

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
HIGH COURT DIVISION
(SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)

Present:

Ms. Justice Fahmida Quader

And

Mr. Justice Md. Ashif Hasan

Writ Petition No. 6819 of 2026

In the matter of:

An Application under Article 102(2)(a)(ii) of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

And

In the matter of:

Md. Roman Bhoyan

.....Petitioner

-Versus-

Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh
Secretariat, Ramna, Dhaka and others

.....Respondents

Mr. M Belayet Hossain, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Mohammad Hossain, Senior Advocate with
Mr. M Mahmudul Hasan, Advocate

...for the petitioner

Mr. Md. Ruhul Quddus (Kazal), Attorney General

Mr. Nur Muhammad Azami, DAG with

Mr. SM Younus Ali Robi, DAG with

Mr. Mohiuddin Md. Hanif, AAG with

Ms. Maria Tanjimath, AAG with

.....for the respondent Nos. 1-3

Mr. Md. Maruf Hasan, Advocate

....for the Respondent No. 4

Heard on: 30.07.2026

Judgment on: 02.09.2026

Fahmida Quader, J.

In this application, filed under Article 102(2)(a)(ii) of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Rule Nisi was
issued in the following terms:-

“Let a Rule Nisi be issued calling upon the Respondents to

show cause as to why the Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং-৫৮.০০.

০০০০.০৪৩.৩২.০০৭.১৭ (অংশ).১৯১ dated 22.08.2024 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs/Respondent No. 3 prescribing mandatory requirement of getting reports from two Intelligence Agencies before issuance of general passports to the persons who revoked and surrendered diplomatic passports so far as that relates to the former Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and their spouses (Annexure: B) and Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং-৪৪.০০.০০০০.০০০.১৩৭.১৮.০০০২.২৪ (অংশ-১). ১৭ dated 21.01.2026 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs/Respondent No. 3 stating that the Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং-৫৮.০০.০০০০.০৪৩.৩২.০০৭.১৭ (অংশ). ১৯১ dated 22.08.2024 would be applicable to the persons who had been appointed during last regime i.e. before 5th August 2024 (Annexure: B1) should not be declared to have been done without lawful authority and is of no legal effect and/or pass such other or further order or orders as to this Court may seem fit and proper.”

The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner is serving as a Protocol Officer of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh since 05.12.2023 and, in such capacity, is entrusted with providing protocol and administrative assistance to the Hon'ble Justices, including matters relating to diplomatic passports, foreign travel, visas and liason with concerned Government Authorities. This instant writ petition has been filed with

permission of the Registrar General of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

The Hon'ble Justices of the Supreme Court and their spouses are entitled to diplomatic passports by virtue of the Warrant of Precedence. Upon retirement, such diplomatic passports are required to be surrendered and the former justices thereafter apply for ordinary passport. Previously, issuance of such ordinary passport was not subject to obtaining reports from intelligence agencies.

On 22.08.2024, Respondent No. 3, the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, issued the impugned Memorandum, prescribing, inter alia, that persons surrendering diplomatic passports would be required to obtain satisfactory reports from two intelligence agencies before issuance of ordinary passports. Subsequently, by another Memorandum dated 21.01.2026, it was clarified that the aforesaid requirement would apply to persons appointed during the previous regime, i.e., before 05.08.2024.

By a separate Memorandum dated 18.02.2025, the Government relaxed the verification requirement for issuance of ordinary passports generally. Nevertheless, the requirement of reports from two intelligence agencies under the impugned Memorandum continued to be applied to former Justices of the Supreme Court who had surrendered their diplomatic passports.

The grievance, particularly arose in the case of Mr. Justice Mohammad Iman Ali, a former Judge of the Appellate Division, who retired in December 2022. After expiry and surrender of his diplomatic passport, he applied for an ordinary passport on 03.11.2024, with a tentative delivery date of 13.11.2024. However, the passport has not been delivered on the ground that satisfactory reports from the two intelligence agencies have not been received. Consequently, despite a lapse of a considerable period, he remains without an ordinary passport and is thereby unable to travel abroad.

