In the Supreme Court of Bangladesh

High Court Division

(Special Original Jurisdiction) Present

    Madam Justice Kashefa Hussain

And

Madam Justice Kazi Zinat Hoque

Writ Petition No. 6202 of 2020 In the matter of:

An application under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.

-And-

In the matter of:

Manoj Kumar Mandol, son of late Debendranath Mandol and late Shushila Mandol of village – Krishi Bank Road, Post Office- Morelganj 9320, Morelganj Pourashava, Morelganj, District- Bagerhat.

……. Petitioner. Vs.

Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affiars and others.

……Respondents.

      Ms. Tasmia Prodhan, Advocate

      …..for the petitioner Mr. Noor Us Sadik Chowdhury, D.A.G

   with Ms. Sayeda Sabina Ahmed Moli A.A.G with Ms. Farida Parvin Flora, A.A.G

... for the respondents No. 1-5

Heard on: 01.11.2022, 13.11.2022, 15.11.2022 and judgment on: 20.11.2022.

Kashefa Hussain, J:

Rule nisi was issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why ¢h¢d 6(P) of “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” (Annexure-C to the writ petition) as published in Bangaldesh Gazette dated 31.07.2018 vide SRO No. 245 Ain/2018, insofar as the same has created bar or block for the appointment of the petitioner and ¢h¢d 9, 10, 14 of “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”, insofar as the same are depriving the teachers and employees of the Nationalized Colleges to count their full service of

the present institution along with previous institution (if any), should

not be declared to have been published without lawful authority and is

of no legal effect and ultra vires the Constitution and why a direction should not be given upon the respondent No. 2 to create a scope to appoint the petitioner from the date of the nationalization of the college and count the full service, in the present institution along with

the previous institution (if any), of the teachers and employees whose colleges have been nationalized under “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” by amending ¢h¢d 6(P), 9, 10, 14 of “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” and/or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. 

The petitioner Manoj Kumar Mandol, son of late Debendranath Mandol and late Shushila Mandol of village – Krishi Bank Road, Post Office- Morelganj 9320, Morelganj Pourashava, Morelganj, District- Bagerhat is a citizen of Bangladesh.

The respondent No. 1 is the Secretary, Ministry of law Justice

and Parliamentary Affairs Bangladesh Secretariat, Shahbagh, Dhaka - 1000, the respondent No. 2 is the Secretary, Ministry of Public Administration, Bangladesh Secretariat, Shahbagh, Dhaka -1000, the respondent No. 3 is the Secretary, Ministry of Education, Bangladesh Secretariat, Shahbagh, Dhaka -1000, the respondent No. 4 is the Secretary, Secondary and Higher Secondary, Ministry of Education,

Bangladesh Secretariat, Shahbagh, Dhaka -1000, the respondent No. 5

is the Deputy Secretary, Secondary and Higher Secondary Department, Non-Government College Sub-section-6, Ministry of Education, Bangladesh Secretariat, Shahbagh, Dhaka -1000, the respondent No. 6 is the Director General, Directorate of Secondary

and Higher Education, Sheikhkha Bhaban, Ramna, Dhaka, the respondent No. 7 is the Principal, Sharankhola Government College, Sharankhola, Bagerhat.

The petitioner’s case inter alia is that the petitioner is an assistant professor of accounting in the Sharonkhola Government College. He got appointment letter to join as a lecturer in the said college on 31.10.1988 and joined the said college on 01.11.1988. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of the assistant professor of

the same subject on 01.11.2013 and since his joining he has been performing his duty with utmost sincerity and diligence. That the Sharonkhala College, where the petitioner is working was established

in 1978. The said college was nationalized on 08.08.2018 vide circular No. 37.00.000.070.002.004.2018-83 dated 12.08.2018 pursuant to Bidhimala, 2018. That ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL

J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” reads as follows:

6) AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡−Nl ®r−œ h¡d¡-¢e−odz ®L¡−e¡ hÉ¢š² AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡N m¡−il

