Home : Supreme Court of Bangladesh

Serial No.	Name of the Parties, Citation and Key Words	Summary of the case	Key Ratio
1.	Dr. Badiul Alam Majumdar and others Vs. Government of Bangladesh and others (Farah Mahbub, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Preamble;Article 123(3); Article 7, 44, 142 of the Constitution; Basic structure doctrine; amendment; living constitution; Non-Party Caretaker Government System; constitutional sedition;Fifteenth Amendment Act, 2011; Referendum.	In Writ Petition No.9935 of 2024, the petitioners, as conscious citizens, filed a public interest litigation under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, challenging the Fifteenth Amendment Act, 2011 (Act No.14 of 2011) as ultra vires the Constitution. They also sought directions regarding whether previous actions taken under this Amendment should be condoned as transaction past and closed. Finding prima-facie substance, the Court issued a Rule Nisi. Interveners later joined to assist the Court, and their participation was allowed. Subsequently, in Writ Petition No.12431 of 2024, the petitioner challenged specific sections of the Fifteenth Amendment Act—Sections 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 20, 21, 22, 39, 42, 44, 47, 50, 53, and 55—seeking declaration of them as ultra vires and void, leading to the issuance of another Rule Nisi. While adjudicating the validity of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 2011, the Hon’ble High Court Division embarked upon an extensive constitutional inquiry into some of the most profound questions, inter alia, whether the essential parts of the Constitution forming its basic structure are immune from amendment; whether the Non-Party Caretaker Government System, reflecting the will of the people, constitutes an integral part of that structure; and whether the amending power conferred by Article 142 remains subordinate to the supremacy clause embodied in Article 7. Further scrutiny was directed towards the validity of the amendment of Article 142 itself—particularly the omission of the referendum provision—and the constitutional propriety of introducing the concept of “Constitutional Sedition” under Article 7A(3) in light of established principles of penal jurisprudence. Ultimately, the Court observed that the Fifteenth Amendment had not fully conformed to the constitutional procedures and limitations prescribed for amendment, concluding that the said amendment was partially ultra vires the Constitution and stood in conflict with the Basic Structure Doctrine.	Verdict on legality and propriety of the Constitution Fifteenth Amendment Act, 2011: — “In the light of the above observations and findings following decisions have been taken by this Court: a) Act No. 14 of 2011, i.e. Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 2011 is found not void as a whole; b) The repeal of Article 58A and Chapter IIA of the Constitution with regard to Non-Party Caretaker Government vide Sections 20 and 21 of the Act No.14 of 2011 has destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution, i.e. democracy; hence, those two sections are declared void being ultra vires the Constitution, with prospective effect; c) With the repeal of referendum, as it was part of Article 142 of the Constitution vide Twelfth Amendment Act, 1991 has negated the will of the people to express their opinion on the amendability of the Preamble and Articles 8, 48 and 56 of the Constitution; hence, repealing the provision of referendum under Article 142 vide Section 42 of the Act No.14 of 2011 is declared void, being repugnant to and inconsistent with the basic structure of the Constitution. Consequently, Article 142 as it then was vide Twelfth Amendment Act, 1991 is hereby restored; d) Incorporating Articles 7A and 7B after Article 7 of the Constitution is squarely contradictory to Article 7, guaranteeing the will of the people and the supremacy of the Constitution including the right of freedom of thought and conscious and of speech and expression. It also, has taken away the power of amendability of the successor Parliament. Hence, it is declared void and a nullity in the eye of the supreme law of the land, i.e. the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Consequently, Section 7 of the Act, 2011 incorporating Articles 7A and 7B after Article 7 of the Constitution is hereby declared void being ultra-vires the Constitution; e)High Court Division is the creature of the Constitution with plenary power of judicial review over the impugned actions of the executive, even the legislature. It has the power to declare amendment of law void which touches the basic structure of the Constitution. Moreso, High Court Division is the guardian of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. The Legislature vide Article 44(2) has allowed said power of the High Court Division to be swallowed up by any other court, which is the product of statute. Thus, it comes in direct conflict with Article 102(1) read with Article 44(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, Section 18 of the Act No.14 of 2011 so far it relates to incorporation of Article 44(2) is hereby declared as void, non-est and a nullity having altered the basic structure of the Constitution; and f) Except Article 58A and Chapter IIA, Article 142 so far it relates to repeal of referendum, Articles 7A and 7B and Article 44(2) of the Constitution, the legality and propriety of all other impugned Sections of the Act No.14 of 2011, i.e. the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 2011 vide which respective Articles of the Constitution including its Preamble have been amended by the Parliament by way of insertion, modification, substitution, repeal etc., are left to be looked into/decided by the successor Parliament in accordance with law. …(Para312)
