1
In the Supreme Court of Bangladesh High Court Division
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
Writ Petition No. 7185 of 2021.
In the matter of:
An application under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
In the matter of:
Zillur Rahman and others.
……. Petitioners. Vs.
Bangladesh and others.
…Respondents.
Mr. Mohammad Shishir Manir with Mr. Mohammad Saddam Hossen with Mr. Mizanul Haque with
PMrre. sJeunstt :i ce Sheikh Hassan Arif Mr.Abudllah Sadiq with
And Mr. Mohammed Noab Ali with Mr. Justice Md. Bazlur Rahman. Mr. Mohammad Sazzad Sanoar with
Mr. G.M. Mozahidur Rahman,
Advocate
…For the petitioners. Mr. A.M. Aminuddin, Attorney General with
Mr. Amit Talukder, D.A.G with Mr. MMG Sarwar, A.A.G with Mr. Md. Rayhan Kabir, A.A.G with Mr. Nasim Islam, A.A.G
.For the respondent No.02. Mr. Khondoker Shahriar Shakir, Advocate
…For the respondent Nos. 4.
Mr. Probir Neogi with
Mr. S.M. Shahjahan, Senior Advocates
..As Amici Curiae.
Heard on 20.11.2023, 27.11.2023, 04.12.2023 and 12.12.2023.
judgment on: 13.05.2024.
SHEIKH HASSAN ARIF, J
184 of 1999), under Sections 302 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860, and his appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 9065 of 2020 as preferred before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, is still pending along with connected Death Reference No. 120 of 2020. Similarly, petitioner No. 02 has been in Sylhet Central Jail with his prisoner ID No. 9215/A having been convicted and sentenced to death vide judgment and order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the Sessions Judge, Sunamgonj in Sessions Case No. 07 of 2020, arising out of Derai Police Station Case No. 02 dated 14.10.2019 (corresponding G.R Case No. 124 of 2019), under Sections 302 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. His appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 2855 of 2020, is also pending before the High Court Division along with connected Death Reference No. 44 of 2020. Petitioner No. 3, being a death- convict, has been in Cumilla Central Jail with his prisoner ID No. 5734/A having been convicted and sentenced to death vide judgment and order dated 22.01.2020 passed by the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Tribunal, Khagrachari in Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Case No. 05 of 2020, arising out of Dighinala Police Station Case No. 01 dated 11.09.2009 (corresponding G.R Case No. 263 of 2009) under Sections 11(Ka) of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjaton Daman Ain, 2000 (amended in 2003). His criminal appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 856 of 2020, is also pending before the High Court Division along with connected Death Reference No. 14 of 2020.
he has right to prefer review petition before the Appellate Division in view of Article 105 of the Constitution. That even if the said review is rejected
by the Appellate Division, he can prefer mercy petition before the Hon’ble President of the Republic under Article 49 of the Constitution. That if such mercy petition is rejected by the Hon’ble President, only then such death sentence can be executed by the jail authority. It is also contended by them that in such protracted process of final execution of death sentence, such prisoner, under the prevailing practice in Bangladesh, is kept in an isolated small cell, commonly known as “condemned cell”, and he/she is kept isolatedly from other prisoners having no right to interact with them and to take part in various welfare activities in jail including sports, religious gathering like milad, vocational training etc. It is also contended that such isolated confinement in such condemned cell is against the very spirit of the Constitution under Article 35, which is one of the vital fundamental rights of the citizens or any of person even in jail. It is also contended that because of such long isolated confinement, such prisoners are punished on regular basis by keeping them in the condemned cell isolatedly for which they have not committed any offence and/or for which no sentence has been
imposed on them by any competent Court. Therefore, according to them, such treatment of death convict- prisoners is violative of Articles 27, 31, and 32, and some other vital provisions of the Constitution. That such confinement in a solitary cell amounts to a separate punishment as provided by Sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code, 1860, and such punishment can only be imposed by a competent Court. This being so, it is contended that the death convict prisoners, like the petitioners, are subjected to double jeopardy in that they are being punished twice for the same offence, particularly when sentence of such offence is death as given by a competent Court and that such sentence may become executable only after rejection of their mercy petition by the Honorable President of the Republic.
