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Annexure-B


1

From the desk of

Mohammad Humaun Kabir L.L.B. L.L.M. DU

LLB. Uni. Of London

PGDL, City University, London Of Lincolns’ Inn Barrister Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh


H. KABIR &       Associates

Barristers, Advocates & Jurist Jahan Plaza (3rd Floor)

42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka- 1000


1

Ref: HKA/LN/NBR/2018 Dated: April 05, 2018

BY REGISTERED POST WITH A/D and e-mail

  1. Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry Finance, Bangladesh Secretariat

Secretariat Building

Ramna, Dhaka.

  1. The Governor

Bangladesh Bank

Bangladesh Bank Bhaban

Motijheel, Dhaka.

Email: bb.cipc@bb.org.bd

  1. Chairman

National Board of Revenue (NBR) Pioneer Road

Dhaka.

Email: feedbacktax@nbr.gov.bd

  1. Secretary

Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Bangladesh Secretariat

Secretariat Building

Ramna, Dhaka.

  1. Secretary

Ministry of Post and Telecommunication Bangladesh Secretariat

Secretariat Building

Ramna, Dhaka.

  1. Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) IEB Bhaban (5,6& 7 floor), Ramna, Dhaka-1000

Email: btrc@btrc.gov.bd

  1. Secretary

Ministry of Information and Communication Technology Bangladesh Secretariat

Secretariat Building

Ramna, Dhaka.

  1. Mr. Matiur Rahman

President

Newspapers Owners Association of Bangladesh. C/O Daily Prothom Alo

CA Bhaban

100 Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue

Kawranbazar, Dhaka 1215. Email:info@prothom-alo.info

  1. The Google

Represented by its Chief Executive Officer The Googleplex

Corporate Headquarters

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway.

Mountain View, CA 94043.

California, United States.

Twitter IDs @google

  1. Facebook

1 Hacker Way

Menlo Park, California 94025. United States.

  1. Yahoo! Inc.

701 1st Ave.

Sunnyvale, CA

94089

California, United States.

  1. Oath (EMEA) Limited (formerly known as Yahoo! EMEA Limited)

5-7 Point Square

North Wall Quay

Dublin 1

Ireland

Tel: +353 1 866 3100

Tel: +353 1 866 3101

  1. YouTube, LLC

901 Cherry Ave.

San Bruno, CA 94066 USA

Fax: +1 650-253-0001

On behalf of:

  1. Mr. Mohammad Humaun Kabir, Barrister-at-Law Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh 42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.
  2. Mr. Mohammed Kawsar, Barrister-at-Law Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh 42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.
  3. Mr. Abu Zafar Md Saleh

Son of Mohammad Shajahan Mia

Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.

  1. Mr. Apurbo Kumar Biswas

Son of Jitendra Nath Biswas

Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.

  1. Mr. Mohammad Sazzadul Islam, Barrister-at-Law

Son of Abdus Salam Mia

Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.

  1. Mr. Mohammd Majedul Quader, Barrister-at-Law

Son of Late Professor Dr.Mohammed Fazlul Quader

Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

42/1/ka, Segunbagicha, Dhaka.

Re:  Legal Notice for realization of appropriate tax, VAT and/or any

other government charges from the revenues earned by the internet giants like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Yahoo etc. through digital advertisements posted on their web pages from Bangladesh by various enterprises/companies since 1995 and to form a special committee having necessary technical know- how and expertise to assess the nature and volume of online financial transactions and amount of payment received by the internet giants from Bangladesh.

Dear Sir,

We have been instructed by the above named notice senders, to serve this Notice upon you as follows:

  1. That all the notice senders are practicing advocates of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. They are law abiding conscious citizens of Bangladesh and human rights activists at all material times. They are very much concerned about violation of fundamental human rights of the citizen as well as State’ wellbeing.
  2. That this notice is given in the context that the government of Bangladesh is entitled to deduct appropriate tax, VAT and other government charges from the payment made to the internet giants like Google, facebook, Amazon, yahoo, Youtube etc by individuals and legal entities in form of online payments against advertisements posted on the webpage of the internet giants. Similarly, internet giants are also legally obliged to pay relevant tax, VAT and other  charges/revenue to the government of Bangladesh in accordance with applicable law of Bangladesh.
  1. That digital advertising is the primary source of revenue for online based enterprises in Bangladesh. With the growth of the digital market in Bangladesh, different brands and advertising agencies have enhanced their presence through increased spending on digital advertising. While making direct advertising in local online platforms, both the advertiser and the publisher are complying with the country's laws and policies. By the end of each fiscal year, both online publishers and advertisers take account of their profit and loss account and pay applicable taxes to the government. However, when the same advertiser is advertising through Facebook Audience Network (FAN) or Google Display Network's (GDN) programmatic advertising platforms, it is making direct payment to these internet giants through an international payment gateway (credit card/dabit cards etc). Google then places ads in its search and display networks while Facebook displays these ads through FAN and a bunch of other apps. An online publisher being a part of GDN or FAN, gets a portion of money an advertiser is paying to these internet giants.
  2. That these Google, yahoo, youtube and Facebook etc. are doing business in Bangladesh without maintaining any registered office and operating without any kind of accountability. They are enjoying huge sums of digital revenue without paying any taxes to local regulators. As Google and Facebook do not disclose the revenues earned from Bangladesh, an online publisher remains in the dark about the advertising deals between an advertiser and them. The publisher never knows the percentage of the revenue it is getting from the deal. Nobody except these internet giants knows the volume of financial transactions that are taking place every day. As a result, Bangladesh is deprived of huge revenue.
  3. That both Google and Facebook are pricing at a much lower rate for publishing advertisements at their sites. As a result of this unfair and unhealthy business practice, local publishers are increasingly becoming vulnerable and fighting for survival. Having no office in Bangladesh, Google and Facebook have so far been able to stay beyond the jurisdiction of local laws. They have also created a monopoly in digital advertising violating Section 15 of the Competition Act, 2012.
  4. That it has been reported in a research study by Visual Capitalist, digital advertising will surpass television advertising (Chart: The Slow Death of Traditional Media, Jeff Desjardins, October 7, 2016) that the digital advertising will become the largest ad market in existence. The growth may open up a bright future for online publishers. But taking into account the present scenario, the dominance of Google and Facebook, the online publishers will have no choice but to make an unconditional surrender. At present these two companies  control 57.06 percent (The Dominance of Google and Facebook in One Chart, Jeff Desjardins, December 9, 2016) of the digital ad market and their slices of the pie are only growing. A rough estimate shows that more than half of each dollar (USD 0.60) that an advertiser spent on digital advertising goes to Google and Facebook. Facebook ran faster than all in terms of digital ad growth—in the first quarter of 2016 the social media company witnessed 57 percent growth to  USD 5.2 billion from USD 3.3 billion (Facebook Revenue Soars on Ad Growth, Washington Post, April 28, 2016). Facebook has more than two billion active

users. It has been squeezing more ads into its News Feed. This lopsided growth and the digital monetisation strategy of internet giants are two big threats to the media stalwarts around the world including Bangladesh.

  1. That it is stated that Newspapers Owners Association of Bangladesh (NOAB) made a representation to the Ministry of Finance on 25.11.2017 expressing their concern over the digital advertisements get published on Google, Facebook, etc., depriving Bangladesh from earning a huge amount of revenues from advertisement sector. It has also been observed by NOAB that Facebook and Google are creating monopoly business in Bangladesh upon controlling over the digital advisement sector as they are not accountable to pay tax, VAT etc. to the government.
  2. That it is stated that both Google and Facebook are registered in California and are subjected to Federal Tax Law and both the companies have been very successful in remaining beyond tax net in most countries of the world. However, in January 2015, Google made a deal with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), UK under which it paid £130 million in tax which was due for more than ten years. Similarly, in Indonesia Google made an agreement under which it would pay the Indonesian government an undisclosed amount of tax for 2016. There are possibilities that the company will be slapped with USD 400 million for 2015 alone.
  3. That it is stated that the Government of Bangladesh can learn from UK, Irish and Indonesian experiences and strategies. There are ample examples that governments in many countries are waking up and clamping down on corporate tax avoidance on digital advertisements.
  4. That as per reports of the various newspapers in Bangladesh, payment to such internet giants in guess of payment for business transaction, is being used as a safe mode and tools for laundering money from Bangladesh to their chosen destination which requires to be enquired.
  5. That as per report published in the daily Jugantor on 17.12.2017 these internet giants earns millions of dollars every year without paying any corporate tax to Bangladesh Government which is violation of law.
  6. That in this circumstance you are humbly requested to do as follows:

(i)                 Notice recipient Nos.2 and 3 is requested to take immediate necessary steps to realize/deduct appropriate AIT/VAT and any other charge as per local law from all payment to be made by any person from Bangladesh in favourt of Google, Yahoo, Youtube, Amazon, Facebook from now on.

(ii)              Notice recipient Nos. 1-7 are requested to issue appropriate directions toGoogle, Yahoo, Youtube, Amazon, Facebook authorities immediately for realization of appropriate tax, Vat etc. from them.

(iii)            Notice recipient Nos. 1-7 are requested to form a special committee having necessary technical know- how and expertise to assess the nature and volume of online financial transactions and amount of payment received by the internet giants from Bangladesh for last 10 years upon investigation and to take appropriate measures for realization of revenue from Google, Yahoo, Youtube, Amazon, Facebook, LinkedIn etc. internet giants from the payments made to them till date and to take all further necessary steps to combat money laundering/avoidance of government revenues by these online tools.

(iv)             Notice recipient Nos.9-13 are requested to pay all the arrear corporate tax to the Bangladesh authority against the payments received by them from Bangladesh against for their service and sales for the last 10 years and not to receive any payments from Bangladesh without paying appropriate corporate tax from now on.

Therefore, all of you are requested to do as advised in paragraph no. 12 above and disseminate your such steps on media through press release and to inform us of your such action in writing within the next 24 hours from the receipt of this Notice, failing which we shall be compelled to take shelter of law by invoking fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Bangladesh before the Honorable High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in writ jurisdiction in the interest of public at large and of the State.

A copy of this Notice is kept in our chambers for future reference, if any be needed.

Thanking you. Yours faithfully,

Mohammad Humaun Kabir Barrister-at-Law (Lincolns’ Inn) Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh For:

H.Kabir and Associates

Barristers, Advocates & Jurist

clM¡Ù¹L¡l£NZ LaѪL ®fÐl£a Ef¢l¢õ¢Ma BCeNa ®e¡¢V−n pw¢nÔø LaѪfr …l¦aÅ fÐc¡e Ll¡u p¡w¢hd¡¢eL c¡uhÜa¡ ®b−L Aœ l£V ¢f¢Vne¢V clM¡Ù¹L¡l£ −j¡q¡Çjc ýj¡u¤e L¢hl J AeÉ¡eÉ LaѪL NZfËS¡a¿»£ h¡wm¡−c−nl pw¢hd¡−el Ae¤−µRc 102(2)(L)(A)(B) Hl Ad£e Aœ clM¡Ù¹ c¡¢M−ml ®fË¢r −a fË¢afr N−Zl Efl L¡lZ cnÑ¡−e¡f§hÑL ¢e−jÀ¡š² l¦m¢VAœ ¢hi ¡N q−a Cp¤É Ll¡ q−u¢Rmx-

“Let a Rule Nisi be issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the respondent nos. 1-7 should not be directed to take immediate necessary steps to realize appropriate tax, vat and/or any other Government charge from the revenue earned by the internet companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Yahoo, You Tube etc. through digital advertisements posted on their webpages from Bangladesh and on the sale proceeds of domains and licences by various enterprises/companies since 2007 onwards and/or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.

Subject to the disposal of the Rule, the respondent Nos. 1-7 are hereby directed to start collecting appropriate corporate tax, vat and other charges immediately from all payments to be made to Google, Facebook, Amazon, Yahoo, You Tube and all internet companies forthwith in accordance with the relevant provisions of law.

However, in order to meet the emergent situation, the respondent nos. 1-7 are further directed to form a Special Committee having necessary technical know how and expertise to assess the nature and volume of online financial transactions and amount of payment received by the internet giants from Bangladesh and to submit their respective reports to this Court by swearing Affidavit-in-compliance by 25.06.2018.

The Rule is returnable within 4(four) weeks from date.”

Ef¢l¢õ¢Ma l¦m¢V Cp¤É qJu¡l flhaÑ£−a Aœ ¢hi ¡N LaѪL ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 14.11.2019 a¡¢l−M B−cn fÐc¡e Ll¡ qu k¡ A¢hLm ¢e−jÀ Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

“Present:

Mr. Justice Moyeenul Islam Chowdhury

And

Mr. Justice Md. Ashraful Kamal

14.11.2019

Mr. Mohammad Humaun Kabir, Advocate in person

------- For the petitioner Mr. Shamim Khaled Ahmed, Advocate

------- For the respondent No. 2

Mr. Saifuddin Khaled, DAG with

Mr. Muhammad Shah Newaj, AAG with Mr. Md. Sirajul Alam Bhuiyan (Siraj)

-------- For the respondent No. 3 Mr. A. K. M. Alamgir Parvez, Advocate

-------- For the respondent No. 6

Today is fixed for passing necessary order.

We have heard the learned Advocates concerned and perused the record and the Affidavit-in-Compliance filed by the Bangladesh Bank, BTRC and the NBR.

It transpires that at the time of issuance of the Rule Nisi on 12.04.2018, this Court directed the respondent Nos. 1-7 to start collecting appropriate corporate tax, vat and other charges immediately from all payments to be made to Google, Facebook, Amazon, Yahoo, Youtube and all internet companies forthwith in accordance with the relevant provisions of law subject to the disposal of the Rule.

On that date (12.04.2018), this Court further directed the respondent Nos. 1-7 to form a Special Committee having necessary technical know-how and expertise to assess the nature and volume of online financial transactions and amount of payment received by the internet gaints from Bangladesh and to submit their respective reports to this Court by swearing Affidavits-in-

Compliance by 25.06.2018.

After taking some adjournments, the Bangladesh Bank, BTRC and the NBR have submitted their respective Affidavits-in- Compliance in response to the interim orders of this Court adverted to above.

We have been taken through the Affidavits-in-Compliance by the Advocates concerned. Those Affidavits-in-Compliance will be taken into consideration at the time of hearing of the Rule on merit. At this stage, let the Affidavits-in-Compliance be kept with the record.

As the Rule is not ready for hearing, let it go out of list for the time being.”

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Annexure- 2 Series

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¢h¢nø HL¢V L¢j¢V NWe Ll¡ quz Aem¡Ce ¢h‘¡fe j§mÉ h¡hc (C¾V¡l−eV

S¡u¡¾V Google, facebook, Amazon, Yahoo, youtube CaÉ¡¢c fÔ¡Vgl−j) ¢h−c−n AbÑ ®fÐlZ Hhw ®fТla A−bÑl ¢hfl£−a VÉ¡„, iÉ¡V f¢l−n¡d ¢ho−u L¢j¢Vl fkÑ¡−hrZ ¢ejÀl©fx

1)                Aem¡Ce ¢h‘¡fe j§mÉ h¡hc ®fТlahÉ AbÑ ¢h−c−n ®fÐl−Zl ®rœ pw¢nÔø ¢h¢d-¢hd¡e f¢lf¡me J ¢h−c−n ®fТla A−bÑl ¢hfl£−a VÉ¡„, iÉ¡V

Bc¡−ul  ®r−œ  hÉ¡w¢Lw  Cä¡¢ØVÌS  fr  ®b−L  fÐ−u¡Se£u  pq−k¡N£a¡ kb¡kbi¡−h fÐc¡e Ll¡ q−µRz Hac¢ho−u 2015 ®b−L 2018 fkÑ¿¹ pj−u hÉ¡w¢Lw QÉ¡−e−m ®fТla A−bÑl hÉ¡wLJu¡l£ ¢hhlZ£ h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL q−a S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑ ®fÐlZ Ll¡ q−u−R (Annexure-1)z  

2)                hÉ¡w¢Lw QÉ¡−e−m ¢h−cn£ Aem¡Ce ¢j¢Xu¡u ¢h‘¡fe fÐQ¡l h¡hc hÉ¢ua A−bÑl f¢lj¡Z S¡e¡l SeÉ h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL La«ÑL hÉ¡wL…−m¡−L Bm¡c¡ ®L¡X hl¡Ÿ Ll¡ q−u−R (Annexure-2)z °h−c¢nL ®me−c−e ¢e−u¡¢Sa hÉ¡wLpj¤q H Bm¡c¡ ®L¡−Xl j¡dÉ−j Aem¡Ce ¢h‘¡fe h¡hc

¢h−c−n ®fТla A−bÑl f¢lj¡Z h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡w−L ¢l−f¡VÑ Ll−Rz ®L¡−e¡ fÐL¡l Aü¡i¡¢hL ®me−ce q−m ®p ¢ho−u h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL La«ÑL fÐ−u¡Se£u hÉhÙÛ¡ NËqZ Ll¡ q−hz

3)                Hac¢ho−u AbÑ ®fÊl−Zl kb¡kb j¢eV¢lw J VÉ¡„, iÉ¡V Bc¡u ¢e¢ÕQa Ll¡l ü¡−bÑ C¾V¡l−eV S¡u¡¾V Google, facebook, Amazon,

Yahoo, youtube CaÉ¡¢c ¢h−cn£ fТaù¡epj¤−ql H−c−n n¡M¡ A¢gp ÙÛ¡f−e  hÉhÙÛ¡  ®eu¡l  ¢ho−u  h¡wm¡−cn  hÉ¡wL  La«ÑL Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) ®L Ah¢qa Ll¡

q−u−R (Annexure-3)z

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Annexure-1

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Bfe¡−cl ¢hnÄÙ¹

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−g¡ex 02-55665001

  1. DUTCH BANGLA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT/TAX (TAKA)

1. Havas Media Bangladesh

Google  Asia  Pacific  Pte. Ltd.

2018

2034.5

33955.8

2. Media Axis

Google  Asia  Pacific  Pte. Ltd

2015

19160.62

360

2016

377908.79

2889890.03

2017

225383.38

2136989.65

2018

99027.32

1237020.37

Facebook Ireland Limited

2016

307560.44

 

2017

560006.95

2655040.89

2018

323982.55

3300292.55

 

 

Ultimedia E Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

2016

351002.58

4131147.36

 

GRAND TOTAL

2266067.13

16384696.65

  1. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. ACTIVATE MEDIA SOLUTIONS LTD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

11280.19

140598

161688

2018

86360.53

1332926.48

1522839

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

60232.71

1229515.49

1049189

2. BITOPI ADVERTISING LTD

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

16737.78

208888

240221

2018

95346.92

1422088.13

1602197

 

GRAND TOTAL

269958.13

4334052.21

4576134

  1. BRAC Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

Nil

Nil

2007- 2014

Nil

Nil

Nil

1. BRAC

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2015

5301.96

110267.51

82700.63

2016

26389.2

548825.64

411619.23

2017

85199.29

1771932.23

1328949.18

2018

24716.51

480348.68

382268.67

2. BRAC ARARONG

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

9737.78

201913.28

151434.71

 

GRAND TOTAL

151344.74

3113287.34

2356972.42

  1. CITY Bank N. A

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. Grameen phone Limited

Facebook Ireland Limited

2015

147789.09

2906181.45

2179636.1

2016

738038.4

14511133.21

10883350

2017

854834.75

17469083.5

13501813

20118

836695.66

18127551.85

13595664

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2015

239662.04

3993892.73

3538149.6

2016

531933.26

10468613.48

7851460.1

2017

535654.87

13245979.07

9934484.3

20118

1180985.91

14700222.16

11025167

 

GRAND TOTAL

5066293.98

95422657.45

72509723

  1. THE CITY Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

 

1. ANALYZEN BANGLADESH LIMITED

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

252663.41

3463938.19

3124744.83

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

143774.23

2025562.27

1806262.27

2. SHOPFRONT LIMITED

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

6101.45

101257.44

75943.08

2018

19911.58

332243.05

249169.16

 

GRAND TOTAL

422450.67

5923000.95

5256119.34

  1. BANK ASIA Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. Asiatic Mindshare LTD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2014

19188458

 

 

2015

65828687

1791803

 

2016

110569716

4365104

 

2017

229610918

31129531

24187586

2018

137029946.1

26743477.41

20554491.92

Facebook Ireland Limited

2014

15807629

 

 

2015

71904006

1446482

 

2016

88279399

3485943

 

2017

150487029

19033618

14351759

2018

97032487.92

19265151.85

14554873.19

2. Madiacon Ltd.

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

1478658.2

295731.61

221798.8

2018

22126406.17

4425281.24

3318960.5

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

4920072.25

984014.43

738011

2018

15153780.05

3030756.46

2273065.72

3. Raise IT Solutions Ltd

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

103434.7

21861

4949

 

GRAND TOTAL

1029520627

116018755

80205495.13

  1. SOUTH EAST Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT (BDT)

1. GEEKY SOCIAL LIMITED

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

19811.62

8490.6

 

 

2018

160056.1

68595.6

2. BUILDING TECHNOLOGY AND IDEAS LIMITED

SRB TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD

2018

1500

450

 

GRAND TOTAL

181367.72

77536.2

  1. DHAKA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. SOFTWIND TECH

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2015

26475.97

967563

48378.24

Facebook Limited

2015

36152.45

 

 

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2016

449367.9

13433096

819661.45

Facebook Limited

2016

673292359

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

151008.07

6084105.1

9742727.25

Facebook Limited

2017

296928.2

 

 

2. Media Star (Protom Alo)

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2016

44506.95

 

 

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

44019.78

20484764

10610766.9

Facebook Ire land Limited

2017

57701.18

 

 

Google Asia39875.28 Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

23806.75

$3,571.01

$3,571.01

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

39875.28

$5,981.29

$5,981.29

 

GRAND TOTAL

1843135.12

$9,552.30

$9,552.30

  1. AB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT (BDT)

Access Telecom BD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

24629.08

411770.02

 

GRAND TOTAL

24629.08

411770.02

10.FIRST SECURITY ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT (BDT)

1. Melonades

Facebook Limited

2018

44608.69

624147.03

2. Active Media Soluation

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

780596.12

8520878.14

 

GRAND TOTAL

825204.81

9145025.17

  1. ISLAMI Bank Bangladesh Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MERCANTILE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. RUPALI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. AL-ARAFAH Islami Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. UNION Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. BANGLADESH COMMERCIAL Bank Limited( BCB)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

17.JAMUNA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. BANGLADESH DEVELOPMENT Bank Limited (DBBL)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. HABIB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. ONE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MIDLAND Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. EXIM Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SOUTH BANGLA AGRICULTURE And COMMERCE Bank Limited (SBAC)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MUTUAL TRUST Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NATIONAL Bank Bangladesh

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. WOORI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MEGHNA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. STANDARD Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. UNITED COMMERCIAL Bank Limited (UCBL)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. IFIC Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. AGRANI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. JANATA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SONALI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. BANGLADESH KRISHI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. BASIC Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. RAJSHAHI KRISHI UNNAYAN Bank

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. ICB ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB COMMERCIAL Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB GLOBAL Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SHAHJALAL ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. THE FARMERS Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. TRUSE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. UTTARA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. Bank ALFALAH Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. HSBC

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NATIONAL Bank OF PAKISTEN

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. STATE Bank OF INDIA

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. COMMERCIAL Bank Of CEYLON

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SOCIAL ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NATIONAL CREDIT AND COMMERCE Bank Limited (NCC)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. PUBALI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. EASTERN Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. ONE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MODHUMOTI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. PREMIER Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SHIMANTO Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

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P)  flhaÑ£ B−hc−el pju C−e¡−i¢Xu¡p La«ÑL ®l¢SØVÌ¡lL«a fТa¢V ®X¡−jC−el e¡jpq ®l¢jVÉ¡−¾pl  ¢hÙ¹¡¢la  abÉ  RL  BL¡−l  c¡¢Mm  Ll−a  q−hz  f¡n¡f¡¢n  CeJu¡XÑ ®l¢jVÉ¡−¾pl abÉJ c¡¢Mm Ll−a q−h;

Q) fТa j¡−p j¡xXx 2,00,000 (c¤C mr) Hl ®h¢n ®l¢jVÉ¡¾p Ll−a q−m H ¢hi¡−Nl f§hÑ¡e¤−j¡ce NËqZ Ll−a q−hz

Bf¡e¡−cl ¢hnÄÙ¹,

ü¡: AØfø

(j¤q¡Çjc n¡q¢lu¡l CLh¡m)

Ef-f¢lQ¡mL

BC¢fx 0255665001-6/21208

p§œ ew-HgC¢f¢X (®l¢jVÉ¡¾p)02/2018-9396 a¡¢lMx 04/11/2018

 p−lS¢je  f¢lcnÑeL¡−m  Ae¤−j¡c−el  naÑ¡¢c  f¢lf¡m−el  AhÙÛ¡(Status) f¢lrZ/ac¡l¢Ll  ¢e¢j−š  jq¡hÉhÙÛ¡fL,  ®~h−c¢nL  j¤â¡  f¢lcnÑe  ¢hi¡N,  h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL, fËd¡e L¡kÑ¡mu, Y¡L¡−L Ae¤¢m¢f fËc¡e Ll¡ q−m¡z

pÅ¡rlx AØfø Ef-f¢lQ¡mL

M/S. Innovadeus PVT Ltd. LaѪL Demain Domain Fee Hl ¢hfl£−a ®fТla A−bÑl ¢hhlZ£

 

Txn Reference

Txn date

Account No.

Account Name

Account Type

Currency

Amount in FCY

Tax Amount

Vat Amount

ORM5076

29 May-19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

4,000.00

84,500.00

21,125.00

ORM5452

8 Jul- 19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

4,000.00

67,600.00

16,900.00

ORM5478

9 Jul- 19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

8,000.00

169,000.00

42,250.00

ORM5558

17 Jul- 19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

800.00

16,900.00

4,225.00

ORM5655

25 Jul- 19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

8,000.00

169,000.00

42,250.00

ORM5984

26 Aug- 19

1501204027287001

INNOVADEUS PVT LTD

BDT A/C

USD

1,056.74

22,324.06

5,580.93

25,856.75  529,324.06  132,330.93


1

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Annexure- 6

NZfÊS¡a¿»£ h¡wm¡−cn plL¡l S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ

l¡Sü ihe,

−p…eh¡¢NQ¡, Y¡L¡z


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1

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pi¡f¢a pi¡l ÙÛ¡e

pi¡l a¡¢lM pi¡l pju


x pcpÉ (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue J BC¢V), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®hXÑ, Y¡L¡z

x S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑl, pcpÉ (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue J BC¢V) Hl L−r (Lr ew 521)z

x 04/11/2018 ¢MËx z

x pL¡m 11.00 O¢VL¡z


1

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(N)       ¢h¢VBl¢pl m¡C−p¾pd¡l£ ®j¡h¡Cm Af¡−lVl Hhw AeÉ¡eÉ m¡C−p¾pd¡l£ fË¢aù¡e Google, Whats App, Yahoo, Amazon,

You Tube, Facebook, Imo  CaÉ¡¢c j¡dÉ−j ¢L f¢lj¡Z ¢X¢SV¡m

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Yahoo, Amazon, You Tube, Facebook, Imo  CaÉ¡¢c fË¢aù¡e

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f¡−lz a−h H ®fËlZ Ll¡l Ab¢l¢V h¡wm¡−cn plL¡−ll ®L¡e

LaѪf−rl B−R, a¡ S¡e¡l SeÉ L¢j¢Vl pLm pc−pÉl Ef¢Ù¢ Ûa−a BlJ

HL¢V pi¡ Ll¡ ®k−a f¡−l;

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B−m¡QÉ ¢ho−u LlZ£u pÇf−LÑ ja¡ja flha£Ñ pi¡u EfÙÛ¡fe Ll−he;

(Q)  ®L¡Çf¡e£ BC−el B−m¡−L ®l¢S−øÊne NËqZ fË¢œ²u¡l ¢hou¢V ¢h−nÔo−el

SeÉ h¡¢ZSÉ j¿»Z¡m−ul HLSe fË¢a¢e¢d−L ®L¡-AÃV Ll¡ k¡uz

04z pi¡u Bl ®L¡e B−m¡Qe¡l ¢hou e¡ b¡L¡u pi¡f¢a pLm−L deÉh¡c S¡¢e−u pi¡l pÇf¡¢ç ®O¡oZ¡ L−lez

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pcpÉ (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue J BC¢V) S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡

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Ae¤¢m¢f pcu AhN¢a J fË−u¡Se£u L¡k¡Ñ−bÑx (®SÉùa¡l œ²j¡e¤p¡−l eu)x

01z p¢Qh, AbÑ j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z(cª¢ø BLoÑe Se¡h a¢ej¡ a¡p¢je, Ef-p¢Qh, AbÑ ¢hi¡N, AbÑ j¿»Z¡mu)z   

02z NiZÑl, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL, j¢a¢Tm, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h ®j¡q¡Çjc ®j¡š²¡l ®q¡−pe, k¤NÈ f¢lQ¡mL, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL)z

03z p¢Qh, X¡L J ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢hi¡N, X¡L, ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N J abÉfËk¤¢š² j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h gMl E¢Ÿe Bm ®qm¡m, jÉ¡−eS¡l (BC¢hHj)z 

04z p¢Qh, BCe J ¢hQ¡l ¢hi¡N, BCe, ¢hQ¡l J pwpc ¢houL j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h ®j¡q¡Çjc Jpj¡e q¡uc¡l, Ef-p¢m¢pVl, BCe J ¢hQ¡l ¢hi¡N)z 

05z −Qu¡ljÉ¡e, h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢mL¢jE¢e−Lne ®l…¢mV¢l L¢jne (¢h¢VBl¢p), Y¡L¡z 06z p¢Qh, abÉ J ®k¡N¡−k¡N fËk¤¢š² ¢hi¡N, C-14/HL¡Ê, BC¢p¢V V¡Ju¡l, ®nl-C- h¡wm¡ eNl, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h E¢jÑ a¡j¡æ¡ (Ef-p¢Qh)z  

07z fËbj p¢Qh (Ll e£¢a), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

08z fËbj p¢Qh (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

Ae¤¢m¢fx pcu AhN¢a SeÉx

01z pcpÉ (j§pL-e£¢a), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

02z pcpÉ (j§pL ¢el£r¡ J ®N¡−u¾c¡), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

03z ¢f Hp V¥ ®Qu¡ljÉ¡e, S¡a£u l¡Sü −h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡ (®Qu¡ljÉ e j−q¡c−u pcu