The impugned requirement has similarly created obstacles for other retiring and former justices of the Supreme Court. Subjecting former constitutional functionaries to such intelligence verification, particularly when the general verification requirement has otherwise been relaxed, is arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and inconsistent with their constitutional rights. A passport is not merely a travel document but an important document evidencing the identity and nationality of a citizen, and its issuance cannot be withheld indefinitely on the basis of an arbitrary administrative condition.

Being aggrieved by the Memorandum dated 22.08.2024, in so far as it requires reports from two intelligence agencies before issuance of ordinary passports to former justices of the Supreme Court who have surrendered their diplomatic passports and finding no other equally efficacious remedy, the petitioner has invoked the

writ jurisdiction of this Court seeking a declaration that the impugned requirement is without lawful authority and of no legal effect, along with appropriate consequential relief.

Mr. Mohammad Hossain, Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. M Mahmudul Hasan, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the impugned Memorandum dated 22.08.2024, requiring reports from two intelligence agencies before issuance of ordinary passports to former Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and their spouses upon surrender of their diplomatic passports, is arbitrary, discriminatory and without lawful authority. He contends that such requirement is particularly unreasonable when the Government, by Memorandum dated 18.02.2025, has already relaxed the verification requirement for issuance of ordinary passports to the general public.

He further submits that former justices, having discharged constitutional functions, cannot reasonably be placed on the same footing as political functionaries or other holders of diplomatic passports. Subjecting them to prolonged intelligence verification is derogatory to the dignity of the constitutional office they held and offends the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Referring to the case of Mr. Justice Mohammed Iman Ali, learned Advocate submits that despite surrendering his diplomatic passport and applying for an ordinary passport on 03.11.2024, the same has remained undelivered for a considerable period solely for

want of satisfactory intelligence reports, thereby restricting his ability to travel abroad. He submits that a passport is an important document of identity and nationality and cannot be withheld indefinitely on the basis of an arbitrary administrative requirement.

Learned Advocate accordingly submits that the impugned Memorandum dated 22.08.2024 and 21.01.2026, in so far as they impose such requirement upon former Judges of the Supreme Court and their spouses, are liable to be declared to have been issued without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect, with a direction upon the concerned respondents to issue and deliver their ordinary passports without further delay.

We have heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned Deputy Attorney General appearing for the respondents, perused the writ petition, the supplementary/additional submissions, the Annexures appended thereto, including the impugned memorandums and considered the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions as well as the decisions relied upon by the petitioners.

At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that none of the respondents has filed any affidavit-in-opposition controverting the material statements annexed thereto. The learned Deputy Attorney General has, however, opposed the Rule on questions of law and sought to justify the impugned action on the basis of the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973 and the requirement of

reports/clearance from the concerned intelligence agencies. In the absence of any affidavit-in-opposition, there is no sworn factual denial of the material facts asserted by the petitioner. Nevertheless, since the Rule involves the exercise of statutory power and fundamental right to freedom of movement, we propose to determine the matter on its merits upon the materials available on record.

Locus Standi of the Petitioner

As regards the locus standi of the petitioner, we find that the petitioner is a Protocol Officer of the High Court of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and has been serving in that capacity since 05.12.2023 (Annexure-A). He, being the Protocol Officer, has instituted the instant writ petition with the permission of competent authority, the Registrar General of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in relation to the non-issuance of ordinary passports to the concerned former Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and their spouses after surrender of their diplomatic passports. The subject-matter of the writ petition is thus directly connected with the petitioner's official responsibility concerning the facilitation and processing of such matters on behalf of the former learned judges and impugned communications were made and dealt with in that official capacity. In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot be regarded as a mere stranger or busybody having no nexus with the cause complained of. Rather, he possesses a sufficient and genuine

interest in seeking judicial review of the impugned actions affecting the discharge of his official functions and the legal rights of the persons concerned.