of the Constitution. Therefore, it is contended that by such isolated confinement in the so called condemned cell, the authorities concerned, including the jail authority, have been violating various fundamental rights of the petitioners as guaranteed in the Constitution. Under such circumstances, the petitioners moved this writ petition and obtained the aforesaid Rule. At the time of issuance of the Rule, a division bench of the High Court Division, vide ad interim order dated 05.04.2022, directed the jail authority, namely, Inspector General of Prison (respondent No. 04) to submit report within 06 (six) months showing the number of death convicts, the number of death cells, general arrangements in a death cell, and the available facilities for the death convicts in the prisons of the country, followed by subsequent orders of this Court expressing dissatisfaction about the information supplied by the jail authority and further directing them to provide more information as regards general arrangements in the death cells and the available facilities. Pursuant to such orders, the jail authority (respondent No. 04) has filed different affidavits-in-compliance giving certain information.
of the petitioners, this Court also added the Supreme Court Registry as respondent Nos. 8, 9 and 10, particularly on the contention of the petitioners that the Registry of the Supreme Court was refusing to give any information as regards disposal of death reference cases and/or death cases by different benches of the High Court Division and the Appellate Division of this Court in a particular period, and as regards data involving confirmation or rejection of such death sentences by the High Court Division and the Appellate Division. On a subsequent attempt by the petitioners seeking order on the registry for such information, this Court kept the said application with record for considering the same at the time of disposal of the Rule itself. In this regard, it is also contended by the petitioners that they sought different information in writing from the jail authority through petitioners’ learned advocate on 09.06.2021 making specific queries about how many death convicts and how many death cells were there in Bangladesh prisons, what steps were being taken if the number of death convicts increased beyond capacity, the available number of cells, how many death convicts were kept in single cell, and whether there was any arrangement for sports, exercise and other recreational activities for the death convicts. However, it is contended, the jail authorities failed to provide any such information, which is clear violation of the Right to Information Act. That it is also published in one of the daily newspapers, namely, the Daily Ittefaq, on 18.06.2021, that three benches of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh were hearing death reference cases sent
to them seeking confirmation of death sentences imposed by the trial Courts during a period in 2015 and 2016, which clearly supports the case of the petitioners as regards inordinate delay in the process
of execution of death sentence. That although the jail authority gave some information as regards total number of convict-prisoners and the number of condemned cells etc., such information was not enough.
by the Indian Supreme Court in another case, namely, Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons case reported in (2019) 2 SCC-435. It is again contended
by the petitioners that Rule 980 of the Jail Code should also be read down or the irrelevant provisions
in the said Code should be declared to be non-
applicable in view of the provisions under Section 30(2) of the Prison Act, 1894 as well as the aforementioned provisions of our Constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights. Accordingly, it is contended that the term “under sentence of death,” as occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Prisons Act, should be read as “under executable sentence of death” as has been held by the Indian Supreme Court in the said Sunil Batra Case.
02) that the decision of Indian Supreme Court in any particular case may only have persuasive effect, and such decision cannot be treated as declaration of law in our country. Therefore, it is contended that such decisions of Indian Supreme Court are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is also contended by government that since Section 30 of the Prisons Act, 1894 has specifically provided for keeping the death sentenced convict in a cell apart from all other prisoners, the provisions under Rule 980 of the Jail Code have been formulated only in order to serve the purpose of the parent law. This being so, it is contended, since the constitutionality of the said parent law has not been challenged, and no Rule has been issued thereon, the Rule issued in this writ petition cannot be made absolute inasmuch as that in making the Rule absolute, the provision under Section 30 of the Prison Act has to be declared unconstitutional.
