Home : Supreme Court of Bangladesh

Serial No.	Name of the Parties, Citation and Key Words	Summary of the case	Key Ratio
1.	Begum Khaleda Zia & others Vs. The State and another (Syed Refaat Ahmed, CJ) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Section-109/405/409 of the Penal Code,1860; Section 5(1),(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; Rule 5 of the Emergency Power Rules, 2007;Section-5,10(1),(1A) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,1958; Section-22 of the Money LaunderingPrevention Act,2012; Non obstante clause; Enhancement of sentences by exercising revisional jurisdiction of the High Court Division, Golden Rule of Interpretation.	The case against the appellants in short is that one Harunur Rashid (Deputy Director) of the Anti- Corruption Commission as the informant lodged a First Information Report under sections 409 and 109 of the Penal Code, 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (PCA, 1947) and Rule 5 of the Emergency Power Rules, 2007 against seven individuals, including the appellants. The main allegations against themwas Begum Khaleda Zia, in her capacity as Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996, had Current Account No. 5416 dated 2.6.1991 opened in the name of the ‘Prime Minister's Orphanage Fund’ at Sonali Bank, Ramna Branch, Dhaka. It was further alleged that an amount of USD 1,255,000 (equivalent to BDT 4,44,81,216/-) was deposited into the said Current Account through Pay Order No. 153367970 from the United Saudi Commercial Bank on 9.6.1991. The gravamen of the charges and accusations brought forth was, therefore, of a criminal breach of trust or a fiduciary responsibility evident in alleged wrongful dealings in entrusted funds. The case strung together against Begum Khaleda Zia is that she in her capacity as Prime Minister was entrusted with certain property, in the present case being a specific quantum of trust fund, and contended to have dominion over fund property long after she left public office and dealt with such entrusted property in a manner as is liable to bring such action under the mischief of the Penal Code’s provisions criminalizing the act of “Criminal Breach of Trust” (section 409). Begum Zia is additionally alleged by the prosecution to have abetted irregular dealings in such entrusted property at all material times of her alleged sustained dominion over such property. Upon the conclusion of the trial, the learned Special Judge of Special Judge Court No. 5, Dhaka, by judgment and order dated 8.2.2018 convicted the appellant Begum Khaleda Zia under sections 409 and 109 of the Penal Code. She was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of five years and directed to pay a fine of BDT 2,10,71,643.80/- to be borne equally by all the convicted persons. The remaining appellants were convicted under sections 409/109 of the Penal Code and each were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of ten years. Being dissatisfied with the sentence imposed upon the appellant Begum Khaleda Zia, the Anti-Corruption Commission filed Criminal Revision before the High Court Division seeking an enhancement of the sentence and, accordingly, obtained a Rule. Concurrently, being discontented with the judgment and order of the trial court the appellants preferred Criminal Appeals before the High Court Division challenging their respective convictions and sentences. The High Court Division, after hearing the appeals and revision analogously dismissed the appeals and made the Rule absolute in Criminal Revision on 30.10.2018. The High Court Division convicted appellant Begum Khaleda Zia under section 409 of the Penal Code as well as section 5(2) of the PCA, 1947. Consequently, her sentence was enhanced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years, and the fine imposed by the learned Special Judge was upheld. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court Division, the appellants preferred Criminal Petitions for Leave to Appeal before the Appellate Division. After hearing, leave was granted in all the petitions primarily on the grounds that the petitions had merit for consideration which gave rise to four separate appeals and all the appeals are allowed by this single judgment.	Thus, an appeal under section 10(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act shall lie before the High Court Division against the judgment of the Special Judge while section 10(1A) invests the High Court Division with the power of revision. However, it has not been categorically provided in the Criminal Law Amendment Act whether either appeal or revision will lie against the inadequacy of sentence passed by the Special Judge. That said, it is the case, moreover, there is no express statutory bar to filing revision in the instance of inadequate sentencing passed by the Special Judge. Given such circumstance, the overwhelming consideration that the Criminal Law Amendment Act being a piece of special legislation governs necessarily sentencing under an equally special piece of legislation like the PCA. It necessarily follows, therefore, that under such circumstances the door is always open under section 10(1A) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to file revision even in instances of inadequate sentences. Therefore, we must necessarily conclude that in the given circumstances, it may logically be deduced that revision will lie in the High Court Division under section 10(1A) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. …(Para93)