Moreover, the expression “person aggrieved” under Article 102 of the Constitution is to be construed in the context of the right involved and the circumstances of each case and not in an unduly narrow or technical manner. We are, therefore, satisfied that the petitioner has sufficient locus standi to maintain the instant writ petition and any objection as to its maintainability on that ground is without substance.

Background and the impugned action:

The writ petition has been instituted concerning issuance of ordinary passports to former Hon'ble judges of the Supreme Court, including Mr. Justice Mohammad Iman Ali, a former Judge of the Appellate Division.

The materials disclose that after retirement, Mr. Justice Mohammad Iman Ali surrendered his diplomatic passport and on 03.11.2024, applied for an ordinary passport in the prescribed manner. Despite completion of the requisite formalities and issuance of the relevant delivery/ collection document, the passport was not delivered. The respondents sought to justify the withholding of the passport on the ground that satisfactory reports/ clearance from two intelligence agencies had not been received.

The record further contains the impugned memo, inter alia, dated 22.08.2024, 18.02.2025 and 21.01.2026 (Annexures-'B', 'B-1' and 'C'), concerning the requirement of intelligence verification/clearance in connection with issuance of ordinary passports. The legality of subjecting the concerned former learned Judges to such an additional requirement and thereby withholding their passports constitutes the principal question for determination.

The question, therefore, is not whether the passport authority possesses statutory power to inquire into an application. Undoubtedly it does. The real question is whether an otherwise eligible citizen, who does not fall within any statutory ground of refusal, may indefinitely be denied or kept waiting for a passport merely because an executive or administrative arrangement requires intelligence clearance which has not been furnished.

In our view, the answers must be in the negative.

Constitutional protection under Article 31, 32 and 36.

Article 36 of the Constitution expressly guarantees freedom of movement in the following terms:

“Subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh.”

Thus, unlike a mere administrative privilege, the right to leave and re-enter Bangladesh is expressly incorporated within the catalogue of fundamental rights. Any restriction upon that right must satisfy two essential requirements: first, it must be imposed by law; and secondly, it must constitute a reasonable restriction in the public interest. The official text confirms that formulation.

The first and foremost consideration which, in our view, distinguishes the present case is the constitutional status previously held by the persons concerned. A judge of the Supreme Court does not hold an ordinary public employment. The office is created and protected by the Constitution itself and constitutes an integral part of one of the three principal organs of the Republic. Appointment to such office carries with it the highest degree of constitutional responsibility and public trust. The State cannot, therefore, ignore this status altogether when considering whether immediately following retirement and surrender of a diplomatic passport, the same person should again be subjected to routine intelligence scrutiny as though his identity, antecedents and status were being examined by the State for the first time.

It is not disputed before us that during their tenure the concerned learned Judges and their spouses were entitled to and were issued diplomatic passports. Such passports were not self-issued documents. They were issued by the competent authorities of the Republic after completion of the governmental process

applicable to persons holding such high constitutional office. The State and its concerned agencies had, therefore, already dealt with and verified the identity and status of those persons before extending to them the privilege of diplomatic passports.

The significance of this circumstances cannot be overlooked. A person who was considered by the State fit to hold a diplomatic passport while serving as a judge of the Supreme Court does not, merely by reason of retirement/ resignation, acquire a different identity or suddenly become a person whose antecedents must again be established before he can receive an ordinary passport. Retirement/ resignation terminates the entitlement to a diplomatic passport; it does not erase the State's previous verification of the person concerned.

In the case before us, the diplomatic passport was duly surrendered after retirement/ resignation. What was thereafter sought was not another diplomatic privilege but an ordinary passport available to an otherwise eligible citizen. We are unable to discern any reasonable nexus between the surrender of the diplomatic passport upon retirement/ resignation and the insistence upon an entirely fresh intelligence clearance as a condition precedent to issuance of an ordinary passport, particularly in the absence of any subsequent adverse circumstances relating to the applicant.