2.	Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK) and others Vs. Bangladesh and other (Md. Rezaul Hasan, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Right to shelter; Section5(1),Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recover of Possession) Ordinance, 1970; Eviction notices on Unauthorized occupation; No legitimate expectation from illegality; Due-process requirement in eviction	In the instant writ petition, Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), acting as a public interest litigant, together with three individual residents of the Shyamoli Road No. 2 slum, impugned eviction notices dated 09.04.2017 issued under section 5(1) of the Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1970. The petitioners alleged that the notices were arbitrary and violative of Articles 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution. The respondents contended that the land in question had long since been allotted for the construction of government offices, that possession had been duly handed over to the authorities concerned, and that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants. It was further asserted that the impugned notices strictly complied with the minimum notice requirements under the Ordinance. Upon consideration, the Court held that the claimed “right to shelter” is traceable to Article 15 of the Constitution, which forms part of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy and is therefore non-justiciable and not enforceable through writ jurisdiction. The notices in question were lawfully issued under section 5(1) of the Ordinance, and no unlawful occupation can mature into a vested right or a legitimate expectation capable of defeating lawful eviction. While recognising that eviction must be carried out in accordance with law and with due regard to human dignity, the Court concluded that the authorities were vested with clear legal authority to proceed. Accordingly, the Rule was discharged and the earlier order of stay was vacated.	We are also of the opinion that, no length of unlawful occupation will validate the same, nor will create any legitimate expectation to get immunity from eviction under the Ordinance. Law in this respect is equal for all, slum dwellers or not. ... (Para 13)
3.	Nazrul Islam Vs. Government of Bangladesh and others. (J. B. M. Hassan, J.) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences;Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; Article 102(2) (b) (i) of the Constitution	The facts, in their essential contour, disclose that—a series of writ petitions were instituted under Article 102(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution in the nature of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of continued detention following multiple convictions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The detenu had been convicted in eight separate proceedings for dishonour of cheques, each resulting in a sentence of one year’s imprisonment with fine. The judgments directed that the sentence would commence from the date of arrest or surrender. The detenu was arrested in mid-2013, and it was contended that the sentence expired in mid-2014, thereby rendering any further confinement unlawful. The ratio for determination is whether Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates consecutive sentences in multiple convictions, or whether the trial courts’ directions fixing commencement from the date of arrest or surrender imply concurrency. The crux lies in reconciling the statutory mandate with the operative effect of judicial directions.	Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,in the case more than one sentence of imprisonment: “On a plain reading of [Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898], it appears that in the case more than one sentence of imprisonment, the subsequent imprisonment shall commence after the expiration of the imprisonment to which has been previously sentenced. In other words, the sentences shall run consecutively one after another i.e the sentence being one year in each case, in 8 (eight) cases the detenu has to suffer eight consecutive years, one after another. However, in the said provision there is an exception with the words “unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence” which clearly indicate that sentences of all cases may run concurrently i.e by one year if in the subsequently judgment the Court directs as above”. ...(Para10)