2.	Bangladesh TailbahiJahaj Malik Samity Vs. Chairman, BIWTA (Md. Ashfaqul Islam, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: নৌসংরক্ষণওপরিচালনএবংপথনির্দেশনাফিসবিধিমালা, ১৯৯০; Merchant Shipping Ordinance, 1983; Definition of Inland Ship; Imposition of Conservancy fees upon Inland Ship according to Bidhimala,1990; Double Jeopardy;	The appellant along with respondent No.2, as plaintiffs instituted Title Suit No. 199 of 2001 before the 1st Court of Assistant Judge, Dhaka, praying for declaration that the application of Conservancy and Pilotage Service Fees Rules, 1990 over the Coastal Ships and Tankers of the plaintiffs established under the Merchants Shipping Ordinance, 1983 is illegal and also for declaration that the letters dated 17.06.2001 and 25.6.2001 and circular vide letter No. M- 2/15/47(4) are illegal and unlawful. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Against which appeal was preferred and the same was allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Challenging the said decision the defendants filed Civil Revision before the High Court Division and obtained Rule. A Single Bench of the High Court Division made the Rule absolute upon setting aside the judgment and decree of the appellate Court and affirming those of the trial Court. Hence, the plaintiff No. 1 preferred civil petition for leave to appeal before the Appellate Division and obtained leave giving rise to this appeal which was dismissed accordingly.	In rationalizing the imposition of conservancy fees on sea-going oil tankers navigating inland waters and rivers, despite ship-owners' arguments of exemption and double jeopardy, several points can be asserted. Firstly, the definition of a river includes any watercourse naturally flowing towards a sea, estuary or lake. Sea-going vessels utilizing these river ways for navigation inherently fall within the purview of vessels using inland waters. Thus, they are subject to relevant fees aimed at maintaining the navigability and health of these watercourses. Secondly, while ship-owners may contend that such fees constitute double jeopardy, it must be underscored that the purpose of conservancy fees is distinct from other maritime charges. These fees specifically contribute to the upkeep and preservation of inland waterways, which are crucial for maritime commerce and environmental sustainability. Therefore, the imposition of conservancy fees is not duplicative but rather seres a distinct regulatory purpose. Moreover, the argument that sea-going vessels are not directly benefiting from inland waterways neglects the interconnectedness of maritime transportation networks. Even if primarily bound for the sea, these vessels rely on river ways for access to ports and estuaries, thereby benefiting from the infrastructure and maintenance funded by conservancy fees. Lastly, acknowledging the significant government expenditure required to maintain river health and navigability underscores the necessity of equitable contributions from all users, including sea-going vessels. In conclusion, the imposition of conservancy fees on sea-going oil tankers navigating inland waters is justifiable both legally and practically, ensuring the sustainable management of vital maritime resources for the benefit of all stakeholders. ... (Para18)
3.	Mohammad Sohel Rana & others Vs. Bangladesh Public Service Commission (Zubayer Rahman Chowdhury, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Article 31,102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh; Setting aside judgment of the High Court Division without granting leave; Principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem– no man should be condemned unheard; Justice hurried, Justice buried;	The appellants successfully passed the viva voce examination, with the final result being published on 21.01.2007. The Bangladesh Public Service Commission recommended 3567 successful candidates, including the appellants, for being appointed in different cadres. In the meantime, some reports were published in different newspapers raising certain allegations with regard to the 27th BCS examination, which was, however, refuted by BPSC. Later, in an unprecedented move, the then Caretaker Government decided to cancel the final result of the 27th BCS which had already been published by BPSC. Accordingly, the Ministry of Establishment requested BPSC to retake the viva-voce examination of all the successful candidates of the 27th BCS upon cancelling the result of the previous viva voce examination. Meanwhile, the second viva voce examination was conducted and the result was published on 23.09.2008, recommending 3239 candidates for being appointed in different cadres under the 27th BCS, excluding, however, 1137 candidates including the appellants, who had previously qualified in the first viva voce examination. Accordingly, a notification was published in the Bangladesh Gazette on 10.11.2008. The present appellants along with several other candidates, who had earlier qualified in the first viva voce examination, filed Writ Petitionschallenging the result published by BPSC on 23.09.2008 as well as the office order dated 20.10.2008. Upon hearing the parties, the High Court Division disposed of the Rules by judgments and orders dated 11.11.2009 and 26.01.2010, directing the concerned respondents to appoint the candidates, including the present appellants, who had been successful in the first viva voce examination, in their respective cadres. Challenging the said decision, the Government preferred Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal Nos.512, 513 and 514 of 2010. By judgment and order dated 11.07.2010, this Division disposed of the leave petitions upon setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court Division dated 11.11.2009. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appellants preferred Civil Review Petition Nos.197-199 of 2024 and leave was granted by this Division by order dated 07.11.2024, which gave rise to the present Civil Appeals which were allowed by this judgment.	