®k¡NÉ qC−h e¡, k¢c-

P) AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡−Nl a¡¢l−M a¡q¡l hup plL¡¢l LjÑQ¡l£N−Zl Ahpl NËq−Zl

hup A−fr¡ A¢dL quz

That as per the date of nationalization of the college which is 08.08.2018, the petitioner is eligible for the adhoc appointment, but

his age would cross the threshold of the requisite 59 years if the date

is counted from any date after 04.12.2018. Appointment process is an administrative  work  and the time  involved  varies  from  college  to

college. In case of one college the appointment process takes more

time while in case of another college could take less time. There is no

set time limit or fixed deadline for adhoc appointment after nationalization of a certain college. Thus finding its harshness, unreasonableness and arbitrariness, respondent No. 7 the Principal of

the said college wrote a letter on 15.09.2018 to the respondent No. 4, Secretary, Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Department, Ministry of Education, to consider appointing the petitioner from the

date of nationalization of the college stating inter alia that the petitioner would be deprived from all the benefits had he not got the appointment from the date of Nationalization. But till now the respondent No. 4 has not taken any steps regarding the matter. That government is also reconsidering the age limit due to the Covid-19 situation which is evident from the circular dated 17.09.2020 vide

memo No. 05.00.0000.170.11.029-19-122 issued by respondent No. 3.

That ¢h¢d 9, 10, 14 of the ¢h¢dj¡m¡ 2018 reads as follows:

9)    ®hae-i¡a¡¢c ¢edÑ¡lZz AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡NfÐ¡ç ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£NZ, pw¢nÔø L−mS plL¡¢lLl−Zl a¡¢lM qC−a, ¢hcÉj¡e S¡a£u ®hae ®ú−ml pw¢nÔø ®NË−Xl fСl¢ñL d¡−f ü ü f−cl ®hae-i¡a¡¢c fСfÉ qC−hez

10)           ®SÉùa¡ ¢edÑ¡lZz plL¡¢lLl−Zl AhÉ¡h¢qa f§−hÑ pw¢nÔø −hplL¡¢l L−m−Sl ¢nLoL J LjÑQ¡l£N−Zl ¯SÉùa¡l ¢i¢š−a AÙb¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡NfÐ¡ç ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£N−Zl ¯SÉùa¡ ¢edÑ¡¢la qC−hz

14) L¡kÑLl Q¡L¢lL¡mz (1) plL¡¢lL«a L−m−S Bš£L«a ®L¡−e¡ ¢nrL h¡ LjÑQ¡l£ pw¢nÔø L−mS plL¡¢lLl−Zl AhpÉ¡h¢qal f§hÑ fkÑ¿¹ d¡l¡h¡¢qLi¡−h Eš² L−m−S phÑ−j¡V ®k pjuL¡m Q¡L¢l L¢l−he, Eš² Q¡L¢lL¡−ml A−dÑL pju pw¢nÔø ¢nrL h¡ LjÑQ¡l£l L¡kÑLl Q¡L¢lL¡m ¢qp¡−h NZÉ qC−hz These 3 Rules thurst an unreasonable condition by imposing the word, “pw¢nÔø L−mS” by depriving teachers and employees of their life long

service since according to the said rules the service of the teachers and employees would be counted where he/she is presently working. Their

service of the previous institution will not be counted even they have

duly paid for the government portion for their retirement benefits.

They are not getting back their portion of the money taken by the government when they join a new college, even though their index number remains the same. That as part of the community, the petitioner’s heart bleeds for this unreasonable condition imposed by

the said Rules. Hence the petitioner is also challenging Rule 9, 10 and

14 in the form of Public Interest litigation. That as per the Bangladesh

Civil Service (Age, qualification and examination for Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1982, age limit is counted from the first day of

the month in which the commission invites applications for holding

the examination. Two relevant provisions from the said Rules are read

as follows:

“13. Age Limit- (1) Subject to the provisions of succeeding sub-rule, no person shall be eligible to appear at the examination if he / she is less than 21 years of age or has exceeded 25 years of age on the first day of the month in which the commission invites applications for holding the examination.”

(2)  No Person shall be eligible to appear at an examination for a post in Bangladesh Civil Service (Education; General Education), Bangladesh Civil Service (Education: Technical Education), Bangladesh Civil Service (Health and Family Planning ) Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial), if he /

she is less than 21 years of age or he has exceeded 30 years of

age on the first day of the month in which the commission invites applications for holding examination.”