4.	Mir Forjet Ali Vs. Rajab Ali Matubbar and others (Md. Ruhul Quddus, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Specific Performance of Contract for sale, Adjudication of third party‘s claim of title and possession in a suit for specific Performance of Contract for sale .	In Civil Revision No. 1615 of 1993, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a 1978 agreement to purchase land from the defendant, who allegedly received Tk. 18,000 as earnest money but later refused to execute the sale deed. The defendants, his sons, contested the claim, asserting that the land had already been gifted to them through a registered deed executed in 1972 and that the alleged agreement was forged. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, but the appellate court reversed the decision. Upon revision, the High Court held that since the defendants claimed independent title and possession under an earlier registered gift deed, their claim should have been adjudicated within the same suit to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Referring to precedents including Bajrang Lal Agarwala v. Aksed Ali Shaikh (35 DLR 110) and Sh. Barkatullah v. Khawaja Mohammad Ibrahim (22 DLR (SC) 419), the Court observed that under exceptional circumstances a third party’s claim of possession and prima facie title may be examined in a suit for specific performance. Applying Section 25(a) of the Specific Relief Act, which disqualifies a person from seeking specific performance where the vendor has no title, the Court remanded the case for expert comparison of the vendor’s thumb impressions and for determination of the defendants’ possession and title, holding that such adjudication was necessary for complete justice and to prevent future litigation.	Under exceptional circumstances, a third party’s claim of physical possession and prima-facie title can be adjudicated on merit in a suit for specific performance of contract, where he is already made a party and claims independent title and physical possession over the subject matter of the contract. This will help avoid multiplicity of litigations and future complications. …(Para 23)
5.	Md. Afzalur Rahman Vs. The state and another (Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Further investigation;Suo Moto order; Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; Section 10(1A) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958; sections Section 435 & 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.	The brief facts of this case suggests that following an inquiry, the Anti-Corruption Commission lodged an FIR alleging that certain government officials, in collusion with contractors, abused their official positions, resulting in incomplete work and financial loss to the public. Investigation led to submission of a charge sheet against selected accused, with sanction for prosecution accorded and cognizance taken by the Special Judge. The petitioner, among the accused, surrendered and was granted bail, which was upheld after transfer of the case for trial to the Divisional Special Judge. Prior to framing of charges, the accused-petitioner sought further investigation under Section 5(6) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, which was rejected. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court under Section 439 CrPC and related provisions, resulting in issuance of the present Rule.One of the core legal points that the court addressed in this case was whether an accused, notwithstanding the general rule against seeking further investigation in criminal cases, may invoke the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, to request further investigation in appropriate circumstances.	Special Judge’s Suo Moto power for an order for further investigation:“Any Special Judge can even Suo Moto order for further investigation if it comes to his knowledge that the investigation was conducted in the manner which is unfair and perfunctory and intentionally designed to mislead the Court. The Court shall not play in the hand of the investigating Officer but the learned Special Judge failed to act as per Section 5(6) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958.” ... (Para 36)
6.	Meejab Ltd Vs. AA Knitspin Ltd (Md. Mozibur Rahman Miah, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Letter of Credit, Injunction, Delivery of Challan	Meejab Limited, an export-oriented garment company, filed Title Suit No. 127 of 2021 seeking to stop payments under several back-to-back letters of credit (BTB LCs) opened in favor of suppliers (defendants1–5).The plaintiff alleged that defendants 1–5, in collusion with defendants 6 and 7, defrauded it by not supplying the contracted goods (fabrics) and instead submitting delivery challans to obtain payments.The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction on 09.02.2021, leading to this appeal.The High Court initially granted an interim injunction in March 2021, restraining payments for eight weeks, which was extended multiple times.Respondent suppliers argued that goods were duly supplied as per LCs, supported by invoices, delivery challans, and shipping documents and that the plaintiff even used the materials to export finished garments abroad.They also contended that the bank’s obligation to honor LCs is absolute and independent of disputes between buyer and seller, unless clear fraud is proven.The appellant later attempted to introduce new evidence alleging substitution of fabrics with yarn, but the court found these claims inconsistent and belated.The larger bench of the High Court, after Appellate Division’s reference, held that no fraud had been established and reiterated the settled principle that LC payments cannot be restrained. The court observed that the plaintiff failed to raise objections at the time of delivery and had already benefited from the goods, making its fraud allegation an afterthought.Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal and discharged the connected civil rule, vacating the earlier injunction and allowing the bank to proceed with payments under the disputed LCs.	Under no circumstances an LC issuing bank can be restrained or withheld in making payment to a supplier/exporter even if fraud has been alleged by any buyer/importer and the bank has been put on notice about such fraud. In the penultimate observation and discussion, we explicitly found that no case of fraud has been established by the appellant and the bank is not abreast with the alleged fraud either. ...(Para31)
7.	Rural Power Company Ltd Vs. Lahmeyer International Pally Power Services Ltd (Mahmudul Hoque, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Execution, Restored the Execution Case, Order 21- Rule 11 of CPC, Section 48 of CPC, Article 182 of Limitation Act, Inherent Power of the Court.	The case arose from a Money Execution Case No. 05 of 2009 filed by Lahmeyer International Pally Power Services Limited (LIPPS) for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award from the Singapore International Arbitration Centre.The award was passed on 02.10.2006 and the execution case was filed on 30.09.2009 before the District Judge, Dhaka.The decree-holderregularly took steps for nearly eight years but on 04.05.2017 failed to appear, leading to dismissal of the execution case for default.On 11.05.2017, the decree-holder applied for restoration of the case, which the judgment-debtors opposed.On 29.11.2017, the District Judge restored the case upon payment of Tk. 5,000 as costs.Rural Power Company Limited (RPCL), the judgment-debtor, challenged this restoration before the High Court Division under Section 115 of the CPC.RPCL argued that execution proceedings cannot be restored once dismissed for default and the decree-holder’s only remedy was to file a fresh execution case.LIPPS argued that the absence on 04.05.2017 was caused by a mistake in the cause list, and restoration was justified under the court’s inherent powers.The High Court Division held that though CPC contains no express provision for restoration, the court may use Section 151 CPC in exceptional circumstances, especially when dismissal resulted partly from a court’s mistake.The Rule was discharged, the restoration order upheld, and the executing court directed to dispose of the case expeditiously.	For speedy disposal of the proceeding by filing an application for restoration and allowing the same in exercise of inherent power of the court, in our view, has caused no injustice to the judgment debtors, moreover, it is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction but at best it can be said to be a case of an inappropriate decision restoring the case. This by itself does not justify interference by this Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mere restoration of an execution case by exercising inherent power of the executing court has not occasioned any injustice to the judgment-debtors, hence, we do not find any reason for interfering with the order passed. This is an exception to the principle of generality and shall not be applicable in every case, like the present one, unless the dismissal of the execution case was caused by the mistake of the court or because of any strenuous circumstance arises beyond the control of the decree-holder subject to the provisions of Section 48 of the Code and Article 182 of the Limitation Act. ... (Para 15)
8.	Al Mamun Mirza and another Vs. Haji Md. Akkash Ali and another (Md. Badruzzaman, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Rejection of Plaint, Locus standi	The appeal arose from the judgment dated 28.10.2019 of the 2nd Joint District Judge, Narayangonj, rejecting the plaint in Title Suit No. 522 of 2018 under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.The plaintiffs (appellants) had filed the suit seeking a declaration that defendant No.1 must execute and register a sale deed of the “Ka” schedule land under an agreement dated 07.05.2015.They also sought a declaration that the subsequent sale deed (“Kha” schedule) in favor of defendant No.2 was collusive, forged, and not binding.The defendants argued that the agreement covered only 0.08 acre of land, which was already fully transferred by two sale deeds in 2015, and the plaintiffs had no further claim.They also contended the suit was barred by limitation since the agreement expired in October 2015, and no suit for specific performance was filed within the required time.The trial court accepted this plea and rejected the plaint as barred by limitation.On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that rejection under Order VII Rule 11 could only be based on the plaint itself, and not on defendants’ pleadings or external materials.The respondents contended that under sections 12 and 21A of the Specific Relief Act, a suit for specific performance required deposit of the balance consideration and ad valorem court fees, which the plaintiffs had failed to do.The High Court Division held that the plaintiffs lacked legal title to the land, their suit was barred under section 21A of the Specific Relief Act, and they had no locus standi to challenge the sale deed.Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming rejection of the plaint as barred by limitation and devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.	A suit may be specifically barred by law and, in such an event, the matter would come under the express terms of clause (d) of rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even in a case where a suit is not permitted by necessary implication of law in the sense that a positive prohibition can be spelt out of legal provisions, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to reject the plaint and this really amounts to saying that Order VII, rule 11 of the Code is not exhaustive and a plaint can be rejected by resorting to section 151 of the Code. ... (Para 38)
9.	Bimal Mistri and others Vs. Anil Mistri (Bhishmadev Chakrabortty, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Declaration of Title, Funeral ceremonies, Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law	The case concerns a civil revision filed by the defendant-petitioners (Bimal Mistri and others) against the plaintiff-opposite party (Anil Mistri) regarding inheritance of property under Hindu Law.The disputed property originally belonged to three brothers: Gouranga, Surendra, and Rajendra Mistri.Rajendra and his only son Haribol died after consuming poisonous fish, leaving no surviving heirs in his line.The plaintiff, Anil Mistri (son of Gouranga), claimed that since Surendra refused to perform Rajendra’s funeral rites, he (the nephew) did so and thus inherited Rajendra’s share of the land.The defendants argued that Surendra, being Rajendra’s brother, rightfully inherited the land under Dayabhaga Hindu Law, regardless of funeral performance.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, holding against his claim of inheritance.On appeal, the Joint District Judge reversed the decision, granting title to the plaintiff on the ground that Surendra forfeited inheritance by not performing funeral rites.The defendant-petitioners challenged this appellate decision before the High Court Division.The High Court held that under Dayabhaga Law, Surendra, as Rajendra’s brother, ranked higher in the order of inheritance than the nephew, and non-performance of funeral rites is not a disqualification for inheritance.The Court set aside the appellate judgment, restored the trial court’s dismissal, and ruled that the property rightfully vested in Surendra and his heirs.	In view of the aforesaid provisions of Hindu law, I do not find that for nonperformance of funeral ceremonies of a deceased, a person would be excluded from inheriting the property left by him. It is well settled position of Hindu law that inheritance is never in abeyance. On the death of a hindu, the person who is then the nearest heir becomes entitled at once to the property left by him. The right of succession vests in him immediately on the death of the owner of the property. ... (Para 12)
10.	Md. Moslem Vs. The State and another (Md. Shohrowardi, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Section 138, N.I. Act; Cheque dishonour; Section 138 (1A), N.I. Act, 1881; Dishonour slip; Proof of service of notice with Acknowledgement Due (AD)	This criminal revision arose out of a conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner, Md. Moslem, proprietor of M/S Nasir Enterprise, had been prosecuted on the basis of a complaint lodged by NCC Bank Ltd., Nawabganj Branch, alleging dishonour of a cheque dated 22.06.2016 for Tk. 84,31,510.32, purportedly returned unpaid on 18.08.2016. The trial court, upon conclusion of proceedings, found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to six months’ simple imprisonment together with a fine equivalent to the cheque amount. The appellate court, by affirming the judgment and order of conviction, sustained the sentence. In revision, the High Court Division scrutinized whether the essential pre-conditions stipulated in section 138 had been duly complied with. On perusal of the record, it appeared that the cheque in question bore no signature or date of any bank official, nor was there an authenticated bank seal evidencing due presentation. No deposit slip was exhibited in proof of presentment, notwithstanding that a “dishonour slip” was issued. Moreover, although a legal notice dated 01.09.2016 was claimed to have been sent by registered post, it was not dispatched with acknowledgment due; there was no material before the Court to establish actual service upon the drawer or the date of receipt. Consequently, the prosecution failed to demonstrate when the cause of action contemplated under proviso (c) accrued. The Court held that the complainant had not fulfilled the mandatory requirements prescribed under provisos (a)–(c) to section 138, read conjointly with section 138(1A) providing for special statutory modes of service. It was further observed that recourse to section 27 of the General Clauses Act could not remedy such defects nor substitute proof of the date of receipt. In consequence, the High Court Division set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below, made the Rule absolute, and directed that the petitioner-convict be at liberty to withdraw fifty per cent of the cheque amount earlier deposited, upon application, within seven days.	