way infringe the right of such prisoner as provided by Articles 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution, particularly when such right can be restricted by law and, accordingly, since the rights of the convict prisoners are restricted by the very conviction and sentence themselves and the provisions under Section 30 of the Prisons Act, they cannot be treated like freemen or other prisoners. It is also contended by this respondent that although there is no term called ‘death cell’ or ‘condemned cell’ in the Prison Act or Jail Code, the provisions under Rules 735 and 736 of the Jail Code provide for separate cells and solitary confinement in different circumstances for different purposes, as for example, to keep confessing prisoners, female prisoners, prisoners under medical observation, lunatics under observation, quarantine prisoners etc. Therefore, it is contended that such separation prisoners for some particular purposes, as provided by jail code and law, cannot be regarded as torture, cruel or degrading punishment or treatment as provided by Article 35 of the Constitution. It is also contended that in view of the provisions under Article 35 (6), the rights guaranteed under sub articles (3) and (5) of Article 35 will not be applicable as regards operation of any existing law which prescribed any punishment or procedure for trial. Therefore, it is contended that the petitioners do not have any case before this Court under writ jurisdiction and, accordingly, the Rule should be discharged.
In the course of hearing, considering the importance of the issues raised in this writ petition involving interpretation of constitutional provisions as well as some provisions of the Prisons Act, 1894, this Court, vide order dated 13.11.2023, requested two senior counsels, namely, Mr. Probir Neogi and Mr. S.M. Sahjahan, to assist us as amici curiae. Accordingly, the said learned advocates have made extensive submissions in addition to the elaborate submissions made by Mr. Mohammad Shishir Manir, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, Mr. A.M. Aminuddin, learned Attorney General appearing for respondent-Government (respondent No. 02), and Mr. Khondoker Shahriar Shakir, learned advocate for the Inspector General of Prisons (respondent No. 4). However, for the sake of avoiding repetitions, we will only refer to the core submissions made by them on points of law and facts.
Submissions:
Prisons Act, thereby, declaring that the terms ‘under sentence of death,’ as provided by subsection (1) of Section 30, be read as “under executable sentence of death”, and as such, since a death sentence becomes executable for
all practical purposes only when the mercy petition is rejected by the Hon’ble President, a prisoner under death sentence cannot be kept in isolated cell depriving him of all necessary amenities of life, in particular to socialize with other prisoners and to take part in recreational, religious, and vocational activities along with other prisoners in jail.
has been done by the Indian Supreme Court in
the aforesaid Sunil Batra Case. In support of his
such submissions, he has referred to different paragraphs of a book authored by our late lamented constitutional lawyer Mr. Mahmudul Islam under the title ‘Interpretation of Statutes and Documents’.
has referred to different decisions of our High Court Division, namely, the decisions in A B Mohiuddin Ahmed, Executive Engineer vs. Bangladesh and others, 49 DLR-353; Small
Traders Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Government of Bangladesh and others, 27 BLC-291 etc.
allowed to be flouted by any law enacted by Parliament or Rules or Jail Code made thereunder. According to him, the provisions under Article 35(5) of our Constitution prohibiting inhuman torture and degrading treatment are almost same in Article 5 of the United Nations Universal Declarations of Human Rights. Therefore, he submits, a prisoner goes to prison with all fundamental rights guaranteed in his favour by Part III of our Constitution except to the extent that such rights are restricted by specific law providing specific restrictions and such restrictions have to be reasonable restrictions in view of the provisions under Article 31 of the Constitution. In support of his such contention, he has referred to the aforesaid decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Sunil Batra Case and another decision of Indian Supreme Court in Habans Singh vs. U.P., AIR 1991 SC 531.
referred to the decision in Sunil Batra Case. According to him, the term “under sentence of death” as provided by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Prisons Act, should be read down like it was done by the Indian Supreme Court as ‘under executable sentence of death’ to make it harmonious with the Constitution. He submits that if the aforesaid term is read down as “executable sentence of death”, a death sentenced prisoner can only be kept in the isolated cell after his mercy petition is rejected by the Hon’ble President.
namely, h¡wm¡cn L¡l¡ J pwn¡de f¢loh¡ A¡Ce, 2023 (Mps¡), he submits that a new approach has in the meantime
been adopted by the jail authority which is reflected in
the said proposed law. According to him, although
under Section 59 of the proposed law provision has
been proposed for keeping the death sentenced
prisoners in separate cells, alternative arrangements
have also been proposed for keeping such prisoners
in Wards. Therefore, according to him, with the
enactment of the said proposed law by the
Parliament, the concerns of the petitioners will be radically reduced.
prominent judges of the 20th Century—suggested that the accuseds in Birmingham bombing of 1974 killing 21 people should have been hanged, although the conviction against them was later quashed by the UK Court of Appeal in 1991. However, they had already spent 16 years in prison with almost all the newspapers in England dubbing them as murderers.
