immediately after her attaining the age of majority;
4. She has no such significant history of prior criminal activity [criminal cases] and
5. She had willingly surrendered to the police station soon after two days of the occurrence.

The contention of learned Advocate Mr. S.M Abdul Mobin for the defence is that the sentence of death is too harsh in this case because both the accused persons tried to save the life of the victim removing him to more than one hospital from the place of occurrence as disclosed by the prosecution witnesses. Now the question is commutation of sentence as pointed out by the defence to be considered or not. In true sense, it is most difficult task on the part of a judge to decide what would be quantum of sentence in awarding upon an accused for committing the offence when it is proved by evidence beyond shadow of doubt but the judge should have considered the legal evidence and materials for punishment of the perpetrator not as a social activist [63 DLR 460, 18 BLD 81 and 57 DLR 591]. Sometimes, it depends on gravity of the offence and sometimes, it confers upon an aggravating or mitigating factor.

In such a situation, it is a very hard job for the court to determine the quantum of sentence whether it will be capital punishment or imprisonment for life upon the accused persons since they played a role for saving the victim’s life soon after occurrence as evident by the said prosecution witnesses. At the same time it is very important to note that the victim was completely an innocent teenager who had no fault of such dire consequences at the hands of the accused persons. Since the determination of awarding sentence to the accused persons is at the middle point of views, it may turn to impose capital punishment or imprisonment for life and that is why, the advantage of lesser one shall find the accused persons to acquire in the instant case. More so, both the accused persons have no significant history of prior criminal activities and their PC and PR [previous conviction and previous records] are found nil in the police report. In this regard it finds support from the decision in the case of Nalu –Vs-The State, reported in 1 ALR(AD)(2012) 222 where one of the mitigating factors was previous records of the accused.

Therefore, since the very definition of the term ‘Coaching Business’ has only attracted the involvement teachers of the above mentioned institutions as a mischief, this Nitimala in fact has not prohibited the ‘coaching business’, or ‘coaching centers’, run by any individual in his or her private capacity who is not a teacher of the above mentioned institutions. This means involvement of an individual, who is not a teacher of the above mentioned institutions, in such coaching centers or business has not been prohibited by this Nitimala. Therefore, the prohibition, as provided by this Nitimala, only applies to the teachers of the above mentioned institutions and not to any individuals or private citizens or persons, who are not teachers of such educational institutions.
From the above discussions, it appears that even in the absence of the said Nitimala, the petitioners and other teachers of non-government and government schools and colleges are not allowed to engage themselves in any sort of coaching business. This prohibition has not been provided by the said Nitimala of 2012, rather this has been given by their concerned service Rules which are delegated legislations and applicable to them. When the petitioners, or other teachers of government and non-government schools and colleges, joined their services, they joined as such fully knowing that the said Service Rules would be applicable to them. Therefore, by the said Nitimala, the government has in fact supplemented the provisions which are already in the statute books and in doing so, the government does not need to show any other sanction of statute or Act of parliament. It is the part of the constitutional power of the government as executive to run the governance and in running such governance, it is the duty and obligation of the government to take steps for implementation of the laws and regulations time to time enacted by the parliament or by the delegatees of the parliament. Under such obligations, the governments in modern countries issue various Circulars, Paripatra, Nitimala etc. and this has now become essential and normal administrative technic in modern countries. The only limitation in issuing such Nitimala or Nirdeshika is that by such Nitimala or Nirdeshika, the government cannot curtail the rights of any citizen which is already granted in his/her favour either by the Constitution or by law or by any other legal instruments.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the petitioners have failed to show that either the Constitution or any act of parliament or any delegated legislation of this Country has given them any right to get involved in coaching business. Rather, it has become evident from the above referred delegated legislations that in fact they have been prohibited by the law of the land from getting involved in coaching business. Thus, in so far as the said Nitimala is concerned, since the same has not curtailed any rights of the petitioners guaranteed either by the constitution or any law, it cannot be knocked down by this Court. Rather, it should be protected by this Court as it is the supplemental instrument to the already existing laws of the land. In this regard, the decisions of Indian Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106, Bishamber Daval Chandra Mohan v State of UP, AIR 1982 SC -33 and Distt. Collector, Chittoor v Chittor Disttt. Groundnut Traders Assn, AIR 1989 SC 989 may be looked into as references. Therefore, on this point of unconstitutionality and unimplementablity of the said Nitimala of 2012, as argued by the learned advocates for the petitioners, we find no substance.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that when the teachers get involved themselves in coaching business, which is prohibited by law, they are disobeying the direction of law and they know it fully that such disobedience might cause injury to the students or their guardians in that by such engagement they are utilizing their resources, potentials and capabilities in such coaching centers rather than using them in the class rooms. Therefore, this Court is of the view that, since this provision under Section 166 of the Penal Code has been incorporated in the Schedule to the Dudak Act, 2004, Dudak thinly had technical jurisdiction to enquire into the allegations as published in the news paper regarding the involvement of teachers in the coaching business. However, this thin and technical jurisdiction is only confined to the teachers of government colleges and schools and not to the teachers of non-government schools and colleges.
Though we are saying that technically Dudak had jurisdiction to enquire into the said matters, we are of the view that Dudak should have priority list as to which offences should get priority in their such enquiry and investigation when it is repeatedly reported in newspapers that Dudak does not have enough resources and logistic supports. We are of the view that leaving behind serious allegations of corruptions in National Banks, Customs Houses, Ports, Court Premises, Government Offices, Land Offices, etc. Dudak should not have inquired into the mere involvement of some teachers in coaching business relying on a newspaper report. When there are some other serious reports of corruption in the country, it does not also look well when Dudak shows such importance to some basically disciplinary matters when teachers of government schools are not attending classes on time. These apparently disciplinary issues should be kept at the bottom of Dudak’s priority list in particular when almost each and every institution of this country is now suffering from huge corruption being committed by its employees and staffs. Though by engaging in coaching businesses the said teachers have disobeyed the direction of law, but it cannot be said that they have committed any ‘corruption’ as we understand the term in its general and common parlance. Therefore, we are of the view that, though thinly and technically Dudak had jurisdiction to enquire into the matters as published in the newspaper as regards involvement of the government teachers in coaching business, they should not have conducted such enquiry at all. Such enquires should have been done by the education directorate of the government or the concerned ministry itself.