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04z ¢f, H V¥ pcpÉ, j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue J BC¢V, S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡ (pcpÉ j−q¡c−ul pcu AhN¢al SeÉ)z

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p§œx (1) S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑl fœ ew 08. 01. 0000. 071. 01. 001. 2015/125 a¡¢lMx 04/10/2018 ¢MËxz (2) S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑl fœ ew 08 .01. 0000. 071. 03. 002. 2015/156 a¡¢lMx 12/12/2018 ¢MËxz

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p¢Qh, AbÑ j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p

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p¢Qh, X¡L J ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢h ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N J abÉ fÊk¤¢š²

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01z ¢p¢eul p¢Qh, h¡¢ZSÉ j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡ (ay¡−L HLSe Efk¤š² fË¢a¢e¢d j−e¡eue fËc¡−el SeÉ Ae¤−l¡d Ll¡ q−m¡)z

02z p¢Qh, AbÑ j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z(cª¢ø BLoÑe Se¡h a¢ej¡ a¡p¢je, Ef-p¢Qh, AbÑ ¢hi¡N, AbÑ j¿»Z¡mu)z   

03z NiZÑl, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL, j¢a¢Tm, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h ®j¡q¡Çjc ®j¡š²¡l ®q¡−pe, k¤NÈ f¢lQ¡mL, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL)z

04z p¢Qh, X¡L J ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢hi¡N, X¡L, ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N J abÉfËk¤¢š² j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h E¢jÑ a¡j¡æ¡ (Ef-p¢Qh)z 

05z p¢Qh, BCe J ¢hQ¡l ¢hi¡N, BCe, ¢hQ¡l J pwpc ¢houL j¿»Z¡mu, h¡wm¡−cn p¢Qh¡mu, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h ®j¡q¡Çjc Jpj¡e q¡uc¡l, Ef-p¢m¢pVl, BCe J ¢hQ¡l ¢hi¡N)z 

06z −Qu¡ljÉ¡e, h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢mL¢jE¢e−Lne ®l…¢mV¢l L¢jne (¢h¢VBl¢p), Y¡L¡z 07z p¢Qh, abÉ J ®k¡N¡−k¡N fËk¤¢š² ¢hi¡N, C-14/HL¡Ê, BC¢p¢V V¡Ju¡l, ®nl-C- h¡wm¡ eNl, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h gMl E¢Ÿe Bm ®qm¡m, jÉ¡−eS¡l (BC¢hHj)z  08z fËbj p¢Qh (Ll e£¢a), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

09z fËbj p¢Qh (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

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04z ¢f Hp V¥ ®Qu¡ljÉ¡e, S¡a£u l¡Sü −h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡ (®Qu¡ljÉ e j−q¡c−u pcu

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05z ¢àa£u p¢Qh, (j§pL ¢hQ¡l J Bf£m), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

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p§œx (1) S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑl e¢b ew 8.01.0000.071.01. 01.2015/125 (01-11) a¡¢lM 04.10.2018 ¢MËx 

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02z j¡ee£u q¡C−L¡VÑ ¢hi¡−Nl ¢lV ¢f¢Vne ew-5227/2018 Hl B−cn ®j¡a¡−hL p§œ£u 1 ew f−œl j¡dÉ−j  ¢h−no L¢j¢V NWe Ll¡ quz 04.11.2018 a¡¢l−M Eš² L¢j¢Vl fËbj pi¡ Ae¤¢ùa quz pi¡l ¢pÜ ¿¹ Ae¤k¡u£ p§œ£u 02 ew f−œl j¡dÉ−j L¢j¢V f¤eÑNWe Ll¡ q−m¡z 

03z Hja¡hÙÛ¡u, Na 04.11.2018 ¢MËx a¡¢l−M Ae¤¢ùa pi¡l ¢pÜ¡−¿¹l B−m¡−L (L¡kÑ¢hhle£l L¢f pwk¤š²) L¡kÑœ²j NËqZ ¢ho−u BN¡j£ 10.01.2019 ¢MËx a¡¢lM pL¡m 11.00 O¢VL¡u pcpÉ (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue J BC¢V), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ Hl pi¡f¢a−aÄ S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡−XÑl p−Çjme

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03z NiZÑl, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL, j¢a¢Tm, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZSe¡h ®j¡q¡Çjc ®j¡š²¡l ®q¡−pe, k¤NÈ f¢lQ¡mL, h¡wm¡−cn hÉ¡wL Hhw A¢a¢lš² (¢hHgBCCE) Hl HLSe fË¢a¢e¢d j−e¡eue J Eš² pi¡u Ef¢ÙÛa b¡L¡l fË−u¡Se£u ¢e−cÑne¡ fËc¡−el SeÉ ¢h−noi¡−h Ae¤−l¡d Ll¡ q−m¡)z

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07z p¢Qh, abÉ J fËk¤¢š² ¢hi¡N, C-14/HL¡Ê, BC¢p¢V V¡Ju¡l, ®nl-C-h¡wm¡ eNl, Y¡L¡z (cª¢ø BLoÑZ Se¡h gMl E¢Ÿe Bm ®qm¡m, jÉ¡−eS¡l (BC¢hHj)z  

08z fËbj p¢Qh (Ll e£¢a), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

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02z pcpÉ (Ll e£¢a) S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

03z ¢f Hp ®Qu¡ljÉ¡e, S¡a£u l¡Sü −h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡ (®Qu¡ljÉ¡e j−q¡c−ul pcu AhN¢al SeÉ)z

04z ¢àa£u p¢Qh, (j§pL ¢hQ¡l J Bf£m), S¡a£u l¡Sü ®h¡XÑ, Y¡L¡z

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  1. DUTCH BANGLA Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT/TAX (TAKA)

1. Havas Media Bangladesh

Google  Asia  Pacific  Pte. Ltd.

2018

2034.5

33955.8

2. Media Axis

Google  Asia  Pacific  Pte. Ltd

2015

19160.62

360

2016

377908.79

2889890.03

2017

225383.38

2136989.65

2018

99027.32

1237020.37

Facebook Ireland Limited

2016

307560.44

 

2017

560006.95

2655040.89

2018

323982.55

3300292.55

Ultimedia E Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

2016

351002.58

4131147.36

 

GRAND TOTAL

2266067.13

16384696.65

  1. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. ACTIVATE MEDIA SOLUTIONS LTD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

11280.19

140598

161688

2018

86360.53

1332926.48

1522839

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

60232.71

1229515.49

1049189

2. BITOPI ADVERTISING LTD

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

16737.78

208888

240221

2018

95346.92

1422088.13

1602197

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

269958.13

4334052.21

4576134

  1. THE CITY Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. ANALYZEN BANGLADESH LIMITED

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

252663.41

3463938.19

3124744.83

Facebook Ireland Limited

2018

143774.23

2025562.27

1806262.27

2. SHOPFRONT LIMITED

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

6101.45

101257.44

75943.08

2018

19911.58

332243.05

249169.16

 

GRAND TOTAL

422450.67

5923000.95

5256119.34

  1. BANK ASIA Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX (BDT)

VAT (BDT)

1. Asiatic Mindshare LTD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2014

19188458

 

 

2015

65828687

1791803

 

2016

110569716

4365104

 

2017

229610918

31129531

24187586

2018

137029946.1

26743477.41

20554491.92

Facebook Ireland Limited

2014

15807629

 

 

2015

71904006

1446482

 

2016

88279399

3485943

 

2017

150487029

19033618

14351759

2018

97032487.92

19265151.85

14554873.19

2. Madiacon Ltd.

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2017

1478658.2

295731.61

221798.8

2018

22126406.17

4425281.24

3318960.5

Facebook Ireland Limited

2017

4920072.25

984014.43

738011

2018

15153780.05

3030756.46

2273065.72

3. Raise IT Solutions Ltd

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

103434.7

21861

4949

 

GRAND TOTAL

1029520627

116018755

80205495.13

9. AB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT (BDT)

Access Telecom BD

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

24629.08

411770.02

 

GRAND TOTAL

24629.08

411770.02

10.FIRST SECURITY ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

VAT (BDT)

 

1. Melonades

Facebook Limited

2018

44608.69

624147.03

2. Active Media Soluation

Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd

2018

780596.12

8520878.14

 

GRAND TOTAL

825204.81

9145025.17

  1. ISLAMI Bank Bangladesh Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MERCANTILE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. RUPALI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. BANGLADESH DEVELOPMENT Bank Limited (DBBL)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. HABIB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. ONE Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. MIDLAND Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. EXIM Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. STANDARD Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. UNITED COMMERCIAL Bank Limited (UCBL)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. IFIC Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. AGRANI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. ICB ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB COMMERCIAL Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NRB GLOBAL Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SHAHJALAL ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. STATE Bank OF INDIA

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. COMMERCIAL Bank Of CEYLON

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. SOCIAL ISLAMI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. NATIONAL CREDIT AND COMMERCE Bank Limited (NCC)

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

  1. PUBALI Bank Limited

 

Client’s Name

Beneficiary

Year

Amount (USD)

TAX

VAT

 

NIL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRAND TOTAL

 

 

 

2. List of Advertisement agencies

 

Serial No

Name

Address

Contact Number

01

ASIATIC MARKETING COMMMUNICATION LTD

Hosuse # 63, Road # 7/B, Block-H, Banani, P.C. 1213, gulshan, Dhaka

Phone-029893303 9892768 FAX-29882530

02.

MEDIACOM LIMITED

Rupayan Centre, 10th floor, 72 Mohakhali Commercial Area, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh

Telephone/ |Contact No. +8808861521-29 E-MAIL ADDRESS: mediacom@mediacombd.

 

 

 

 

 

com

03.

Softwind TECH ltd

Road # 7, Block # G, House #35/D, Suit # B5, Banani , Dhaka- 1213

Phone: 9871458

FAX: 9871468 EMAIL:moinur.hossain@ softwindtech.com WEBSITE:WWW.softwind tech.com

04.

ACTIVATE MEDIA SOLUTIONS LTD

Company address: Plot 180, Block-B, Bashundh R/A, Dhaka- 1229.

+88001670198594 Email.accounts@bitopi.co m  

05.

BITOPI

Plot-180, Block-B, Basundhara R/A, Dhaka

 

06.

HAVAS MEDIA

Address-Flat B4, House 257/A, Rd 19, New DOHS, Mohakhali

Tel: +88029884482 Mail:info@havasbanglad esh.com

07.

MEDIA ACCESS

House No. 57/B, Road 15/A, 26 (Old) Dhanmondi, Dhaka- 1209

Phone 88028191534 FAX 88029127907

08

ANALYZEN BANGLADESH LTD

Bangladesh Office: Analyzen Innovation Lab Level 1, House 1A, Road 16/A, Gulshan 1 Dhaka-1212, Bangladesh

+88-01708126311 mail@analyzenbd.com www.analyzenbd.com  

INFORMATION OF SHOPFRONT LIMITED

Rumana Rouf, Karwan Bazar Branch  Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 5:46 PM

Dear Sir,

As discussed over phone following information is given bwlow of SHOP FRONT LIMITed:

Please see the details info as requested;

  1. Postal Adress: 50, Lake Circus, Kalabagan, Dhaka-1205
  2. Group E-Mail Id: directors@shopf.co

 

Name

Degination

Phone number

Email Address

Siffat Sarwar

Chief Operating Officer

01610- 006655

Siffat@shopf.co

Afeef Zubaer Zaman

MD & Chief Executive Officer

01746- 653101

afeef@shopf.com

Shaheen Siam

Chairman & Chief Finance Officer

01716- 401114

siam@shopf.co

Ataur Rahmin Chowdhury

Chief Technology Officer

01720- 018642

ataur@shopf.co

S H M Shanawaz

Assi: Manager- Finance & Accounts

01877- 755602

shanawaz@shopf.co

Ruma Akter

Sr. Executive- Finance & Accounts

01877- 755604

ruma@shopf.co

Thanks & Regards.

Rumana Rouf

Customer Service Manager

The City Bank Ltd. Karwan Bazar Branch. 8 Pantaphth, Dhaka-1215.

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Annexure- II

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission IEB Bhaban, Ramna, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh

To

Chief Executive Officer Youtube Inc

Greetings from Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission!

This is to inform you that Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) is an independent regulatory body acting under Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001 (an Act passed by the sovereign parliament of Bangladesh) which represents the Government of the people’s Republic of Bangladesh in enforcing its rights and obligations in the field of ICT/telecommunication for ensuring ICT and telecommunications revenue, security, social tranquility and public order within the country.

On April 2018, The Honorable High court of Bangladesh has ordered the authorities to tax the transactions on Bangladeshi advertisements posted on Google, Facebook, YouTube and others similar websites. The respondents include the finance, law, post and telecoms, and information secretaries, Governor of Bangladesh Bank, Chairman of National Board of Revenue and Chairman of Bangladesh  Telecommunication Regulatory Commission.

In response to the writ petition No.5227/2018, a special committee was formed to assess the flow of money going aboard through the advertisements on Goggle, Facebook and YouTube. For your information, remittance of money outside Bangladesh is regulated by Bangladesh Bank under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947(“FERA”). Remittance is allowed only for specific circumstances and is required to be supported by appropriate documentation.

As respondent to the High Court order, the commission, request for your cooperation so that we can provide the information required by the committee. Your services are used in Bangladesh and thus you need to comply by its rules and regulations and sustainable business. You are kindly requested to provide us the followings:  

1)    Total revenue earned from Bangladesh (in the fiscal year July 2017-June 2018 and July 2018 - December 2018)

2)    List of the major companies or individual Ad-link accounts from Bangladesh and

3)    The Payment methods from Bangladesh.

Your cooperation in this regard will help us to recommend policies to formalize your business in Bangladesh and frame legal method for money transfers and means for NBR to realize taxes. Thus, your earliest response will be highly appreciated. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Thanking You.

Sincerely

Signature/- 20.2.19

Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC)

Annexure- III

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission

IEB Bhaban, Ramna, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh

To

Chief Executive Officer Google Inc

Greetings from Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission!

This is to inform you that Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) is an independent regulatory body acting under Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001 (an Act passed by the sovereign parliament of Bangladesh) which represents the Government of the people’s Republic of Bangladesh in enforcing its rights and obligations in the field of ICT/telecommunication for ensuring ICT and telecommunications revenue, security, social tranquility and public order within the country.

On April 2018, The Honorable High court of Bangladesh has ordered the authorities to tax the transactions on Bangladeshi advertisements posted on Google, Facebook, YouTube and others similar websites. The respondents include the finance, law, post and telecoms, and information secretaries, Governor of Bangladesh Bank, Chairman of National Board of Revenue and Chairman of Bangladesh  Telecommunication Regulatory Commission.

In response to the writ petition No.5227/2018, a special committee was formed to assess the flow of money going aboard through the advertisements on Goggle, Facebook and YouTube. For your information, remittance of money outside Bangladesh is regulated by Bangladesh Bank under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947(“FERA”). Remittance is allowed only for specific circumstances and is required to be supported by appropriate documentation.

As respondent to the High Court order, the commission, request for your cooperation so that we can provide the information required by the committee. Your services are used in Bangladesh and thus you need to comply by its rules and regulations and sustainable business. You are kindly requested to provide us the followings:  

1)    Total revenue earned from Bangladesh (in the fiscal year July 2017-June 2018 and July 2018 - December 2018)

2)    List of the major companies or individual Ad-link accounts from Bangladesh and

3)    The Payment methods from Bangladesh.

Your cooperation in this regard will help us to recommend policies to formalize your business in Bangladesh and frame legal method for money transfers and means for NBR to realize taxes. Thus, your earliest response will be highly appreciated. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Thanking You.

Sincerely

Signature/- 20.2.19

Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC)

Annexure- IV

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission

IEB Bhaban, Ramna, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh

To                                                                                                        Chief Executive Officer

Facebook Inc

Greetings from Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission!

This is to inform you that Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) is an independent regulatory body acting under Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001 (an Act passed by the sovereign parliament of Bangladesh) which represents the Government of the people’s Republic of Bangladesh in enforcing its rights and obligations in the field of ICT/telecommunication for ensuring ICT and telecommunications revenue, security, social tranquility and public order within the country.

On April 2018, The Honorable High court of Bangladesh has ordered the authorities to tax the transactions on Bangladeshi advertisements posted on Google, Facebook, YouTube and others similar websites. The respondents include the finance, law, post and telecoms, and information secretaries, Governor of Bangladesh Bank, Chairman of National Board of Revenue and Chairman of Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission.

In response to the writ petition No.5227/2018, a special committee was formed to assess the flow of money going aboard through the advertisements on Goggle, Facebook and YouTube. For your information, remittance of money outside Bangladesh is regulated by Bangladesh Bank under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947(“FERA”). Remittance is allowed only for specific circumstances and is required to be supported by appropriate documentation.

As respondent to the High Court order, the commission, request for your cooperation so that we can provide the information required by the committee. Your services are used in Bangladesh and thus you need to comply by its rules and regulations and sustainable business. You are kindly requested to provide us the followings:  

1)    Total revenue earned from Bangladesh (in the fiscal year July 2017-June 2018 and July 2018 - December 2018)

2)    List of the major companies or individual Ad-link accounts from Bangladesh and

3)    The Payment methods from Bangladesh.

Your cooperation in this regard will help us to recommend policies to formalize your business in Bangladesh and frame legal method for money transfers and means for NBR to realize taxes. Thus, your earliest response will be highly appreciated. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Thanking You.

Sincerely

Signature/- 20.2.19

Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC)

…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u  Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission Hl  Head of Regulatory Operations  LaѪL ®Qu¡ljÉ¡e hl¡h−l ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 16.08.2018 a¡¢l−Ml fœ¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Annexure- V

No. GP/RO/BTRC/App (Tariff)/2018-317 date 16 August, 2018

Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission IEB Bhaban (5, 6 & 7 floor)

Ramna, Dhaka-1000

Attettion: Director General (Systems & Service)

Subject:  Information regarding publishing digital advertisement on different social media (Google, WhatsApp, Yahoo, Amazon, YouTube, Facebook, Imo etc.)

Reference:

  1. BTRC Letter No. 14.32.0000.600.36.156.18.231 dated 29 July 2018
  2. AMTOB Letter No. 26862.07082018.02, dated 07 August, 2018

Dear Sir,

Greeting from Grameenphone Ltd!

In reference to your letter vide under reference#1, BTRC has asked us to submit the information of publishing digital advertisement on  different  social  media  (Google,  Whatsapp,  Yahoo,  Amazon, YouTube, Facebook, Imo etc.) by 07 August 2018.

After receiving the letter we have started working immediately to gather the mentioned     data by engaging necessary stakeholders. As you understand this type of requirement is first in nature and need  considerable  task  of  data  to  collect  from  different  ends (external and internal), thus we seek for additional time to provide you necessary data vide under reference#2. Referring that letter we  are  attachted  herewith  the  available  information  regarding publishing digital advertisement on different social media (Google, Whatsapp, Yahoo, Amazon, YouTube, Facebook, Imo etc.)

This is for your kind information and record.

Truly yours

Signature

Imtiaz Shafiq

Head of Regulatory Operations

Enclosure: Available information regarding publishing digital advertisement on different social media.

Grameenphone Ltd.

 

Year

Month

Platform Name

Paid directly by/ through

Currency

Total

2016

November

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,290,815.29

2016

December

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

4,212,373.00

2017

January

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,522,914.64

2017

February

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

1,119,313.69

2017

March

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,196,522.65

2017

April

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

1,927,458.05

2017

May

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

685,670.39

2017

June

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

684,650.20

2017

July

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,461,500.50

2017

August

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

874,424.06

2017

September

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,449,931.50

2017

October

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

1,488,825.88

2017

November

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,716,815.19

2017

December

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

2,316,695.13

2018

January

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

2,396,368.56

2018

February

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

1,621,475.56

2018

March

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,510,305.06

2018

April

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

1,260,060.75

2018

May

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

1,287350.25

2018

June

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

2,103,489.44

2016

August

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

115,000..00

2016

November

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

115,000.00

2016

December

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

18,400.00

2017

January

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

149,500.00

2017

February

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

103,500.00

2017

March

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

94,300.00

2017

April

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

181,700.00

2017

May

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

262,200.00

2017

June

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

207,000.00

2017

July

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

23,000.00

2017

August

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

69,000.00

2017

September

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

23,000.00

2017

December

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

94,300.00

2018

February

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

920,000.00

2018

March

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

219,901.85

2018

June

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

98,900.00

2017

January

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

89,219.30

 

2017

February

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

115,000.00

2017

April

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

245,907.95

2017

May

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

3,025.65

2017

June

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

92,000.00

2017

July

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

108,992.40

2017

August

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

132,312.10

2017

September

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

231,156.90

2017

October

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

570,056.15

2017

November

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

612,288.75

2017

December

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

735,108.75

2018

January

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

1,216,650.55

2018

February

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

621,756.70

2018

March

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

813,952.75

2018

April

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

562,466.15

2018

May

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

542,973.15

2018

June

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

1,087,293.95

2018

January

Targetoo

By Mindshare

BDT

397,900.00

2018

May

Targetoo

By Mindshare

BDT

768,200.00

2018

June

Targetoo

By Mindshare

BDT

289,800.00

2018

March

Cricbuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

1,272,200.15

2017

March

Sizmek

By Mindshare

BDT

88,550.00

2017

December

Sizmek

By Mindshare

BDT

74,750.00

2018

February

Sizmek

By Mindshare

BDT

1,010,613.10

2018

March

Sizmek

By Mindshare

BDT

859,050.00

2011

April

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

6,000.00

2012

December

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

9,000.00

2015

June

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

45,000.00

2015

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

18,960,54

2015

July

BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATONAL LIMITED

By GP

USD

971.00

2015

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

37,473.74

2015

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

17,812.14

2015

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

13,654.91

2015

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

40,133.13

2015

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

36,269.57

2015

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

27,379.70

2015

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

22,545.77

2015

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

23,299.42

2015

November

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

27,646.52

2015

November

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

40,277.61

2015

November

LINKDOTNET

By GP

USD

7,000.00

2015

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

19,769.72

2015

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,708.95

2016

January

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

76,111.93

2016

January

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

21,546.69

2016

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

36,202.83

2016

February

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,140.10

2016

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

26,975.23

2016

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

37,605.56

2016

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,074.70

2016

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

22,067.87

2016

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,003.10

2016

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

15,531.88

2016

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,143.78

2016

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

83,787.38

2016

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

50,010.59

2016

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

65,132.67

2016

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

64,022.61

2016

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

35,139.85

2016

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

26,888.09

2016

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,713.46

2016

September

INTERNET ESCROW SERVICES (SM)

By GP

USD

8,746.73

2016

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

75,503.52

2016

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

125,102.25

2016

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

61,609.86

2016

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

105,420.42

2016

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

116,237.29

2017

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

125,220.59

2017

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

25,993.72

2017

March  

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

106,183.01

2017

March  

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

40,251.28

 

2017

March  

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

28,592.91

2017

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

69,010.66

2017

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

56,073.66

2017

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

72,165.92

2017

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

62,943.92

2017

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,644.26

2017

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

64,870.34

2017

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

62,570.39

2017

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,381.68

2017

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,640.65

2017

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

62,885.77

2017

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

47,445.00

2017

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

72,026.53

2017

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

53,158.84

2017

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

99,284.85

2017

November

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

79,124.90

2017

November

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

57,434.15

2017

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

60,782.73

2017

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By Gp

USD

81,429.80

2018

February

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

62,352.27

2018

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

119,300.29

2018

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

61,582.38

2018

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

39,928.36

2018

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

153,199.53

2018

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

109,110.50

2018

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

113,919.02

2018

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

77,595.90

2018

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

97,363.68

2018

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

53,318.56

2018

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

75,037.60

2018

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By Gp

USD

119,863.04

2018

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

144,728.04

2018

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

115,174.28

Annexure- VI

Robi Axiata Limited

Robi Corporate Office

53 Gulshan South Avenue, Gulshan-1, Dhakka-1212, Bangladesh. Phone: +88 02 9887146-48, Fax: +88 02 9885463

Date: August 16,2018

Our Ref: Robi/RAD/BTRC/Gen/2018/07

The Chairman

Bangladesh  Telecommunication  Regulatory  Commission (BTRC)

IEB Bhaban (5th , 6th & 7th floor)

Ramna, Dhaka-1000  

Att.- Director General, Systems & Services Division, BTRC REF:

  1. BTRC Letter No. 14.32.0000.600.36.156.18-231 dated 29-07- 2018
  2. AMTOB Letter dated 7th Aug 2018 for time extension

SUB:  Digital  advertisement  publication  in  different  social  media communication

Dear Sir,

Greetings from Robi Axiata Limited (“Robi”)!

Referred to the subject matter in reference to your letter ref. 1 above, we state as follows:

  1. We have placed digital media communication with soft wind Tech Ltd, a local entity engaged in Digital Advertising. The total contract value was BDT 163.81m.
  2. In 2017-18, we have engaged Adknowledge Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. The breakdown is as follows :

 

Social Media

Agent Name

Initiating Time

Amount (BDT) mn

Facebook

Adknowledge Asia Pacific Pte Ltd

2017

105.00

Google

2017

30.00

Imo

2017

 --

Facebook

2018

144.00

Google

2018

38.00

Imo

2018

1.00

Facebook

2018

3.38

Google

2018

--

Imo

2018

--

Please note that we have not remitted the above mentioned amount as we are still waiting for approval of the Bangladesh Bank.

 Thank You

 Sincerely

 For and on behalf of Robi Axiata Limited

      Signature

Shah Md. Fazle Khuda

Vice President, Regulatory Affairs

…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u −j¡Ù¹g¡ L¡j¡m j¡p¤c, −l…−mV¢l H−gu¡pÑ, ¢p¢eul jÉ¡−eSl, L−fÑ¡−lV Hä −l…−mV¢l H−gu¡pÑ LaѪL ®fÐl£a ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Annexure- VII

No.  : Banglalink /CoRA/BTRC/SS/Digital advertisement/160818 

Date  : 16th of August 2018                                          

The Chairman

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission IEB Bhaban (5th – 7th floor)

Ramna, Dhaka-1000  

Attettion: Director (Systems & Service)

Subject:  Information regarding digital advertisement . Dear Sir,

Kindly  refer  to  your  letter  no.  14.32.0000.600.36.156.18.231; Dated 29th July 2018 on the above mentioned subject. Please find

below the information as requested. Kindly note, since we have split the amount from total value, the amount may vary slightly from the original payment.

 

Name  of  the Media agency

Agreement year

Facebook

Google

Yahoo

Top of Mind

2011

453,000

 

 

Top of Mind

2012

975,587

 

 

Top of Mind

2013

5,553,542

3,961,000

 

Top of Mind

2014

10,673,900

5,768,344

 

Top of Mind

2015

22,050,614

18,956,044

 

Media Axis

2016

58,112,065

40,522,095

1,359,946

Media Axis

2017

40,834,054

25,814,987

1,262,341

Activate  Media Solutions Limited

2018 (Till June)

24,895,851

25,276,597

 

Grand Total

163,548,612

120,299,067

2,622,287

This is for your kind information please. Thanking you.

Sincerely,

Mustafa Kamal Masud Regulatory Affairs Senior Manager Corporate and Regulatory Affairs

Annexure-VIII

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ü¡/- AØfø

25.03.19

L¡’e l¡e£ cš

¢àa£u p¢Qh (j§pL-h¡Ù¹h¡ue fZÉ)

…l¦aÄf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢eu¿»e L¢jne Hl Ef- f¢lQ¡mL  wm‡÷g mvwf©‡mm wefvM, wewUAviwm Hl ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 28.08.2019 a¡¢l−Ml fœ¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x  

Annexure-XI

evsjv‡`k †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM wbqš¿b Kwgkb

AvBBwe feb, igbv, XvKv-1000, evsjv‡`k| ¯^viK bs-14.32.0000.600.36.156.18-307  a¡¢lM-

28.08.2019 ¢MËx

Rbve

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Rbve,

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Bqvû, A¨vgvRb, BDwUDe I †dmeyK Gi gZ Internet Giants hviv wWwRUvj weÁwß cÖPv‡ii gva¨‡g wewfbœ †Kv¤úvbxi wbKU †_‡K ivR¯^ Avnib Ki‡Q Zv‡`i wbKU

†_‡K AvBb Abyhvqx Av`vq‡hvM¨ Tax/Vat ev Ab¨vb¨ wdm ev PvR© Av`v‡qi wb‡`©kbv †P‡q ewY©Z ixU wcwUkbwU `v‡qi Kiv nq| D‡jøwLZ ixU wcwUk‡bi Av‡jv‡K mKj †gvevBj Avcv‡iU‡ii wbKU †dmeyK,¸Mj, †nvqvUmA¨vc mn  Kj B›Uvi‡bU wfwËK †mevq wK cwigvb weÁvcb cÖ`vb Kiv n‡q‡Q Rvb‡Z †P q Kwgkb n‡Z cÎ cÖ`vb Kiv nq| G †cÖwÿ‡Z 3 (wZb) wU †gvevBj Acv‡iUi n‡Z wb‡¤œi QK ÒKÓ †Z D‡jøwLZ cwigvb A‡_©i GKwU wnmve cvIqv hvqt

QK-ÒKÓ

 

SL

Name of Operator

Type

Amount (USD)

Total Amount (BDT)

1

Grameen Phone Ltd.

MNO

433125629.1

 

2

Banglalink  Digital Communications Ltd

MNO

286469967

 

3

Robi Axiata Ltd.

MNO

321380000

 

 

 

 

104,09,75,596

87441950073

2| G ch©v‡q QK ÒKÓ Abyhvqx Z_¨ Ges †gvevBj Acv‡iUi‡`i wbKU n‡Z cÖvß c‡Îi Kwc mshy³ K‡i h_vh_ gva¨‡g gnvgvb¨ nvB‡KvU© wefv‡M `vwL‡ji Rb¨ †cÖib Kiv nq| cieZ©x‡Z gvgjvwU wb`©kbv cÖvß n‡q c~bivq wnmvewU c~bt †PK K i‡j Q‡Ki †nwWs G fzj cvIqv hvq| Z‡e welqwU m¤ú~b© Awb”QvK…Z f  zjK‡I †gvU UvKvi cwigvb (104,09,75,596) wVK _vK‡jI Q‡Ki †nwWs G Wjvi I UvKv f~j Dõ ‡L Kivq, Q‡Ki †kl Kjv‡g Hw`‡bi Wjvi †iU (84.0) UvKv w`‡q fvM bv K‡i fzj Mybb K‡i emv‡bv nq|

3| †h‡nZz †gvevBj Acv‡iUi 3(wZb) wUÕi Z_¨vw` (mshy³  )Abyhvqx †gvU UvKvi cwigvb GKB i‡q‡Q, †m‡nZz wb‡¤œi QK-ÒLÓ Abyhvqx bZzb K‡i Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kiv n‡jvt

QK-ÒLÓ

 

SL

Name of Operator

Type

Amount (USD)

Total Amount (BDT)

1

Grameen Phone Ltd.