In USA, even with the most modern criminal justice system, one in every ten death convicts finally gets acquitted after long incarceration (see Dr. Bharat Malkari, Birmingham Law School: Birmingham. ac. uk.). In 1988, the Court of Appeal in UK posthumously quashed the conviction of Mahmoud Hussein Mattain, who was hanged in Cardiff Prison on 8 September 1952. In delivering the landmark judgment in the said case, Lord Justice Rose observed: the case clearly demonstrated that “Capital punishment was not..................an appropriate culmination for a criminal justice system which was human and therefore fallible” (see Moving Away from the Death Penalty—Wrongful Convictions, www.gov.uk). Recent media report in Japan, which is one of the only two G7 (other is USA) countries which
still maintains death sentence, has reported that one death sentenced convict aged 87 years has been ordered retrial by the highest judiciary after he spent about 45 years on death row (see The Daily Guardians, 13 March 2023).
imprisonment, it has deliberately put embargo even on the Court not to give such punishment beyond the period of three months in total, exceeding fourteen days at a time and exceeding seven days in one month. Thus, it has been considered by the Legislature to be such a harsh punishment that a person cannot be kept under such punishment exceeding three months in total, exceeding fourteen days at a time and exceeding seven days in a month.
he is immediately sent to jail. Because, in such a case, law does not empower the trial Courts to grant bail. (see Section 426 Cr.P.C.).
the trial Courts “shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court Division” (see Sections 31 and 374 of the Cr.P.C.). The ordeal and agony of the convict even continues thereafter for at least six years in the High Court Division (HCD), particularly when it is known to our legal community that disposal of a death reference in HCD now takes at least six years.
convict has the constitutional right to submit mercy petition before the Hon’ble President of the Republic under Article 49 of the Constitution read with Section 402A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see also Clause 991 of Jail Code).
if we compare this data with the disposal rate of the HCD for the said two years period, it appears that the High Court Division disposed of only 253 death reference cases which were sent from the trial Courts at least six years back. Thus, near about 50% of death reference cases could not be disposed of during that period, which led to the piling up of such cases. Although confirmation of death sentences in respect of 557 convicts was sought in the said disposed of cases, the High Court Division confirmed death sentences in respect of only 129 convicts, i.e., 24% (less than one fourth) convicts. Not only that, in the said period the High Court Division acquitted 170 death sentenced convicts (more than one third) and commuted to life imprisonment in respect of 203 convicts (near about one third). Now, the statistics of our Appellate Division. During the said two years period, 105 convicts preferred appeals before the Appellate Division as against confirmation of their death sentences by the High Court Division. However, the Appellate Division retained death sentences only in respect of 7 convicts, acquitted 05 convicts and commuted the death sentences to life imprisonments in respect of 26 convicts. It may be noted here that no such appeal was disposed of by the Appellate Division in 2023. However, it is unfair to
it a mockery of justice for the people against whom death sentences become unexecutable. The said people remain in isolated cells of the jails concerned which are commonly known as ‘Condemned Cells’. Not only that, during such long incarceration (which is
about 15 to 20 years), they are not even allowed to prefer any bail applications before the High Court Division or the Appellate Division pending their appeals on any exceptional ground. In this regard, we have examined the provisions under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has clearly allowed the High Court Division, as appellate court, to entertain bail application by such convict-appellant. This provision does not discriminate between appellant who has been sentenced to life imprisonment and the appellant who has been sentenced to death. However, the embarrassing part
is that we have not yet seen a single example wherein a bail application by the death sentenced- appellant has been entertained by any of the benches
of the High Court Division or the Appellate Division which have been hearing death reference cases and/or criminal appeals preferred by the death sentenced prisoners. Not a single example could be cited from the Bar wherein a death sentenced- appellant has been granted bail by the High Court Division or the Appellate Division on his such application in pending appeal. Therefore, it appears
that the highest judiciary of this country, namely, the Supreme Court, has also been committing discrimination between death sentenced prisoners and other prisoners in so far as their pending appeal- bail is concerned, particularly when it cannot be denied by us that there is huge disparity in respect of imposing death sentences by our trial Courts [see the study by Malik (2000) and Rahman (2017:Chapter-6]
“35 (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subject to a penalty greater than, or different form, that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.
