Since we hold that Sub-Sections (2) and (4) of Section 6 of the Ain, 1995 and Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 34 of the Ain of 2000 are ultra vires the Constitution, despite repeal of the Ain of 1995, all cases pending and the appeals pending under the repealed Ain shall be regulated under the said law, but on the question of imposing sentence, the sentences prescribed in respect of those offences shall hold the field until new legislation is promulgated. I hold that there was total absence of proper application of the legislative mind in promulgating those Ains, which may be rectified by amendments. In respect of section 303 of the Penal Code, the punishment shall be made in accordance with section 302 of the Penal Code. It is hereby declared that despite repeal of Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan (Bishesh Bidhan) Ain, 1995, the pending cases including appeal may be held under the repealed Ain, while dealing with the question of sentence, the alternative sentences provided in the corresponding offences prescribed in the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2000 shall be followed.

Writ petitioners did not challenge any disciplinary action taken against them by the Inspector General of Police. The authority did not give the directions in accordance with the Police Act or the Bengal Police Regulations or the Ordinance of 1969. The writ petitioners also did not challenge the propriety of the imposition of black marks upon them. They have challenged the embargo imposed upon them by the Police Headquarter, which directly affected their right to be considered for promotion to the next higher post. Clause (5) of Article 102 does not stand in their way of making an application under Article 102(1) of the Constitution subject to the provision of Article 45 of the Constitution.

In view of the clear bar under article 47(3) of the Constitution read with article 102(3) thereof, the High Court Division had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in question and the same not being entertainable, it ought to have summarily rejected the writ petition on the ground of its maintainability.

The High Court Division observed: `The present writ petition without preferring any objection/appeal under section 9(2ka)/42 of the VAT Act is not also maintainable.' We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court Division.

The Administrative Appellate Tribunal came into a finding that while passing the impugned decision the Administrative Tribunal failed to consider that the departmental proceeding against respondent No.1 was not initiated and disposed of legally and that the Administrative Tribunal arrived at a wrong finding in disallowing the case causing serious miscarriage of justice. The findings arrived at and the decision made by the Administrative Appellate Tribunal having been based on proper appreciation of law and fact do not call for interference.

The reason of delay in lodging FIR even after the release of the victim from the clutch of the accused has not been properly described; so it is very difficult to consider the evidence of prosecutrix, P.W.2 as beyond any reasonable doubt which is the fundament requirement of conviction of an accused person. (Majority View)

It appears from the petition of complaint that the respondent sent taka 6,00,000/- to the appellant through Bank with an understanding that he would supply the cloths at a reduced rate during Eid period. Though the appellant admitted that he had received the said amount but without supplying clothes he had repaid his loan by the said money, thereby, misappropriated the same. Lastly, he denied repaying the said money to the complainant. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is difficult to accept that prima-facie ingredients of section 406/420 of the Penal Code had not been established against the appellant