MNO

433125629.1

 

2

Banglalink  Digital Communications Ltd

MNO

286469967

 

3

Robi Axiata Ltd.

MNO

321380000

 

 

 

 

104,09,75,596.91

1,23,92,566.62

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28/08/2019

(‡gvt bvwn`yj nvmvb)

Dc-cwiPvjK

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Total Summary

 

SL No.

Name of Operator

Type

Amount (BDT)

Amount (USD)

1

Grameen Phone Ltd.

MNO

433125629.9

1 USD = 84.0 (as per 16.05.19)

2

Banglalink  Digital  Communications Ltd

MNO

286469967

3

Robi Axiata Ltd.

MNO

321380000

 

 

 

104,09,75,596.91

1,23,92,566.62

In Word:

One Hundred four crore nine lac seventy five thousand five hundred ninety six taka and ninety one paisa only.

ü¡/- AØfø  ü¡/- AØfø

¢h−NËx ®Se¡x H. ¢h. Hj. ýj¡u¤e L¢hl  28.08.19

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…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u ®Qu¡ljÉ¡e  Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory  Commission  (BTRC-H  fÐcš  Robi  Axiata Limited Hl 16.08.2018 a¡¢l−Ml fМ¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x-

Robi Axiata Limited

Robi Corporate Office

53 Gulshan South Avenue, Gulshan-1, Dhakka-1212, Bangladesh. Phone: +88 02 9887146-48, Fax: +88 02 9885463

Date: August 16,2018

Our Ref: Robi/RAD/BTRC/Gen/2018/07

The Chairman

Bangladesh  Telecommunication  Regulatory  Commission (BTRC)

IEB Bhaban (5th , 6th & 7th floor)

Ramna, Dhaka-1000  

Att.- Director General, Systems & Services Division, BTRC REF:

  1. BTRC Letter No. 14.32.0000.600.36.156.18-231 dated 29-07- 2018
  2. AMTOB Letter dated 7th Aug 2018 for time extension

SUB:  Digital  advertisement  publication  in  different  social  media communication

Dear Sir,

Greetings from Robi Axiata Limited (“Robi”)!

Referred to the subject matter in reference to your letter ref. 1 above, we state as follows:

  1. We have placed digital media communication with soft wind Tech Ltd, a local entity engaged in Digital Advertising. The total contract value was BDT 163.81m.
  2. In 2017-18, we have engaged Adknowledge Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. The breakdown is as follows :

 

Social Media

Agent Name

Initiating Time

Amount (BDT) mn

Facebook

Adknowledge Asia Pacific Pte Ltd

2017

105.00

Google

2017

30.00

Imo

2017

 --

Facebook

2018

144.00

Google

2018

38.00

Imo

2018

1.00

Facebook

2018

3.38

Google

2018

--

Imo

2018

--

Please note that we have not remitted the above mentioned amount as we are still waiting for approval of the Bangladesh Bank.

 Thank You

 Sincerely

 For and on behalf of Robi Axiata Limited

       Signature

Shah Md. Fazle Khuda

Vice President, Regulatory Affairs

…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u  evsjv‡`k  †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM  wbqš¿b  Kwgkb fÐcš Annexure- XII ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x-

Annexure- XII

evsjv‡`k †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM wbqš¿b Kwgkb

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Total Summary

 

SL No.

Year

Grameen Phone

Robi Axiata

Banglalink

Total Taka

1

2011

504,000.00

--

453,000.00

28,645,373.00

2

2012

756,000.00

--

975,587.00

3

2013

0

--

9,514,542.00

4

2014

0

--

16,442,244.00

5

2015

37,120,702.08

--

41,006,658.00

1,012,330,223.91

6

2016

113,441,428.14

--

99,994,106.00

7

2017

152,912,612.10

135,000,000.00

67,911,382.00

8

2018

128390887.6

186,380,000.00

50,172,448.00

 

 

433,125,629,91

321,380,000.00

286,469,967.00

104,09,75,596.91

In Word:

One Hundred four crore nine lac seventy five thousand five hundred ninety six taka and ninety one paisa only.

ü¡/- AØfø  ü¡/- AØfø

¢h−NËx ®Se¡x H. ¢h. Hj. ýj¡u¤e L¢hl  28.08.19

¢fHp¢p¢VC  fÐx ®L¡x −j¡x e¡¢qc¤m q¡p¡e jq¡f¢lQ¡mL  ¢p−ØVj Hä p¡¢iÑ−pp ¢hi¡N

¢p−ØVjp Hä p¡¢iÑ−pp ¢hi¡N  h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢eu¿»Z L¢jne h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢eu¿»Z L¢jne

 

Year

Month

Platform Name

Paid directly by/ through

Currency

Total

Taka

2016

November

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,290,815.29

2016

December

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

4,212,373.00

2017

January

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,522,914.64

2017

February

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,119,313.69

2017

March

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,196,522.65

2017

April

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,927,458.05

2017

May

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

685,670.39

2017

June

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

684,650.20

2017

July

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,461,500.50

2017

August

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

874,424.06

2017

September

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,449,931.50

2017

October

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,488,825.88

2017

November

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,716,815.19

2017

December

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

2,316,695.13

2018

January

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

2,396,368.56

2018

February

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,621,475.56

2018

March

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,510,305.06

2018

April

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,260,060.75

2018

May

Facebook

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,287350.25

2018

June

Google

By Mindshare

BDT

 

2,103,489.44

2016

August

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

115,000..00

2016

November

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

115,000.00

2016

December

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

18,400.00

 

2017

January

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

149,500.00

2017

February

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

103,500.00

2017

March

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

94,300.00

2017

April

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

181,700.00

2017

May

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

262,200.00

2017

June

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

207,000.00

2017

July

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

23,000.00

2017

August

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

69,000.00

2017

September

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

23,000.00

2017

December

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

94,300.00

2018

February

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

920,000.00

2018

March

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

219,901.85

2018

June

Adplay

By Mindshare

BDT

 

98,900.00

2017

January

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

89,219.30

2017

February

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

115,000.00

2017

April

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

245,907.95

2017

May

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

3,025.65

2017

June

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

92,000.00

2017

July

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

108,992.40

2017

August

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

132,312.10

2017

September

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

231,156.90

2017

October

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

570,056.15

2017

November

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

612,288.75

2017

December

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

735,108.75

2018

January

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,216,650.55

2018

February

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

621,756.70

2018

March

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

813,952.75

2018

April

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

562,466.15

2018

May

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

542,973.15

2018

June

Eskimi

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,087,293.95

2018

January

Targetoo

By Mindshare

BDT

 

397,900.00

2018

May

Targetoo  

By Mindshare

BDT

 

768,200.00

2018

June

Targetoo  

By Mindshare

BDT

 

289,800.00

2018

March

Cricbuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,272,200.15

2017

March

Surebuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

 

88,550.00

2017

December

Surebuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

 

74,750.00

2018

February

Surebuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

 

1,010,613.10

2018

March

Surebuzz

By Mindshare

BDT

 

859,050.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

47,362,886.5

2011

April

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

6,000.00

5040

2012

December

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

9,000.00

7560

2015

June

SYMMETRY FZC

By GP

USD

45,000.00

3780

2015

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

18,960.00

1592685

2015

July

BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATONAL LIMITED

By GP

USD

971.00

81

2015

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

37,473.74

314779

2015

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

17,812.14

149621

2015

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

13,654.91

11470

2015

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

40,133.13

33711

2015

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

36,269.97

30446

2015

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

27,389.70

2300734.8

2015

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

22,545.77

1893844.68

2015

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

23,299.42

1957151.28

2015

November

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

27,646.52

2322307.68

2015

November

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

40,277.61

3383319.24

2015

November

LINKDOTNET

By GP

USD

7,000.00

588000

2015

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

19,769.72

1660656.48

2015

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,708.95

5351551.8

2016

January

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

76,111.93

6393402.12

2016

January

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

21,546.69

1809921.96

2016

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

36,202.83

3041037.72

2016

February

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,140.10

4127768.4

2016

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

26,975.23

2265919.32

 

2016

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

37,605.56

3158867.04

2016

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,074.70

3534274.8

2016

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

22,067.87

1853701.08

2016

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,003.10

3528260.4

2016

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

15,531.88

1304677.92

2016

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,143.78

4128077.52

2016

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

83,787.38

7038139.92

2016

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

50,010.59

4200889.56

2016

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

65,132.67

5,496,023.40

2016

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

64,022.61

5,402,354.34

2016

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

35,139.85

2,965,169.98

2016

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

26,888.09

2,268,870.17

2016

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

42,713.46

3,604,246.16

2016

September

INTERNET ESCROW SERVICES (SM)

By GP

USD

8,746.73

738,066.36

2016

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

75,503.52

6,371,119.34

2016

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

125,102.25

10,556,375.06

2016

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

61,609.86

5,198,761.73

2016

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

105,420.42

8,895,583.35

2016

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

116,237.29

9,808,332.22

2017

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

125,220.59

10,566,360.82

2017

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

25,993.72

2,193,401.46

2017

March  

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

106,183.01

8,959,932.20

2017

March  

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

40,251.28

3,396,482.54

2017

March  

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

28,592.91

2,412,726.25

2017

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

69,010.66

5,823,255.86

2017

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

56,073.66

4,731,606.23

2017

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

72,165.92

6,089,502.93

2017

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

62,943.92

5,311,332.35

2017

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

49,644.26

4,189,080.76

2017

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

64,870.34

5,473,887.47

2017

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

62,570.39

5,279,813.15

2017

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,381.68

5,348,271.40

2017

August

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

63,640.65

5,370.123.80

2017

August

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

62,885.77

5,306,425.53

2017

September

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

47,445.00

4,011,941.05

2017

September

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

72,026.53

6,077,740.93

2017

October

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

53,158.84

4,485,647.96

2017

October

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

99,284.85

8,377,851.83

2017

November

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

79,124.90

6,702,810.54

2017

November

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

57,434.15

4,847,166.50

2017

December

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

60,782.73

5,128.966.86

 

2017

December

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By Gp

USD

81,429.80

6840103.2

2017

February

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

62,352.27

5237590.68

2018

February

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

119,300.29

10021224.36

2018

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

61,582.38

5172919.92

2018

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

39,928.36

3353982.24

2018

March

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

153,199.53

12868760.52

2018

March

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

109,110.50

9165282

2018

April

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

113,919.02

9569197.68

2018

April

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

77,595.90

65180556

2018

May

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

97,363.68

8178549.12

2018

May

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

53,318.56

4478759.04

2018

June

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

75,037.60

6303158.4

2018

June

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

119,863.04

10068495.36

2018

July

GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.LTD

By GP

USD

144,728.04

12157155.36

2018

July

FACEBOOK IRELAND LIMITED

By GP

USD

115,174.28

9674639.52

 

USD to BDT

385762743.3

BDT total

47,362,886.59

Total BDT

433,125,629.93

Robi Axiata Limited

 

Social Media

Agent Name

Initiating Time

Amount (BDT) mn

Total Taka

Facebook

Adknowledge Asia Pacific Pte Ltd

2017

105.00

105000000

Google

2017

30.00

30000000

Imo

2017

 --

0

Facebook

2018

144.00

144000000

Google

2018

38.00

38000000

Imo

2018

1.00

1000000

Facebook

2018

3.38

3380000

Google

2018

--

0

Imo

2018

--

0

Total BDT

321380000

ü¡/- AØfø  ü¡/- AØfø

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jq¡f¢lQ¡mL  h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢eu¿»Z L¢jne ¢p−ØVjp Hä p¡¢iÑ−pp ¢hi¡N

h¡wm¡−cn ®V¢m−k¡N¡−k¡N ¢eu¿»Z L¢jne

Banglalink Digital Communication Ltd

 

Sl

Name of the Media agency

Agreement

Facebook

Google

Yahoo

1

Top of Mind

2011

453,000

 

 

2

Top of Mind

2012

975,587

 

 

3

Top of Mind

2013

5,553,542

3,961,000

 

4

Top of Mind

2014

10,673,900

5,768,344

 

5

Top of Mind

2015

22,050,614

18,956,044

 

6

Media Axis

2016

58,112,065

40,522,095

1,359,946

7

Media Axis

2017

40,834,054

25,814,987

1,262,341

8

Activate Media Solutions Limited

2018 (Till June)

24,895,851

25,276,597

 

 

Total

163,548,613

120,299,067

2,622,287

 

TOTAL BDT:

286,469,367

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…l¦aÅf§eÑ ¢hd¡u www.icrict.com-Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e fÐL¡¢na Jose Antonio Ocampo  LaѪL  ¢m¢Ma  ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 23.01.2019 a¡¢l−M “How big tech companies avoid taxes and what can be done about it” ¢n−l¡e¡−jl ®mM¡¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

How big tech companies avoid taxes and what can be done about it

23 January 2019

By José Antonio Ocampo

NEW YORK: At first glance, it appears to be a bureaucratic meeting like any other.

But the discussions at the OECD in Paris at the end of this month are of the utmost importance, because the world’s richest countries will present new proposals for taxing digital multinational companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Netflix, and Uber.

CHANGES IN THE TAX SYSTEM HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY

Back in 2012, when scandals related to tax-avoidance schemes by Apple, Amazon, and Google unleashed public anger and forced the G20 to act, the OECD was called on to reform the international corporate tax system. That led, three years later, to a package of reforms known as the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” Project, or BEPS.

The reform process was led by OECD countries and opened up to developing countries only after this initial package was unveiled. Today, 125 countries are involved, forming a group called the “Inclusive Framework.”

BEPS was undoubtedly an important step toward tackling some of the most egregious tax-avoidance strategies used by multinationals. It initiated, for example, the sharing among tax authorities of country-by-country reports on these companies’ profits and tax payments.

Unfortunately, however, this norm will apply only to very large multinationals, and the reports will not be publicly available, depriving civil society of an essential tool of transparency.

Furthermore, BEPS failed to reach the root of the problem. Companies are still permitted to move their profits wherever they want and to take advantage of very-low-tax jurisdictions.

Google, for example, moved €19.9 billion (US$22.7 billion) through a Dutch shell company to Bermuda in 2017, and in the same year Facebook paid just £7.4 million (US$9.6 million) in corporation tax in the United Kingdom, despite generating £1.3 billion in revenue there.

TAX AVOIDANCE

Multinationals can do this legally by using so-called transfer pricing: A parent company sets the prices of transactions among its subsidiaries to guarantee that profits are registered in low-tax countries, rather than where the economic activity that generated the profits actually occurred.

For example, Vodafone, the first big multinational to publish country-by-country data voluntarily, revealed that nearly 40 per cent of its profits for 2016 to 2017 were allocated to tax havens, with €1.4 billion declared in Luxembourg, where the company is taxed at an effective rate of 0.3 per cent.

Tax avoidance can be found in all economic sectors, but digital companies best demonstrate how outdated the current international tax system is. Because these companies’ marginal cost of production is zero, the revenue accruing to them is equal to a rent, and it is therefore important to tax this rent effectively.

And, contrary to what these companies’ leaders claim, this taxation would not negatively affect the supply of digital services.

MORE MUSCLE NEEDED

The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT), which I chair, believes that the BEPS process has achieved what it could, given the political muscle of big corporations and the army of lawyers and accountants who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

In our latest report, we take stock of what has been achieved and highlight what should happen in the next phase of reform, “BEPS 2.0.”

The upcoming OECD meeting will be decisive in this respect. For the first time, the OECD will present to the Inclusive Framework, including developing countries, the outlines of the BEPS 2.0 plan and its vision of a deeper transformation of the tax system in response to the challenges posed by the digital economy.

It is a unique opportunity for all 125 governments in the Inclusive Framework to urge the OECD to repudiate transfer pricing and move toward a fairer and more effective system.

The lack of consensus so far on how to tax digital multinationals has led numerous countries to implement (as India, Italy, Spain, and France have done) or promise to implement (in the case of the United Kingdom) turnover-based taxes as a stop- gap measure to raise revenue. But unilateral action is not enough.

The ICRICT supports all discussions that move toward unitary taxation of multinationals, which would eliminate multinationals’ use of transfer prices to shift profits, because their global income would be consolidated.

Global profits and associated taxes could then be allocated geographically according to objective factors such as the company’s sales, employment, resources, and even digital users in each country.

We also strongly support the introduction of a global minimum effective corporate-tax rate of between 20 per cent and 25 per cent on all profits earned by multinationals.

The overriding priority now is to establish an international corporate tax system fit for the digital economy. The OECD BEPS process was essentially conceived by developed countries for developed countries. In Paris this month, developing countries must understand what is at stake and make their voices heard, to ensure that any new proposal benefits all.

Jose Antonio Ocampo is a board member of Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, professor at Columbia University, Chair of the UN Economic and Social Council’s Committee for Development Policy, and Chair of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation.

…l¦aÅf§eÑ ¢hd¡u channelnewsasia.com Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e fÐL¡¢na  Gillian Tans-LaѪL ¢m¢Ma  “Commentary: What taxation for the digital age ought to consider” ¢n−l¡e¡−jl ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 21.01.2019 a¡¢l−Ml ®mM¡¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Commentary: What taxation for the digital age ought to consider

Taxing businesses based on revenue rather than income will result in an intolerably heavier tax burden for enterprises with low profits and high turnover, says says CEO of Booking.com Gillian Tans.

AMSTERDAM: The question of how to tax increasingly globalised and digitised businesses is vital to the future health of cross-border trade and investment. Sadly, the current debate is mired in confusion and complexity, and is not helped by populist political responses that demonise digital businesses.

A prime example is the European Commission’s proposal, first published in March 2018, to create an EU digital services tax (DST). The measure is aimed mainly at multinational tech giants whose corporate structures allow them to siphon digitally-derived profits to low-tax jurisdictions.

But should the DST take effect, it will be Europe’s own startups and digital ecosystems that pay the biggest price.

As a company that operates in a globalised market, we have numerous concerns about the limited vision for the future of business embodied in the European Commission’s proposals. This is why we must oppose the DST idea in its entirety.

TAXING DIGITAL TRADE

The proposed DST, as well as rushed digital taxation efforts by several EU member states, reflects the outdated idea that digital companies are different from traditional businesses.

As entire industries become digitised, this distinction grows increasingly unsustainable. Attempting to maintain it threatens to cause serious long-term damage to European businesses and national economies.

Under current international corporate tax rules, businesses can be taxed only on profits they earn in the country in which they are physically based, but not if trading is conducted through digital means.

The often-heated discussion surrounding this issue has generated an image of large multinational tech firms profiting in local markets and using local infrastructure while operating without any tax liability.

This increasingly widespread narrative contributed to the European Commission’s proposals for an EU-wide DST, along with the wider reform of corporate taxation to cover any substantial operational presence by a digital business.

But rather than producing a tax system that is fair and supportive of business, the DST would be much more likely to erode the benefits and opportunities that the digital economy currently offers to companies and consumers.

BUT THE TAX STIFLES START-UPS

The proposed DST supposedly an interim solution, pending the agreement of global measures has two specific drawbacks.

For starters, taxing businesses based on revenue rather than realised income will result in an intolerably heavier tax burden for enterprises with low profits and high turnover. Rather than hitting the targeted tech giants, a DST would most likely be a hindrance to the many European tech startups that have become global leaders in their fields.

This innately unfair approach will distort competition, undermine enterprise, and harm domestic economic growth. Unfortunately, EU leaders are too focused on curbing the corporate structures of certain global tech brands to see the negative long-term implications that a DST would have for the growth of European businesses.

SETTING A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

The second problem is the likely creation of a patchwork of digital taxation measures, both within and beyond the EU. Although the European Commission argues that its proposed DST would prevent the emergence of similar policies at the national level within the EU, recent developments in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy suggest the opposite.

Furthermore, a rushed or ill-considered digital taxation strategy by the EU could result in a template that is replicated internationally.

This could lead to a patchy global tax map, with confusion, variation, and forms of double taxation accepted as standard. The consequences, in terms of the growth and survival of small and medium-size business around the world, could be grave.

LOOK TO OECD COLLABORATION

On a more encouraging note, the OECD is making good progress toward reaching a consensus on digital taxation – covering search engines, online marketplaces, and social media platforms.

I strongly believe that collaboration at the OECD/G20 level is essential to developing fair and transparent tax rules for businesses offering digital services. This is an approach that I fully support and that is more likely to protect the interests of businesses and economies alike.

Companies like ours operate in a truly globalised world. We are required to comply with a variety of tax laws and, like all progressive businesses in the digital era, are happy to do so. What we want is a fair, supportive corporate tax system to help safeguard growth across the board, particularly when economic conditions are challenging.

Business taxation must continue to be based fundamentally on realised income, and a global consensus regarding the development of a uniform taxation framework is now essential.

Such a consensus cannot wait. The global economy is becoming more digitised by the day. As a European company, we want to see EU businesses grow, succeed, and become leaders in this exciting new landscape.

Separate tax measures, such as the DST, for digital companies are short-sighted and unrealistic, and will ultimately prove counterproductive for all.

…l¦aÅf§eÑ ¢hd¡u  fortune.com  Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e fÐL¡¢na ERIK SHERMAN-LaѪL ¢m¢Ma “A New Report Claims Big Tech Companies Used Legal Loopholes to Avoid Over $100 Biullion in Taxes. What Does That Mean for the Industry’s Future?”  ¢n−l¡e¡−jl ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 06.12.2019 a¡¢l−Ml ®mM¡¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

A New Report Claims Big Tech Companies Used Legal Loopholes to Avoid Over $100 Billion in Taxes. What Does That Mean for the Industry’s Future?

Erik Sherman

A new report about Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Netflix—nicknamed the "Silicon Six" by the non- profit Fair Tax Mark—claims a major gap in the taxes they might be expected to owe and how much they actually pay.

According to the report, between 2010 and 2019, using legal tax avoidance strategies that have become popular among corporations, the taxes paid collectively by the companies across all global territories in which they operate was $155.3 billion less than what the actual tax rates would have required. When considering not just the cash paid but money put aside for future taxes, the gap was still $100.2 billion.

"We got the cash taxes paid from the cash flow statement, and we got the cash provisions from the [income statement]" through U.S. financial filings, says Fair Tax Mark chief executive Paul Monaghan. These amounts were matched against the companies' profits over the time period.

Percentage of 2010-2019 Profit in Cash Tax Payments

Silicon Six Company  percentage of Profit Paid in Cash Tax

Amazon  12.7%

Facebook  10.2%

Google  15.8%

Netflix  15.8%

Apple  17.1%

The result is the difference between what national tax laws would seem to expect and what companies can do using legal tax avoidance.

"The bulk of the shortfall almost certainly arose outside the United States, given this 'foreign' activity accounts for more than half  of  booked  revenue  and  two-thirds  of  booked  profits,"  the report read.

Corporate taxation has been a contentious issue for a long time,  with  some  profitable  Fortune  500s  paying  no  taxes  in multiple years, again all on the legal level. The biggest savings are often owed to  complex international strategies that strip profits from high-tax districts and shift them to low-tax ones.

But many countries have become increasingly concerned about a lack of tax revenues and are looking for ways to capture more, like France's attempt to tax digital giants or a push by the Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development (OECD)  to  change  cross-country  tax  laws  and  practices.  The upshot could mean significantly higher taxes for the technology elite and possibly an unwelcome surprise for many investors.

Fortune reached out to all the companies targeted by the report.  Google  and  Amazon  replied.  Apple  acknowledged  the request but did not provide a comment. There was no response from Microsoft, Netflix, or Facebook.

War of definitions

Google  sent  a  statement  that  read,  in  part,  the  report "ignores  the  reality  of  today's  complicated  international  tax system, and distorts the facts documented in our regulatory filings" and  that  "we  pay  the  vast  majority—more  than  80%—of  our corporate income tax in our home country."

According to the  company's 2018 annual report, about 54% of consolidated revenues came from international markets. That raises the question of why 80% of taxes are paid on 46% of revenues, which would suggest that foreign countries aren't getting equal shares.

Amazon claimed the "suggestions are all wrong" and, citing typically low margins in retail, said that "comparisons to technology companies with operating profit margins of closer to 50% is not rational." The company also said that it "had a 24% effective tax rate on profits from 2010-2018—neither 'dominant' nor 'untaxed.'"

According to Amazon's third quarter earnings release, its AWS cloud computing segment had operating income of $2.3 billion, which was 25% of its net sales and almost 72% of its total operating income. Amazon's  2018 annual report  showed a net income of $11.3 billion and provision for income tax of just under $1.2 billion, or 10.6%.

But Amazon's operations are complex, and tax discussions often come down to intricacies of accounting. For example, there are at least two different references to income tax that corporations typically show—the provision for income tax Amazon listed in one part of the annual report and actual cash payments show in another.

"It's called the book tax difference," says Fair Tax Mark's Monaghan. Provisions show the cash taxes actually paid plus amounts kept aside for expected future tax requirements that might not actually happen because tax provisions aren't a final statement of taxes. That can lead to complex interplays of numbers.

Going back to Amazon, in 2018 the provision for income tax happened to equal the cash tax paid that year. But in 2017, cash tax paid was $957 million with a net tax provision of $769 million. In 2016, the tax provision was $1.4 billion, with cash taxes of $412 million. Monaghan called Amazon's numbers "impenetrable."

"Overall, cash effective tax rates, on average, are lower than GAAP [standard U.S. accounting] effective tax rates," says Stephen Lusch, assistant professor of accounting at Texas Christian University. "It’s not particularly surprising that someone looking to highlight low tax rates for tech multinationals will focus on the cash rate, while the company, seeking to combat the perception of 'not paying its fair share,' will focus on the GAAP rate in its rebuttal. As usual, the truth ultimately probably lies somewhere in the middle."

Future changes?

"Since the US, France, UK, Germany, Japan, and Italy would all win—or at least lose less—under the OECD proposal, and the nations that currently win—[like] the Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland—are not as strong politically, the proposal has a chance," says Kevin Rejent, an attorney and global risk consultant for Maggiore Risk.

Many of the companies in question are flush with money, but some could still face problems should big changes come.

"Facebook is most exposed," Monaghan says, "because Facebook has the lowest amount of cash taxes going out, even though it's a very high margin business in the United States, but apparently not elsewhere."

Then there are the investors who could face big surprises. "There will be limited or no pricing in [of the risk in shares currently]" because too much is unknown, says Richard Asquith, vice president of indirect tax at tax software vendor Avalara. "It is far from clear which new tax regime will be implemented: the globally agreed OECD model or a proliferation of national inconsistent taxes. Since the US is getting cold feet on the OECD route, we are likely headed for the latter and a range of tax battles and retaliatory tariffs."

Markets, and even the Silicon Six and other big corporations, still don't know what the financial effects will be, although "investors think everything is fine," Monaghan says.

In other words, investors may find the international scene still a place of intrigue, no matter how safe some of their investments have seemed.

…l¦aÄf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u bbc.com Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 26.10.2020 a¡¢l−M fËL¡¢na Facebook, Google and Microsoft

'avoiding $3bn in tax in poorer nations'” ¢n−l¡e¡−jl fË¢a−hce¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Facebook, Google and Microsoft 'avoiding $3bn in tax in poorer nations'

26 October 2020

Google, Facebook and Microsoft should be paying more corporation tax in developing nations, says Action Aid.

The aid charity estimates that poorer countries are missing out on up to $2.8bn (£2.2bn) in tax revenue that could be used to tackle the pandemic.

ActionAid is calling for big companies to pay a global minimum rate of tax.

Facebook and Microsoft declined to comment while Google did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Multinational corporations are currently not required by law to publicly disclose how much tax they pay in some developing countries.

According to ActionAid, "billions" might be at stake that could be used to transform underfunded health and education systems in some of the world's poorest countries, especially since multiple tech giants have reported soaring revenues during the pandemic.

The aid charity wants to see a new global tax system created, preferably by the United Nations, whereby large corporations are required to pay a global minimum rate of corporate tax reflective of their "real economic presence".

ActionAid estimates that $2.8bn could pay for 729,010 nurses, 770,649 midwives or 879,899 primary school teachers annually in 20 countries across Africa, Asia and South America.

The aid charity said its research showed that the developing nations with the highest "tax gaps" from Google, Facebook and Microsoft are India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria and Bangladesh.

"Women and young people are paying the price for an outdated system that has allowed big tech companies, including giants like Facebook, Alphabet and Microsoft, to rack up huge profits during the pandemic, while contributing little or nothing towards public services in countries in the global south," said David Archer, global taxation spokesperson for ActionAid International.

"The $2.8bn tax gap is just the tip of the iceberg - this research covers only three tech giants. But alone, the money that Facebook, Alphabet (Google's owner) and Microsoft would be paying under fairer tax rules could transform public services for millions of people".

Tax avoidance concerns

There have long been concerns that the biggest corporations do not pay enough tax in developed nations, and re- route profits through low-tax jurisdictions.

Facebook, Google, Apple and Amazon have all settled disputes with French tax authorities over their operations in the country over the last decade. And the UK in April launched a new digital sales tax aimed at forcing tech giants to pay more on the income they generate inside the country.

In February, Facebook boss Mark Zuckerberg said he recognised the public's frustration over the amount of tax paid by firms like his.

He added that Facebook accepted the fact it might have to pay more in Europe "under a new framework" in future, and backed plans by think tank the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) to find a global solution.

…l¦aÄf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u  bbc.com Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 24.08.2020 a¡¢l−Ml  “Facebook agrees to pay France €106m in back taxes” ¢n−le¡−jl fË¢a−hce¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Facebook agrees to pay France €106m in back taxes

24 August 2020

Facebook has agreed to pay the French government €106m (£95.7m) in back taxes to settle a dispute over revenues earned in the country.

The payment covers the last decade of its French operations from 2009.

The social networking giant has also agreed to pay €8.46m in taxes on revenues in France for 2020 - 50% more than in 2019.

"We pay the taxes we owe in every market we operate," said a Facebook spokeswoman.

"We take our tax obligations seriously and work closely with tax authorities around the world to ensure compliance with all applicable tax laws and to resolve any disputes, as we have done with the French tax authorities."

