DISTRICT-MADARIPUR

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH HIGH COURT DIVISION

(CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION)

CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS CASE NO.25615 OF 2019

IN THE MATTER OF:

An application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IN THE MATTER OF:

Md. Nazmul Huda

---- Petitioner

-VERSUS- The State and another

----- Opposite Parties Mr. Md. Moniruzzaman, Advocate

--For the Petitioner

Mr. Farhad Ahmed, D.A.G with Ms. Nusrat Jahan, D.A.G

------ For the State

Present:

MR. JUSTICE M. ENAYETUR RAHIM

 AND

MR. JUSTICE MD. MOSTAFIZUR RAHMAN

The 3rd February, 2019 By filing an application under section 561A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure the accused petitioner has sought quashment of the proceedings in Nari-O-Shishu Case No.106 of 2018 under section 11(ga) of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Damon Ain,2000 (as amended,2003), now pending in the Court of Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Tribunal, Madaripur.  

Heard the learned Advocate for the accused petitioner, perused the petition of complaint, inquiry report, order of framing charge and other materials as placed before us.

The accused petitioner has sought quashment of the proceedings mainly on the plea that in the inquiry report it was not mentioned whether the complainant went to the police

station for lodging the First Information Report and the concerned police officer refused to lodge the First Information

Report and thus the Tribunal took cognizance of the offence

against the accused illegally.

To address the above issue it is needed to examine

section 27(1ka) (ka) (kha) of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Daman

Ain, 2000, (hereinafter after referred to as Ain, 2000) which

runs as follows:

Ò(1K) †Kvb Awf‡hvMKvix Dc-aviv (1)-Gi Aaxb †Kvb cywjk Kg©KZ©v‡K ev ÿgZvcÖvß e¨w³‡K †Kvb Aciv‡ai Awf‡hvM MÖnY Kwievi Rb¨ Aby‡iv aKwiqv e¨_© nBqv‡Qb g‡g© njdbvgv mnKv‡i UªvBey¨bv‡ji wbKU Awf‡hvM `vwLj Kwi‡j UªvBey¨bvj Awf‡hvMKvix‡K cixÿv Kwiqv-

(K)  mš ó‘ nB‡j Awf‡hvMwU AbymÜv‡bi (inquiry) Rb¨ †Kvb g¨vwR‡÷ªU wKsev Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³‡K wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb Ges AbymÜv‡bi Rb¨ wb‡`©kcÖvß e¨w³ Awf‡hvMwU AbymÜvb Kwiqv mvZ Kvh© w`e‡mi g‡a¨ UªvBey¨bv‡ji wbKU wi‡cvU© cÖ`vb wi‡eb;

(L)   mš ó‘ bv nB‡j Awf‡hvMwU mivmwi bvKP Kwi‡eb|Ó [underlines supplied to

give emphasis]

On a careful examination of section 27(1ka) coupled with sub-section (ka) it becomes crystal clear that on receipt of a complaint supported by an affidavit if the Tribunal is satisfied

upon examining the complainant that after being refused by

the concerned police officer or the authorised person he/she

directly came to the Tribunal in that event an order for holding

inquiry can be made.

It appears that in the case in hand, the complainant filed

the petition of complaint before the Tribunal along with an

affidavit stating that she went to the police station but the police refused to accept her complaint and the concerned Tribunal being satisfied about the same, upon examining the complainant, directed to hold inquiry into the allegation.

Since the complainant by swearing an affidavit before the Tribunal asserted that the concerned police officer refused to accept her complaint and the Tribunal has also been satisfied about the said complaint, in our view, there is no legal necessity to make an inquiry into the said issue afresh.

Moreso, the word ‘A¢i−k¡N¢V Ae¤på¡−el SeÉ’ as contemplated in section 27(1ka) is very significant. It means that an inquiry should be done on the allegations brought against an accused.

It does not mean that inquiry should be done to ascertain whether the complainant went to the police station and he/she

was refused by the police.

Section 27(1ga) of the Nari-O-Shishu Nirjatan Ain, 2000 speaks as follows:

(1M) Dc-aviv (1) Ges (1K) Gi Aaxb cÖvß wi‡cvU© †Kvb e¨w³i weiæ‡× Aciva msNU‡bi Awf‡hvM ev Zrm¤ú‡K© Kvh©µg MÖn‡Yi mycvwik bv _vKv m‡Ë¡I UªvBey¨bvj, h_vh_ Ges b¨vqwePv‡ii ¯^v‡_© cÖ‡qvRbxq g‡b Kwi‡j, KviY D‡jøLc~e©K D³ e¨w³i e¨vcv‡i mswkøó Aciva wePviv_© MÖnY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

In view of the above provision, the Tribunal has given unfettered power to take cognizance of the offence against an accused assigning cogent reasons, despite no recommendation

is made for accusation in the report.

Further, when upon an inquiry by a competent person the allegations made against an accused is prima facie found to be true then the concerned accused should not be given a go by merely on any hiper technical issue.

In view of the above, we find no merit in the application.  Accordingly, the application is rejected summarily. Communicate a copy of this order at once. 

I.Sarwar/B.O