Generally understood, leave is granted to consider the appellant(s) case on certain grounds of law and facts, giving an opportunity to the concerned respondent(s), in whose favour the impugned judgment had been passed, to have an opportunity to reply, in writing, to the grounds upon which the appellant(s) case is predicated. This is in accordance with the constitutional mandate of “due process”, as enshrined in Article 31 of our Constitution. Hence, the practice of setting aside any judgment and/or order passed by the High Court Division or the Administrative Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, without granting leave, is not only a gross violation of the principle of natural justice, it also deprives the concerned respondents from placing their case before the apex Court, a fundamental right granted to them under the Constitution. The principle audi alteram partem –no man should be condemned unheard- is now so well entrenched in the judicial system that any deviation therefrom is bound to be interfered with, even at the stage of review. ...(Para26 & 27)
4.	The Anti-Corruption Commission Vs. Begum Khaleda Zia & another (Md. Rezaul Haque, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Documentary evidence; Oral evidence; Section-5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; Section-109 of the penal Code, 1860;	The respondent, during her tenure from 2001-2006 as Prime Minister of Bangladesh had formed a trust, namely "Shaheed Ziaur Rahman Charitable Trust". The allegation against the respondent was that no money was spent from the trust account for any charitable purpose, rather she in the disguise of the trust had spent money for purchasing 42 Kathas land in Kakrail in the name of “Shaheed Ziaur Rahman Charitable Trust”. After trial, the respondent was convicted by the trial court under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the property which was bought in the name of Shaheed Ziaur Rahman Charitable Trust was confiscated in favour of the state. The respondents appealed against that judgment of conviction in the High Court Division and the High Court Division after hearing both the parties acquitted her and others from the charge leveled against them. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division, the State and the Anti-Corruption Commission being petitioners filed these Criminal Petitions for Leave to Appeal which were dismissed summarily on merit through this judgment without granting leave.	It is well settled that the contents of documentary evidence should ordinarily get preference over oral evidence unless the alleged document is the product of forgery or false personation. The trial court failed to appreciate the documentary evidence juxtaposing the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer for which it reached erroneous conclusion that Metro Makers and Developers Ltd. did not make payment in the account of the said Trust though there was reasonable doubt that Metro Makers and Developers Ltd. might have made payment in the account of the said Trust having regard to the account statement of the said company and oral testimony of the Investigating Officer that he did not record after interrogation the statements of the persons concerned with the clearing cheques dated 16.01.2005. ... (Para29)
5.	Rezaul Haq Vs. MossammatMonwara Khanam and others. (S. M. Emdadul Hoque, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Recovery of khas possession, purchasers from different co-sharers by inheritance, partition, ejmali property, subsequent purchaser	The plaintiff purchased and mutated the suit land in 1991 and was in possession until dispossession by the defendant, a subsequent purchaser in 1997. The Trial Court rightly decreed the suit in part, which was erroneously reversed by the First Appellate Court on the ground of non-partition. The High Court Division correctly restored the Trial Court’s decree. The Appellate Division found that prior possession and dispossession having been proved, the plaintiff’s suit was maintainable in law and no prayer for partition was necessary. The appeal was dismissed.	Plaintiff’s right to sue for declaration of title and recovery of possession without partition: in a suit for recovery of possession, the plaintiff must first prove possession and then dispossession. It appears that, in the instant suit, the plaintiff-respondent No.1 succeeded in proving her title and that she was forcefully dispossessed from the suit land by the defendant No.1-appellant. It is also the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 successfully proved her title and that the defendant No.1-appellant took possession of the said land six years after the plaintiff-respondent No.1 had purchased it. In such a case, there is no bar to file a suit for declaration of title and recovery of khas possession alone, and a prayer for partition is not required. ... (Para 28)
6.	Md. Obaidul Islam and others Vs. Md.Abdul Mazid Mondal and others, (A.K.M. Asaduzzaman, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Declaration; selection of site of Union Parishad; representative character suit; policy decision of government; administrative decision	Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operative issued a letter on 21.03.2005 selecting site of Pashapol Union Parishad Complex Building at Pashapol. Theplaintiffs filed the present case arguing that the government earlier recognized the old site for Pashapol Union Parishad Office at Bariali Mouza where all the requirements for construction of the Complex Building were available. Ignoring that site the government's letter dated 21.03.2005 is illegal. The defendants denied the facts of the plaintiffs and stated inter-alia that Pashapol is the centre point of the Union. There are hut, Educational Institutions, mosque and others. They prayed for dismissal of the suit.The trial Court dismissed the suit. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs.On revision the High Court Division affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. The defendants preferred leave to appeal before the Appellate Division while the leave was granted. The petitioners submit that the selection of site of Union Parishad is the business of the government and relates to policy matters and as such the plaintiffs have no locus standi to challenge such policy decision of the government. On the contrary, the contention of the respondents are- specific guidelines were given by circular dated 28.12.2005 issued by the Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Co-operative vide its memo no.ইপ/অঙন/০৬/২০০৫/১৬৮০(৫০১) in respect of selection of site by government. Those guidelines have not been followed in the impugned letter. The Appellate Division holds the view that shifting of site of the Union Parishad is a policy matter of the government and administrative decision. The plaintiffs have no local standi to challenge the policy making power of the government and as such the appeal is allowed and suit is dismissed.	The petitioner-plaintiffs had no locus standi to challenge the policy making power of the government in any way. The shifting of site of the Union Parishad is a policy matter of the government as well as administrative decision, Plaintiff individual had no locus standi to challenge the same. ...(Para 14)
7.	Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Vs. Interbulk Overseas SA Bangladesh Limited and another. (Farah Mahbub, J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Settlement case, The Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982, L.A. Case, Lease agreement, clean hands, acquisition process, fraud upon the Court,	Four civil appeals (Nos. 171–174 of 2015) arose from a High Court Division judgment (13.02.2014) that declared certain land acquisition proceedings in Chittagong unlawful. The disputes centered around Land Acquisition Case No.1/2010-2011, where the Ministry of Land approved acquisition of lands for a power project without the alleged mandatory approval of the Prime Minister. The writ petitioners (various companies and individuals) claimed they had valid leases or ownership and that their objections to acquisition were ignored. They relied on a note dated 14.11.2010, allegedly signed by the then Prime Minister, directing the Ministry to submit a fresh report, which was never complied with. The High Court held that the Ministry’s memo dated 23.11.2010 was issued without lawful authority, malafide, and unconstitutional, since the Prime Minister’s approval was required. The Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, appealed, arguing that the Prime Minister’s note was fictitious and that the High Court had relied on forged documents. The Appellate Division found substance in this claim, noting that the writ petitioners had quoted from confidential government files without authority. The Court emphasized that fraud vitiates all legal proceedings and that no relief can be granted to litigants who approach the court with “unclean hands.” It held that the alleged note of 14.11.2010 was non-existent and fictitious, thereby invalidating the foundation of the High Court’s decision. Consequently, the Appellate Division struck down the High Court’s judgment and allowed all four civil appeals, restoring the government’s acquisition process.	Unauthorized reproduction of any document is a punishable offence: The respondent-writ petitioner has quoted/reproduced the summary dated 02.11.2010 prepared for the then Hon’ble Prime Minister of the Republic, a confidential document, without disclosing as to how they managed to obtain the same and for using them in a court proceeding without being duly authorised, is a punishable offence under the Official Secret Act, 1923. ...(Para 42)
8.	Md. Humayun Kabir Vs. The State (Syed Md. Ziaul Karim,J) 20 SCOB [2025] AD Key Words: Section 302 of the Penal Code, Commutation of sentence, Hearsay evidence, Interested and partisan witnesses, Dying declaration, Circumstantial evidence	The appellant herein was convicted under section 302 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to death by the trial court. The specific allegation against him was from his gunshot the deceased was severely injured and died afterwards. The deceased narrated the occurrence to some witnesses while he was being taken to the Hospital. Later, a Division Bench of the High Court Division after hearing rejected the death reference and commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life against which the appellant filed appeal before this Division which was dismissed by this judgment.	Sentencing Discretion under Section 302 of the Penal Code: Judicial Principles and Considerations: With regard to the sentence imposed upon the appellant, we are of the view that sentencing discretion on the part of a Judge is the most difficult task to perform. There is no system or procedure in the Criminal Justice Administration Method or Rule to exercise such discretion. In sentencing process, two important factors come out which shall shape appropriate sentence (i) Aggravating factor and (ii) Mitigating factor. These two factors control the sentencing process to a great extent. But it is always to be remembered that the object of sentence should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the society has the satisfaction that justice has been done and court responded to the society's cry for justice. Under section 302 of the Penal Code, though discretion has been conferred upon the Court to award two types of sentences, death or imprisonment for life, the discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental principle of criminal justice. ...(Para 74)