That those Rules do not provide the threshold for age limit after completion of the recruitment process rather it specifically mentioned

that the age limit should be counted from the first day of the month in which the Commission invites applications for holding the examination. As such ¢h¢d 6(P) of the ¢h¢dj¡m¡ 2018 is discriminatory, arbitrary, malafide and ultra vires to the constitution as it provides an unreasonable condition that the age limit for appointment shall be counted from the date of appointment. That the continuity of the service in case of transfer from one college to another has always been counted as per Rule 11(11), (12), Rule 12, Rule 13 which reads as follows:

11z ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£−cl (ú¥m, L−mS, j¡â¡p¡ J L¡¢lN¢l fТaù¡epj§q) ®hae-i¡a¡ ¢edÑ¡lZ:-

12z Ce−X„d¡l£ ¢nrL/LjÑQ¡l£ HL dl−Zl fТaù¡e q−a AeÉ dl−Zl fТaù¡−e pjf−c/pj−ú−m Q¡L¥¢l−a ®k¡Nc¡e Ll−m f§hÑ A¢i‘a¡ NZe¡−k¡NÉ q−hz

22z EµQ j¡dÉ¢jL ¢hcÉ¡mu/EµQ j¡dÉ¢jL L−mS/pÀ¡aL (f¡p) L−mS Hl AdÉr/Ef¡dÉr ¢e−u¡−Nl ®r−œ j¡â¡p¡ /L¡¢lN¢l ¢nr¡ fТaù¡−el fÐi¡oL (p¡d¡lZ)/ pqL¡l£ AdÉ¡fL (p¡d¡lZ) Hl A¢i‘a¡ NZe¡ Ll¡ q−hz

12z ¢nr¡ fТaù¡e (ú¥m, L−mS, j¡â¡p¡ J L¡¢lN¢l) f¢lhaÑe:- ®hae i¡a¡¢cl plL¡l£ Awn fÐ¡ç ®L¡e ¢nr¡ fТaù¡−e Q¡L¥¢lla AhÙÛ¡u fÊ¢aù¡e fÐd¡e−L Ah¢qaLl−Zl j¡dÉ−j ®L¡e ¢nrL/LjÑQ¡l£ AeÉ −k ®L¡e Hj.¢f.J i¥š² ¢nr¡fТaù¡−e pjf−c/EµQal f−c ¢e−u¡−Nl SeÉ B−hce Ll−m a¡−L ¢hi¡N£u fСbÑ£l¦−f NZÉ Ll¡ q−hz Hl¦f fСbÑ£ ®k ¢nr¡ fТaù¡−e ¢e−u¡¢Sa q−he ®p ¢nr¡fТaù¡e Hj¢fJ i¥š² q−m f§−hÑ¡š² fТaù¡−el c¡uj¤¢š²fœ NËqZ Hhw AeÉ¡eÉ ®k¡NÉa¡ f§lZ p¡−f−r ¢a¢e ea¥e fТaù¡−e ®k¡Nc¡eL¡m£e pj−ul hÉhd¡e p−hÑ¡µQ 2 (c¤C) hvpl fkÑ¿¹ a¡l Ce−X„ eðl hq¡m b¡L−hz a−h Hl A¢dL q−m Q¡L¥¢ll ¢hl¢a (Break of Service) h−m NZÉ q−hz HR¡s¡ Hj¢fJi¥š² ®L¡e ¢nrL- LjÑQ¡l£ pjf−c B−hce L¢l−m a¡−cl ®r−œ ¢ehåe fl£r¡l fÐ−u¡Se q−h e¡z plL¡l Hj¢fJ i¥š² ¢nrL, LjÑQ¡l£−cl fÐ−u¡Se−h¡−d e£¢aj¡m¡ fÐZu−el j¡dÉ−j HL fТaù¡e ®b−L AeÉ fТaù¡−e hc¢m Ll−a f¡l−hz

13z ®SÉùa¡ J A¢i‘a¡ ¢edÑ¡lZ:- ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£−cl f¡lØf¡¢lL ®SÉùa¡ J A¢i‘a¡ a¡−cl fÐbj Hj¢fJ i¥¢š²l a¡¢lM ®b−L NZe¡ Ll¡ q−hz a−h Hj¢fJi¥¢š² HLC a¡¢l−M q−m ®SÉùa¡ ¢ed¡l−Zl ®r−œ ®k¡Nc¡−el a¡¢lM ¢h−hQe¡ Ll¡ q−hz ®k¡Nc¡eJ HLC a¡¢l−M q−m a¡−cl S¾j a¡¢l−Ml ¢i¢š−a ®SÉùa¡ ¢edÑ¡lZ Ll¡ q−hz a−h ®L¡e ¢nr−Ll ¢e−u¡N ¢eu¢jaLlZ Ll¡ q−m ¢eu¢jaLl−Zl a¡¢lM ®k¡Nc¡−el a¡¢lM ¢q−p−h NZÉ q−hz

That said Rules of ¢h¢d 6(P) of “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” in so far as the same created a bar on the petitioner and     ¢h¢d 6(P), 9, 10, 14 of the ¢h¢dj¡m¡ 2018 is depriving a teacher of the nationalized college of the present institution along with previous institution and any such rule is unlawful and without lawful authority

and ultra vires of the constitution. And the respondents are refraining from absorbing and appointing the petitioner from date of nationalist of the  college  counting the  full  service which inaction is  without lawful effect. Hence the writ petition.