The social networking giant did not share details of the tax dispute, but France has been pushing tech companies to pay more tax inside the country where it is generated.

Other tech giants like Google, Apple and Amazon have reached similar agreements with the French tax authorities.

Facebook said that since 2018, it had changed its sales structure so that "income from advertisers supported by our teams in France is registered in this country".

The BBC understands that Facebook paid a tax rate in France of 38% in 2019, which is above the statutory income tax rate of 33.3%.

In February, Facebook boss Mark Zuckerberg said he recognised the public's frustration over the amount of tax paid by tech giants.

He added that Facebook accepted the fact it might have to pay more tax in Europe "in different places under a new framework" going forward, and backed plans by think tank the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to find a global solution to how to tax tech companies. New digital taxes

Facebook has been accused of not paying its fair share of tax in the countries where it operates.

Last year, France announced a new digital services tax on multinational technology firms, but in January, the country said it would delay the tax until the end of 2020.

The new tax would have required global tech giants to make tax payments equivalent to 3% of their French revenues twice a year in April and in November.

In response to France delaying the new tax, the US said it would not impose retaliatory tariffs on $2.4bn (£1.8bn) of French goods, including champagne and cheese.

The OECD is working on a multilateral agreement on how tech giants should be taxed by governments.

In the UK, Facebook paid just £28.5m in corporation tax in 2018, despite generating a record £1.65bn in British sales.

The UK government implemented its own tax on technology firms in April. The Digital Services Tax (DST) requires digital services operating in the UK to pay a 2% tax in connection to social media services, internet search engines and online marketplaces.

HM Treasury has stressed that the tax will remain in place until a global solution to taxing tech giants is agreed.

In June, Chancellor Rishi Sunak and finance ministers in France, Italy and Spain signed a letter saying that tech giants, like Google, Amazon and Facebook, need "to pay their fair share of tax".

In the letter, obtained by the BBC, the four finance ministers told the US Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, that the pandemic had increased the need for such levies.

"The current Covid-19 crisis has confirmed the need to deliver a fair and consistent allocation of profit made by multinationals operating without - or with little - physical taxable presence," the letter said.

"The pandemic has accelerated a fundamental transformation in consumption habits and increased the use of digital services, consequently reinforcing digital business models' dominant position and increasing their revenue at the expense of more traditional businesses."

…l¦aÄf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u  bbc.com Hl Aem¡Ce pwúl−e ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 12.09.2019 a¡¢l−Ml Google to pay €1bn to end French tax probe” ¢n−l¡e¡−jl fË¢a−hce¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

Google to pay €1bn to end French tax probe

12 September 2019

Google is to pay French authorities almost €1bn (£900m) to end a long-running investigation into its taxes.

The settlement includes a €500m fine and additional taxes of €465m, but it is less than the tax bill authorities had accused Google of evading.

It rounds off a four year investigation that saw authorities raid Google's Paris headquarters in 2016.

Investigators said Google owed about €1.6bn in unpaid taxes amid a wider crackdown on tax planning of big firms.

French authorities had been seeking to establish whether Google, which has its European headquarters in Dublin, failed to declare some of its activities in the country.

The search giant, which is part of Alphabet, pays little tax in most European countries because it reports almost all of its sales in Ireland.

It is able to do that thanks to a loophole in international tax law. However, that loophole hinges on staff in Dublin concluding all sales contracts.

The agreement allows Google "to settle once for all these past disputes," said Antonin Levy, one of the firm's lawyers.

In March, the EU hit Google with a €1.5bn fine for blocking rival online search advertisers and last year the European Commission levelled a record €4.3bn fine against the firm over its Android mobile operating system.

In January, France fined Google €50m a breach of the EU's data protection rules.

…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u  forbes.com-H ¢hNa Cw−lS£ 09.12.2019 a¡¢l−Ml Aem¡Ce pwúl−e Charles Radelyffe Hl “How To Rate Tech Giants On Ethics”  ¢n−l¡e¡−jl ®mM¡¢V ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

How To Rate Tech Giants On Ethics

We are worried. Some of the things we worry about are the same as everyone else who is trying to imagine the impact of emerging technologies on our lives. We worry about how smartphones are consuming our attention and mediate our relationships. We worry about how much of our decision-making we ought delegate to machines. We worry about protecting privacy. We worry about how to prevent people being exploited by industries and their technological developments. We are concerned for all the people who will lose jobs as a result of automation. And like them, we worry about the right directions we need to take going forward. We call this field of worry “ethics.”

What is useful about thinking of this field of worry in ethical terms is that it moves us from being passive recipients of problems to active participants determining our course. It is from this active and engaged perspective that we invite readers to join us in thinking towards our future.

We are told that we stand at the brink of a new Industrial Revolution. This time around, it is data that needs refinement through artificial intelligence techniques as opposed to crude oil. We worry that this analogy might be fitting on more levels than one.

Two centuries ago, arsonists attacked the Albion Flour Mills on the banks of the Thames in London. The devastation was celebrated by independent millers. We know them today as the “dark Satanic Mills” made famous in William Blake’s poetry. It was not just Mills in London that burned. As the Industrial Revolution raged, communities were displaced, aristocracies overthrown, and genocides were committed. Voices concerned about the sustainability of it all were muted. Short-term ambitions outweighed long-term consequence. At no point was there a moratorium calling for a halt to industrial society while the long term effects on our environment were considered. Today, we eat food cultivated with chemicals and breathe air infused with the reek of industry. We enter this coming decade with no foresight as to how long the Anthropocene will endure.

This new Industrial Revolution is not short of its detractors. Ted Kaczynski became infamous for his calls not just to halt industrial society but to abandon it–a neo-Amish turned terrorist— such was his hatred of proponents of industry and his inability to reconcile individual freedom with a system of technology. While we hope the Unabomber remains an outlier, the “techlash” is gaining momentum and trust in Big Tech has fallen recently to new lows.

There are some who argue that social media was responsible for distorting our democratic processes leading to the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum result. Whether you subscribe to this position or not, it is clear that our relationship with sources of “authority” in the sense of providence of information has fundamentally shifted. While the technology industry indulge themselves as to how best to handle “deepfakes,” journalists and newspapers continue to face an existential threat.

Those battling to survive also include high street retailers. While Mark Zuckerberg’s organization has been largely responsible for decimating newsrooms, it is Jeff Bezos’ firm who is blamed for the destruction of retail. The wholesale sacking of the British high street cannot simply be put down to the effects of the economic cycle; instead what we are experiencing is a phase-shift– maybe as great as the shift from serfdom to industrial capitalism a few centuries ago? The challenge is, we have no idea what might lie on the other side of this phase-shift nor how much pain and suffering will be caused while it plays out.

Since the dawn of time, philosophers have argued about ethics; and now technologists frequently cite the term also. However, we worry that the definition of ethics is too narrow– particularly in the fields of artificial intelligence where it is limited to technical considerations such as how to mitigate data bias and how to make the workings of algorithms explainable. We see this as an important field, but one where engineering standards, design process, and risk management techniques are the key to mitigating the worst harm.

Often also is the conversation about ethics conflated with regulatory compliance. GDPR in Europe has raised the level of consciousness for good data stewardship best practice, and now in California the CCPA achieves similar goals within the U.S. Organisations must of course respond to regulatory change, and seek to influence it also where appropriate—but this is a very different consideration to that of ethics–which we argue is a broader set of questions that speaks to the intention and application of technology, and not merely its implementation.

We argue that robust ethics management is an act of negotiation, where dialogue needs to be established with stakeholders who are affected by the technology in question. To be sure, this is a challenge even in small groups, but given the immense reach of modern technology platforms the problem of how to manage ethics appears intractable. And yet it is essential that we get it right if we are to safely guide a path from this side of the phase-shift to the other avoiding the worst consequences along the way.

We wonder what lessons can be learned from the last Industrial Revolution if we are to survive the next? In recent years there has been a rise of Environmental, Societal and Governance (ESG) considerations from the Investment Management industry which supports investors who are looking to place capital where it might have the most positive impact, or be free from the gravest potential risks. ESG ratings are now more than just de riguer to investors and consumers, and might in fact be the very nudge necessary to shift focus towards good, long-term best practice and away from short-term financial gain.

The challenge ahead of us in proposing similar ESG ratings for Digital Ethics is great. Firstly, we need to ensure the domains of governance are separated–as explained above. Next, we need to ensure a common vernacular. Firms at the leading edge of this debate still use terms such as “ethics boards” and “ethics councils” interchangeably. Finally, we need a framework by which to manage ethics without getting bogged down in the issues of what is right and wrong to us as individuals. If we can agree on such a framework, then we can be hopeful that firms that score highly against the rigour of its implementation will avoid the sort of reputational issues that have mired Facebook, Google, Huawei and others of late.

We worry about the future, but we are hopeful also. We are hopeful, particularly because the “techlash” shows us that there are many out there who want to be part of designing our future. What is most striking is how similar our goals are, as whether we are data scientists, politicians, economists, or philosophers–the activity in hand is one of conceiving models for how the world is, how we believe it should be, and designing strategies to nudge us from this place to that. We hope that a focus on ethics can bring people from across these disparate disciplines together, for regardless of our skills and experience–it is a structured conversation about our individual values that we need to hold, and hold at scale. Our values determine the measure by which we live well with ourselves and in accord with others. While we believe ethics are very much a human concern, we believe they now also carry very real commercial benefit.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Kant’s Moral Philosophy

First published Mon Feb 23, 2004; substantive revision Thu Jul 7, 2016

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a standard of rationality that he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Kant characterized the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Aquinas, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either instrumental principles of rationality for satisfying one’s desires, as in Hobbes, or external rational principles that are discoverable by reason, as in Locke and Aquinas. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason reveals the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he also argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle), and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality the CI is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect.

Kant’s most influential positions in moral philosophy are found in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter, “Groundwork”) but he developed, enriched, and in some cases modified those views in later works such as The Critique of Practical Reason, The Metaphysics of Morals, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as well as his essays on history and related topics. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, which were lecture notes taken by three of his students on the courses he gave in moral philosophy, also include relevant material for understanding his views. We will mainly focus on the foundational doctrines of the Groundwork, even though in recent years some scholars have become dissatisfied with this standard approach to Kant’s views and have turned their attention to the later works. We find the standard approach most illuminating, though we will highlight important positions from the later works where needed.

  1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy

The most basic aim of moral philosophy, and so also of the Groundwork, is, in Kant’s view, to “seek out” the foundational principle of a “metaphysics of morals,” which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters of the Groundwork. He proceeds by analyzing and elucidating commonsense ideas about morality, including the ideas of a “good will” and “duty”. The point of this first project is to come up with a precise statement of the principle or principles on which all of our ordinary moral judgments are based. The judgments in question are supposed to be those that any normal, sane, adult human being would accept on due rational reflection. Nowadays, however, many would regard Kant as being overly optimistic about the depth and extent of moral agreement. But perhaps he is best thought of as drawing on a moral viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general judgments that are very deeply held. In any case, he does not appear to take himself to be primarily addressing a genuine moral skeptic such as those who often populate the works of moral philosophers, that is, someone who doubts that she has any reason to act morally and whose moral behavior hinges on a rational proof that philosophers might try to give. For instance, when, in the third and final chapter of the Groundwork, Kant takes up his second fundamental aim, to “establish” this foundational moral principle as a demand of each person’s own rational will, his conclusion apparently falls short of answering those who want a proof that we really are bound by moral requirements. He rests this second project on the position that we — or at least creatures with rational wills — possess autonomy. The argument of this second project does often appear to try to reach out to a metaphysical fact about our wills. This has led some readers to the conclusion that he is, after all, trying to justify moral requirements by appealing to a fact our autonomy that even a moral skeptic would have to recognize.

Kant’s analysis of the common moral concepts of “duty” and “good will” led him to believe that we are free and autonomous as long as morality, itself, is not an illusion. Yet in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant also tried to show that every event has a cause. Kant recognized that there seems to be a deep tension between these two claims: If causal determinism is true then, it seems, we cannot have the kind of freedom that morality presupposes, which is “a kind of causality” that “can be active, independently of alien causes determining it” (G 4:446).

Kant thought that the only way to resolve this apparent conflict is to distinguish between phenomena, which is what we know through experience, and noumena, which we can consistently think but not know through experience. Our knowledge and understanding of the empirical world, Kant argued, can only arise within the limits of our perceptual and cognitive powers. We should not assume, however, that we know all that may be true about “things in themselves,” although we lack the “intellectual intuition” that would be needed to learn about such things.

These distinctions, according to Kant, allow us to resolve the “antinomy” about free will by interpreting the “thesis” that free will is possible as about noumena and the “antithesis” that every event has a cause as about phenomena. Morality thus presupposes that agents, in an incomprehensible “intelligible world,” are able to make things happen by their own free choices in a “sensible world” in which causal determinism is true.

Many of Kant’s commentators, who are skeptical about these apparently exorbitant metaphysical claims, have attempted to make sense of his discussions of the intelligible and sensible worlds in less metaphysically demanding ways. On one interpretation (Hudson 1994), one and the same act can be described in wholly physical terms (as an appearance) and also in irreducibly mental terms (as a thing in itself). On this compatibilist picture, all acts are causally determined, but a free act is one that can be described as determined by irreducibly mental causes, and in particular by the causality of reason. A second interpretation holds that the intelligible and sensible worlds are used as metaphors for two ways of conceiving of one and the same world (Korsgaard 1996; Allison 1990; Hill 1989a, 1989b). When we are engaging in scientific or empirical investigations, we often take up a perspective in which we think of things as subject to natural causation, but when we deliberate, act, reason and judge, we often take up a different perspective, in which we think of ourselves and others as agents who are not determined by natural causes. When we take up this latter, practical, standpoint, we need not believe that we or others really are free, in any deep metaphysical sense; we need only operate “under the idea of freedom” (G 4:448). Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s conception of freedom requires a “two worlds” or “two perspectives” account of the sensible and intelligible worlds (Guyer 1987, 2009; Langton 2001; Kohl 2016; Wood 1984; Hogan 2009).

Although the two most basic aims Kant saw for moral philosophy are to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality, they are not, in Kant’s view, its only aims. Moral philosophy, for Kant, is most fundamentally addressed to the first-person, deliberative question, “What ought I to do?”, and an answer to that question requires much more than delivering or justifying the fundamental principle of morality. We also need some account, based on this principle, of the nature and extent of the specific moral duties that apply to us. To this end, Kant employs his findings from the Groundwork in The Metaphysics of Morals, and offers a categorization of our basic moral duties to ourselves and others. In addition, Kant thought that moral philosophy should characterize and explain the demands that morality makes on human psychology and forms of human social interaction. These topics, among others, are addressed in central chapters of the second Critique, the Religion and again in the Metaphysics of Morals, and are perhaps given a sustained treatment in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Further, a satisfying answer to the question of what one ought to do would have to take into account any political and religious requirements there are. Each of these requirement turn out to be, indirectly at least, also moral obligations for Kant, and are discussed in the Metaphysics of Morals and in Religion. Finally, moral philosophy should say something about the ultimate end of human endeavor, the Highest Good, and its relationship to the moral life. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argued that this Highest Good for humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter. Unfortunately, Kant noted, virtue does not insure wellbeing and may even conflict with it. Further, he thought that there is no real possibility of moral perfection in this life and indeed few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy. Reason cannot prove or disprove the existence of Divine Providence, on Kant’s view, nor the immortality of the soul, which seem necessary to rectify these things. Nevertheless, Kant argued, an unlimited amount of time to perfect ourselves (immortality) and a commensurate achievement of wellbeing (insured by God) are “postulates” required by reason when employed in moral matters.

Throughout his moral works, Kant returns time and again to the question of the method moral philosophy should employ when pursuing these aims. A basic theme of these discussions is that the fundamental philosophical issues of morality must be addressed a priori, that is, without drawing on observations of human beings and their behavior. Kant’s insistence on an a priori method to seek out and establish fundamental moral principles, however, does not always appear to be matched by his own practice. The  Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, is meant to be based on  a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience.

In one sense, it might seem obvious why Kant insists on an a priori method. A “metaphysics of morals” would be, more or less, an account of the nature and structure of moral requirements — in effect, a categorization of duties and values. Such a project would address such questions as, What is a duty? What kinds of duties are there? What is the good? What kinds of goods are there?, and so on. These appear to be metaphysical questions. Any principle used to provide such categorizations appears to be a principle of metaphysics, in a sense, but Kant did not see them as external moral truths that exist independently of rational agents. Moral requirements, instead, are rational principles that tell us what we have overriding reason to do. Metaphysical principles of this sort are always sought out and established by a priori methods.

Perhaps something like this was behind Kant’s thinking. However, the considerations he offers for an a priori method do not all obviously draw on this sort of rationale. The following are three considerations favoring  a priori methods that he emphasizes repeatedly.

The first is that, as Kant and others have conceived of it, ethics initially requires an analysis of our moral concepts. We must understand the concepts of a “good will”, “obligation”, “duty” and so on, as well as their logical relationships to one another, before we can determine whether our use of these concepts is justified. Given that the analysis of concepts is an a priori matter, to the degree that ethics consists of such an analysis, ethics is a priori as a well.

Of course, even were we to agree with Kant that ethics should begin with analysis, and that analysis is or should be an entirely a priori undertaking, this would not explain why all of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy must be pursued a priori. Indeed, one of the most important projects of moral philosophy, for Kant, is to show that we, as rational agents, are bound by moral requirements and that fully rational agents would necessarily comply with them. Kant admits that his analytical arguments for the CI are inadequate on their own because the most they can show is that the CI is the supreme principle of morality if there is such a principle. Kant must therefore address the possibility that morality itself is an illusion by showing that the CI really is an unconditional requirement of reason that applies to us. Even though Kant thought that this project of “establishing” the CI must also be carried out a priori, he did not think we could pursue this project simply by analyzing our moral concepts or examining the actual behavior of others. What is needed, instead, is a “synthetic”, but still a priori, kind of argument that starts from ideas of freedom and rational agency and critically examines the nature and limits of these capacities.

This is the second reason Kant held that fundamental issues in ethics must be addressed with an a priori method: The ultimate subject matter of ethics is the nature and content of the principles that necessarily determine a rational will.

Fundamental issues in moral philosophy must also be settled a priori because of the nature of moral requirements themselves, or so Kant thought. This is a third reason he gives for an a priori method, and it appears to have been of great importance to Kant: Moral requirements present themselves as being  unconditionally necessary. But an  a posteriori method seems ill-suited to discovering and establishing what we  must do whether we feel like doing it or not; surely such a method could only tell us what we actually do. So an a posteriori method of seeking out and establishing the principle that generates such requirements will not support the presentation of moral “oughts” as unconditional necessities. Kant argued that empirical observations could only deliver conclusions about, for instance, the relative advantages of moral behavior in various circumstances or how pleasing it might be in our own eyes or the eyes of others. Such findings clearly would not support the unconditional necessity of moral requirements. To appeal to a posteriori considerations would thus result in a tainted conception of moral requirements. It would view them as demands for which compliance is not unconditionally necessary, but rather necessary only if additional considerations show it to be advantageous, optimific or in some other way felicitous. Thus, Kant argued that if moral philosophy is to guard against undermining the unconditional necessity of obligation in its analysis and defense of moral thought, it must be carried out entirely a priori.

  1. Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty

Kant’s analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good without qualification is a “good will”. While the phrases “he’s good hearted”, “she’s good natured” and “she means well” are common, “the good will” as Kant thinks of it is not the same as any of these ordinary notions. The idea of a good will is closer to the idea of a “good person”, or, more archaically, a “person of good will”. This use of the term “will” early on in analyzing ordinary moral thought prefigures later and more technical discussions concerning the nature of rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone to which Kant returns throughout his works. The basic idea, as Kant describes it in the Groundwork, is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way “determined” by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, the moral law. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make decisions that she holds to be morally worthy and who takes moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value, Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, we believe, he means primarily two things.

First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit restriction or qualification to the effect that a commitment to give moral considerations decisive weight is worth honoring, but only under such and such circumstances.

Second, possessing and maintaining a steadfast commitment to moral principles is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing. Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having only on the condition that they do not require giving up one’s fundamental moral convictions. The value of a good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a good will. Indeed, since a good will is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out that a good will must then also be good in itself and not in virtue of its relationship to other things such as the agent’s own happiness, overall welfare or any other effects it may or may not produce A good will would still “shine like a jewel” even if it were “completely powerless to carry out its aims” (G 4:394).

In Kant’s terms, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty. A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty because such a will does not have natural inclinations and so necessarily fulfills moral requirements without feeling constrained to do so. It is the presence of desires that could operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of “duty.” So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not want to simply from the thought that we are morally required to do so.

Kant confirms this by comparing motivation by duty with other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness. He argues that a dutiful action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will. Assuming an action has moral worth only if it expresses a good will, such actions have no genuine “moral worth.” The conformity of one’s action to duty in such cases is only related by accident to morality. For instance, if one is motivated by happiness alone, then had conditions not conspired to align one’s duty with one’s own happiness one would not have done one’s duty. By contrast, were one to supplant any of these motivations with the motive of duty, the morality of the action would then express one’s determination to act dutifully out of respect for the moral law itself. Only then would the action have moral worth.

Kant’s views in this regard have understandably been the subject of much controversy. Many object that we do not think better of actions done for the sake of duty than actions performed out of emotional concern or sympathy for others, especially those things we do for friends and family. Worse, moral worth appears to require not only that one’s actions be motivated by duty, but also that no other motives, even love or friendship, cooperate. Yet Kant’s defenders have argued that his point is not that we do not admire or praise motivating concerns other than duty, only that from the point of view of someone deliberating about what to do, these concerns are not decisive in the way that considerations of moral duty are. What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that in conforming to duty a perfectly virtuous person always would, and so ideally we should, recognize and be moved by the thought that our conformity is morally obligatory. The motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to those requirements. In other words, we should have a firm commitment not to perform an action if it is morally forbidden and to perform an action if it is morally required. Having a good will, in this sense, is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality. Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s claims about the motive of duty go beyond this basic point (Timmermann 2007; Herman 1993; Wood 1998; Baron 1995).

Suppose for the sake of argument we agree with Kant. We now need to know what distinguishes the principle that lays down our duties from these other motivating principles, and so makes motivation by it the source of unqualified value.

  1. Duty and Respect for Moral Law

According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of bare respect for the moral law. What naturally comes to mind is this: Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our own powers of reason. For instance, the bylaws of a club lay down duties for its officers and enforce them with sanctions. City and state laws establish the duties of citizens and enforce them with coercive legal power. Thus, if we do something because it is our “civic” duty, or our duty “as a boy scout” or “a good American,” our motivation is respect for the code that makes it our duty. Thinking we are duty bound is simply respecting, as such, certain laws pertaining to us.

However intuitive, this cannot be all of Kant’s meaning. For one thing, as with the Jim Crow laws of the old South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws to which these types of “actions from duty” conform may be morally despicable. Respect for such laws could hardly be thought valuable. For another, our motive in conforming our actions to civic and other laws is rarely unconditional respect. We also have an eye toward doing our part in maintaining civil or social order, toward punishments or loss of standing and reputation in violating such laws, and other outcomes of lawful behavior. Indeed, we respect these laws to the degree, but only to the degree, that they do not violate values, laws or principles we hold more dear. Yet Kant thinks that, in acting from duty, we are not at all motivated by a prospective outcome or some other extrinsic feature of our conduct except insofar as these are requirements of duty itself. We are motivated by the mere conformity of our will to law as such.

To act out of respect for the moral law, in Kant’s view, is to be moved to act by a recognition that the moral law is a supremely authoritative standard that binds us and to experience a kind of feeling, which is akin to awe and fear, when we acknowledge the moral law as the source of moral requirements. Human persons inevitably have respect for the moral law even though we are not always moved by it and even though we do not always comply with the moral standards that we nonetheless recognize as authoritative.

Kant’s account of the content of moral requirements and the nature of moral reasoning is based on his analysis of the unique force moral considerations have as reasons to act. The force of moral requirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration. Basic moral requirements retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. So, whatever else may be said of basic moral requirements, their content is universal. Only a universal law could be the content of a requirement that has the reason- giving force of morality. This brings Kant to a preliminary formulation of the CI: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (G 4:402). This is the principle which motivates a good will, and which Kant holds to be the fundamental principle of all of morality.

  1. Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives

Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative. It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not (e.g. , “Leave the gun. Take the cannoli.”). It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves.

There are “oughts” other than our moral duties, according to Kant, but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a command that also applies to us in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way  given we have antecedently willed an end. A hypothetical imperative is thus a command in a conditional form. But not any command in this form counts as a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense. For instance, “if you’re happy and you know it, clap your hands!” is a conditional command. But the antecedent conditions under which the command “clap your hands” applies to you do not posit any end that you will, but consist rather of emotional and cognitive states you may or may not be in. Further, “if you want pastrami, try the corner deli” is also a command in conditional form, but strictly speaking it too fails to be a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense since this command does not apply to us in virtue of our willing some end, but only in virtue of our desiring or wanting an end. For Kant, willing an end involves more than desiring; it requires actively choosing or committing to the end rather than merely finding oneself with a passive desire for it. Further, there is nothing irrational in failing to will means to what one desires. An imperative that applied to us in virtue of our desiring some end would thus not be a hypothetical imperative of practical rationality in Kant’s sense.

The condition under which a hypothetical imperative applies to us, then, is that we will some end. Now, for the most part, the ends we will we might not have willed, and some ends that we do not will we might nevertheless have willed. But there is at least conceptual room for the idea of a natural or inclination-based end that we must will. The distinction between ends that we might or might not will and those, if any, we necessarily will as the kinds of natural beings we are, is the basis for his distinction between two kinds of hypothetical imperatives. Kant names these “problematic” and “assertoric”, based on how the end is willed. If the end is one that we might or might not will — that is, it is a merely possible end — the imperative is problematic. For instance, “Don’t ever take side with anyone against the Family.” is a problematic imperative, even if the end posited here is (apparently) one’s own continued existence. Almost all non-moral, rational imperatives are problematic, since there are virtually no ends that we necessarily will as human beings.

As it turns out, the only (non-moral) end that we will, as a matter of natural necessity, is our own happiness. Any imperative that applied to us because we will our own happiness would thus be an assertoric imperative. Rationality, Kant thinks, can issue no imperative if the end is indeterminate, and happiness is an indeterminate end. Although we can say for the most part that if one is to be happy, one should save for the future, take care of one’s health and nourish one’s relationships, these fail to be genuine commands in the strictest sense and so are instead mere “counsels.” Some people are happy without these, and whether you could be happy without them is, although doubtful, an open question.

Since Kant presents moral and prudential rational requirements as first and foremost demands on our wills rather than on external acts, moral and prudential evaluation is first and foremost an evaluation of the will our actions express. Thus, it is not an error of rationality to fail to take the necessary means to one’s (willed) ends, nor to fail to want to take the means; one only falls foul of non-moral practical reason if one fails to will the means. Likewise, while actions, feelings or desires may be the focus of other moral views, for Kant practical irrationality, both moral and prudential, focuses mainly on our willing.

One recent interpretive dispute (Hill 1973; Schroeder 2009; Rippon 2014) has been about whether hypothetical imperatives, in Kant’s view, have a “wide” or “narrow” scope. That is, do such imperatives tell us to take the necessary means to our ends or give up our ends (wide scope) or do they simply tell us that, if we have an end, then take the necessary means to it.

Kant describes the will as operating on the basis of subjective volitional principles he calls “maxims”. Hence, morality and other rational requirements are, for the most part, demands that apply to the maxims that we act on. . The form of a maxim is “I will A in C in order to realize or produce  E where “A” is some act type, “C” is some type of circumstance, and E is some type of end to be realized or achieved by A in C. Since this is a principle stating only what some agent wills, it is subjective. (A principle that governs any rational will is an objective principle of volition, which Kant refers to as a practical law). For anything to count as human willing, it must be based on a maxim to pursue some end through some means. Hence, in employing a maxim, any human willing already embodies the form of means-end reasoning that calls for evaluation in terms of hypothetical imperatives. To that extent at least, then,  anything dignified as human willing is subject to rational requirements.

  1. The Formula of the Universal Law of Nature

Kant’s first formulation of the CI states that you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). O’Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1980, 1989), among others, take this formulation in effect to summarize a decision procedure for moral reasoning, and we will follow their basic outline: First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible.

If your maxim fails the third step, you have a “perfect” duty admitting “of no exception in favor of inclination” to refrain from acting on that maxim (G 4:421). If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an “imperfect” duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions. If your maxim passes all four steps, only then is acting on it morally permissible. Following Hill (1971), we can understand the difference in duties as formal: Perfect duties come in the form “One must never (or always) φ to the fullest extent possible in C”, while imperfect duties, since they require us to adopt an end, at least require that “One must sometimes and to some extent φ in C.” So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test at the fourth step. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others.

Kant held that ordinary moral thought recognized moral duties toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, together with the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, Kant recognized four categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others. Kant uses four examples in the Groundwork, one of each kind of duty, to demonstrate that every kind of duty can be derived from the CI, and hence to bolster his case that the CI is indeed the fundamental principle of morality. To refrain from suicide is a perfect duty toward oneself; to refrain from making promises you have no intention of keeping is a perfect duty toward others; to develop one’s talents is an imperfect duty toward oneself; and to contribute to the happiness of others is an imperfect duty toward others. Again, Kant’s interpreters differ over exactly how to reconstruct the derivation of these duties. We will briefly sketch one way of doing so for the perfect duty to others to refrain from lying promises and the imperfect duty to ourselves to develop talents.

Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money. Naturally, being rational requires not contradicting oneself, but there is no self-contradiction in the maxim “I will make lying promises when it achieves something I want.” An immoral action clearly does not involve a self-contradiction in this sense (as would the maxim of finding a married bachelor). Kant’s position is that it is irrational to perform an action if that action’s maxim contradicts itself once made into a universal law of nature. The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what you want generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the universalized version that all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when doing so gets them what they want.