Despite the provision made in section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1958, the Legislature inserted sub-section (1A) in Section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by Act No.III of 2006 regarding the mode of sending notice under clause b of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Under Section 138(1)(1A) of the said Act the notice is required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque, a. by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or b. by sending it by registered post with acknowledgement due to that person at his usual or last known place of abode or business in Bangladesh; or c. by publication in a daily Bangla national newspaper having wide circulation. The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a special law. Service of notice upon the accused in compliance with the provision made in Section 138(1) (1A) of the said Act at least by one mode as stated above is sine qua non. …(Para 14)
11.	Kazi Abdul Bakir Vs. Nur Taj Hossain Suchona (Fatema Najib, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Keywords: Family court; Jurisdiction of family court to decide on the validity of Kabinnama; Validity of marriage; Section 10 of CPC; Multiplicity of suits; Stay of family court proceedings pending civil suit	In Civil Revision No. 1497 of 2021, the petitioner, Kazi Abdul Bakir, assailed the continuance of a family suit instituted by his wife, Nur Taj Hossain Suchona, before the Family Court at Gazipur. The petitioner had earlier filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that the marriage kabinnama dated 06.01.2017 was void, alleging suppression of the opposite party’s subsisting prior marriage and consequent fraudulent inducement into the present marriage. Thereafter, the opposite party brought a family suit claiming dower of Tk. 10,00,000 and maintenance. The petitioner sought stay of the family suit pending disposal of his civil suit, which prayer was rejected by both the trial court and the appellate court. In revision, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the two suits raised an identical and fundamental question—namely, whether a valid marriage subsisted between the parties—and hence, in terms of section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the family suit ought to be stayed to obviate inconsistent findings. Conversely, the opposite party contended that under the Family Courts Ordinance, 1985, the Family Court, as a special forum, was empowered to incidentally determine the validity of marriage where such determination was indispensable to adjudicating claims of dower and maintenance. Upon consideration of the statutory provisions and judicial authorities, the Court held that, notwithstanding the earlier institution of the civil suit, the Family Court retained jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of marriage in deciding ancillary claims. Emphasising the principle that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided and effective relief may be granted in the family suit itself, the Court found no cogent ground to stay the proceedings. Accordingly, the Rule was discharged, the order of stay vacated, and the Family Court was directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously.	On perusal those decisions it is clear Family court has got every jurisdiction to decide as to whether the ‘kabinnama’in question is a genuine and valid document or not. It transpires that though the matter of validity of marriage does not strictly fall within preview of section 5 of the Family Courts Ordinance such a question may be decided by a Family Court if the husband denies the marriage. Though civil suit passed earlier, Family Suit filed latter, but since in Family Suit the validity of marriage and dower and maintenance can be decided so, to avoid multiplicity of suit the subsequent Family suit cannot be stayed. …(Para 26)