Learned Advocate Ms. Tasmia Prodhan appeared for the petitioner while learned D.A.G Mr. Noor Us Sadik Chowdhury along with Ms. Syeda Sabina Ahmed Moli, A.A.G along with Ms. Farida Parvin Flora, A.A.G appeared for the respondent Nos. 1-5.  

Learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the Rules impugned in the writ petition pertaining to the rules to “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” so far as it may deprive the petitioner of his lawful right to be absorbed, such Rule is ultra vires of the constitution and unlawful. He submits that ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” is unlawful and vague given that it does not specify as to when exactly pursuant to nationalization of an educational institution a teacher may be appointed on temporary basis. She contends that such vagueness in the Rules of 2018 is being taken advantage of by the respondents and has consequently led to violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under the constitution. She reiterates that ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” does not specify the prescribed time of appointment as temporary teacher pursuant to regularization.

She next contends that the petitioner has been serving in the college from 1.11.1988 which is his initially joining date pursuant to appointment. She also draws attention to the document Annexure-2 and submits that it is also evident that pursuant to appointment as lecturer he was subsequently promoted as assistant professor of the college on 1.11.2013. She agitated that therefore it is clear that the petitioner has been serving in the college by way of being lecturer later followed by being assistant professor for long years. She argued that therefore such arbitrary conduct by way of enacting ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” and some other Rules is totally ultra vires of the constitution and the arbitrary refraining of the respondents from absorbing the petitioner as a teacher in the nationalized college is without lawful authority.

Upon a query from this bench as to the petitioner having crossed the retirement age when the writ petition filed in 2013, Learned Advocate for the petitioner concedes that during the filing of the writ petition the petitioner had already crossed the retirement age. She however argued that it is nevertheless a fundamental right of the petitioner which have been violated given that it was the Respondents’ duty to absorb the petitioner in the nationalized college soon after the Bš£LlZ (Annexure-B of the writ petition dated 08.08.2018).

 She argued that on 08.08.2018 when the college was nationalized (Bš£LlZ) at that time the petitioner was in service and therefore not appointing and absorbing him soon after the Bš£LlZ is a violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner.

She next contends that although the petitioner has not been appointed and absorbed to the post as a teacher in the nationalized college but however teachers from other colleges in the same footing as the petitioner were however absorbed. She agitated that therefore the respondents are also in violation of article 29 of the Constitution upon committing discrimination between same class of persons. Upon

a query from this bench regarding the issue of discrimination the learned Advocate for the petitioner however could not cite any specific example of discrimination against the petitioner. She pursuaded that ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” bears a vague and unclear language and has consequently created much uncertainty in the law. She contends that moreover such vaugeness is being taken advantage of by the respondent. He continues that upon taking advantage of the vaugeness

of the Rules the respondents are unlawfully and arbitrarily depriving

the petitioner and his fundamental rights are thus violated. She further contends that therefore such a vague Rule being ultra vires of the constitution having lacking clarity are not sustainable. She concludes

her submission upon assertion that the Rule bears merit ought to be made absolute for ends of justice.

On the other hand learned D.A.G appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1-5 vehemently opposes the rule. He submits that the petitioner has no reason to feel aggrieved since on the date of filing of

the writ petition the petitioner was already retired from service. He

next draws our attention to ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” and contends that there is no apparent vaugeness whatsoever noticed in ¢h¢d 6(P) the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”. He further submits that even if for sake

of academic discussion had the petitioner filed the writ petition before

his retirement age in that event also the petitioner did not have any

fundamental right to be absorbed. He submits that no fundamental or

statutory right is created by ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J

LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”. He submits that the government has its

own Rules and criteria as to who they will and who they will not

appoint or absorb whatsoever. He asserts that therefore it is not a

vested right of the petitioner to be absorbed ispo facto pursuant to ¢h¢d

6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”.