Here is one way of seeing how this might work: If I conceive of a world in which everyone by nature must try to deceive people any time this will get them what they want, I am conceiving of a world in which no practice of giving one’s word could ever arise and, because this is a law of nature, we can assume that it is widely known that no such practice could exist. So I am conceiving of a world in which everyone knows that no practice of giving one’s word exists. My maxim, however, is to make a deceptive promise in order to get needed money. And it is a necessary means of doing this that a practice of taking the word of others exists, so that someone might take my word and I take advantage of their doing so. Thus, in trying to conceive of my maxim in a world in which no one ever takes anyone’s word in such circumstances, and knows this about one another, I am trying to conceive of this: A world in which no practice of giving one’s word exists, but also, at the very same time, a world in which just such a practice does exist, for me to make use of in my maxim. It is a world containing my promise and a world in which there can be no promises. Hence, it is inconceivable that I could sincerely act on my maxim in a world in which my maxim is a universal law of nature. Since it is inconceivable that these two things could exist together, I am forbidden ever to act on the maxim of lying to get money.

By contrast with the maxim of the lying promise, we can easily conceive of adopting a maxim of refusing to develop any of our talents in a world in which that maxim is a universal law of nature. It would undoubtedly be a world more primitive than our own, but pursuing such a policy is still conceivable in it. However, it is not, Kant argues, possible to rationally will this maxim in such a world. The argument for why this is so, however, is not obvious, and some of Kant’s thinking seems hardly convincing: Insofar as we are rational, he says, we already necessarily will that all of our talents and abilities be developed. Hence, although I can conceive of a talentless world, I cannot rationally will that it come about, given that I already will, insofar as I am rational, that I develop all of my own. Yet, given limitations on our time, energy and interest, it is difficult to see how full rationality requires us to aim to fully develop literally all of our talents. Indeed, it seems to require much less, a judicious picking and choosing among one’s abilities. Further, all that is required to show that I cannot will a talentless world is that, insofar as I am rational, I necessarily will that some talents in me be developed, not the dubious claim that I rationally will that they all be developed. Moreover, suppose rationality did require me to aim at developing all of my talents. Then, there seems to be no need to go further in the CI procedure to show that refusing to develop talents is immoral. Given that, insofar as we are rational, we must will to develop capacities, it is by this very fact irrational not to do so.

However, mere failure to conform to something we rationally will is not yet immorality. Failure to conform to instrumental principles, for instance, is irrational but not always immoral. In order to show that this maxim is categorically forbidden, one strategy is to make use of several other of Kant’s claims or assumptions.

First, we must accept Kant’s claim that, by “natural necessity,” we will our own happiness as an end (G 4:415). This is a claim he uses not only to distinguish assertoric from problematic imperatives, but also to argue for the imperfect duty of helping others (G 4:423) He also appears to rely on this claim in each of his examples. Each maxim he is testing appears to have happiness as its aim. One explanation for this is that, since each person necessarily wills her own happiness, maxims in pursuit of this goal will be the typical object of moral evaluation. This, at any rate, is clear in the talents example itself: The forbidden maxim adopted by the ne’er-do-well is supposed to be “devoting his life solely to…enjoyment” (G 4:423) rather than to developing his talents.

Second, we must assume, as also seems reasonable, that a necessary means to achieving (normal) human happiness is not only that we ourselves develop some talent, but also that others develop some capacities of theirs at some time. For instance, I cannot engage in the normal pursuits that make up my own happiness, such as playing piano, writing philosophy or eating delicious meals, unless I have developed some talents myself, and, moreover, someone else has made pianos and written music, taught me writing, harvested foods and developed traditions of their preparation.

Finally, Kant’s examples come on the heels of defending the position that rationality requires conformity to hypothetical imperatives. Thus, we should assume that, necessarily, rational agents will the necessary and available means to any ends that they will. And once we add this to the assumptions that we must will our own happiness as an end, and that developed talents are necessary means to achieving that end, it follows that we cannot rationally will that a world come about in which it is a law that no one ever develops any of their natural talents. We cannot do so, because our own happiness is the very end contained in the maxim of giving ourselves over to pleasure rather than self- development. Since we will the necessary and available means to our ends, we are rationally committed to willing that everyone sometime develop his or her talents. So since we cannot will as a universal law of nature that no one ever develop any talents — given that it is inconsistent with what we now see that we rationally will — we are forbidden from adopting the maxim of refusing to develop any of our own.

  1. The Humanity Formula

Most philosophers who find Kant’s views attractive find them so because of the Humanity Formulation of the CI. This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity. Kant was clearly right that this and the other formulations bring the CI “closer to intuition” than the Universal Law formula. Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings.

First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we apparently do this all the time in morally appropriate ways. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our goals. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the chairs we sit on and the computers we type at are gotten only by way of talents and abilities that have been developed through the exercise of the wills of many people. What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but not the other as a means of transportation. Unlike a horse, the taxi driver’s humanity must at the same time be treated as an end in itself.

Second, it is not human beings per se but the “humanity” in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other rational capacities necessarily connected with these. Thus, supposing that the taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world. For instance, if losing weight is my end, then losing weight is something I aim to bring about. An end in this sense guides my actions in that once I will to produce something, I then deliberate about and aim to pursue means of producing it if I am rational. Humanity is not an “end” in this sense, though even in this case, the end “lays down a law” for me. Once I have adopted an end in this sense, it dictates that I do something: I should act in ways that will bring about the end or instead choose to abandon my goal.

An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as well, and so guides action, but in a different way. Korsgaard (1996) offers self-preservation as an example of an end in a negative sense: We do not try to produce our self-preservation. Rather, the end of self-preservation prevents us from engaging in certain kinds of activities, for instance, picking fights with mobsters, and so on. That is, as an end, it is something I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends, rather than something I produce.

Humanity is in the first instance an end in this negative sense: It is something that limits what I may do in pursuit of my other ends, similar to the way that my end of self- preservation limits what I may do in pursuit of other ends. Insofar as it limits my actions, it is a source of perfect duties. Now many of our ends are subjective in that they are not ends that every rational being must have. Humanity is an objective end, because it is an end that every rational being must have. Hence, my own humanity as well as the humanity of others limit what I am morally permitted to do when I pursue my other, non- mandatory, ends.

The humanity in myself and others is also a positive end, though not in the first positive sense above, as something to be produced by my actions. Rather, it is something to realize, cultivate or further by my actions. Becoming a philosopher, pianist or novelist might be my end in this sense. When my end is becoming a pianist, my actions do not, or at least not simply, produce something, being a pianist, but constitute or realize the activity of being a pianist. Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be cultivated, developed or fully actualized. Hence, the humanity in oneself is the source of a duty to develop one’s talents or to “perfect” one’s humanity. When one makes one’s own humanity one’s end, one pursues its development, much as when one makes becoming a pianist one’s end, one pursues the development of piano playing. And insofar as humanity is a positive end in others, I must attempt to further their ends as well. In so doing, I further the humanity in others, by helping further the projects and ends that they have willingly adopted for themselves. It is this sense of humanity as an end-in-itself on which some of Kant’s arguments for imperfect duties rely.

Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect” for the humanity in persons. Proper regard for something with absolute value or worth requires respect for it. But this can invite misunderstandings. One way in which we respect persons, termed “appraisal respect” by Stephen Darwall (1977), is clearly not the same as the kind of respect required by the Humanity Formula: I may respect you as a rebounder but not a scorer, or as a researcher but not as a teacher. When I respect you in this way, I am positively appraising you in light of some achievement or virtue you possess relative to some standard of success. If this were the sort of respect Kant is counseling then clearly it may vary from person to person and is surely not what treating something as an end-in-itself requires. For instance, it does not seem to prevent me from regarding rationality as an achievement and respecting one person as a rational agent in this sense, but not another. And Kant is not telling us to ignore differences, to pretend that we are blind to them on mindless egalitarian grounds. However, a distinct way in which we respect persons, referred to as “recognition respect” by Darwall, better captures Kant’s position: I may respect you because you are a student, a Dean, a doctor or a mother. In such cases of respecting you because of who or what you are, I am giving the proper regard to a certain fact about you, your being a Dean for instance. This sort of respect, unlike appraisal respect, is not a matter of degree based on your having measured up to some standard of assessment. Respect for the humanity in persons is more like Darwall’s recognition respect. We are to respect human beings simply because they are persons and this requires a certain sort of regard. We are not called on to respect them insofar as they have met some standard of evaluation appropriate to persons. And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity.

  1. The Autonomy Formula

The third formulation of the CI is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.” (G 4:432). Although Kant does not state this as an imperative, as he does in the other formulations, it is easy enough to put it in that form: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws. This sounds very similar to the first formulation. However, in this case we focus on our status as universal law givers rather than universal law followers. This is of course the source of the very dignity of humanity Kant speaks of in the second formulation. A rational will that is merely bound by universal laws could act accordingly from natural and non-moral motives, such as self-interest. But in order to be a legislator of universal laws, such contingent motives, motives that rational agents such as ourselves may or may not have, must be set aside. Hence, we are required, according to this formulation, to conform our behavior to principles that express this autonomy of the rational will — its status as a source of the very universal laws that obligate it. As with the Humanity Formula, this new formulation of the CI does not change the outcome, since each is supposed to formulate the very same moral law, and in some sense “unite” the other formulations within it. Kant takes each formulation that succeeds the first in its own way as bringing the moral law “closer to feeling”. The Autonomy Formula presumably does this by putting on display the source of our dignity and worth, our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very moral laws that bind us.

  1. The Kingdom of Ends Formula

This formulation has gained favor among Kantians in recent years (see Rawls, 1971; Hill, 1972). Many see it as introducing more of a social dimension to Kantian morality. Kant states that the above concept of every rational will as a will that must regard itself as enacting laws binding all rational wills is closely connected to another concept, that of a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”, or a “Kingdom of Ends” (G 4:433). The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (G 4:439). It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions to the laws of an ideal moral legislature, (ii) that this legislature lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of “a merely possible kingdom” each of whose members equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.

  1. The Unity of the Formulas

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. What he says is that these “are basically only so many formulations of precisely the same law, each one of them by itself uniting the other two within it,” and that the differences between them are “more subjectively than objectively practical” in the sense that each aims “to bring an Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling” (G 4:435). He also says that one formula “follows from” another (G 4:431), and that the concept foundational to one formula “leads to a closely connected” concept at the basis of another formula (G 4:433). Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways.

Kant’s statement that each formula “unites the other two within it” initially suggests that the formulas are equivalent in meaning, or at least one could analytically derive one formula from another. Some of Kant’s commentators, for example, have argued along the following lines: That I should always treat humanity as an end in itself entails that I should act only on maxims that are consistent with themselves as universal laws of nature (O’Neill 1975, 1990; Engstrom 2009; Sensen 2011). There are remaining doubts some commentators have, however, about whether this strategy can capture the full meaning of the Humanity Formula or explain all of the duties that Kant claims to derive from it (Wood 1999, 2007; Cureton 2013).

Perhaps, then, if the formulas are not equivalent in meaning, they are nevertheless logically interderivable and hence equivalent in this sense. The universal law formula is not itself derived, as some of Kant’s interpreters have suggested, from the principle of non-contradiction. That would have the consequence that the CI is a logical truth, and Kant insists that it is not or at least that it is not analytic. Since the CI formulas are not logical truths, then, it is possible that they could be logically interderivable. However, despite his claim that each contains the others within it, what we find in the Groundwork seems best interpreted as a derivation of each successive formula from the immediately preceding formula. There are, nonetheless, a few places in which it seems that Kant is trying to work in the opposite direction. One is found in his discussion of the Humanity Formula. There Kant says that only something “whose existence in itself had an absolute worth” could be the ground of a categorically binding law (G 4:428). He then boldly proclaims that humanity is this absolutely valuable thing, referring to this as a “postulate” that he will argue for in the final chapter of the Groundwork (G 4:429n). One might take this as expressing Kant’s intention to derive thereby the universal law formula from the Humanity Formula:  If something is absolutely valuable,  then we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. But (he postulates) humanity is absolutely valuable. Thus, we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. This (we think) anomolous discussion may well get at some deep sense in which Kant thought the formulations were equivalent. Nonetheless, this derivation of the universal law formulation from the Humanity Formulation seems to require a substantive,  synthetic claim, namely, that humanity is indeed absolutely valuable. And if it does require this, then, contrary to Kant’s own insistence, the argument of Groundwork II does not appear to be merely an analytic argument meant simply to establish the content of the moral law.

The most straightforward interpretation of the claim that the formulas are equivalent is as the claim that following or applying each formula would generate all and only the same duties (Allison 2011). This seems to be supported by the fact that Kant used the same examples through the Law of Nature Formula and the Humanity Formula. Thus, the Universal Law Formulation generates a duty to φ if and only if the Humanity Formula generates a duty to φ, (and so on for the other formulations). In other words, respect for humanity as an end in itself could never lead you to act on maxims that would generate a contradiction when universalized, and vice versa. This way of understanding Kant’s claim also fits with his statement that there is no “objective practical difference” between the formulations although there are “subjective” differences. The subjective differences between formulas are presumably differences that appeal in different ways to various conceptions of what morality demands of us. But this difference in meaning is compatible with there being no practical difference, in the sense that conformity to one formulation cannot lead one to violate another formulation.

  1. Autonomy

At the heart of Kant’s moral theory is the idea of autonomy. Most readers interpret Kant as holding that autonomy is a property of rational wills or agents. Understanding the idea of autonomy was, in Kant’s view, key to understanding and justifying the authority that moral requirements have over us. As with Rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of one’s own making. The idea of freedom as autonomy thus goes beyond the merely “negative” sense of being free from causes on our conduct originating outside of ourselves. It contains first and foremost the idea of laws made and laid down by oneself, and, in virtue of this, laws that have decisive authority over oneself.

Kant’s basic idea can be grasped intuitively by analogy with the idea of political freedom as autonomy (See Reath 1994). Consider how political freedom in liberal theories is thought to be related to legitimate political authority: A state is free when its citizens are bound only by laws in some sense of their own making — created and put into effect, say, by vote or by elected representatives. The laws of that state then express the will of the citizens who are bound by them. The idea, then, is that the source of legitimate political authority is not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to “the will of the people.” It is because the body politic created and enacted these laws for itself that it can be bound by them. An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of the people in that state, rather than in the will of a people external to that state, as when one state imposes laws on another during occupation or colonization. In the latter case, the laws have no legitimate authority over those citizens. In a similar fashion, we may think of a person as free when bound only by her own will and not by the will of another. Her actions then express her own will and not the will of someone or something else. The authority of the principles binding her will is then also not external to her will. It comes from the fact that she willed them. So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures that the source of the authority of the principles that bind her is in her own will. Kant’s view can be seen as the view that the moral law is just such a principle. Hence, the “moral legitimacy” of the CI is grounded in its being an expression of each person’s own rational will. It is because each person’s own reason is the legislator and executor of the moral law that it is authoritative for her. (For a contrasting interpretation of autonomy that emphasizes the intrinsic value of freedom of choice and the instrumental role of reason in preserving that value, see Guyer 2007).

Kant argues that the idea of an autonomous will emerges from a consideration of the idea of a will that is free “in a negative sense.” The concept of a rational will is of a will that operates by responding to what it takes to be reasons. This is, firstly, the concept of a will that does not operate through the influence of factors outside of this responsiveness to apparent reasons. For a will to be free is thus for it to be physically and psychologically unforced in its operation. Hence, behaviors that are performed because of obsessions or thought disorders are not free in this negative sense. But also, for Kant, a will that operates by being determined through the operation of natural laws, such as those of biology or psychology, cannot be thought of as operating by responding to reasons. Hence, determination by natural laws is conceptually incompatible with being free in a negative sense.

A crucial move in Kant’s argument is his claim that a rational will cannot act except “under the Idea” of its own freedom (G 4:448). The expression “acting under the Idea of freedom” is easy to misunderstand. It does not mean that a rational will must believe it is free, since determinists are as free as libertarians in Kant’s view. Indeed, Kant goes out of his way in his most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason, to argue that we have no rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, he argues, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ‘things in themselves’ apart from the causally determined world of appearances. Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. For much the same reason, Kant is not claiming that a rational will cannot operate without feeling free. Feelings, even the feeling of operating freely or the “looseness” Hume refers to when we act, cannot be used in an a priori argument to establish the CI, since they are empirical data.

One helpful way to understand acting “under the Idea of freedom” is by analogy with acting “under the Idea” that there are purposes in nature: Although there is, according to Kant, no rational basis for the belief that the natural world is (or is not) arranged according to some purpose by a Designer, the actual practices of science often require looking for the purpose of this or that chemical, organ, creature, environment, and so on. Thus, one engages in these natural sciences by searching for purposes in nature. Yet when an evolutionary biologist, for instance, looks for the purpose of some organ in some creature, she does not after all thereby believe that the creature was designed that way, for instance, by a Deity. Nor is she having some feeling of “designedness” in the creature. To say that she “acts under the Idea of” design is to say something about the practice of biology: Practicing biology involves searching for the purposes of the parts of living organisms. In much the same way, although there is no rational justification for the belief that our wills are (or are not) free, the actual practice of practical deliberation and decision consists of a search for the right causal chain of which to be the origin — consists, that is, seeking to be the first causes of things, wholly and completely through the exercise of one’s own will.

Kant says that a will that cannot exercise itself except under the Idea of its freedom is free from a practical point of view (im practischer Absicht). In saying such wills are free from a practical point of view, he is saying that in engaging in practical endeavors — trying to decide what to do, what to hold oneself and others responsible for, and so on — one is justified in holding oneself to all of the principles to which one would be justified in holding wills that are autonomous free wills. Thus, once we have established the set of prescriptions, rules, laws and directives that would bind an autonomous free will, we then hold ourselves to this very same of set prescriptions, rules, laws and directives. And one is justified in this because rational agency can only operate by seeking to be the first cause of its actions, and these are the prescriptions, and so on, of being a first cause of action. Therefore, rational agents are free in a negative sense insofar as any practical matter is at issue.

Crucially, rational wills that are negatively free must be autonomous, or so Kant argues. This is because the will is a kind of cause—willing causes action. Kant took from Hume the idea that causation implies universal regularities: if x causes y, then there is some universally valid law connecting Xs to Ys. So, if my will is the cause of my φing, then Φing is connected to the sort of willing I engage in by some universal law. But it can’t be a natural law, such as a psychological, physical, chemical or biological law. These laws, which Kant thought were universal too, govern the movements of my body, the workings of my brain and nervous system and the operation of my environment and its effects on me as a material being. But they cannot be the laws governing the operation of my will; that, Kant already argued, is inconsistent with the freedom of my will in a negative sense. So, the will operates according to a universal law, though not one authored by nature, but one of which I am the origin or author. And that is to say that, in viewing my willing to φ as a negatively free cause of my φing, I must view my will as the autonomous cause of my having φed, as causing my having φed by way of some law that I, insofar as I am a rational will, laid down for my will.

Thus, Kant argues, a rational will, insofar as it is rational, is a will conforming itself to those laws valid for any rational will. Addressed to imperfectly rational wills, such as our own, this becomes an imperative: “Conform your action to a universal non- natural law.” Kant assumed that there was some connection between this formal requirement and the formulation of the CI which enjoins us to “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” But, as commentators have long noticed (see, e.g., Hill, 1989a, 1989b), it is not clear what the link is between the claim that rational autonomous wills conform themselves to whatever universally valid laws require, and the more substantial and controversial claim that you should evaluate your maxims in the ways implied by the universal law of nature formulation.

Kant appeared not to recognize the gap between the law of an autonomous rational will and the CI, but he was apparently unsatisfied with the argument establishing the CI in Groundwork III for another reason, namely, the fact that it does not prove that we really are free. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he states that it is simply a “fact of reason” (Factum der Vernunft) that our wills are bound by the CI, and he uses this to argue that our wills are autonomous. Hence, while in the Groundwork Kant relies on a dubious argument for our autonomy to establish that we are bound by the moral law, in the second Critique, he argues from the bold assertion of our being bound by the moral law to our autonomy.

The apparent failure of Kant’s argument to establish the autonomy of the will, and hence the authority of moral demands over us, has not deterred his followers from trying to make good on this project. One strategy favored recently has been to turn back to the arguments of  Groundwork II for help. Kant himself repeatedly claimed that these arguments are merely analytic but that they do not establish that there is anything that answers to the concepts he analyzes. The conclusions are thus fully compatible with morality being, as he puts it, a “mere phantom of the brain” (G 4:445). Kant clearly takes himself to have established that rational agents such as ourselves must take the means to our ends, since this is analytic of rational agency. But there is a chasm between this analytic claim and the supposed synthetic conclusion that rational agency also requires conforming to a further, non-desire based, principle of practical reason such as the CI. Nevertheless, some see arguments in  Groundwork II that establish just this. These strategies involve a new “teleological” reading of Kant’s ethics that relies on establishing the existence of an absolute value or an “end in itself” (we say more about this teleological reading below). They begin with Kant’s own stated assumption that there is such an end in itself if and only if there is a categorical imperative binding on all rational agents as such. If this assumption is true, then if one can on independent grounds prove that there is something which is an end in itself, one will have an argument for a categorical imperative. One such strategy, favored by Korsgaard (1996) and Wood (1999) relies on the apparent argument Kant gives that humanity is an end in itself. Guyer, by contrast, sees an argument for freedom as an end in itself (Guyer 2000). Both strategies have faced textual and philosophical hurdles. Considerable interpretive finesse, for instance, is required to explain Kant’s stark insistence on the priority of principles and law over the good in the second Critique (CPrR 5:57–67)

Although most of Kant’s readers understand the property of autonomy as being a property of rational wills, some, such as Thomas E. Hill, have held that Kant’s central idea is that of autonomy is a property, not primarily of wills, but of principles. The core idea is that Kant believed that all moral theories prior to his own went astray because they portrayed fundamental moral principles as appealing to the existing interests of those bound by them. By contrast, in Kant’s view moral principles must not appeal to such interests, for no interest is necessarily universal. Thus, in assuming at the outset that moral principles must embody some interest (or “heteronomous” principles), such theories rule out the very possibility that morality is universally binding. By contrast, the Categorical Imperative, because it does not enshrine existing interests, presumes that rational agents can conform to a principle that does not appeal to their interests (or an “autonomous” principle), and so can fully ground our conception, according to Kant, of what morality requires of us.

A different interpretive strategy, which has gained prominence in recent years, focuses on Kant’s apparent identification, in Groundwork III, of the will and practical reason. One natural way of interpreting Kant’s conception of freedom is to understand it in terms of the freedom and spontaneity of reason itself. This in turn apparently implies that our wills are necessarily aimed at what is rational and reasonable. To will something, on this picture, is to govern oneself in accordance with reason. Often, however, we fail to effectively so govern ourselves because we are imperfect rational beings who are caused to act by our non–rational desires and inclinations. The result, at least on one version of this interpretation (Wolff 1973), is that we either act rationally and reasonably (and so autonomously) or we are merely caused to behave in certain ways by non–rational forces acting on us (and so heteronomously). This is, however, an implausible view. It implies that all irrational acts, and hence all immoral acts, are not willed and therefore not free. Most interpreters have denied that this is the proper interpretation of Kant’s views. However, several prominent commentators nonetheless think that there is some truth in it (Engstrom 2009; Reath 2015; Korsgaard 1996, 2008, 2009). They agree that we always act under the “guise of the good” in the sense that our will is necessarily aimed at what is objectively and subjectively rational and reasonable, but these interpreters also think that, for Kant, there is a middle–ground between perfect conformity to reason and being caused to act by natural forces. In particular, when we act immorally, we are either weak– willed or we are misusing our practical reason by willing badly. We do not have the capacity to aim to act on an immoral maxim because the will is identified with practical reason, so when we will to perform an immoral act, we implicitly but mistakenly take our underlying policy to be required by reason. By representing our immoral act as rational and reasonable, we are not exercising our powers of reason well, so we are simply making a “choice” that is contrary to reason without “willing” it as such. Our choice is nonetheless free and attributable to us because our will was involved in leading us to take the act to be rational and reasonable. It remains to be seen whether, on this complicated interpretation of Kant, it sufficiently allows for the possibility that one can knowingly and willingly do wrong if the will is practical reason and practical reason is, in part, the moral law.

  1. Virtue and Vice

Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty” (MM 6:405) and vice as principled immorality (MM 6:390). This definition appears to put Kant’s views on virtue at odds with classical views such as Aristotle’s in several important respects.

First, Kant’s account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as a kind of strength and resolve to act on those principles despite temptations to the contrary.

Second, virtue is, for Kant, strength of will, and hence does not arise as the result of instilling a “second nature” by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but a disposition of one’s will, not a disposition of emotions, feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz., continence or self-control.

Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue typically differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves (MM 6:404, 432). Prodigality and avarice, for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough with one’s means. They differ in that the prodigal person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them.

Fourth, in classical views the distinction between moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul, but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness alongside courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non- moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of Anthropology is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral.

Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses or temptations. Morality is “duty” for human beings because it is possible (and we recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence is virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.

Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant’s system in other respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will (G 6: 408). That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one’s duty from duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in Religion. Until one achieves a permanent change in the will’s orientation in this respect, a revolution in which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one’s pursuits, all of one’s actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one’s will to put this revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant’s considered view is that a good will is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.

Kant distinguishes between virtue, which is strength of will to do one’s duty from duty, and particular virtues, which are commitments to particular moral ends that we are morally required to adopt. Among the virtues Kant discusses are those of self-respect, honesty, thrift, self-improvement, beneficence, gratitude, sociability, and forgiveness. Kant also distinguishes vice, which is a steadfast commitment to immorality, from particular vices, which involve refusing to adopt specific moral ends or committing to act against those ends. For example, malice, lust, gluttony, greed, laziness, vengefulness, envy, servility, contempt and arrogance are all vices in Kant’s normative ethical theory.

(Interest in Kant’s conception of virtue has rapidly grown in recent years. For further discussion, see Cureton and Hill 2014, forthcoming; Wood 2008; Surprenant 2014; Sherman 1997; O’Neil 1996; Johnson 2008; Hill 2012; Herman 1996; Engstrom 2002; Denis 2006; Cureton forthcoming; Betzler 2008; Baxley 2010).

  1. Normative Ethical Theory

The Categorical Imperative, in Kant’s view, is an objective, unconditional and necessary principle of reason that applies to all rational agents in all circumstances. Although Kant gives several examples in the Groundwork that illustrate this principle, he goes on to describe in later writings, especially in  The Metaphysics of Morals, a complicated normative ethical theory for interpreting and applying the CI to human persons in the natural world. His framework includes various levels, distinctions and application procedures. Kant, in particular, describes two subsidiary principles that are supposed to capture different aspects of the CI. The Universal Principle of Right, which governs issues about justice, rights and external acts that can be coercively enforced, holds that “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (MM 6:230). The Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue, which governs questions about moral ends, attitudes, and virtue, requires us to “act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have” (MM 6:395). These principles, in turn, justify more specific duties of right and of ethics and virtue.

In Kant’s framework, duties of right are narrow and perfect because they require or forbid particular acts, while duties of ethics and virtue are wide and imperfect because they allow significant latitude in how we may decide to fulfill them. For example, Kant claims that the duty not to steal the property of another person is narrow and perfect because it precisely defines a kind of act that is forbidden. The duty of beneficence, on the other hand, is characterized as wide and imperfect because it does not specify exactly how much assistance we must provide to others.

Even with a system of moral duties in place, Kant admits that judgment is often required to determine how these duties apply to particular circumstances. Moral laws, Kant says, “must be meticulously observed” but “they cannot, after all, have regard to every little circumstance, and the latter may yield exceptions, which do not always find their exact resolution in the laws” (V 27:574; see also CPR A133/B172; MM 6:411).

  1. Teleology or Deontology?

The received view is that Kant’s moral philosophy is a deontological normative theory at least to this extent: it denies that right and wrong are in some way or other functions of goodness or badness. It denies, in other words, the central claim of teleological moral views. For instance, act consequentialism is one sort of teleological theory. It asserts that the right action is that action of all the alternatives available to the agent that has the best overall outcome. Here, the goodness of the outcome determines the rightness of an action. Another sort of teleological theory might focus instead on character traits. “Virtue ethics” asserts that a right action in any given circumstance is that action a virtuous person does or would perform in those circumstances. In this case, it is the goodness of the character of the person who does or would perform it that determines the rightness of an action. In both cases, as it were, the source or ground of rightness is goodness. And Kant’s own views have typically been classified as deontological precisely because they have seemed to reverse this priority and deny just what such theories assert. Rightness, on the standard reading of Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character.

There are several reasons why readers have thought that Kant denies the teleological thesis. First, he makes a plethora of statements about outcomes and character traits that appear to imply an outright rejection of both forms of teleology. For instance, in Groundwork I, he says that he takes himself to have argued that “the objectives we may have in acting, and also our actions’ effects considered as ends and what motivates our volition, can give to actions no unconditional or moral worth…[this] can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought about by such action” (G 4: 400). This appears to say that moral rightness is not a function of the value of intended or actual outcomes. Kant subsequently says that a categorical imperative “declares an action to be objectively necessary of itself without reference to any purpose—that is, even without any further end” (G 4:415). A categorical imperative “commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being conditional on any further goal to be reached by that conduct” (G 4:416). These certainly appear to be the words of someone who rejects the idea that what makes actions right is primarily their relationship to what good may come of those actions, someone who rejects outright the act consequentialist form of teleology. Moreover, Kant begins the Groundwork by noting that character traits such as the traditional virtues of courage, resolution, moderation, self- control, or a sympathetic cast of mind possess no unconditional moral worth, (G 4:393– 94, 398–99). If the moral rightness of an action is grounded in the value of the character traits of the person who performs or would perform it then it seems Kant thinks that it would be grounded in something of only conditional value. This certainly would not comport well with the virtue ethics form of teleology.

Second, there are deeper theoretical claims and arguments of Kant’s in both the Groundwork and in the second Critique that appear to be incompatible with any sort of teleological form of ethics. These claims and arguments all stem from Kant’s insistence that morality is grounded in the autonomy of a rational will. For instance, Kant states that “if the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law…heteronomy always results” (G 4:441). If the law determining right and wrong is grounded in either the value of outcomes or the value of the character of the agent, it seems it will not be found in the fitness of the action’s maxim to be a universal law laid down by the agent’s own rational will. And Kant’s most complete treatment of value, the second Critique’s “On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason”, appears to be a relentless attack on any sort of teleological moral theory. “The concept of good and evil” he states, “must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it” (CPrR 5:63).