12.	Md. Zahangir Alam and others Vs. Ziaul Haque and others (S M Kuddus Zaman, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Jurisdiction of Land Survey Tribunal; Jurisdiction of Land Survey Appellate Tribunal; Adjudication on the question of title and possession by Land Survey Tribunal; Declaration as the errors of S.A. Khatian in a proceeding before Land Survery Tribunal	The opposite parties instituted a suit before the Land Survey Tribunal, Chandpur, seeking a declaration that two B.S. khatians recorded in the names of the defendants were unlawful, together with a direction for preparation of a new khatian in their favour in respect of 19 decimals of land. Their claim was founded on inheritance and a registered deed of gift executed in 1970. The defendants contested, contending that their predecessors had lawfully acquired the entire 31 decimals of land through registered deeds of exchange in 1932, that their names were duly recorded in the S.A. khatian, and that such entries were correctly carried forward to the B.S. khatians. The Land Survey Tribunal decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, which decree was subsequently upheld by the Land Survey Appellate Tribunal. Aggrieved, the defendants preferred a civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon hearing, the Court observed that the Land Survey Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals are not civil courts and are not vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title or possession in respect of immovable property. Their competence is confined to detecting errors or omissions in the preparation of B.S. khatians. By declaring the S.A. khatian erroneous and pronouncing upon title, both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal had clearly acted in excess of jurisdiction. The Court accordingly held that the civil revision was not maintainable. Nonetheless, in disposing of the matter, it issued guidelines delineating the proper jurisdiction and functions of the Land Survey Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals.	The Land Survey Tribunal being not a civil court it has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit involving dispute as to title and possession in immovable property. ...(Para 19)
13.	Mst Nurunnahar Iqbal and others Vs. Md. Rustom Ali Bepari and others (Md Atoar Rahman, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key words: Validity of Minor’s contract; Section 11 of Contract Act, 1872; Section 21A, Specific Relief Act, 1877; Depositing balance of consideration pending suit for specific performance;	The petitioners, being minors at the relevant time, entered into a registered contract for sale with the defendant, who accepted almost the entire consideration but subsequently refused to execute the sale deed. The petitioners thereafter instituted a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the suit, which dismissal was affirmed in appeal, on the ground that the contract was void ab initio since minors are incompetent to contract under section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872. Aggrieved, the petitioners invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court Division under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that, while contracts entered into by minors cannot be enforced against them, an executed contract made for the benefit of minors may nevertheless be enforced at their instance. However, the Court further observed that the present suit was barred by section 21A(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, as the petitioners had failed to deposit the balance of the consideration money at the time of filing the suit, which was a statutory precondition. Accordingly, although the Court differed from the reasoning adopted by the courts below, it found no merit in the revision. The Rule was therefore discharged.	There was no scope to give direction or permission to deposit the balance amount of consideration to the plaintiff-appellants after filing the suit and, as such, the suit is hopelessly barred under section 21A(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. ...(Para 19)
14.	Jamir Ali and others Vs. Bangladeshand another (Mohi Uddin Shamim,J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Alluvion; Diluvion; Section 86 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950; Vesting; Extinguishment of Rights	The plaintiffs-appellants sought a declaration of title over 2.86 acres of land, claiming purchase and continuous possession after its reappearance following river erosion in 1974, and challenged the R.S. record prepared in the Government’s name in 1970. The Government argued that, under section 86 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 as amended by P.O. No. 135 of 1972, land lost by diluvion and reappearing after 1972 vested in the Government. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ rights were extinguished, their claim lacked legal recognition, and the suit was barred by limitation. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial Court’s Judgment and Decree.	Land lost by diluvion and reappearing after 1972 vests absolutely in the Government under section 86 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950: In view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 86 as quoted above, the lands lost by diluvion before or after the commencement of State Acquisition and Tenancy (Fourth Amendment) Order, 1972 and reappeared on or after the said date of commencement of the said Order, 1972 shall vest in the Government. In the instant case, the suit lands were lost by diluvion in 1967 as claimed by the plaintiff appellants and the same reappeared in 1974 i.e. after the commencement of the State Acquisition and Tenancy (Fourth Amendment) Order, 1972 and as such, the lands vest in the Government. However, as per sub-section (5) of section 86 of the amendment to the Act on 1994, those re-appeared lands may be settled/allotted to the owners of the lands if they fulfill the condition attached there in section 86 (5). …(Para 24)