Regarding the petitioner’s claim of alleged discrimination by

the respondents the learned D.A.G submits that although the petitioner

made such claims but however the petitioner could not show anything

from the records that any discrimination has occured among persons

placed on similar footing. He asserts that no fundamental right has

been found to be violated. He concludes his submission upon

assertion that the Rule bears no merits ought to be discharged for ends

of justice.

We have heard the learned counsels for both sides, perused the

application, materials on records. Admittedly the petitioner crossed

his retirement age before the filing of the writ petition. However since

the petitioner raised an issue on the vires of some Rules including ¢h¢d

6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”, therefore it is our duty to examine as to whether at all such rule is

ultra vires of the Constitution. ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J

LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” is reproduced below:

“6) AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡−Nl ®r−œ h¡d¡-¢e−odz ®L¡−e¡ hÉ¢š² AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡N m¡−il ®k¡NÉ qC−h e¡, k¢c-

P) AÙÛ¡u£i¡−h ¢e−u¡−Nl a¡¢l−M a¡q¡l hup plL¡¢l LjÑQ¡l£N−Zl Ahpl NËq−Zl hup A−fr¡ A¢dL quz”

We have particularly examined ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” which the petitioner claims to be

ultra vires of the Constitution.  After perusal of ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” we are of the considered view that apparently we do not find any vaugeness in ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”. In our understanding Rule 6(P) contemplates that in case of temporary appointment as a teacher if the age of the teacher is to be found to be beyond the retirement age of any government employees, in that case

such person will not be considered for appointment for temporary

appointment whatsoever.

 The learned Advocate for the petitioner also contended that the petitioner is an assistant professor of accounting in the Sharonkhola Government College. He received appointment letter to join as a lecturer in the said college on 31.10.1988 and joined the said college on 01.11.1988. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of assistant professor of the same subject on 01.11.2013 and since his joining he has been performing his duty with utmost sincerity and diligence. She also contends that the Sharonkhala College where the petitioner is working was established in 1978. The said college was nationalized on 08.08.2018 vide circular No. 37.00.000.070.002.004.2018-83 dated 12.08.2018 pursuant to Bidhimala, 2018. She further contended that due to the ‘vague’ language used in Rule 6(P) including some other Rules, the Respondents have taken undue advantage of such vagueness. She further contended that consequently by taking such undue advantage of the vague expression, used in the Rules, the Respondents are depriving the petitioner of his fundamental rights to

be absorbed and regularized pursuant to nationalization.  

Against such argument we are of the view that upon examination we however do not find any vaugeness in ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018”. The learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that since there is no specification

in ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” as to pursuant to nationalization when a person may be considered temporary appointment, therefore such vaugeness has deprived the petitioner of his rights to be appointed and absorbed pursuant to Bš£LlZ. She further contended that  the petitioner crossed the retirement age pursuant to Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018 is not due to any fault

or any laches of the petitioner but due to the arbitrary conduct of the respondents upon misusing the vague language of ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” . Our considered

view is as mentioned above we do not find any vagueness in ¢h¢d 6(P)

of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” and therefore consequently we are of the opinion that ¢h¢d 6(P) of the “plL¡¢lL«a L−mS ¢nrL J LjÑQ¡l£ Bš£LlZ ¢h¢dj¡m¡, 2018” is not ultra vires

of the constitution.

The petitioner also contended that to be appointed and absorbed as teacher is a basic fundamental right of the petitioner given that he has served in the institution long years as a lecturer and subsequently as Assistant Professor. We are in agreement with the argument of the learned D.A.G. Truly enough the government has its own criteria and policy regarding appointment of a person a teacher following nationalization of any institution. Whether at all a teacher or other persons fill such criterias are disputed matters of fact which cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction. As to who they will appoint following the criteria, is essentially a matter of policy which we are not in a position to examine.

The petitioner raised an issue of discrimination upon assertion of violation of Article 29 of the Constitution. However, although the petitioner claimed discrimination between the petitioner and others but she could not cite any specific example of any such  discrimination. Consequently we do not find any discrimination between the petitioner or /and any person in the same footing.

 Under the fact and circumstances and foregoing discussion made above, we do not find any merit in this Rule.

In the result, the Rule is discharged without any order as to costs.

Communicate this judgment at once.

I agree.    

Kazi Zinat Hoque, J:

Arif(B.O)