provided by law. Sub-article (2) prohibits prosecution and punishment of a person more than once for the same offence. Sub article (3) guarantees a right to speedy public trial to every person accused of any criminal offence. Sub article (4) guarantees a right in favour of an accused not to be a witness against himself, and, finally, sub article (5) guarantees that no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. However, sub article (6) provides an exception. According to it, nothing in sub-articles (3) and (5) of Art. 35 shall affect operation of any existing law, which prescribes any punishment or procedure for trial.
Penal Code prescribes punishments, some provisions
of Cr.P.C prescribe procedure for trial. However, can
it be said that Section 30 of the Prisons Act, or Rule
980 of the Jail Code, prescribes any punishment or
procedure for trial? Answer is ‘NO’. While appeals
may be regarded as continuation of trial, the
aforesaid provisions under Section 30 of the Prisons
Act, or Rule 980 of the Jail Code, do not prescribe
any procedure for such trial. While the word “procedure”, (according to ‘A¡Ce-nëL¡o', by Muhammad Habibur Rahman and Anisuzaman)
means the formal method by which the works of
Court are conducted ( k A¡e¤ù¡¢eL fÜ¢aa A¡c¡ma LjÑ f¢lQ¡¢ma qu), the word “trial” refers to the procedures of
trial from Sections 241 to 250 and Sections 260 to
265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
However, they do not provide anything as to how a
death sentenced prisoner is to be treated or to be
kept in jail. Therefore, we do not find any iota of substance in the submissions of learned Attorney
General that such prisoners will not get any protection
under sub articles (3) and (5) of Article 35 of the Constitution.
Supreme Court of USA subsequently, but failed to get any appropriate relief because of the aforesaid state sovereignty complications. [For detail, see Erin Simmons, Challenging An Execution After Prolonged Confinement On Death Row (LACKEY revisited), Case Western Reserve Law Review [Vol. 59:4], Mary Marshall, “The Promise of Porter? Porter vs. Clerk and Its Potential Impact On Solitary Confinement Litigation”, Columbia Law Review Forum [161. 120:67] and Robert Johnson, “Solitary Confinement Until Death by State-Sponsored Homicide: An Eight Amendment Assessment of the Modern Execution Process, 73 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1213 (2016)]. However, it has to be kept in mind that following bad examples of a country like USA (some argue that it has most notorious partisan judiciary) cannot be the practice of an ever evolving democracy like Bangladesh. We want to adopt good practices even from otherwise bad countries.
above cited Sunil Batra Case by way of ‘reading down’ the provisions under Section 30 of the Prisons Act, 1894. It held that the term “under sentence of death”, as occurring in sub-section (1) thereof, has to be read down narrowly as “under executable sentence of death”. Accordingly, it allowed the death sentenced prisoners to enjoy all other facilities like other ordinary prisoners in jail compound, except in exceptional cases. The Indian Supreme Court, in another case, has even gone to the extent of allowing conjugal life of prisoners and their right to progeny. See, for example, Nond Lal’s case, 2022(2)RLW1236 (Raj.), Jasvir Singh and another
vs. State of Pubjab, 2015 Cri LJ 2282, and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No(s). 21875/2022].