Had any specific adverse material arisen after the earlier verification, or had any circumstances contemplated by Article 6 of the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973 existed, the matter might have stood on a different footing. No such case has been pleaded before us. No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed stating that any of the concerned former learned Judges has subsequently incurred a statutory disqualification. Nor has any adverse report, criminal proceeding, order prohibiting departure, security concern or other statutory ground been placed before this Court.

The respondents cannot, therefore, rely upon the abstract possibility of intelligence verification to justify an indefinite deprivation of the passport of a person whose antecedents had previously been examined by the State and in whose favour a diplomatic passport had been issued.

The matter assumes greater constitutional significance when Article 36 of the Constitution is considered. It guarantees that, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen has the right –

- “to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh.”

Thus, the right to leave and re-enter Bangladesh is itself a constitutionally protected fundamental right. Any restriction thereon must consequently satisfy the constitutional requirements

that it be imposed by law, that it be reasonable and that it serve the public interest.

Article 5(2) of the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973 the passport authority, upon receipt of an application and after making such inquiry as it considers necessary, to deal with the application subject to the provisions of the Order. The power of inquiry is therefore ancillary to the statutory power of deciding the application, it cannot itself be converted into a substantive and indefinite ground for withholding a passport.

Article 6 is particularly important. Article 6(1) specifies circumstances in which the passport authority "may refuse" to issue a passport or travel document, while Article 6(2) identifies circumstances in which it "shall refuse" to do so. Article 6(1)(e), for example, deals with an applicant who -

“is evading or likely to evade appearance in any pending proceedings against him in a criminal court in Bangladesh [against whom] an order prohibiting the departure from Bangladesh... has been made by any such court.”

Likewise, Article 6(2) deals, inter alia, with circumstances where the Government forms the requisite opinion regarding activities prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity or security of Bangladesh, evasion of a statutory public service, or where issuance of a passport would not be in the public interest.

These provisions demonstrate that the legislature itself has prescribed the circumstances in which a citizen's access to a passport may lawfully be curtailed. Non-receipt of a report from an intelligence agency is not, by itself, one of those statutory grounds.

Effect of the impugned memorandum:

We have carefully examined the effect of the impugned memorandum dated 22.08.2024 (Annexure-B), 18.02.2025 (Annexure-C) and 21.01.2026 (Annexure-B1). The memorandum dated 22.08.2024 introduced the requirement of satisfactory reports from two intelligence agencies; the subsequent memorandum dated 18.02.2025 generally relaxed the verification requirement; while the memorandum dated 21.01.2026 clarified the application of the earlier requirement in respect of persons appointed before 05.08.2024.

Administrative instructions may undoubtedly prescribe a procedure to assist the passport authority. But an executive memorandum cannot create a substantive disqualification which the parent law itself does not contemplate. Nor can such memorandum be applied mechanically without regard to the status and particular circumstances of the applicant so as to produce an arbitrary or unreasonable result.

In the present case, the irrationality becomes particularly apparent. The same State which, after the requisite process, issued diplomatic passports to the concerned Hon'ble Judges while they

occupied constitutional offices now refuses or delays ordinary passports after their retirement/ resignation merely because the intelligence agencies have not again furnished satisfactory reports. No explanation has been offered as to why the earlier verification suddenly became insufficient upon retirement/ resignation, or what intervening circumstances made fresh scrutiny necessary.

The learned Deputy Attorney General has opposed the Rule, but no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed explaining this anomaly. A submission from the Bar cannot take the place of facts required to establish a lawful basis for interference with a fundamental right. If there existed any specific adverse material warranting fresh verification of any particular former Judges, it was open to the respondents to disclose the legal basis thereof before this Court. They have not done so.

We are therefore unable to accept that a blanket administration requirement can justify treating every former Judges, upon surrender of his diplomatic passport, as requiring fresh intelligence clearance irrespective of his previous verification and irrespective of the absence of any subsequent adverse material.