A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his  Utilitarianism, Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. Several 20th century theorists have followed Mill’s suggestion, most notably, R. M. Hare. Hare argued that moral judgments such as “Stealing is wrong” are in fact universal prescriptions (“No stealing anywhere by anyone!”). And because they are universal, Hare argued, they forbid making exceptions. That in turn requires moral judgments to give each person’s wellbeing, including our own, equal weight. And when we give each person’s wellbeing equal weight, we are acting to produce the best overall outcome. Thus, in his view, the CI is “simply utilitarianism put into other words” (1993, p. 103). More recently, David Cummiskey (1996) has argued that Kant’s view that moral principles are justified because they are universalizable is compatible with those principles themselves being consequentialist. Indeed, Cummiskey argues that they must be: Respect for the value of humanity entails treating the interests of each as counting for one and one only, and hence for always acting to produce the best overall outcome.

There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. That, she argues, would imply that there would be no reason to conform to them. Instead, Kant thought the principles of rationality taken together constitute rational agency, and rational agency so constituted itself functions as a value that justifies moral action (1993, 231). Herman’s proposal thus has Kant’s view grounding the rightness of actions in rational agency, and then in turn offering rational agency itself up as a value. Both Paul Guyer and Allen Wood have offered proposals that differ from Herman’s in content, but agree on the general form of teleology that she defends as a reading of Kant. Guyer argues that autonomy itself is the value grounding moral requirements. Moral thinking consists in recognizing the priceless value of a rational agent’s autonomous will, something in light of whose value it is necessary for any rational agent to modify his behavior (1998, 22– 35). And Wood argues that humanity itself is the grounding value for Kant. While the second  Critique claims that good things owe their value to being the objects of the choices of rational agents, they could not, in his view, acquire any value at all if the source of that value, rational agency, itself had no value (1999, 130; see also 157–8). Finally, Rae Langton has argued that if Kant’s theory is to be thought of as an objectivistic view, we must suppose that the value of humanity and the good will are independent of simply being the objects of our rational choices. If their value thereby becomes the source of the rightness of our actions — say, our actions are right if and because they treat that self-standing value in various ways — then her reading too is teleological.

It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? But a powerful argument for the deontological reading is Kant’s own apparent insistence that the authority of moral demands must come simply from their being the demands of a rational will, quite apart from the value that will may have (see Schneewind 1996; Johnson 2007, 2008; and Reath 1994). On the latter view, moral demands gain their authority simply because a rational will, insofar as you are rational, must will them. Proponents of this reading are left with the burden of answering Herman’s challenge to provide a rationale for having willed such demands, although one response may be that the very question Herman raises does not make sense because it asks, in effect, why it is rational to be rational. On the former view, by contrast, a rationale is at hand: because your will is, insofar as it is rational, good. Proponents of this former reading are, however, then left with the burden of explaining how it could be the autonomy of the will alone that explains the authority of morality.

  1. Metaethics

It has seemed to a number of Kant’s interpreters that it is important to determine whether Kant’s moral philosophy was realist, anti-realist or something else (e.g. a constructivist). This issue is tricky because the terms “realism,” “anti-realism” and “constructivism” are terms of art.

One relevant issue is whether Kant’s views commit him to the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, and so apt to be evaluated for their truth or falsity (or are “truth apt”).

One might have thought that this question is quite easy to settle. At the basis of morality, Kant argued, is the Categorical Imperative, and imperatives are not truth apt. It makes little sense to ask whether “Leave the gun, take the cannoli.” is true. But, in fact, the question is not at all easy. For one thing, moral judgments such as “Lying is wrong” might well be best analyzed according to Kant’s views as “The Categorical Imperative commands us not to lie”, and this judgment is not an imperative, but a report about what an imperative commands. Thus while at the foundation of morality there would be an imperative which is not truth apt, particular moral judgments themselves would describe what that imperative rules out and so would themselves be truth apt.

Philosophers such as R.M. Hare, however, have taken Kant’s view to be that moral judgments are not truth apt. Although on the surface moral judgments can look as if they describe a moral world, they are, as Hare reads Kant, “prescriptions”, not “descriptions”. This is not, in his view, to say that Kant’s ethics portrays moral judgments as lacking objectivity. Objectivity, according to Hare, is to be understood as universality, and the Categorical Imperative prescribes universally.

A second issue that has received considerable attention is whether Kant is a metaethical constructivist or realist.

Constructivism in metaethics is the view that moral truths are, or are determined by, the outcomes of actual or hypothetical procedures of deliberation or choice. Many who interpret Kant as a constructivist claim that his analysis of “duty” and “good will” reveals that if there are moral requirements then the agents who are bound to them have autonomy of the will (Rawls 1980; Korsgaard 1996; O’Neil 1989; Reath 2006; Hill 1989a, 1989b, 2001; Cureton 2013, 2014; Engstrom 2009). Autonomy, in this sense, means that such agents are both authors and subjects of the moral law and, as such, are not bound by any external requirements that may exist outside of our wills. Instead, we are only subject to moral requirements that we impose on ourselves through the operation of our own reason independently of our natural desires and inclinations. The common error of previous ethical theories, including sentimentalism, egoism and rationalism, is that they failed to recognize that morality presupposes that we have autonomy of the will. These theories mistakenly held that our only reasons to be moral derive from hypothetical imperatives about how to achieve given moral ends that exist independently of the activity of reason itself (for a discussion of Kant’s more specific objections to previous ethical theories, see Schneewind 2009). On these interpretations, Kant is a skeptic about arbitrary authorities, such as God, natural feelings, intrinsic values or primitive reasons that exist independently of us. Only reason itself has genuine authority over us, so we must exercise our shared powers of reasoned deliberation, thought and judgment, guided by the Categorical Imperative as the most basic internal norm of reason, to construct more specific moral requirements. Kantians in this camp, however, disagree about how this rational procedure should be characterized.

Other commentators interpret Kant as a robust moral realist (Ameriks 2003; Wood 1999; Langton 2007; Kain 2004). According to these philosophers, Kant’s theory, properly presented, begins with the claim that rational nature is an objective, agent- neutral and intrinsic value. The moral law then specifies how we should regard and treat agents who have this special status. Autonomy of the will, on this view, is a way of considering moral principles that are grounded in the objective value of rational nature and whose authority is thus independent of the exercise of our wills or rational capacities.

Some interpreters of Kant, most notably Korsgaard (1996), seem to affirm a kind of quietism about metaethics by rejecting many of the assumptions that contemporary metaethical debates rest on. For example, some of these philosophers seem not to want to assert that moral facts and properties just are the outcomes of deliberative procedures. Rather, they seem more eager to reject talk of facts and properties as unnecessary, once a wholly acceptable and defensible procedure is in place for deliberation. That is, the whole framework of facts and properties suggests that there is something we need to moor our moral conceptions to “out there” in reality, when in fact what we only need a route to decision. Once we are more sensitive to the ethical concerns that really matter to us as rational agents, we will find that many of the questions that animate metaethicists turn out to be non-questions or of only minor importance. Others have raised doubts, however, about whether Kantians can so easily avoid engaging in metaethical debates (Hussain & Shaw 2013).

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(7)  “Assessee” means a person by whom any tax or other sum of money is payable under this Ordinance, and includes-

(a)               every person in respect of whom any proceeding under this Ordinance has been taken for the assessment of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable, or of the amount of refund due to him or to such other person;

(b)              every person who is required to file a return under section 75, section 89 or section 91;

(c)               every person who desires to be assessed and submits his return of income under this Ordinance; and

(d)              every person who is deemed to be an assessee, or an assessee in default, under any provision of this Ordinance;

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(14)  “business” includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture;

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(20)  “Company” means a company as defined in 5[the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) or ‡Kv¤úvbx AvBb, 1994 (1994 m‡bi 18 bs AvBb)] and includes-

(a)               a body corporate established or constituted by or under any law for the time being in force;

(b)              any nationalised banking or other financial institution, insurance body and industrial or business enterprise;

[* * *]

[(bb) an association or combination of persons, called by whatever name, if any of such persons is a company

as defined in [the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) or ‡Kv¤úvbx AvBb, 1994 (1994 m‡bi 18 bs AvBb)];

(bbb) any association or body incorporated by or under

the laws of a country outside Bangladesh; and]

(c)               any foreign association or body, [not incorporated by or under any law], which the Board may, by general or special order, declare to be a company for the purposes of this Ordinance;

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(33)          “Foreign company” means a company which is not a Bangladeshi company;

(34)          “income” includes-

(a)               any income, profits or gains, from whatever source derived, chargeable to tax under any provision of this Ordinance under any head specified in section 20;

(b)              any loss of such income, profits or gains;

(c)               the profits and gains of any business of insurance carried on by a mutual insurance association computed in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Fourth Schedule;

(d)              any sum deemed to be income, or any income accruing or arising or received, or deemed to accrue or arise or be received in Bangladesh under any provision of this Ordinance

Provided that the amount representing the face value of any bonus share or the amount of any bonus declared, issued or paid by any company registered in Bangladesh under ‡Kv¤úvbx AvBb, 1994 (1994 m‡bi 18 bs AvBb) to its shareholders with a view to increase its paid-

up share capital shall not be included as income of that share-holder.]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (42)  “non-resident” means a person who is not a resident; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(46)  “person” includes an individual, a firm, an association of persons, a Hindu undivided family, a local authority, a company and every other artificial juridical person;

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[(62) “tax” means the income tax payable under this Ordinance

and includes any additional tax, excess profit tax, penalty, interest, fee or other charges leviable or payable under this Ordinance;]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(65)  “total income” means the total amount of income referred to in section 17 computed in the manner laid down in this Ordinance, and includes any income which, under any provision of this Ordinance, is to be included in the total income of an assessee; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAPTER VIII          RETURN AND STATEMENT

75. (1) Save as provided in section 76, every person shall file or cause to be filed, with the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable to tax under this Ordinance,-

(a)               if his total income during the income year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, or

(b)              if he was assessed to tax for any one of the 2[three years] immediately preceding that income year

Provided that any non-resident Bangladeshi may file his return of income along with bank draft equivalent to the tax liability, if any, on the basis of such return, to his nearest Bangladesh mission and the mission will issue a receipt of such return with official seal and send the return to the Board.]

[(1A)Where a person is not required to file a return of income under sub-section (1), he shall file a return of his income during the income year, on or before the date specified in clause

(c) of sub-section (2), if he-

(a)               resides within the limits of a city corporation or apaurashava or a divisional headquarters or district headquarters and who at any time during the relevant income year fulfils any of the following conditions, namely:-

[***]

(ii) owns a motor car; [***]

[(iv) owns a membership of a club registered under g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki AvBb, 1991 (1991 m‡bi 22 bs AvBb);]

(b)              runs any business or profession having trade license from a city corporation, a paurashava or a union parishad, and operates a bank account;

(c)               has registered with a recognised professional body as a doctor, dentist, lawyer, income-tax practitioner, chartered accountant, cost and management accountant, engineer, architect or surveyor or any other similar profession;

(d)              member of a chamber of commerce and industries or a trade association;

(e)               is a candidate for an office of any [***] paurashava, city corporation, or a Member of Parliament;

(f)               participates in a tender floated by the Government, semi- Government, autonomous body or a local authority

[***]

(h)  any non-government organisation registered with NGO Affairs Bureau.]

Explanation.- In this sub-section, the term “motor car” means a motor car as defined in clause (25) of section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1983 (LV of 1983) and includes a jeep and a micro-bus.]

[(1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section

(1) and (1A), every company shall file a return of its income or the income of any other person for whom the company is assessable, on or before the date specified in clause (c) of sub-section (2).]

(2) The return under sub-section 5[(1), (1A) and (1B)] shall

be-

(a)               furnished in the prescribed form setting forth therein such particulars and information as may be required thereby including the total income of the assessee;

(b)              signed and verified-

(i)                in the case of an individual, by the individualhimself; where the individual is absent from Bangladesh, by the individual concerned or by some person duly authorised by him in this behalf; and when the individual is mentally incapacitated from attending to his affairs, by his guardian or by any other person competent to act on his behalf;

(ii)              in the case of Hindu undivided family, by the Karta, and, where the Karta is absent from Bangladesh or is mentally incapacitated from attending to his affairs, by any other adult member of such family;

(iii)           in the case of a company or local authority, by the principal officer thereof;

(iv)            in the case of a firm, by any partner thereof, not being a minor;

(v)                in the case of any other association, by any member of the association or the principal officer thereof; and

(vi)              in the case of any other person, by that person or by some person competent to act on his behalf;

(c)               filed, unless the date is extended under sub-section (3),-

(i)                in the case of a company, by the fifteenth day of July next following the income year or, where the fifteenth day of July falls before the expiry of six months from the end of the income year, before the expiry of such six months; and

[(ii)  in all other cases, by the thirtieth day of September

next following the income year:

Provided that an individual being Government official engaged in higher education on deputation or employed under lien outside Bangladesh shall file return or returns for the period of such deputation or lien, at a time, within three months from the date of his return to Bangladesh; and]

[(d)  accompanied by-

[(i) in the case of an individual a statement in the

prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner giving particulars of his personal and family expenditure to be called life style

Provided that an individual, not being a shareholder director of a company, having income from salary or income not exceeding three lakh taka from business or profession may opt not to submit such statement.]

(ii)              in the case of an individual [* * *], a statement in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner giving particulars specified in section 80 in respect of himself, his spouse, his minor children and dependents;

[(iii) In the case of a company, an audited statement of

accounts and where the profit or loss of a business is different from profit or loss disclosed in the return of income in accordance with the provision of this Ordinance, a computation sheet showing how the income shown in the return is arrived at on the basis of profit and loss account.]

(3) The last date for the submission of return as specified in

sub-section (2) may be extended by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes in respect of any person or class of persons:

[Provided that the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes may extend the date up to three months from the date so specified and he may further extend the date up to three months with the approval of the Inspecting Joint Commissioner.

…l¦aÅf§ZÑ ¢hd¡u j§mÉ pw−k¡Se Ll J pÇf§lL öó BCe, 2012 Hl L¢afu d¡l¡ ¢e−jÀ A¢hLm Ae¤¢mMe q−m¡x

g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki I m¤c~iK ïé AvBb, 2012

( 2012 m‡bi 47 bs AvBb )

[ 10 wW‡m¤^i, 2012 ]

g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki, m¤c~iK ïé Ges Uvb©Ifvi Ki Av‡iv‡ci †¶Î we¯—…ZKiY Ges Ki Av`vq cÖwµqv mnRxKiY msµvš— wewa-weavb mymsnZKiY Ges Avbylw½K Ab¨vb¨ wel‡q weavb cÖYqbK‡í AvbxZ AvBb|

†h‡nZz g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki, m¤c~iK ïé Ges Uvb©Ifvi Ki Av‡iv‡ci †¶Î we¯—…ZKiY Ges Ki Av`vq cÖwµqv mnRxKiY msµvš— wewa-weavb mymsnZKiY Ges Avbylw½K Ab¨vb¨ wel‡q weavb Kiv mgxPxb I cÖ‡qvRbxq;

†m‡nZz GZ`&Øviv wbæiƒc AvBb Kiv nBj:-

cÖ_g Aa¨vq

cÖviw¤¢K

msw¶ß wk‡ivbvg I cÖeZ©b

1| (1) GB AvBb g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki I m¤c~iK ïé AvBb, 2012 bv‡g AwfwnZ nB‡e|

(2)  GB AvB‡bi wØZxq Aa¨vq, Øv`k Aa¨vq I cÂ`k Aa¨vq Ges viv 128, 132, 134 I 135 Awej‡¤^ Kvh©Ki nB‡e|

(3)  Dc-aviv (2) G Dwj−wLZ Aa¨vq I avivmg~n e¨ZxZ G BAvB‡bi Ab¨vb¨ Aa¨vq

I avivmg~n miKvi, miKvwi †M‡R‡U cÖÁvcb Øviv, †h ZvwiL wba©viY Kwi‡e, †mB Zvwi‡L Kvh©Ki nB‡e|

* Gm, Avi, I bs 168-AvBb/2019/25-g~mK, ZvwiLt 13 Ryb, 2019 Bs Øviv 30 ˆR¨ô, 1426 e½vã †gvZv‡eK 1 RyjvB, 2019 wLªóvã ZvwiL n‡Z D³ Dwj−wLZ Aa¨vq I avivmg~n Kvh©Ki |

msÁv

2| welq ev cÖm‡½i cwicš x’ †Kvb wKQz bv _vwK‡j, GB AvB‡b,―

(1) “AbvevwmK e¨w³” A_© Ggb e¨w³ whwb AvevwmK b‡nb;

(2) “Aciva” A_© aviv 111, 112, 113,116 I 117 G Dwj−wLZ †Kvb Aciva;

(3) “Ae¨vnwZcÖvß mieivn” A_© aviv 26 G Dwj−wLZ Ae¨vnwZcÖvß mieivn;

(4) “Ae¨vnwZcÖvß Avg`vwb”A_© aviv 26 G Dwj−wLZ Ae¨vnwZcÖvß Avg`vwb;

(5) “A_©” A_© evsjv‡`k ev †h‡Kvb †`‡k cÖPwjZ †Kvb gy`ªv (legal tender), Ges wbæewY©Z `wjjvw`I Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) wewb‡gq `wjj (negotiable instrument)

(L)  wej Ae G·‡PÄ, cÖwgmwi †bvU, e¨vsK WªvdU, †cv÷vj AW©vi, gvwb AW©vi ev

mgZzj¨ `wjj;

(M) †µwWU KvW© ev †WweU KvW©; ev

(N)  G¨vKvD›U †WweU ev †µwW‡Ui gva¨‡g cÖ`Ë mieivn;

(6) “A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg” A_© cY¨, †mev ev ¯ v’ ei m¤cwË mieiv‡ni D‡Ï‡k¨ wbqwgZ ev avivevwnKfv‡e cwiPvwjZ †Kvb Kvh©µg; Ges

(K) wbæewY©Z Kvh©µgI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(A)  †Kvb e¨emv †ckv, e„wË, RxweKv DcvR©‡bi Dcvq, cY ¨cÖ¯ Z‘ ev †Kvb ai‡bi D‡`¨vM (undertaking) gybvdvi j‡¶¨ Kvh©µgwU cwiPvwjZ nDK ev bv nDK;

(Av) wjR, jvB‡mÝ ev Abyiƒc Dcv‡q †Kvb cY¨, †mev ev m¤cwË mi ivn;

(B) †Kej GKev‡ii Rb¨ cwiPvwjZ †Kvb evwYwR¨K Kvh©µg ev D‡`¨vM; ev

(C) D³ Kvh©µ‡gi cÖvi‡¤¢ ev †k‡l m¤cvw`Z †Kvb Kvh©; Z‡e―

(L) wbæewY©Z Kvh©µg Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv, h_v:―

(A) Kg©Pvix KZ©…K Zvnvi wb‡qvMKZ©v‡K cÖ`Ë †mev;

(Av) †Kv¤cvbxi †Kvb cwiPvjK KZ©…K cÖ`Ë †Kvb †mev:

Z‡e, †hB‡¶‡Î D³ e¨w³ Zvnvi e¨emv cwiPvjbvi wbwgË D³ cwiPvj‡Ki c` MÖnY K‡ib, †mB‡¶‡Î ZrKZ©…K cÖ`Ë †mev A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg nB‡e;

(B) evwYwR¨Kfv‡e cwiPvwjZ bq Ggb †Kvb we‡bv`bg~jK KvR ev kL;

(C) evwYwR¨K D‡Ïk¨ e¨ZxZ, miKvi KZ©…K cwiPvwjZ wba©vwiZ †Kvb Kvh©µg;

(7)  “Askx`vwi Kvievi” A_© Askx`vwi Kvievi AvBb, 1932 (1932 m‡bi 9 bs AvBb) Gi aviv 4 G msÁvwqZ Askx`vwi Kvievi;

(8)  “AvMvg Ki” A_© aviv 31(2) Gi Aaxb Ki‡h¨M¨ Avg`vwbi Dci AvMvg cÖ‡`q Ki;

(9)  “Av‡`k” A_© †evW© ev Aby‡gvw`Z g~mK Kg©KZ©v KZ©…K cÖ`Ë †Kvb ma vviY ev we‡kl Av‡`k;

[(10) ÒAvbyµwgK (progressive) ev ch©ve„Ë (periodic) mieivnÓ A_© †Kvb Pzw³ ev wjR ev nvqvi Ae jvB‡mÝ (dvBb¨vÝ wjRmn) Gi Aaxb AvbyµwgK ev ch©ve„Ëfv‡e A_© cwi‡kv‡ai k‡Z© cÖ`Ë †Kvb mieivn;]

(11) “Avbylw½K cwienb †mev” A_© Rvnv‡R cY¨ †evSvBKiY ev LvjvmKiY msµvš— †mev, cY¨ evuav msµvš— †mev, cY¨ cwi`k©b msµvš— †mev, ïé `wjjvw` cÖ¯ Z‘ KiY

I cÖwµqvKiY msµvš— †mev, K‡›UBbvi n¨vÛwjs msµvš— †mev, cY¨ ¸`vgRvZKiY

ev msi¶Y msµvš— †mev I Abyiƒc Ab¨ †Kvb †mev;

(12) “Avš—R©vwZK cwienb” A_© Avbylw½K cwienb †mev e¨wZ‡i‡K, moK, †bŠ ev AvKvkc‡_ hvÎx I cY¨vw`i wbæewY©Z cwienb, h_v:―

(K)  evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯’Z †Kvb ¯ v’ b nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb ¯’v‡b cwienb;

(L)   evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯’Z †Kvb ¯ v’ b nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i †Kvb ¯’v‡b cwienb; ev

(M) evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb ¯ v’ b nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb ¯’v‡b cwienb;

(13)  “Avš—R©vwZK mnvqZv I FY Pzw³” A_© evsjv‡`k‡K A_©‰bwZK, KvwiMwi ev cÖkvmwbK †¶‡Î mnvqZv cÖ`v‡bi wbwgË evsjv‡`k miKvi Ges we‡`kx miKvi ev Avš—t‡`kxq Avš—R©vwZK ms¯ v’ i mwnZ Ave× †Kvb Pzw³;

[(14) ÒAvcxjvZ UªvBe¨ybvjÓ A_© Customs Act, 1969 Gi section 196 Gi Aaxb MwVZ Òïé, AveMvwi I g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki AvcxjvZ UªvBe¨ybvj; ]

(15) “AvevwmK e¨w³” A_© Ggb †Kvb e¨w³, whwb―

(K) ¯^vfvweKfv‡e evsjv‡`‡k emevm K‡ib; ev

(L)  PjwZ el©cwÄi 182 (GKkZ weivwk) w`e‡mi AwaKKvj evsjv‡`‡k A ¯ v’ b K‡ib; ev

(M) †Kvb el©cwÄi 90 (beeB) w`e‡mi AwaKKvj evsjv‡`‡k Ae¯ v’ b K‡ib Ges el©cwÄi  Ae¨ewnZ  c~e©eZ©x  Pvi  erm‡ii  g‡a¨  365  (wZbkZ  cqlwÆ)  w`e‡mi AwaKKvj evsjv‡`‡k Ae¯ v’ b Kwiqv _v‡Kb; Ges wbæewY©Z mËvI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K)  †Kv¤cvbx, hw` Dnv evsjv‡`‡ki we`¨gvb AvB‡bi Aaxb wbMwgZ nq ev Dnvi wbqš¿Y I e¨e¯ v’ cbvi †K›`ª¯ j’ evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ nq;

(L)   Uªv÷, hw` Uªv‡÷i GKRb Uªvw÷ evsjv‡`‡k AvevwmK nb e Uªv‡÷i wbqš¿Y I e¨e¯ v’ cbvi †K›`ª¯ j’ evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ nq;

(M) Uªv÷ e¨ZxZ †Kvb e¨w³ msN, hw` Dnv evsjv‡`‡k MwVZ nq ev Dnvi wbqš¿Y I e¨e¯ v’ cbvi †K›`ª¯ j’ evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ nq;

(N)  mKj miKvwi mËv; ev

(O)  m¤cwË Dbœq‡b †hŠ_ D‡`¨vM;

(16)   “Avg`vwb”  A_©  evsjv‡`‡ki  evwni  nB‡Z  evsjv‡`‡ki  †fЇMvwjK  mxgvi   Af¨š—‡i †Kvb cY¨ Avbqb;

[(17) ÒAvg`vwbK…Z †mevÓ A_© evsjv‡`‡ki evwni nB‡Z e mi ivnK…Z †mev;]

(18) “B‡jKUªwbK †mev” A_© †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM †bUIqvK©, ¯ v’ bxq wKsev ˆewk¦K Z_¨ †bUIqvK© ev Abyiƒc gva¨‡g cÖ`vbK…Z wbæewY©Z †m― ev

(K) I‡qe mvBU, I‡qe-‡nvw÷s ev Abyôvb I hš¿cvwZi `~ieZx © i¶Yv‡e¶Y;

(L)  mdUIq¨vi Ges `~ieZ©x †mev cÖ`v‡bi gva¨‡g Dnvi nvjbvMv`K Y;

(M) cÖ`Ë B‡gR (image), †U·U Ges Z_¨;

(N) WvUv‡eBR ev Z_¨fvÛv‡i cÖ‡ekvwaKvi (access to database);

(O) ¯^-wk¶Y c¨v‡KR;

(P)  m½xZ, Pjw”PÎ Ges µxov; Ges

(Q) ivR‰bwZK,  mvs¯‹…wZK,  wkíKjv,  †Ljvayjv,  weÁvb  welqK  Ges  †Uwjwfkb m¤cÖPvimn †h‡Kvb we‡bv`bg~jK m¤cÖPvi Ges Abyôvb|

[(18K)  ÒDcKiYÓ  A_©  mKj  cÖKvi  KvuPvgvj,  j¨ve‡iUix  wi-G‡R›U,  j¨ve‡iUix BKzBc‡g›U, j¨ve‡iUix G‡·mwiR, R¡vjvbx wnmv‡e e¨eüZ †h †Kvb c`v_©, †gvoK mvgMÖx, †mev, hš¿cvwZ I hš¿vsk; Z‡e wbæewY©Z cY¨ ev †mevmg~n DcKiY wnmv‡e we‡ewPZ nB‡e bv, h_vt-

(K)  kªg, f‚wg, BgviZ, Awdm BKzBc‡g›U I wd·Pvi, `vjvb‡KvVv ev AeKvVv‡gv ev ¯’vcYv  wbg©vY,  mylgxKiY,  AvaywbKxKiY,  cÖwZ¯’vcb,  m¤cm ÖviY,  ms¯‹viKiY  I †givgZKiY;

(L)   mKj  cÖKvi AvmevecÎ, Awdm mvc−vB,  †÷kbvix `ªe¨vw`,  †iwd«Rv‡iUi  I wd«Rvi, GqviKwÛkbvi, d¨vb, Av‡jvK miÄvg, †Rbv‡iUi µq ev †g vgZKiY;

(M) B‡›Uwiqi wWRvBb, ¯ v’ cZ¨ cwiKíbv I bKkv;

(N)  hvbevnb fvov I wjR MÖnY;

(O)  ågY, Avc¨vqb, Kg©Pvixi Kj¨vY, Dbœqbg~jK KvR I Dnvi mwnZ mswk−ó cY¨ ev †mev; Ges

(P)   e¨emv cÖwZôv‡bi cÖv½b, Awdm, †kv-i“g ev Abyiƒc †¶Î, †h bv‡gB AwfwnZ nDK bv †Kb, fvov (Rent) MÖnY:

Z‡e  kZ©  _v‡K  †h,  GB  AvB‡bi  Z…Zxq  Zdwm‡ji  Aby‡”Q`  (3G )  Dwj−wLZ Òe¨emvqxÓ KZ©…K e¨emvq cwiPvjbvi †¶‡Î weµq, wewbgq ev cÖKviv‡š— n¯—vš—‡ii D‡Ï‡k¨ Avg`vwbK…Z, µqK…Z, AwR©Z ev Ab¨‡Kvbfv‡e xZ ms  Mc „nY¨  ÒDcKiYÓ wnmv‡e MY¨ nB‡e;]

[(19) ÒDcKiY KiÓ (Input Tax) A_© †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³ KZ©…K DcKiY wnmv‡e Avg`vwbK…Z cY¨ ev †mevi wecix‡Z Avg`vwb ch©v‡q ck wiv ‡waZ g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki

(AvMvg Ki e¨ZxZ) Ges ¯ v’ bxq Drm nB‡Z DcKiY wnmv‡e µqK…Z ev msM„nxZ cY¨

ev †mevi wecix‡Z cwi‡kvwaZ g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki;]

(20) “Drcv` Ki” (output tax) A_© †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³ KZ©…K wbæewY©Z †¶‡Î cÖ‡`q g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki, h_v:―

(K) D³ e¨w³ KZ©…K Ki‡hvM¨ cY¨, †mev ev ¯ v’ ei m¤cwË mieivn; ev

(L)  D³ e¨w³ KZ©…K Ki‡hvM¨ †mev Avg`vwb;

[21) ÒDr‡m Ki KZ©bKvix mËvÓ A_©―

(K) †Kvb miKvwi mËv;

(L)  GbwRI welqK e¨y‡iv ev mgvR †mev Awa`ßi KZ©…K A‡ bg yvw`Z †Kvb †emiKvwi cÖwZôvb;

(M) †Kvb e¨vsK, exgv †Kv¤cvbx ev Abyiƒc Avw_©K cÖwZôvb;

(N) †Kvb gva¨wgK ev Z`~aŸ© ch©v‡qi wk¶v cÖwZôvb; ev

(O) †Kvb wjwg‡UW †Kv¤cvbx;]

(22) “Dr‡m Ki KZ©b mb`cΔ A_© Dr‡m Ki KZ©b msµvš— †Kvb mb`cÎ; [(23) ÒKwgkbviÓ A_© aviv 78 Gi Aaxb wb‡qvMK…Z Kwgki b;] v

(24)  “Ki” A_© g~mK, Uvb©Ifvi Ki I m¤c~iK ïé, Ges e‡Kqv Av`v‡qi D‡Ï‡k¨ my`, Rwigvbv I A_©`ÛI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e;

(25)  “Ki PvjvbcΔ (tax invoice) A_© aviv 51 Gi Aaxb mieivnKvix KZ©…K Bm¨yK…Z †Kvb `wjj;

(26)  “Ki`vZv” A_© GB AvB‡bi Aaxb Ki cwi‡kvaKvix Ges Dr‡m Ki KZ©bKvix mËv;

(27)  “Ki  wbiƒcY”  A_©  cÂg  Aa¨vq  Gi  Aaxb  Ki`vZv  KZ©…K  Ki  wbiƒcY (assessment);