Constitution, as incorporated in 2011 by the 15th Amendment, has already made the Fundamental Principles under Part II and the Fundamental Rights under Part-III as un-amendable basic Articles of the Constitution. This being so, in giving interpretation to any law, we must not only do so by keeping in mind
the provisions under Part III, we should also keep our vigilance on the Fundamental Principles of State policy as provided under Part II. It should also be noted that Article 8(2) thereof has mandated that the principles set out in the said part “shall be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall
be applied by the State in the making of laws, shall be
a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and of
the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the State and of its citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable”. Again, Article 26, sub-article (2), under Part III, mandates that “The State shall not make any law inconsistent with any provisions of this Part, and any law so made shall, to the extent of such inconsistency be void”.
Section 30 of the Prisons Act, 1894:
“30 (1) Every prisoner under sentence of death shall, immediately on his arrival in the prison after sentence, be searched by, or by order of, the Jailer and all articles shall be taken from him which the Jailer deems it dangerous or inexpedient to leave in his possession. (2) Every such prisoner shall be confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners, and shall be placed by day and by night under the charge of a guard”. (Underlines supplied)
980 of the Bengal Jail Code:
See Section “980. Every prisoner sentenced to death shall, 3108(924),. RuAlect7 36I X, from the date of his sentence, and without
waiting for the sentence to be confirmed by the High Court, be confined in some safe place, a cell if possible, within the jail, apart from all other prisoners. The cell or room in which a convict condemned to death is confined shall invariably, before he is placed in it, be examined by the Jailer, who shall satisfy himself of its fitness and safety, and shall record the result of the examination in his report book”.
(Underlines supplied)
of a guard during day time and night time. In the same way, Rule 980 of the Bengal Jail Code provides that every prisoner sentenced to death shall be confined in some safe place, a cell if possible, within jail apart from all other prisoners and he shall be kept in such cell from the date of his sentence without waiting for the said sentence to be confirmed by the High Court Division. By comparison between the above provisions under Section 30 of the Prisons Act and Rule 980 of the Jail Code, it appears that some words have been inserted in Rule 980 which are clearly absent in the parent law. To be specific, the words “from the date of his sentence” and the words
“without waiting for the sentence to be confirmed by the High Court” are totally absent in Section 30 of the Prisons Act.
says “see Section 30(2), Act IX, 1894, Rule 736”. As stated above, although it has made reference to Section 30 of the Prisons Act, it has inserted new words therein which are absent in Section 30. While Section 30 of the Prisons Act does not say anything about date of sentence or necessity to wait for the
said sentence to be confirmed by the High Court Division, the question arises whether the Government, by such circulars issued time to time,
can incorporate such words in the Jail Code which may have every possibility of giving different meaning and different intents having adverse impact on the lives of the death sentenced prisoners. In this regard,
we have also examined the provisions under Rule
736 of the Jail Code, falling under Chapter 20, incorporating provisions therein relating to the treatment of prisoners of different categories. “Clauses (a) to (K)” have been provided therein for maintaining separate solitary confinement cells. While Clause-(a) is meant for the purpose of solitary confinement under Sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code, Clause-(i) is meant for the confinement of prisoners condemned to death sentence.
common sense. However, we have been supplied with the scientific literatures and research papers on such impact, some of which are given below:
Project 39A, a research organization inspired by the Article 39-A of the Indian Constitution, conducted extensive research titled ‘A Mental Health Perspective of The Death Penalty’ and published a report available in the public domain. The research analysis shows that Major Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Substance Use Disorder, Suicidal Ideation, Comorbid Mental Disorder, Cognitive Impairment etc. are high in percentage among those prisoners. [Ref: Pg-90 of the Publication]. The said research specifically emphasized on the suicidal behaviour of the death row convicts. The relevant portion of the said research is quoted below:
“Of the 88 death row prisoners we interviewed, 72 prisoners volunteered information on their lifetime history of suicidal behaviors, both ideation and attempts. Out of these 72 prisoners, 63 prisoners volunteered information on suicidal behaviour in prison. Of these 63, 34 prisoners i.e. over 50% had thoughts of dying by suicide in prison and eight prisoners had also attempted suicide in prison.” [Ref: Pg-118 of the Publication].