Dignity of Constitutional office and protection against arbitrary treatment:

We must also observe that this case is not connected with granting any special immunity to a former Justices from the operation of law. A former Judge of the Supreme Court, like every

other citizen, remains subject to the law, including the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973. If any statutory ground under Article 6 exists against a former judge, the passport authority is fully empowered — and, where the statute so required, bound to act upon it.

But equality before law does not mean mechanical treatment divorced from relevant circumstances. Previous verification by the State, previous possession of a diplomatic passport, the constitutional office held by the applicant, surrender of that passport upon retirement, absence of any intervening adverse material and the absence of any statutory disqualification are all relevant circumstances which a lawful and reasonable administrative decision cannot simply disregard.

Subjecting former Judges of the Supreme Court to repeated intelligence verification without any disclosed cause, after the State itself had already found them fit to receive diplomatic passports, serves no demonstrated statutory purpose. Rather, in the circumstances before us, it operates as unnecessary harassment and an unreasonable impediment to the enjoyment of a fundamental right.

The dignity attached to constitutional office does not cease to have all relevance on the date of retirement/ resignation. Persons who have discharged constitutional judicial functions are certainly

not above scrutiny where the law requires it; equally they ought not to be subjected to repetitive and unexplained administrative scrutiny merely because an executive instruction mechanically demands it.

Applicable authorities:

Our conclusion receives support from the decisions placed before us. In *Md. Sharafat Ali v. Government of Bangladesh and others*, 65 DLR (HCD) 201, this Division, while considering the withholding of passport, emphasized that the right to travel abroad is an important component of personal liberty and that restriction thereon must be supported by law. The Court ultimately held that the passport authority could not indefinitely withhold the passport without due process of law.

Similarly, in *Tariqul Islam v. Bangladesh and others*, 68 DLR (2016) 150, this Division considered the constitutional protection under Article 36 together with the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973 and found that mere pendency of criminal cases did not automatically disqualify a person from receiving a passport unless the circumstances contemplated by the statutory provisions existed. The judgment reiterated the observation made in *Syed Mokbul Hossain v. Bangladesh*, 44 DLR 39:

“The passport is more than a property to a citizen because without passport one can't move an inch whenever he is outside the country.”

The principle is important not only for rhetoric of expression but for the legal proposition underlying it; a passport is the practical means by which the constitutional freedom to leave and re-enter the country is exercised and, therefore, cannot be withheld arbitrarily.

The authorities placed before us further recognize that a passport is an important document of identity and prima facie evidence of nationality, although, as held in *Bangladesh vs. Professor Golam Azam*, 46 DLR(AD)(1994) 192, possession of a passport does not by itself confer citizenship nor constitute conclusive evidence thereof. That distinction does not weaken the petitioner's case; rather it reinforces the proposition that the passport is a statutory travel and identity document whose issuance or withholding must be governed by law.

We find from the record that Mr. Justice Mohammad Imman Ali, a former Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, retired from his constitutional office in December 2022 and, upon retirement, duly surrendered his diplomatic passport bearing No. D00011645. Thereafter, on 03.11.2024 he applied for an ordinary passport upon complying with the prescribed formalities and was given 13.11.2024 as the tentative

date of delivery. The passport, however, was not delivered on the ground that satisfactory reports from two intelligence agencies had not been received. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has particularly emphasized that Mr. Justice Imman Ali had served as a Judge of the highest Court of the Republic and during his tenure in such constitutional office, his antecedents and relevant particulars had already been subjected to the requisite governmental scrutiny before issuance of this diplomatic passport. Nothing has been placed before us to suggest that, subsequent to such verification or after his retirement, any adverse circumstances arose against him attracting any of the grounds enumerated in Article 6 of the Bangladesh Passport order, 1973. In such circumstances, after accepting the surrender of his diplomatic passport, requiring him to undergo a fresh and repetitive intelligence verification merely for obtaining an ordinary passport, without disclosing any specific legal necessity or adverse material, appears to us wholly unreasonable and devoid of any rational justification. A former Judge of the Appellate Division cannot, merely upon retirement, be treated as if his identity and antecedents were altogether unknown to the State. In the absence of any statutory disqualification, withholding his ordinary passport solely for want of fresh intelligence reports amounts to an arbitrary and unnecessary impediment to the exercise of his fundamental right to leave and re-

enter Bangladesh guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution and cannot be sustained in law.