15.	Rahela Akhter (Rumi) and others Vs. Md. Akter Ali (Md. Riaz Uddin Khan,J) 20 SCOB [2024] HCD Key Words: Ad-interim stay; Revisional application; Implied refusal; Limitation; Title Execution	In the Civil revision under section 115(4) CPC, the petitioners challenged the District Judge’s order dated 02.03.2010 condoning delay and admitting revision but refraining from granting ad-interim stay of further proceedings in Title Execution Case No. 01 of 1998. The High Court Division held that non-grant of interim stay amounts to implied refusal, thereby entitling the petitioners to seek revisional remedy. Relying on precedents, the Court made the Rule absolute, stayed all further execution proceedings pending before the Assistant Judge, and directed the District Judge to first dispose of the stay application and thereafter the revision within six months.	If a court does not expressly grant an ad-interim stay application, the inaction is treated as an implied refusal: It also appears from the order that the learned District Judge refrained himself from passing any order regarding the application for staying operation of all further proceedings of the Title Execution case no. 01 of 1998. Now the question before me is that, since the learned District Judge did not pass any interim order regarding the prayer for stay of further proceedings of Title Execution Case No. 01 of 1998, whether it amounts to refusal of the ad-interim prayer of the petitioners. The application for stay is still pending before the learned district judge. If a relief is claimed in ad-interim form, but is not expressly granted, it shall be deemed to have been refused and the aggrieved party can take appropriate recourse of law against that implied rejection. …(Para 08)
16.	Bangla Food and Beverage Limited Vs. The Customs, Excise and VAT Appellate Tribunal and another (Ahmed Sohel, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Statutory Deposit; Custody of Goods; Custody of Goods; Section 194 of the Customs Act, 1969	In this case, Bangla Food and Beverage Limited challenged the dismissal of its appeal by the Customs, Excise and VAT Appellate Tribunal for non-deposit of the statutory amount under Section 194 of the Customs Act, 1969, while the disputed goods remained in the custody of the customs authority. The Supreme Court held that the statutory deposit under Section 194 applies only when goods have ceased to be under customs control. Therefore, the court declared the order passed by the tribunal is of no lawful authority and legally ineffective. The Court directed the Tribunal to admit and dispose of the appeal within six months.	Deposit of duty or penalty not required for appeal when goods remain in customs custody: From the plain reading of Section 194 (1) of the Customs Act, 1969, it is crystal clear that if the goods which have been ceased to be under the control of the customs authority, then there is a requirement of statutory deposit for filing an appeal under the said Act. In the instant case, admittedly, the goods are lying with the customs authority, i.e.the goods in question are in custody of the customs authority, which is evident from Annexure- E-1 to the writ petition. Since, the goods are lying with the customs authority, the deposit of demanded duty or penalty levied as prescribed under Section 194 of the Customs Act 1969, is not applicable for preferring appeal before the Commissioner (Appeal) or the Tribunal under Section 193 or 196A of the said Act.…(Para 18)
17.	Tasnova Iqbal Vs. The State (Md. Bazlur Rahman, J) 20 SCOB [2025] HCD Key Words: Defamation; Locus-standi; Cognizance; Prima-facie; Quashment	In this case,Tasnova Iqbal was accused of defaming her husband and his father, a State Minister, through statements made to a TV reporter, arising from ongoing family disputes over custody and prior court proceedings. The complainant alleged that these statements harmed their reputation and social standing. The High Court held that while her spoken words constituted prima facie defamation under Section 500 of the Penal Code, no printed or engraved defamatory material existed to sustain proceedings under Section 501. Consequently, the cognizance under Section 501 was quashed, whereas the Section 500 case was directed to proceed before the Metropolitan Magistrate.	Complaint under Sections 499–501 Penal Code maintainable only at instance of ‘person aggrieved’ within meaning of Section 198 CrPC: The third crux of the contention as agitated by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner was about the locus-standi of the complainant-opposite-party No. 2 as to whether he could file a complaint-petition for also the defamation of his father when section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XXI (Of Defamation) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence. Thus the learned counsel submitted that in relation to offences covered by section 499 to 501 of Penal Code “only aggrieved person” and none else can file the complaint. The section mandates to file such a complaint by “person aggrieved”, not necessarily by “person defamed.” …(Para 17)