[(28) ÒKi wba©viYÓ A_© GKv`k Aa¨vq Gi Aaxb h‡_vchy³ Kg©KZ©v KZ©…K Ki wba©viY (determination);]

(29)   “Ki  fMœvsk”  A_©  wbæewY©Z  m~Î  Abyhvqx  wbY©xZ  A‡_©i  cwigvY,  h_― v: R/(100+R) †hB‡¶‡Î, A_© aviv 15(3) G DwjøwLZ g~mK nvi;

(30)   “Ki †gqv`” A_©―

(K) g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Ges m¤c~iK ï‡éi †¶‡Î, wLª÷xq el©cwćZ wPwýZ GK gvm; ev

(L)  Uvb©Ifvi K‡ii †¶‡Î, ˆÎgvwmK mgqKvj, hvnv gvP© 31, Ryb 30, †m‡Þ¤^i 30 ev wW‡m¤^i 31 G mgvwß N‡U;

(31) “Ki‡hvM¨ Avg`vwb” A_© Ae¨vnwZcÖvß Avg`vwb e¨ZxZ †h‡Kvb Avg`vwb;

[(32)  ÒKi‡hvM¨  mieivnÓ  A_©  †Kvb  A_©‰bwZK  Kvh©µg  cÖwµqvq  Ae¨vnwZ vß mieivn e¨ZxZ †h †Kvb mieivn;]

(33) “Kinvi” A_© cÖvmw½KZv †f‡`―

(K) aviv 15(3) G Dwj−wLZ g~mK nvi;

(L)  aviv 55(4) G Dwj−wLZ m¤c~iK ïénvi; ev

(M) aviv 63(1) G Dwj−wLZ Uvb©Ifvi Kinvi;

(34) “Ki myweav” A_© wbæewY©Z †Kvb myweav, h_v:―

(K) Drcv` Ki nªvmKiY;

(L)  cY¨ Avg`vwbi Dci g~mK nªvmKiY;

(M) †Ri Uvbv AwZwi³ A‡_©i e„w× ev Ki`vZvi Ki`v‡qi cwigvY nªvmKiY;

(N) nªvmKvix mgš^‡qi cÖvc¨Zv e„w×KiY;

(O) e„w×Kvix mgš^q nªvmKiY;

(P)  Ki †diZ cÖ`vb;

(Q) Drcv` Ki ¯ w’ MZKiY ev DcKiY Ki †iqv‡Zi `vex DÌvcb Z¡ivwš^ZKiY;

(R) Drcv` Ki ev e„w×Kvix mgš^q wnmve wejw¤^ZKiY evD cKiY Ki †iqvZ ev nªvmKvix mgš^q `vwe DÌvcb Z¡ivwš^ZKiY;

(S)  g~jZ I Kvh©Z GKwU Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn ev Ki‡hvM¨ Avg`vwb‡K Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn ev Avg`vwb‡Z cwiYZKiY;

(T)  g~jZ I Kvh©Z †Kvb Avg`vwb ev AR©‡bi †¶‡Î DcKiY Ki †iqvZ cÖvwßi AwaKvi bv _vKv m‡Ë¡I †iqvZ cÖvwßi AwaKvi m„wóKiY; e  v

(U) Ki`vZvi Uvb©Ifvi Kg cÖ`k©b;

[(35) ÒKvh©aviv (Proceedings)Ó A_© mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v KZ©…K GB AvB‡bi Aaxb M„nxZ †Kvb Kvh©aviv ev Kvh©µg, wKš‘ †lvok Aa¨v‡q Dwj−wLZ Aciva msµvš—

gvgjvi Kvh©µg Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv;]

[(36) ÒwKw¯—‡Z g~j¨ cwi‡kva Pzw³Ó A_© µq-weµq msµvš— †Kvb Pzw³ hvnvi Aaxb †Kvb mieiv‡ni cY GKvwaK wKw¯—i gva¨‡g cwi‡kva Kiv nq;]

[(37) Ò‡K›`ªxq BDwbUÓ A_© Awfbœ A_ev mgRvZxq cY¨ ev †me ev Df‡qi mieivn msµvš— A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi mKj wnmve-wbKvk I †iKW©cÎ †hL ‡b †K›`ªxqfv‡e cwiPvwjZ I msiw¶Z nq;]]

[(38) Ò‡Kv¤cvwbÓ A_© evsjv‡`k ev Ab¨ †Kvb †`‡ki we`¨gvb †Kvb AvB‡bi Aaxb †Kv¤cvwb wnmv‡e wbMwgZ †Kvb cÖwZôvb;]

(39) “‡µwWU †bvU” A_© nªvmKvix mgš^q MÖn‡Yi D‡Ï‡k¨ Ki`vZv KZ©…K Bm¨yK…  Z †Kvb `wjj;

[(40) ÒPvjvbcÎÓ A_© cY cwi‡kv‡ai `vq msµvš— †Kvb `wjj;]

(41)  “Rwigvbv” A_© aviv 85 Gi Aaxb [g~mK Kg©KZ©v] KZ©…K Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbv, wKš‘ Aciv‡ai wePv‡ii †¶‡Î Av`vjZ KZ©…K cÖ`Ë A_©`Ê Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv;

(42)  “Uvb©Ifvi” A_© †Kvb e¨w³ KZ©…K †Kvb wba©vwiZ mg‡q ev Ki †gqv‡` Zvnvi A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg Øviv cÖ¯ Z‘ K…Z, Avg`vwbK…Z ev µqi K‡ …hvM  c K‡Y¨i mieivn ev Ki‡hvM¨ †mev cÖ`vb nB‡Z cÖvß ev cÖvc¨ mgy`q A_©;

(43)  “Uvb©Ifvi Ki” A_© aviv 63 Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Ki;

(44)  “‡WweU †bvU” A_© e„w×Kvix mgš^q MÖn‡Yi D‡Ï‡k¨ Ki`vZv KZ©…K Bm¨yK… †K Zvb `wjj;

(45)  “Zdwmj” A_© GB AvB‡bi †Kvb Zdwmj;

(46)  “ZvwjKvfz³” A_© aviv 10(2) Gi Aaxb Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfz³;

(47)  “ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨  e¨w³”  A_©  aviv  10(1)  Gi  Aaxb  Uvb©Ifvi  Ki ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ †Kvb e¨w³;

(48)  “ZvwjKvfzw³mxgv” A_© †Kvb e¨w³i A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi Uvb©Ifvi cÖwZ 12 (evi) gvm mg‡q 16[50 (cÂvk)] j¶ UvKvi mxgv, wKš‘ wbæewY©Z g~j¨ Dnvi Aš—f©z³

nB‡e bv, h_v:―

(K) Ae¨vnwZcÖvß mieiv‡ni g~j¨;

(L)  g~jabx m¤c‡`i weµq g~j¨;

(M) A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi cÖwZôvb ev Dnvi †Kvb Ask we‡k‡li weµq g~j¨; ev

(N) A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg ¯ v’ qxfv‡e eÜ Kwievi djkª“wZ‡Z K… m Zieiv‡ni g~j¨;

(49) “`wjj” A‡_© wbæewY©Z e¯‘ Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K)  †Kvb KvMR ev Abyiƒc †Kvb e¯‘ hvnvi Dci A¶i, msL¨v, cÖZxK ev wP‡ýi gva¨‡g †Kvb †jLbx cÖKvk Kiv nq; ev

(L)   †Kvb B‡j±ªwbK DcvË, Kw¤cDUvi †cÖvMÖvg, Kw¤cDUvi wdZv, Kw¤cDUvi wW¯‹ ev Abyiƒc †Kvb wWfvBm (device) hvnv DcvË aviY Kwi‡Z cv‡i;

(50)  “`vwLjcΔ A_© Ki wbiƒcY I Ki wba©vi‡Yi D‡Ï‡k¨ †Kvb Ki‡gqv‡` Ki`vZv KZ©…K †ckK…Z †Kvb `vwLjcÎ;

(51)  “‡`Iqvbx Kvh©wewa” A_© †`Iqvbx Kvh©wewa, 1908 (1908 m‡bi 5 bs AvBb);

(52)  “wbw`©ó  ¯’vb”  A_©  evsjv‡`‡k  ev  evsjv‡`‡ki  evwn‡i  A_©‰bwZK  Kvh©µg cwiPvjbvi Rb¨ wbæewY©Z †Kvb ¯ v’ b, h_v:―

(K) e¨e¯’vcbvi ¯’vb;

(L)  kvLv, `ßi, KviLvbv ev IqvK©kc;

(M) Lwb, M¨vmK‚c, cv_i ev Abyiƒc †Kvb LwbR m¤c` AvniY †¶Î (quarry); ev

(N) wbg©vY ev ¯ v’ cbv cÖK‡íi Ae¯ v’ b;

(53) “wba©vwiZ” A_© †evW© KZ©…K cÖYxZ †Kvb wewa ev Av‡`k Øviv wba©vwiZ;

(54) “wbeÜb” A_© aviv 6 Gi Aaxb g~mK wbeÜb;

(55) “wbeÜb‡hvM¨ e¨w³” A_© aviv 4 Gi Aaxb g~mK wbeÜb‡hvM¨ †Kvb e¨w³;

(56) “wbewÜZ e¨w³” A_© aviv 6 Gi Aaxb g~mK wbewÜZ †Kvb e¨w³;

(57) “wbeÜbmxgv” A_© †Kvb e¨w³i A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi Uvb©Ifvi cÖwZ 12 (evi) gvm mg‡q [3 (wZb) †KvwU] UvKvi mxgv, wKš‘ wbæewY©Z g~j¨ Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv,

h_v:―

(K) Ae¨vnwZcÖvß mieiv‡ni g~j¨;

(L)  g~jabx m¤c‡`i weµq g~j¨;

(M) A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi cÖwZôvb ev Dnvi †Kvb As‡ki weµq g~j¨; ev

(N) A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg ¯ v’ qxfv‡e eÜ Kwievi djkª“wZ‡Z K… m Zieiv‡ni g~j¨ [:

Z‡e kZ© _v‡K †h, aviv 4 Gi Dc-aviv (2) Gi `dv (N) GiAaxb †Kvb e¨w³‡K wbewÜZ Kwievi †¶‡Î GB wbeÜbmxgv cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e bv;]

(58) “b¨vh¨ evRvi g~j¨” A_©―

(K) ci¯ci mn‡hvMx bq Giƒc †µZv Ges we‡µZvi g‡a¨ ¯^vfvweK m¤c‡K©i wfwˇZ wba©vwiZ †Kvb mieiv‡ni cY;

(L)  hw` `dv (K) G Dwj−wLZ b¨vh¨ evRvi g~j¨ cvIqv bv hvq, Zvnv nB‡j B‡Zvc~‡e© GKB cwiw¯ w’ Z‡Z mgRvZxq †Kvb mieiv‡ni cY;

(M) hw` D³iƒ‡c b¨vh¨ evRvi g~j¨ wba©viY Kiv bv hvq, Zvnv nB‡j ci¯ci mn‡hvMx bq Ggb †µZv Ges we‡µZvi g‡a¨ mvaviY e¨emvq m¤c‡K©i wfwˇZ wbiƒwcZ c‡Yi ˆbe¨©w³K M‡oi wfwˇZ †evW© KZ©…K wba©vwiZ g~j¨;

(59) “cY” A_© †Kvb mieiv‡ni [wecix‡Z] cÖZ¨¶ ev c‡iv¶fv‡e cÖ`Ë ev cÖ‡`q A_© ev bM` A‡_©i cwie‡Z© cÖ`Ë ev cÖ‡`q `ª‡e¨i b¨vh¨ evRvi g~j¨,―

Ges wbæewY©Z wel‡qi A_©I Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:― (K) GB AvBb ev Ab¨ †Kvb AvB‡bi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Ki, hvnv― (A) mieiv‡ni Dci ev mieiv‡ni Kvi‡Y mieivnKvix KZ©…K cÖ‡`q nq; ev

(Av) MÖnxZvi wbKU nB‡Z cÖvß g~‡j¨i g‡a¨ Aš—f©z³ ev n Dvi mwnZ ms‡hvwRZ nq; (L) mvwf©m PvR© wnmv‡e Dwj−wLZ †Kvb A_©; ev

(M) nvqvi cvi‡PR ev dvBb¨vÝ wjR Pzw³i Aaxb cY¨ mieiv‡ni c‡Yi g‡a¨ dvBb¨vÝ wjR ev nvqvi cvi‡P‡Ri Aaxb FY cÖ`vb m¤cwK©Z cÖ‡`q †h †Kvb A_© Aš—f©z³ _vwK‡e; wKš‘ mieiv‡ni mgq †h g~j¨Qvo †`Iqv nq Zvnv Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv;

(60)  “cY¨” A_© †kqvi, ÷K, wmwKDwiwUR Ges A_© e¨ZxZ mKj cÖKvi `„k¨gvb A¯’vei m¤cwË;

[(61) ÒcY¨ mieivnÓ A_©―

(K) c‡Y¨i weµq, wewbgq ev Ab¨weafv‡e weµ‡qi gva¨‡g c‡Y¨i AwaKvi n¯—vš—i; ev

(L)  wjR, fvov, wKw¯—, nvqvi cvi‡PR ev Ab¨ †Kvbfv‡e cY¨ e¨env‡ii AwaKvi cÖ`vb Ges dvBb¨vÝ wj‡Ri AvIZvq cY¨ weµqI Dnvi Aš—fz³ © nB‡e;]]

(62) “cÖ”Qbœ ißvwb” A‡_© wbæewY©Z GK ev GKvwaK mieivn Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i †fv‡Mi Rb¨ Awf‡cÖZ †Kvb [cY¨ ev †mev] wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z ˆe‡`wkK gy`ªvi wewbg‡q [wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z] mieivn;

(L)  †Kvb Avš—R©vwZK `ic‡Îi gva¨‡g ˆe‡`wkK gy`ªvi wewbg‡q [wba©v iZ c×wZ‡Z] evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i †Kvb cY¨ ev †mevi mieivn; ev

(M) ¯ v’ bxq FYc‡Îi wecix‡Z ˆe‡`wkK gy`ªvi wewbg‡q evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i †Kvb cY¨ ev †mevi mieivn;

(63) “cÖwZwbwa” A_©-

(K) A¶g e¨w³i †¶‡Î, AwffveK ev ZrKZ©„K wbhy³ e¨e¯ v’ cK;

[(L)  †Kv¤úvbxi  †¶‡Î,  Aemvqbvaxb  †Kv¤úvbx  e¨wZ‡i‡K  †Kv¤úvbxi  gyL¨  wbe©vnx Kg©KZ©v ev ZrKZ„„K wbhy³ Ab¨‡Kvb Dchy³ Kg©KZ©v ev cÖwZwbwa;]

(M) Askx`vwi Kviev‡ii †¶‡Î, Dnvi †Kvb Askx`vi;

(N)  U«v‡÷i †¶‡Î, D³ U«v‡÷i U«vw÷ ev wbe©vnK ev cÖkvmK;

(O)  e¨w³ ms‡Ni †¶‡Î, Dnvi †Pqvig¨vb, m¤úv`K ev †Kvlva¨¶;

[(P) miKvwi mËvi †¶‡Î, Dnvi gyL¨ wbe©vnx Kg©KZ©v ev Zr Z©„K wbhy³ Ab¨‡Kvb Dchy³ Kg©KZ©v ev cÖwZwbwa;]

(Q) ˆe‡`wkK miKv‡ii †¶‡Î, D³ ˆe‡`wkK miKvi KZ©„K wbhy³ †Kvb Kg©KZ©v;

(R) AbvevwmK e¨w³i †¶‡Î, ZrKZ©„K wbhy³ g~mK G‡R›U; ev

(S)  wba©vwiZ Ab¨ †Kvb cÖwZwbwa;

[(64) “cÖ‡`q bxU Ki” A_© †Kvb Ki †gqv‡` aviv 45 Gi Aaxb wbi“wcZ Ki;]

(65) “cÖ¯—yZKiY (manufacturing)” A_©-

(K) †Kvb c`v_© GKKfv‡e ev Ab¨ †Kvb c`v_© ev miÄvg ev Drcv`‡bi Askwe‡k‡li

mwnZ ms‡hvM ev m‡¤§j‡bi Øviv cÖwµqvKi‡Yi gva¨‡g Ab¨ †Kvb mywbw`©ó c`vZ© ev c‡Y¨ iƒcvš—iKiY ev Dnv‡K GBiƒ‡c cwiewZ©Z, iƒcvš—wiZ ev cybivK…wZ cÖ`vbKiY hvnv‡Z D³ c`v_© wfbœfv‡e ev mywbw`©ófv‡e e¨env‡ii Dc‡hvMx nq;

(L) c‡Y¨i cÖ¯—ywZ m¤úbœ Kwievi Rb¨ †Kvb Abymw½K ev mnvqK cÖwµqv;

(M)       gy`ªY, cÖKvkbv, wkjvwjwc ev wgbvKiY cÖwµqv;

(N) ms‡hvRb, wgkªY, cwiï×KiY, KZ©b, ZixKiY, †evZjRvZKiY, †gvoKve×KiY ev cybt‡gvoKve×KiY; ev

(O) ga¨eZ©x ev Amgvß cÖwµqvmn cY¨ Drcv`b ev ˆZix‡Z M„nxZ mKj cÖwµqv;

(66) “dvBb¨vÝ wjR” A_© nvqvi cvi‡PR e¨ZxZ Ggb †Kvb wjR hvnv B›Uvib¨vkbvj dvBb¨vwÝqvj wi‡cvwU©s ÷¨vÛvW© Abyhvqx dvBb¨vÝ wjR wnmv‡e MY¨;

(67) “‡dŠR`vix Kvh©wewa” A_© †dŠR`vix Kvh©wewa, 1898 (1898 m‡bi 5bs AvBb);

(68) “e‡Kqv Ki” A_© aviv 95 G Dwj−wLZ e‡Kqv Ki;

(69) “wewa” A_© †evW© KZ©…K cÖYxZ †Kvb wewa;

(70) “wej Ae Gw›Uª” (Bill of Entry) A_© [Kv÷gm AvB‡bi] aviv 2 (wm)-‡Z msÁvwqZ Bill of Entry;

(71) “e„w×Kvix mgš^q” A_© wbæewY©Z †Kvb e„w×Kvix mgš^q, h_v― :

(K) Dr‡m KwZ©Z K‡ii e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(L)  evrmwiK cybtwnmve cÖYq‡bi d‡j e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(M) e¨vswKs P¨v‡b‡j A_© cwi‡kva bv Kwievi d‡j e„w×Ki vx mgš^q;

(N) e¨w³MZ D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨eüZ (private use) c‡Y¨i †¶‡Î e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(O) wbewÜZ nIqvi ci e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(P)  wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Kvi‡Y e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(Q) g~mK nvi cwiewZ©Z nIqvi Kvi‡Y e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

[(QQ) c~e©eZ©x †h †Kvb Ki †gqv‡` Kg cwi‡kvwaZ g~m‡Ki e„w×Kvix mgš^q;]

[(R) my`, Rwigvbv, A_©`Ê, wd, e‡Kqv Ki BZ¨vw`  cwi‡kva msµvš— e„w×Kvix mgš^q; ev]

(S) wba©vwiZ Ab¨ †Kvb e„w×Kvix mgš^q;

(72)  “e„nr Ki`vZv BDwbU” A_© aviv 78(3) Gi Aaxb MwVZ †Kvb e„nr Ki`vZv BDwbU;

(73)  “‡evW©” A_© RvZxq ivR¯^ †evW© Av‡`k, 1972 (ivóªcwZi 1972 m‡bi 76 bs Av‡`k) Gi

Aaxb MwVZ RvZxq ivR¯^ †evW©;

(74)  “e¨w³” A_© ¯^vfvweK †Kvb e¨w³, Ges wbæewY©Z mËvI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) †Kvb †Kv¤cvbx;

(L)  †Kvb e¨w³ msN;

(M) †Kvb miKvwi mËv;

(N)  †Kvb ˆe‡`wkK miKvi ev ZrKZ©…K wba©vwiZ †Kvb wefvM ev wbhy³ †Kvb Kg©KZ©v; [(O) †Kvb Avš—t †`kxq I Avš—R©vwZK msMVb;

(P) m¤cwË Dbœq‡b †hŠ_ D‡`¨vM ev Abyiƒc †Kvb D‡`¨vM; ev

(Q) Ab¨vb¨ e¨emv cÖwZôvb;]

(75) “e¨w³ msN” A_© Askx`vwi Kvievi, Uªv÷ ev Abyiƒc †Kvb e¨w³ msN, wKš‘ †Kvb †Kv¤cvbx ev AwbMwgZ †hŠ_ g~jabx Kvievi Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv;

(76) “e¨emv mbv³KiY msL¨v” A_© wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ †Kvb e¨w³i AbyK‚‡j Bm¨yK…Z g~mK wbeÜb mb`cÎ ev Uvb©Ifvi Ki mb`c‡Î Dwj−wLZ †Kvb Abb¨ e¨emv mbv³KiY msL¨v;

(77) “f‚wgi mwnZ cÖZ¨¶fv‡e mswk−ó †mev” A‡_©―

(K) f‚wgi Dci cÖZ¨¶fv‡e cÖ`Ë †mev;

(L)  wbw`©ó f‚wgi Dci we‡klÁ Ges G‡÷U G‡R›U cÖ`Ë †mev;

(M) wbw`©ó f‚wgi Dci M„nxZ ev M„nxZe¨ wbg©vY KvR c mwK ¤©Z †mev;

(78) “g~j¨” A_©―

(K) aviv 28 G Dwj−wLZ Avg`vwb g~j¨; ev

(L)  aviv 32 G Dwj−wLZ mieivn g~j¨;

(79) “g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki” ev “g~mK” A_© aviv 15 Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki;

(80) “g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki KZ©…c¶” A_© aviv 78 G Dwj−wLZ KZ©…c¶;

(81) “g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Kg©KZ©v” ev “g~mK Kg©KZ©v” A_© aviv 78(1) G Dwj−wLZ †Kvb Kg©KZ©v;

(82) “ißvwb” A_© evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—i nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki †fЇMvwjK mxgvi evwn‡i †Kvb [***] mieivn Ges cÖ”Qbœ ißvwbI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e;

[***]

[(84) ÒKv÷gm AvBbÓ A_© Customs Act, 1969 (Act No. IV of 1969) ev Z`axb cÖYxZ †Kvb wewa ev cÖ`Ë †Kvb Av‡`k;]

[(85) ÒKv÷gm KwgkbviÓ ev ÒKv÷gm Kg©KZ©vÓ A_© Kv÷gm AvB‡bi Aaxb wbhy³ †Kvb Kg©KZ©v;]

(86)   “k~b¨nvi  wewkó  mieivn  A_©  aviv  21  G  Dwj−wLZ  k~b¨nvi  wewkó  †Kvb mieivn;

(87)   “mgš^q NUbv” A_© wbæewY©Z †Kvb NUbv, h_v:―

(K) †Kvb mieivn evwZjKiY;

(L)  †Kvb mieiv‡ni cY cwieZ©b;

(M) mieivnK…Z cY¨ m¤c~Y© ev Dnvi Askwe‡kl mieivnKvi w xb iKU †diZ cÖ`vb;

(N) mieiv‡ni cÖK…wZ cwieZ©‡bi Kvi‡Y †Kvb mieivn An ew ¨Z vcÖvß ev k~b¨nvi wewkó mieiv‡n cwiYZ nIqv; ev

(O) wba©vwiZ Ab¨ †Kvb NUbv;

(88)  “m¤cwË Dbœq‡b †hŠ_ D‡`¨vM” A_© †Kvb Pzw³ hvnvi Aaxb †Kvb f‚wgi gvwjK Zvnvi f‚wg‡Z feb wbg©v‡Yi Rb¨ †Kvb wbg©vZvi mwnZ kZax‡b Aw½Kvive× nq;

(89)  “m¤c~iK ïé” A_© aviv 55 Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ m¤c~iK ïé;

(90)  “m¤c~iK ïé Av‡ivc‡hvM¨ cY¨” A_© wØZxq Zdwm‡j Dwj−wLZ †Kvb cY¨;

(91)  “m¤c~iK ïé Av‡ivc‡hvM¨ †mev” A_© wØZxq Zdwm‡j Dwj−wLZ †Kvb †mev;

(92)  [***] Dr‡m Ki KZ©b mb`cΔ A_© aviv 53 G Dwj−wLZ †Kvb `wjj;

(93)  “miKvix mËv” A_©―

(K) miKvi ev Dnvi †Kvb gš¿Yvjq, wefvM, ev `ßi;

(L)  AvavmiKvwi ev ¯^vqËkvwmZ †Kvb ms¯ v’ ;

(M) ivóªxq gvwjKvbvaxb †Kvb cÖwZôvb; ev

(N) ¯ v’ bxq KZ©…c¶, cwil` ev Abyiƒc †Kvb ms¯ v’ ;

(94)   “mieivn” A_© †h †Kvb mieivn Ges wbæewY©Z welqmg~nI Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) cY¨ mieivn;

(L)  ¯’vei m¤cwË mieivn;

(M) †mev mieivn; ev

(N) `dv (K), (L) Ges (M) †Z ewY©Z mieiv‡ni mgvnvi;

(95)  “mb`cΔ A_© GB AvB‡bi Aaxb [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] KZ©…K mieivnK…† ZK vb mb`cÎ;

(96)  “mieiv‡ni mgq” A_©―

(K) cY¨ mieiv‡ni †¶‡Î, †h mg‡q c‡Y¨i `Lj Ac©Y ev AcmviY Kiv nq;

(L)  †mev mieiv‡ni †¶‡Î, †h mg‡q †mev cÖ`vb, m„wó, ¯ n—š—i ev ¯^Z¡ Ac©Y Kiv nq; ev

(M) ¯ v’ ei m¤cwË mieiv‡ni †¶‡Î, †h mg‡q m¤cwË Ac©Y, m„wó, n¯—š—i ev ¯^Z¡ cÖ`vb Kiv nq †mB mgq;

[97) Òmn‡hvMxÓA_© `yBRb e¨w³i g‡a¨ Ggb m¤cK© hvnvi Kvi‡Y G‡K Ac‡ii ev Df‡q Aci †Kvb Z…Zxq e¨w³i AwfcÖvq Abyhvqx KvR K‡ibv ewi‡eb ewjqv cÖZ¨vkv Kiv nq, Ges wbæewY©Z e¨w³I Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nBe ‡b, h_v:-

(K) Askx`vwi Kviev‡ii †Kvb Askx`vi;

(L)  †Kv¤cvbxi †Kvb †kqvi †nvìvi;

(M) †Kvb Uªv÷ Ges D³ Uªv‡÷i myweav‡fvMx;

(N) †Kvb m¤cwË Dbœq‡b †hŠ_ D‡`¨vM Ges D³ D‡`¨v‡Mi Askx`vi f‚wg gvwjK, wbg©vZv ev Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³; ev

(O)  cÖwZwbwa, g~mK G‡R›U, cwi‡ekK, jvB‡mÝx ev Abyiƒc m¤cK©hy³ e¨w³eM©: Z‡e kZ© _v‡K †h, PvKzwii m¤cK©hy³ e¨w³eM© Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡eb bv;]

[(97K) Òmswk−ó Kg©KZ©vÓ A_© GBiƒc †h †Kvb g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Kg©KZ©v whwb GB AvB‡bi Aaxb KwZcq `vwqZ¡ cvj‡bi Rb¨ †ev‡W©i wbKU nB‡Z †evW© KZ©…K RvixK…Z miKvwi †M‡RU cÖÁvc‡bi gva¨‡g ¶gZvcÖvß nBqv‡Qb;]

(98)   “‡m‡KÛ-n¨vÛ cY¨” A_© Ggb †Kvb cY¨ hvnv c~‡e© e¨eüZ nBqv‡Q, wKš‘ g~j¨evb avZz ev Dnvi Øviv ˆZix †Kvb cY¨ (‡hgb: ¯^Y©, †iŠc¨, c−vwUbvg ev Abyiƒc

†Kvb avZz), Ges nxiv, cÙivMgwY ev Pzwbœ, cvbœv, bxjgwY ev bxjKvš—gwY Dnvi Aš—

f©z³ nB‡e bv;

(99) “‡mev” A_© †h †Kvb †mev Z‡e, cY¨, ¯ v’ ei m¤cwË Ges A_© (money) Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e bv;

(100) “‡mev mieivn” A_© Ggb mieivn hvnv cY¨, A_© ev ¯’vei m¤cwËi mieivn b‡n, Z‡e mvgwMÖKZv‡K ¶~bœ bv Kwiqv wbæewY©Z welqmg~n Dnvi Aš—f©z³ nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) AwaKvi cÖ`vb (grant), n¯—vš—i (assignment), mgvwß (termination), ev †Kvb AwaKvi mgc©Y;

(L)  †Kvb my‡hvM, myweav ev DcKvi MÖn‡Yi e¨e¯ v’ KiY;

(M) †Kvb Kvh© Kiv, †Kvb Ae¯ v’ ev †Kvb Kvh©µg MÖnY Kiv nB‡Z weiZ _vKv ev gvwbqv jIqvi Rb¨ Pzw³; Ges

(N) jvB‡mÝ, cviwgU, mb`cÎ, we‡kl myweav, AbygwZcÎ ev Abyiƒ AwaKvi RvwiKiY, n¯—vš—i ev mgc©Y;

[(101) Ò¯ v’ ei m¤cwËÓ A_© ¯ v’ ei m¤cwËi Dci ¯^Z¡ ev AwaKvi hvnv‡Z f‚wg, ev f‚wgi Dci Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb feb ev Dnv‡Z ¯ v’ wcZ ev ¯ v’ qxfv‡e mshy³ †Kvb KvVv‡gv, ms¯’vwcZ _vKzK ev bv _vKzK;]

(102) “¯’vei m¤cwË mieivn” A‡_© wbæewY©Z mieivnmg~n Aš—f©z³ nB‡e―

(K) f‚wgi Dci †Kvb AwaKvi ev ¯^v_©;

(L)  f‚wgi Dci †Kvb AwaKvi ev ¯^v_© cÖ`v‡bi Avnevb m¤^wjZ e¨w³MZ AwaKvi,

(M) Avevmb mieivnmn f‚wg‡Z Awaôv‡bi( occupy)

wbwgË jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vb ev f‚wg‡Z cÖ‡qvM‡hvM¨ †Kvb Pzw³wfË wK AwaKvi;