This research conducted by the Department of law, University of Dhaka, shows that most of the death row convicts are from poor family background and they cannot afford to engage lawyer privately. State defence lawyers are mostly of rouse. The economic burdens on the family become unbearable. Family members face wrath of victim’s family and local people compelling them to repeatedly shift residences etc.
confinement itself is a punishment under Sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code, which may be imposed by
a Court only, and not by prison authority, IG Prison or the Government. Not only that, the said provisions have also provided that such confinement can only be imposed for only three months in total, and a person cannot be kept in such solitary confinement more than fourteen days at a time and more than seven days in a month. This being so, a death sentenced prisoner is kept in solitary confinement, or condemned cell, for about more than 20 years for no offence having ever been committed by him, and for no sentence imposed upon him by any Court. Therefore, it appears that while the Legislature has even allowed the Court to impose such punishment of solitary confinement only for three months period in whole etc., the State machineries are keeping him for about 20 years, or more, in such solitary confinement, known as ‘condemned cell’, without any reasonable sanction of law. This is a clear violation of his right to life and liberty (Art-32), right to be treated in accordance with law (Art. 31), right to equal protection of law (Art. 27), right to speedy trial [(Art.
35(3)], etc. He is subjected to punishment twice for the same offence [(Art. 35(2)] and subjected to degrading and cruel treatment [Art. 35(5)]. Thus, such treatment directly assaults and violates his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 27, 31, 32, 35(2). 35(3) and 35(5) of the Constitution.
scope given by the Parent Law, as the same will be violative of the well recognized principle of ‘delegatus non potest delegare’ (a delegatee cannot act beyond
the power delegated to him). Therefore, we hold that those excess words in Rule 980, namely, “from the date of his sentence” and “without waiting for the sentence to be confirmed by the High Court” cannot remain in the said Jail Code as the same is not consistent with the very provisions under Section 30
of the Prisons Act and they adversely affect the fundamental rights of the prisoners. Again, since such excess words have allowed prison authority to confine a death sentenced prisoner in condemned
cell immediately after his arrival in jail upon sentence
of death by trial Court or Tribunal, they violate his fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and as such the same become void vide operation of Art. 26(1) of the Constitution.
as meaning from the point of time when such sentence of death is imposed by the trial Court or it should be regarded as a sentence of death when it becomes executable finally after exhausting all remedies given by law and the Constitution in favour of a death sentenced prisoner. The words “under sentence of death” do not clearly say that a prisoner will be treated “under sentence of death” from the date of his sentence by the trial Court. They do not also clearly suggest that he will be “under sentence of death” only after it becomes executable finally upon rejection of his mercy petition. Therefore, the said words may be interpreted in both ways. This being so, the interpretation which is beneficial to a prisoner has to be adopted by Court in line with the established rule of interpretation, given that the said words have punitive impact of confinement in condemned cell on the prisoner (See Mahmudul Islam, Interpretation of Statutes and Documents, Mullick Brothers, P-122). This method of interpretation is to be adopted for the purpose of any potential conflict of sec. 30 with the aforementioned Articles of the Constitution in order to reach a harmonious conclusion.
Act enacted during British era, is still operative in India and Bangladesh. Therefore, the interpretation given by the Indian Supreme Court in the said Sunil Batra Case may also be looked into, although we are aware that the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court only have persuasive value. Now, let us see whether
the said decision of the Indian Supreme Court is good enough to persuade us to follow it. It appears from
the said decision that the author judge therein was Justice D.A. Desai, and the bench was comprised of
five Hon’ble Judges of the Indian Supreme Court, including the high profile judge, Justice V.R Krishna Iyer, who gave separate judgment, though concurring with the final conclusion of the author judge. While interpreting Section 30, Justice Desai, for the Court, has referred not only to the relevant provisions of the said Act and the Penal Code, but also to the Indian Law Commission’s 42nd report wherein it was categorically recommended that solitary confinement
became out of tune with modern thinking and should not find a place in the Penal Code as a punishment to be ordered by the Criminal Court. In describing the nature of such solitary confinement of a death sentenced prisoner, Indian Supreme Court observed:
“Such confinement can nether be cellular confinement nor separate confinement and in any event it cannot be solitary confinement. In our opinion, sub-section (2) of Section 30 does not empower the jail authorities in the garb of confining a prisoner under sentence of death, in a cell apart from all other prisoners, to impose solitary confinement on him. Even jail discipline inhibits solitary confinement as a measure of jail punishment. It completely negatives any suggestion that because a prisoner is under sentence of death therefore, and by reason of that consideration alone, the jail authorities can impose upon him additional and separate punishment of solitary confinement. They have no power to add to the punishment imposed by the Court which additional punishment could have been imposed by the Court itself but has in fact been not so imposed. Upon a true construction, sub-section (2) of Section 30 does not empower a prison authority to impose solitary confinement upon a prisoner under sentence of death” (see paragraph 220 of the reported case).