Taking the cumulative circumstances into consideration, we find that:-

1. the concerned persons held the constitutional office of Judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh;
2. during their tenure they had been issued diplomatic passports upon completion of the requisite governmental process;
3. their identity and antecedents had then already been subjected to scrutiny by the competent State authorities;
4. after retirement/ resignation they duly surrendered those diplomatic passports and applied for ordinary passports;
5. in the case of Mr. Justice Imman Ali, the application for an ordinary passport was made on 3.11.2024 after surrender of diplomatic passport No. D00011645, yet issuance was withheld for want of reports from two intelligence agencies;
6. no subsequent adverse circumstances or statutory disqualification under Article 6 of the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973 has been disclosed;
7. no order of any competent Court prohibiting departure has been placed before us;
8. none of the respondents has filed an affidavit-in-opposition explaining the necessity or legal justification for subjecting

the concerned former learned Judges to repeated intelligence verification; and

9. the impugned administrative memos cannot override Article 27, 31, 32 and 36 of the Constitution or enlarge the grounds of refusal prescribed by the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973.

In these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that requiring fresh intelligence clearance as an inflexible pre-condition for issuance of ordinary passports to the concerned former Judges and their spouses after they had already undergone the requisite scrutiny and had been issued diplomatic passports during their tenure, without any subsequent adverse material or statutory disqualification, is arbitrary, unreasonable, without lawful jurisdiction and disproportionate to any legitimate object sought to be achieved. Such action unnecessarily exposes former holders of high constitutional office to repeated administrative scrutiny and harassment and places an unjustified impediment upon the exercise of their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution.

We hasten to add that our conclusion does not confer upon any serving or former Judges an exemption from the Bangladesh Passport Order, 1973. Where a statutory ground contemplated by Article 6 actually exists, the competent authority shall act strictly in accordance with law. What cannot be sustained is a blanket,

repetitive intelligence-verification requirement unsupported by any individualized statutory ground, particularly where the State had previously verified the person concerned and issued him a diplomatic passport.

Accordingly, we find merit in the submissions of the learned Advocate for petitioner and substance in the Rule.

In the result, the rule is made absolute.

The the Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং-৫৮.০০. ০০০০.০৪৩.৩২. ০০৭.১৭ (অংশ).১৯১ dated 22.08.2024 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs/Respondent No. 3 prescribing mandatory requirement of getting reports from two Intelligence Agencies before issuance of general passports to the persons who revoked and surrendered diplomatic passports so far as that relates to the former Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and their spouses (Annexure: B) and Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং- ৪৪.০০.০০০০.০০০.১৩৭.১৮.০০০২.২৪ (অংশ-১). ১৭ dated 21.01.2026 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs/Respondent No. 3 stating that the Memorandum bearing স্মারক নং-৫৮.০০.০০০০.০৪৩.৩২.০০৭.১৭ (অংশ). ১৯১ dated 22.08.2024 would be applicable to the persons who had been appointed during

last regime i.e. before 5th August 2024 (Annexure: B1) are declared to have been issued without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

The respondents concerned are accordingly directed to issue and deliver the ordinary passports to the concerned former Hon'ble Judges and their spouses, including Mr. Justice Mohammad Imman Ali, without subjecting them to repetitive intelligence verification solely on account of the impugned administrative instructions. The respondents, particularly respondent no 4, is further directed to complete the necessary formalities and issue/deliver the passports within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Communicate the judgment and order at once.

Md. Ashif Hasan, J.

I agree.