(N)  `dv (K), (L) Ges (M)‡Z ewY©Z †Kvb welq AR©‡bi AwaKvi ev fwel¨‡Z D³ AwaKvi cÖ‡qv‡Mi AwfcÖvq (option);

[ (103) ÒnªvmKvix mgš^qÓ A_© wbæewY©Z †Kvb nªvmKvix mgš^q, h_vt-

(K) AvMvg Ki wnmv‡e cwi‡kvwaZ A‡_©i nªvmKvix mgš^q;

(L)  mieivnKvix KZ©…K cÖ`Ë mieiv‡ni wecix‡Z Dr‡m KwZZ © K‡ii nªvmKvix mgš^q;

(M) evrmwiK cybtwnmve cÖYqb ev wbix¶vi d‡j cÖ‡hvR¨ nªvmKvix mgš^q;

(N) †µwWU †bvU Bm¨yi Kvi‡Y nªvmKvix mgš^q;

[***]

(P) g~mK nvi nªvm cvBevi †¶‡Î nªvmKvix mgš^q;

(Q) c~e©eZ©x Ki †gqv` nB‡Z †bwZevPK A‡_©i cwigvY †Ri Uvbvi wbwgË nªvmKvix mgš^q;

(R) c~e©eZ©x Ki †gqv‡` AwZwi³ cwi‡kvwaZ g~mK nªvmKvix mgš^q; ev

(S) wba©vwiZ Ab¨ †Kvb nªvmKvix mgš^q|]

AvB‡bi cÖvavb¨

3| AvcvZZ ejer Ab¨ †Kvb AvBb, wewa, cÖweavb ev AvB‡bi ¶gZvm¤cbœ Ab¨ †Kv‡bv `wj‡j hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, GB AvB‡bi weavbvejx cÖvavb¨ cvB‡e|

wØZxq Aa¨vq

g~mK wbeÜb Ges Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfzw³

g~mK wbeÜb‡hvM¨ e¨w³

[4| (1) wbæewY©Z cÖ‡Z¨K e¨w³ †Kvb gv‡mi cÖ_g w`b nB‡Z g~mK wbeÜb‡hvM¨ nB‡eb, h_v:¾

(K) †h e¨w³i Uvb©Ifvi D³ gv‡mi c~e©eZ©x gv‡mi †k‡l mgvß 12 (evi) gvm mg‡q wbeÜbmxgv AwZµg K‡i; ev

(L)  †h e¨w³i cÖv°wjZ Uvb©Ifvi D³ gv‡mi c~e©eZ©x gv‡mi cÖvi¤¢ nB‡Z cieZ©x 12 (evi) gvm mg‡q wbeÜbmxgv AwZµg K‡i|

(2)  Dc-aviv (1) G hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, wbæewY©Z A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg

cwiPvjbvKvix cÖ‡Z¨K e¨w³‡K Uvb©Ifvi wbwe©‡k‡l g~mK wbewÜZ nB‡Z nB‡e, whwb

(K)  evsjv‡`‡k m¤c~iK ïé Av‡ivc‡hvM¨ cY¨ ev †mev mieivn, cÖ¯ Z‘ ev Avg`vwb K‡ib;

(L)   †Kvb †UÛv‡i AskMÖn‡Yi gva¨‡g ev †Kvb Pzw³ ev Kvh©v‡`‡ki wecix‡Z cY¨ ev †mev ev DfqB mieivn K‡ib;

(M) †Kvb Avg`vwb-ißvwb e¨emvq wb‡qvwRZ;

(N)  †evW© KZ©…K wba©vwiZ †Kvb wbw`©ó †fЇMvwjK GjvKvq ev †Kvb wbw`©ó cY¨ ev †mev mieivn, cÖ¯ Z‘ ev Avg`vwb mswk−ó A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡g wb‡qvwRZ|]

wbeÜb

[5| (1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ `yB ev Z‡ZvwaK ¯ v’ b nB‡Z Awfbœ A_ev mgRvZxq cY¨ ev †mev ev DfqB mieivn msµvš— A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi mKj wnmve-wbKvk, Ki cwi‡kva I †iKW©cÎ †K›`ªxq BDwb‡U msi¶Y K‡ib, Zvnv nBj [ wba©vwiZ kZ© I c×wZ‡Z] wZwb wnmve-wbKvk msi¶‡Yi D³ wVKvbvq GKwU g~mK wbeÜb MÖnY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e:

Z‡e kZ© _v‡K †h, Awfbœ ev mgRvZxq cY¨ ev †mev mieivn Kiv m‡Ë¡I †Kvb BDwbU nB‡Z A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi wnmve-wbKvk, Ki cwi‡kva I †iKW©cÎ ¯^Zš¿fv‡e msi¶Y Kwi‡j Zvnv‡K c„_K wbeÜb MÖnY Kwi‡Z nB‡e [:

AviI kZ© _v‡K †h, †K›`ªxq wbeÜb MÖnY I Ki cwi‡kv‡ai j‡¶¨ †evW© wewagvjv cÖYqb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|]

[(1K) Dc-aviv (1) G hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, aviv 58 Gi Aaxb we‡kl cwiK‡íi Aaxb ZvgvKRvZ cY¨ mieiv‡ni †¶‡Î †K›`ªxq wbeÜb cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e bv]

(2) Dc-aviv (1) G hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, hw` †Kvb e¨w³ `yB ev Z‡ZvwaK ¯ v’ b nB‡Z wfbœ wfbœ cY¨ ev †mev mieivn msµvš— A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv K‡ib Zvnv nB‡j Zvnv‡K cÖwZwU ¯’v‡bi Rb¨ c„_K wbeÜb MÖnY Kwi‡Z nB‡e|

(3) Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb wbewÜZ e¨w³i †K›`ªxq GK BDwbU nB‡Z Aci BDwb‡U cY¨ ev †mevi Av`vb-cÖ`vb ev PjvPj mieivn ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e bv Ges djkª“wZ‡Z Drcv` Ki `vq ev DcKiY Ki †iqvZ D™¢‚Z nB‡e bv|]

g~mK wbeÜb c×wZ

[6|  (1) cÖ‡Z¨K wbeÜb‡hvM¨ e¨w³ wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, g~mK wbe܇bi Rb¨ mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi wbKU Av‡e`b Kwi‡eb|

(2)   mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v, wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, D³ e¨w³‡K wbewÜZ Kwiqv e¨emv mbv³KiY msL¨v msewjZ wbeÜb mb`cÎ cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb|

(3)   Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb †Kvb Av‡e`b wewam¤§Z bv nB‡j mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v, KviY D‡j−Lc~e©K, wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv I c×wZ‡Z, Av‡e`bKvix‡K Dn AewnZ Kwi‡eb|]

wbewÜZ e¨w³e‡M©i ZvwjKv cÖKvk I msi¶Y

7| (1) †evW©, mgq mgq, wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z wbewÜZ e¨w³e‡M©i ZvwjKv cÖYqb Kwiqv Dnv cÖKvk, cÖPvi I msi¶Y Kwi‡e|

(2)  †Kvb e¨w³i bvg cÖKvwkZ ZvwjKvq bv _vwK‡j, D³ e¨w³ wbewÜZ ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e bv|

(3)  †Kvb e¨w³i bvg D³ ZvwjKvq _vwK‡j, D³ e¨w³ GB AvB‡bi Aaxb wbewÜZ ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|

†¯^”Qv g~mK wbeÜb

 [8| (1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ aviv 4 Gi weavb Abyhvqx wbe܇bi Avek¨KZv bv _vKv m‡Ë¡I wbewÜZ nB‡Z B”QzK nb, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb [***] †¯^”Qvq g~mK wbe܇bi Rb¨ mswk−ó g~mK Kg©KZ©vi wbKU, wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(2)   mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v, wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, D³ e¨w³‡K wbewÜZ Kwiqv e¨emv mbv³KiY msL¨v msewjZ wbeÜb mb`cÎ cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb|

(3)   †¯^”Qvq wbewÜZ e¨w³i Dci wbewÜZ Ab¨vb¨ e¨w³i b¨vq GB AvB‡bi mKj weavb cÖwZcvjb eva¨Zvg~jK nB‡e Ges wZwb wbe܇bi ZvwiL nB‡Z Ab¨~b GK ermi AwZµvš— nBevi c~‡e© wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Rb¨ Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z v cwi‡eb bv|]

g~mK wbeÜb evwZj

9| (1) hw` †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³ A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv nB‡Z we Z _v‡Kb, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb, wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, g~mK wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Rb¨ [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(2)  †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³ hvnvi Avi wbewÜZ _vwKevi cÖ‡qvRb bvB, Zvnvi Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn cÖ`vb Ae¨vnZ _vwK‡j, wZwb wba©vwiZ kZ© I c×wZ‡Z [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Rb¨ Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb [ | ]

[***]

(3)   [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v], wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, g~mK wbeÜb evwZj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(4)   hw` †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³ g~mK wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Rb¨ Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb Av‡e`b `vwLj bv K‡ib Ges h_vh_ AbymÜv‡bi ci hw` [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU cÖZxqgvb nq †h, D³ e¨w³i g~mK wbeÜb evwZj‡hvM¨, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb D³ e¨w³‡K g~mK wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Av‡e`bcÎ `vwLj Kwievi wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb Ges D³ wb‡`©k Abyhvqx Av‡e`b Kiv bv nB‡j [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M Z nvi g~mK wbeÜb evwZj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(5)   †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³i g~mK wbeÜb evwZ‡ji ci hw` †`v L hvq †h, wZwb ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ Zvnv nB‡j [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] Av‡e`‡bi wfwˇZ ev ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M Zvnv‡K Uvb©Ifvi Ki`vZv wnmv‡e ZvwjKvfz³ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(6)   †Kvb wbewÜZ e¨w³i g~mK wbeÜb evwZj Kiv nB‡j, wZwb―

(K) AbwZwej‡¤^ Ki PvjvbcÎ, [***] Dr‡m Ki KZ©b mb`cÎ, iwk`, †µwWU †bvU, †WweU †bvU, BZ¨vw` e¨envi ev Bm¨y Kiv nB‡Z weiZ _vwK‡eb; Ges

(L)  wba©vwiZ mg‡qi g‡a¨ g~mK wbeÜb mb`cÎ Ges Dnvi mKj cÖZ¨vwqZ Abywjwc [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU †diZ cÖ`vb Ges e‡Kqv Ki cwi‡kva I P‚ovš— g~mK `vwLjcÎ `vwLj Kwi‡eb|

[(7) †Kvb e¨w³ AbjvB‡b wbeÜb MÖnY Kwievi ci mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v¾

(K)   wbe܇bi Av‡e`‡b Dwj−wLZ e¨w³i wVKvbv, Aw¯—Z¡ I Kvh©µg m‡iRwg‡b cwi`k©bc~e©K Ab¨vb¨ Z_¨vw` hvPvB Kwi‡eb;

(L)    hvPvBqv‡š— e¨w³i wVKvbv ev Aw¯—Z¡ cvIqv bv †M‡j wKsev ¸i“Z¡c~Y© Z_¨vw` AmZ¨ cÖgvwYZ nB‡j mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v e¨w³i wbeÜb evwZ‡ji Rb¨ [wba©vwiZ kZ© I c×wZ‡Z cÖ‡qvRbxq e¨e¯’v MÖnY Kwi‡eb|]

[***]

ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ e¨w³ I ZvwjKvfzw³

10| (1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv Kwiqv 12 gv‡mi †Kvb ˆÎgvwmK †k‡l ZvwjKvfzw³mxgv AwZµg K‡ib wKš‘ hw` wbeÜbmxgv AwZµg bv K‡ib, Zvnv nB‡j D³ e¨w³ ˆÎgvwmK mgq mgvß nBevi 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi g‡a¨, wba©vwiZ kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, Uvb©Ifvi Ki`vZv wnmv‡e ZvwjKvfzw³i Rb¨ [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU Av‡e`b Kwi‡eb|

(2) [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, D³ e¨w³‡K Uvb©Ifvi Ki`vZv wnmv‡e ZvwjKvfz³ Kwiqv e¨emv mbv³KiY msL¨v m¤^wjZ Uvb©Ifvi Ki mb`cÎ cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb|

ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZj

11| (1) cÖ‡Z¨K ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³ wbæewY©Z Kvi‡Y Zvnvi Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZ‡ji Rb¨ [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©vi] wbKU wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb, h_v:―

(K) hw` wZwb A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv eÜ K‡ib;

(L)  hw` Zvnvi A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi Uvb©Ifvi ci ci wZbwU Ki †gqv‡` AvbycvwZK nv‡i ZvwjKvfzw³ mxgvi wb‡æ _v‡K|

(2)  [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©] wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv, kZ© I c×wZ‡Z, D³ e¨w³i ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

(3)  g~mK wbe܇bi Rb¨ `vwLjK…Z Av‡e`b ZvwjKvfzw³ evwj Zi ‡ Av‡e`b wnmv‡e we‡ewPZ nB‡e Ges [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] †h Zvwi‡L g~mK wbeÜb mb`cÎ Bm¨y Kwi‡eb †mB Zvwi‡Li Ae¨ewnZ c~e©eZ©x w`e‡m Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZj nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|

(4)  hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZ‡ji Rb¨ Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb Av‡e`b bv K‡ib, Zvnv nB‡j [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] wba©vwiZ mgqmxgv I c×wZ‡Z, D³ e¨w³i ZvwjKvfzw³ evwZj Kwiqv cÖ‡qvRbxq Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|

[***] ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M wbeÜb‡hvM¨ I ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ e¨w³‡K wbeÜb ev ZvwjKvfzw³KiY

12| [mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] h_vh_ AbymÜv‡bi ci hw` mš ó‘ nb †h, †Kvb e¨w³ g~mK wbeÜb‡hvM¨ ev Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ wKš‘ wZwb wbeÜb ev ZvwjKvfzw³i Rb¨ Av‡e`b K‡ib bvB, Zvnv nB‡j 66[mswk−ó Kg©KZ©v] ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M D³ e¨w³‡K g~mK wbewÜZ ev Uvb©Ifvi Ki ZvwjKvfz³ Kwi‡eb|

mb`cÎ cÖ`k©‡b wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³i `vwqZ¡

13| cÖ‡Z¨K wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³ A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi bw`©ó ¯’v‡b g~mK wbeÜb mb`cÎ ev Uvb©Ifvi Ki mb`cÎ ev Dnvi mZ¨vwqZ Abywjwc Ggbfv‡e cÖ`k©b Kwiqv ivwL‡eb hvnv‡Z Dnv mn‡R `„wó‡MvPi nq|

cwiewZ©Z Z_¨ AewnZKi‡Y wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³i `vwqZ¡

[14|  wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³ A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg mswk−ó wbæewY©Z Z‡_¨i cwieZ©‡bi †¶‡Î, wba©vwiZ mgq I c×wZ‡Z, mswk−ó Kg©KZv ©‡K AewnZ Kwi‡eb, h_vt-

(K)  e¨emv‡qi bvg ev Ab¨ †Kvb evwYwR¨K bvgmn D³ e¨w³i bvg ev e¨emvi aib cwieZ©b;

(L)   D³ e¨w³i wVKvbv ev Ab¨ †Kvb †hvMv‡hv‡Mi Z_¨vw` cwieZ©b;

(M) A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbvi ¯’vb cwieZ©b;

(N)  D³ e¨w³i e¨vsK wnmv‡ei †Kvb Z‡_¨i cwieZ©b;

(O)  D³ e¨w³ KZ©…K cwiPvwjZ GK ev GKvwaK A_©‰bwZK K©µ vh‡gi cÖK…wZ cwieZ©b;

(P)   gvwjKvbvq ev Askx`vwi‡Z¡ cwieZ©b;

(Q)  wba©vwiZ Ab¨ †Kvb cwieZ©b| ]

Z…Zxq Aa¨vq

g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Av‡ivc

g~mK Av‡ivc

15| (1) GB AvB‡bi Ab¨vb¨ weavbvejx mv‡c‡¶, Ki‡hvM¨ Avg`vwb Ges Ki‡hvM¨ mieiv‡ni Dci g~mK Av‡ivwcZ I cÖ‡`q nB‡e|

(2) Ki‡hvM¨ Avg`vwb ev Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn g~‡j¨i mwnZ c D-aviv (3) G Dwj−wLZ g~mK nvi ¸Y Kwiqv cÖ‡`q g~j¨ ms‡hvRb K‡ii cwigvY wbiƒcY I wba©v Y Kwi‡Z nB‡e|

[(3) Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn ev Ki‡hvM¨ Avg`vwbi †¶‡Î g~mK nvi nB‡e 15 kZvsk:

Z‡e, kZ© _v‡K †h, miKvi Rb¯^v‡_© Z…Zxq Zdwm‡j mywbwK `… ©óZ †h †Kvb cY¨ ev †mevi †¶‡Î nªvmK…Z g~m‡Ki nvi wKsev mywbw`©ó cwigvYi   Kwba©viY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e: AviI kZ© _v‡K †h, †Kv‡bv wbewÜZ e¨w³ Z…Zxq Zdwm‡j Y e©Z w nªvmK…Z g~mK nvi wKsev mywbw`©ó K‡ii cwie‡Z© wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z 15 kZvsk nv‡i g~mK cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e| ]

g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki cwi‡kv‡a `vqx e¨w³

16| wbæewY©Z e¨w³‡K g~mK cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z nB‡e, h_v:―

(K) g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Av‡ivc‡hvM¨ Avg`vwbi †¶‡Î: Avg`vbxKviK;

(L)  evsjv‡`‡k Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn cÖ`v‡bi †¶‡Î: mieivnKvix;

(M) Avg`vwbK…Z †mevi Ki‡hvM¨ mieiv‡ni †¶‡Î: mieiM vnÖn xZv; [(N) Ab¨vb¨ †¶‡Î: mieivnKvix ev mieivnMÖnYKvix|]

evsjv‡`‡k cÖ`Ë mieivn

17| (1) aviv 15 Gi D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í wbæewY©Z mieivnmg~n evsjv‡`‡k cÖ`Ë nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e:―

(K) AvevwmK e¨w³ KZ©…K mieivn;

(L)  AbvevwmK e¨w³ KZ©…K evsjv‡`‡ki †Kvb wbw`©ó ¯ v’ b nB‡Z ev Dnvi gva¨‡g A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbvc~e©K cÖ`Ë mieivn;

(M) Dc-aviv (L)-‡Z Dwj−wLZ mieivn e¨ZxZ AbvevwmK e¨w³ KZ©…K cÖ`Ë mieivn, hw` mieivnwU―

(A)   ¯’vei m¤cwËi mieivn nq Ges ¯’vei m¤cwË msµvš— f‚wgi Ae¯’vb evsjv‡`‡k nq;

(Av) c‡Y¨i mieivn nq Ges Dnv evsjv‡`‡k n¯—vš—i , Ac©Y, ¯ v’ b ev ms‡hvRb Kiv nq;

(B) hw` mieivnwU wbæewY©Z †Kvb mieivn nq Ges g~mK AwbewÜZ e¨w³‡K cÖ`vb Kiv nq:―

(K) †mev cÖ`vbKv‡j evsjv‡`‡k Ae¯ v’ b Kwiqv †mev cÖ`vbKvix KvwqKfv‡e evsjv‡`‡k †mev cÖ`vb K‡ib;

(L)  evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ f‚wgi mwnZ mivmwi mswk−ó †mevi mieivn nq;

(M) evsjv‡`‡ki †Kvb wVKvbvq †eZvi I †Uwjwfkb nB‡Z M„nxZ m¤cÖPvi †mev nq;

(N) mieivnKv‡j evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb e¨w³i wbKU B‡j±ªwbK †mev mieivn;

(O) †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM †mev hvnv †Kvb †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM mieivnK ix ev evsjv‡`‡k A¯ v’ qxfv‡e Ae¯ v’ bKvix †Kvb ˆewk¦K ågYKvix (global roaming) e¨ZxZ evsjv‡`‡k Ae¯ v’ biZ †Kvb e¨w³ KZ©…K m~ÎcvZ NUv‡bv nq |

(2)   Dc-aviv (1) Gi `dv (M) Gi Dc-`dv (Av) Gi D‡Ïk¨c~iYK‡í †Kvb AbvevwmK e¨w³ KZ©…K Avg`vwbK…Z cY¨ Af¨š—ixY †fv‡Mi wbwgË Lvjv‡mi c~‡e© mieivn cÖ`vb Kiv nB‡j D³ mieivn evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i cÖ`vb Kiv nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|

(3)   Dc-aviv (1) Gi `dv (M) Gi Dc-`dv (B) Gi Dc-Dc`dv (O) Gi D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í †h e¨w³ †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM †mev cÖ`vb K‡ib wZwb †mB e¨w³―

(K) whwb †mev mieivnKvix KZ©…K wbæiƒ‡c mbv³‡hvM¨ nb―

(A) mieiv‡ni m~Pbv wbqš¿YKvixiƒ‡c;

(Av) †mevi g~j¨ cÖ`vbKvixiƒ‡c;

(B) mieiv‡ni Rb¨ Pzw³Kvixiƒ‡c;

(L) hw` GKvwaK e¨w³ `dv (K) Gi kZ©vejx c~iY K‡ib, Zvnv nB‡j whwb D³ `dvi ZvwjKvq AwaKevi `„k¨gvb nb; Ges

(M) †mevi aib ev cÖKvi ev ZvwjKvfz³ e¨w³M‡Yi ev¯—e Ae¯ v’ b †Kvb Kvi‡Y mieivnKvix KZ©…K mbv³ Kiv m¤¢e bv nB‡j, †mB †¶‡Î D³iƒc †mev ev D³iƒc †kªYxi MÖvn‡Ki wbKU cÖ`Ë †Uwj‡hvMv‡hvM †mevi mKj cÖKvi mieivn, mieivnKvixi wbKU nB‡Z PvjvbcÎ MÖnYKvix MÖvn‡Ki †h cÖK…Z ev eve ¯  —AvevwmK ev evwYwR¨K wVKvbv iwnqv‡Q †mB ¯’v‡b, mieivnwU cÖ`vb Kiv nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|

wbewÜZ mieivnKvix Ges mieivn MÖnxZv

18| aviv 17 G hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, †Kvb wbewÜZ Abvev mK e¨w³ KZ©…K Aci †Kvb wbewÜZ MÖnxZvi wbKU mieivnK…Z †mev evsjv‡`‡kÖ` Ë c nB‡e, hw`―

(K)  mieivnMÖnxZv evsjv‡`‡k †Kvb wbw`©ó ¯ v’ b nB‡Z ev Dnvi gva¨‡g A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv K‡ib; Ges

(L)   mieivnwU D³ A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µ‡gi D‡Ï‡k¨ ev D³ wbw`ó © ¯’v‡b cÖ`vb Kiv nq|

AbvevwmK e¨w³i g~mK G‡R›U

19| (1) †Kvb AbvevwmK e¨w³ evsjv‡`‡ki †Kvb wbw`©ó ¯v’ b nB‡Z A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv bv Kwi‡j, Zvnv‡K GKRb g~mK G‡R›U wb‡qvM Kwi‡Z nB‡e|

[(2) AbvevwmK e¨w³i mKj `vq`vwqZ¡ I Kvh©vejx D³ g~mK G‡R›U cvjb I m¤cv`b Kwi‡eb, Z‡e Av‡ivwcZ Ki, Rwigvbv, `Ê Ges my`mn hveZxq A_© cwi‡kv‡ai Rb¨ AbvevwmK e¨w³ `vqe× _vwK‡eb|]

(3)   g~mK  G‡R›U  KZ©…K  m¤cvw`Z  A_©‰bwZK  Kvh©µ‡gi  wbeÜb  Zvnvi  cÖav‡bi (principal) bv‡g nB‡Z nB‡e|

(4)   †evW©, g~mK G‡R›U wb‡qv‡Mi kZ©, c×wZ I Zvnvi `vq-`vwqZ¡ wba©viY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|

Avg`vwbK…Z †mevi †¶‡Î MÖnxZvi wbKU nB‡( Zr everse charged) Ki Av`vq

20| (1) GB AvB‡b hvnv wKQzB _vKzK bv †Kb, Avg`vwbK…Z†K vb †mev mieivn Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn nB‡e, hw`―

(K) mieivn MÖnxZv GKRb wbewÜZ ev wbeÜb‡hvM¨ e¨w³ nb Ges A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cÖwµqvq D³ †mev AR©b (acquire) K‡ib; Ges

(L)  mieivnwU  wbewÜZ  ev  wbeÜb‡hvM¨  e¨w³  KZ©…K  A_©‰bwZK  Kvh©µg  cÖwµqvq evsjv‡`‡k cÖ`Ë nB‡j―

(A) D³ †mev k~b¨nvi wewkó bv nBqv Ab¨ †Kvb nv‡i Ki‡hvM¨ nq; Ges (Av) mieivnMÖnxZv D³ †mevi Dci Av‡ivwcZ mgy`q g~mK †iqvZcÖvß [***] nb|

(2)  Avg`vwbK…Z †mevi Ki‡hvM¨ mieiv‡ni MÖnxZv KZ©…KÖ‡ ` cq g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki D³ e¨w³i Drcv` Ges DcKiY Dfqwea Ki nB‡e|

(3)  Avg`vwbK…Z †mev mieiv‡ni Kvi‡Y hw` †Kvb mgš^qU b Nv msNwUZ nBqv _v‡K ev nq, Zvnv nB‡j D³iƒc mgš^q msNU‡bi Kvi‡Y D³ †mev GKwU Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn nB‡e Ges D³ †mevi mieivn MÖnxZv †mev mieivnKvix wnmv‡e MY¨ nB‡eb|

(4)  “Avg`vwbK…Z †m” evi msÁv Ges †mevi †¶‡Î GB AvBb cÖ‡qv‡Mi D‡Ïk¨c~iYK‡í, hw` †Kvb wbewÜZ ev wbeÜb‡hvM¨ e¨w³ evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i wbw`©ó †Kvb ¯ v’ b nB‡Z Ges evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i GK ev GKvwaK wbw`©ó ¯ v’ b nB‡Z A_©‰bwZK Kvh©µg cwiPvjbv K‡ib, Z‡e―

(K)  D³ e¨w³‡K evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i Ges evwn‡i cwiPvwjZ Ki‡hvM¨ Kvh©µ‡gi †¶‡Î `yBRb c„_K e¨w³ wnmv‡e MY Kiv nB‡e;

(L)   evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯ Z’ e¨w³ evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨vš—‡i Aew¯ Z’ e¨w³i wbKU

(GB AvB‡bi D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í msÁvwqZ) †mevi cÖK…wZ wew km óyweav m¤^wjZ †mev cÖ`vb Kwiqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ Kiv nB‡e, hvnv evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯ Z’ e¨w³ KZ©…K cwiPvwjZ Kvh©µ‡gi gva¨‡g ev djkª“wZ‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨š—‡i Aew¯ Z’ e¨w³ KZ©…K cÖvß nBqv‡Q;

(M) †mev mieivn Kiv nBqv‡Q Dnv Abygvb Kwiqv mieiv‡ni mgq wba©viY Kiv nB‡e; Ges

(N)  †mev mieivn evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb AbvevwmK e¨w³ KZ©…K evsjv‡`‡k Aew¯ Z’ †Kvb mn‡hvMxi wbKU cÖ`vb Kiv nBqv‡Q Abygvb Kwiqv Dnvi g~j¨ wba©viY Kiv nB‡e|

[(5) GB avivi Ab¨vb¨ Dc-avivmg~‡n wfbœiƒc hvnv wKQ zB_vKzK bv †Kb, cÖ_g Zdwm‡j ewY©Z Ae¨vnwZcÖvß †mevmg~n e¨ZxZ wbewÜZ ev ZvwjKvfz³ b‡nb A_e wbeÜb ev ZvwjKvfzw³‡hvM¨ b‡nb Ggb †Kvb e¨w³ KZ©…K Avg`vwbK…Z †Kvb †mev Ki‡hvM¨ mieivn nB‡e Ges Dnv nB‡Z wbæiƒ‡c g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki Av`vq nB‡e, h_v:-

(K)  mswk−ó †mev Avg`vwbi †¶‡Î †mevg~‡j¨i AvswkK evc ~Y©g~j¨ cwi‡kv‡ai mgq cÖ‡`q mgy`q g~j¨ ms‡hvRb Ki g~j¨ cwi‡kv‡ai gva¨g wnmv‡e e¨eüZ e¨vsK ev Ab¨ †Kvb Avw_©K cÖwZôvb KZ©b Kwi‡e; Ges

(L)   KZ©bKvix e¨vsK ev Ab¨ †Kvb Avw_©K cÖwZôvb †mev Avg`vwbKvi‡Ki c‡¶ †UªRvwi Pvjv‡bi gva¨‡g miKvwi †KvlvMv‡i cwi‡kva Kwiqv Zvnvi `vwLjc‡Î cÖ`k©b Kwi‡e|]

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Ef¢l¢õ¢Ma j§mÉ pw−k¡Se Ll J pÇf§lL öó BCe, 2012 Hl d¡l¡ 4 Ae¤k¡u£ …Nm, ®gCph¤L, CE¢VEh, Cu¡ý, Bj¡Sepq AeÉ¡eÉ C¾V¡l−eV ¢i ¢šL p¡j¡¢SL ®k¡N¡−k¡N j¡dÉj−L j§pL ¢ehåe h¡dÉa¡j§mLz

Ef¢l¢õ¢Ma The Income-Tax Ordinance, 1984 Hl d¡l¡ 75 −j¡a¡−hL …Nm, ®gCph¤L, CE¢VEh, Cu¡ý, Bj¡Sepq AeÉ¡eÉ C¾V¡l−eV ¢i ¢šL p¡j¡¢SL ®k¡N¡−k¡N j¡dÉj BuLl ¢lV¡eÑ c¡¢Mm Ll−a h¡dÉz

j§mÉ pw−k¡Se Ll J pÇf§lL öó BCe, 2012 Hhw The Income-Tax Ordinance, 1984 BCe Ae¤k¡u£ …Nm, ®gCph¤L, CE¢VEh, Cu¡ý, Bj¡Sepq

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AaHh, B−cn qu ®k, Aœ l¦m¢V ¢he¡ MlQ¡u Q¨s¡¿¹ Ll¡ q−m¡z

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l£V ®j¡LŸj¡¢V HL¢V Qmj¡e B−cn (Continuing Mandamus) ¢q−p−h AhÉ¡qa b¡L−hz 

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