or voided by any judicial or constitutional procedure. In other words, it must be a sentence which the authority charged with the duty to execute and carry
out must proceed to carry out without intervention from any outside authority. In a slightly different context in State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi alias Raman, it was said that the trial of an accused person under sentence of death does not conclude with the termination of the proceedings in the Court of Sessions because of the reason that the sentence of death passed by the Sessions Court is subject to confirmation by the High Court. A trial cannot be deemed to have concluded till an executable sentence is passed by a competent court” (see paragraph-223 of the reported case). Then, finally, the Supreme Court of India concluded that confining a death sentenced prisoner in a solitary confinement, or cell, tantamount to imposing a punishment for the same offence more than once, which is clear violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
cannot be kept in isolation, or condemned cell, unless
and until his sentence of death becomes final, conclusive etc. after exhaustion of all remedies under
the law and the Constitution. Elaborating further in his separate judgment, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, while agreeing with Justice Desai, observed that such prisoners “shall be entitled to the amenities of ordinary inmates in the prison like games, books, newspapers, reasonably good food, the right to expression, artistic or otherwise, and normal clothing and bed. In a sense, they stand better than ordinary prisoners because they are not serving any term of rigorous imprisonment, as such” (underlines supplied). His Lordship further observed
that such prisoners cannot be denied, except on specific grounds warranting such a course such as homosexual tendencies, disease, violent proclivities
and the like, the general amenities applicable to ordinary prisoners.
above, since solitary confinement itself is a separate punishment, if a death sentenced prisoner is kept in solitary confinement without any further offence being committed by him, it will be clear violation of the principle of double jeopardy as well as the right guaranteed under Article 35(5) of the Constitution. It is true that for the sake of security of the prisoner himself, his co-prisoners, jail, and State, some prisoners may be kept separately. However, in general, a prisoner cannot be punished for no offence
or he cannot be punished twice for the same offence. Therefore, we are of the view that the above interpretation and findings of the Indian Supreme Court in the Suni Barta Case is highly persuasive. In
a country like ours, where we practice similar judicial and criminal justice system, we should adopt progressive and eye-opening interpretation of law given by the Supreme Court of India or any other higher Courts in the world. Accordingly, we are of the view that the term “prisoner under death of sentence” as occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the prisons Act, should be read down as “prisoner under executable sentence of death”, and he will reach such executable stage only after exhaustion of all legal and constitutional remedies by him. Thus, the jail authority (respondent No.4) and the Government must take appropriate measures to amend the purported Rule, namely, Rule 980 of the Jail Code, in line with our above observations and interpretation of Section 30.
Orders of the Court:
be confirmed by the High Court” are declared to be without lawful authority and are of no legal effect. Jail Authority is directed to immediately amend Rule 980 of the Jail Code and other relevant Rules to that effect.
all the facilities available in jail as are given to other prisoners and, only in exceptional cases, he may be kept in isolated cell for limited period. In doing so, the jail authority must give him a limited scope of opportunity to explain as to why he should not be kept in such isolated cell. However, in such case, he would not be entitled to have the assistance of lawyer.
With the above observations, declarations, directions and orders, the Rule is disposed of.
Communicate this.
………………………. (Sheikh Hassan Arif,J)
I agree.
……….…………………… (Md. Bazlur Rahman,J)
W.P. No. 7185 of 2021 (Judgment dated 13.05.2024)